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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  need  to  deal  adequately  with  uncertainty  in  environmental 
decision  making.  The  research  is  based  on  the  premise  that  uncertainty  is  a  key  issue  which 
must  be  addressed,  if  sustainability  objectives  are  to  met  at  a  project  or  policy  level.  Using  an 
alternative  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty,  it  is  contended  that  there  are  a  number  of  different 
modes  of  uncertainty  and  that  many  environmental  decisions  are  largely  characterised  by 
what  is  termed  'hard  uncertainty,  in  which  the  set  of  possible  actions  or  future  states  is 
unknown  or  where  the  probability  distribution  for  such  outcomes  is  unknown  or  not  fully 
definable.  The  presence  of  hard  uncertainty  radically  alters  the  way  in  which  environmental 
uncertainty  can  be  dealt  with  at  both  an  epistemological  and  a  practical  level  and  poses  a 
number  of  problems  for  traditional  decision-making  frameworks  based  on  probability. 
Consequently,  a  critique  is  advanced  of  the  use  of  traditional  models,  such  as  expected  utility, 
in  environmental  decision  making  and  it  is  argued  that  there  is  a  need  to  evaluate  decision- 
making  models  in  relation  to  the  rationality  of  the  way  that  decisions  are  made.  Building  on 
this,  an  alternative  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  derived  from  the  work  of 
George  Shackle  is  outlined  and  applied  to  environmental  decision  making.  The  model  is 
operationalised  in  terms  of  both  explaining  the  way  that  decisions  are  and  should  be  made, 
and  applied  to  a  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project. 
Specifically  quantitative  and  qualitative  evidence  was  derived  from  a  series  of  interviews  with 
decision  makers  in  the  Government  of  Belize,  the  Inter  American  Development  Bank,  the 
Department  of  Foreign  and  International  Development  (DFID)  and  the  World  Bank.  The 
relevance  of  the  Shackle  model  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is 
evaluated  within  the  decision  making  process  is  demonstrated,  and  data  which  suggest  that 
the  behaviour  of  individual  decision  makers  is  broadly  consistent  with  the  key  propositions  of 
the  model,  in  relation  to  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  and  sifting  of  outcomes,  is  presented.  At 
an  institutional  level  however,  it  is  argued  that  although  a  sifting  out  of  the  possible  outcomes 
of  a  project  or  policy  does  occur,  hard  uncertainty  is  often  not  explicitly  recognised  in  the 
decision-making  process.  Consequently,  a  normative  framework  for  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making,  is  advanced  as  a  means  of  ensuring  that  hard 
uncertainty  is  explicitly  considered  in  the  decision-making  process. Contents 
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCTION:  DEALING  WITH  UNCERTAINTY  IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL  DECISION  MAKING 
1.1  Introduction  to  the  problem  of  environmental  uncertainty. 
"On  the  whole,  men  are  more  good  than  bad,  that  however  isn't  the  real  point.  But  they  are 
more  or  less  ignorant,  and  it  is  this  that  we  call  vice  or  virtue;  the  most  incorTigible  vice  being 
that  of  an  ignorance  that  fancies  it  knows  everything  and  therefore  claims  for  itself  the  right  to 
kill'.  Albert  Camus,  The  Plague 
At  the  core  of  this  thesis  is  the  assertion  that  many  decisions  surrounding  the  environment  are 
conditioned  by  the  presence  of  uncertainty.  The  recognition  that  that  there  are  a  number  of 
different  modes  of  uncertainty  radically  alters  the  way  in  which  environmental  uncertainty  can 
be  dealt  with  both  at  a  epistemological  and  practical  level,  and  necessitates  an  alternative 
approach  to  that  encompassed  by  traditional  probability  based  models.  However,  while  there 
is  an  extensive  literature  on  probability  based  models  of  risk  in  decision  making,  (Perrings,  et 
al,  1995)  the  literature  with  regards  to  dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty  and  in  particular 
to  what  will  be  termed  'hard  uncertainty"  in  decision  making  is  rather  limited.  It  is  this  issue  of 
dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty  in  decision  making  that  provides  the  impetus  for  the 
research  carried  out  and  presented  in  this  thesis. 
The  uncertainty  that  decision  makers  are  faced  with  in  many  environmental  problems  is 
derived  from  three  main  sources.  Firstly,  uncertainty  exists  about  the  resilience  of 
ecosystems  and  the  consequences  of  human  induced  change  to  ecosystems,  particularly 
when  the  action  could  result  in  a  ecosystem  threshold  being  exceeded.  Secondly,  uncertainty 
is  often  present  with  regard  to  the  value  of  those  changes.  The  third  source  stems  from 
uncertainty  as  to  future  supply  of  vital  ecosystem  functions  and  services  that  may  be  of 
unanticipated  importance  in  terms  of  human  welfare.  The  prevalence  of  uncertainty  in 
environmental  problems,  raises  questions  about  how  uncertainty  is  and  should  be  evaluated 
in  the  decision-making  process. 
'  Hard  uncertainti,  can  be  defined  at  this  stage  in  terms  of  situations  in  which  a)  The  set  of  possible  actions  I IP 
or  future  states  is  unknown  or  b)  Where  an  exhaustive  set  of  future  states  can  be  specified,  the  probability 
distribution  for  such  outcomes  are  unknown  or  not  fully  definable.  A  more  comprehensive  definition  of  hard 
uncertainty  and  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  is  left  till  chapter  3. Chapter  1:  Introduction 
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While  current  models  can  claim  some  virtues  in  dealing  with  risk  or  what  will  be  termed  soft 
uncertainty2'  it  is  argued  that  they  are  limited  in  terms  of  their  applications  to  hard  uncertainty 
problems  of  the  sort  often  encountered  on  a  regular  basis  in  environmental  decisions.  A 
central  hypothesis  of  this  thesis  is  therefore,  that  decision  models  based  on  risk  or  soft 
uncertainty  and  in  particular  the  notion  of  probability  cannot  be  expected  to  deal  either 
adequately  or  explicitly  with  issues  of  environmental  uncertainty  such  as  biodiversity  loss. 
Given  the  need  for  an  alternative  and  novel  decision-making  framework  for  dealing  with 
environmental  uncertainty,  the  Shackle  model  will  be  proposed  and  interpreted  in  the  context 
of  environmental  uncertainty.  The  question  of  whether  this  model  is  useful  in  explaining  the 
way  that  decisions  are  made  under  environmental  uncertainty  will  be  addressed.  In  addition  a 
key  element  of  the  research  aims  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  Shackle  model  can  be 
adapted  to  serve  as  a  decision  -  making  framework  which  allows  explicit  attention  to  be  given 
to  uncertainty. 
The  research  therefore  aims  to  provide  a  contribution  in  five  main  areas.  Firstly,  an  important 
step  will  be  in  developing  criteria  on  which  the  nature  and  the  different  modalities  of 
environmental  uncertainty  can  be  defined  and  on  which  the  implications  of  the  different  levels 
of  uncertainty  in  terms  of  decision  making  can  be  assessed.  Secondly,  on  the  basis  of  these 
criteria  traditional  models  for  dealing  with  risk  will  be  critically  assessed  in  terms  of  their 
suitability  for  dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty.  Thirdly,  an  alternative  model  for  dealing 
with  uncertainty  based  on  the  work  of  George  Shackle  will  be  interpreted  and  applied  in 
relation  to  environmental  uncertainty  and  fourthly  the  practical  application,  of  a  model  that  will 
aid  decision  makers  to  adequately  deal  with  uncertainty  will  be  advanced. 
The  final  contribution  centres  on  a  reassessment  of  how  we  rationalise  decision  making  when 
faced  with  the  realities  of  uncertainty.  The  interpretation  of  the  resulting  model  of  uncertainty 
necessitates  a  departure  from  the  use  of  the  traditional  criteria  used  to  assess  decision  rules 
in  terms  of  their  rationality.  Consequently  models  of  environmental  uncertainty  need  to  be 
assessed  more  in  terms  of  their  procedural  rationality  and  their  application  at  the  ex  ante 
stage  of  decision  making  rather  than  purely  in  terms  of  their  optimality  or  usefulness  in 
providing  ex  post  explanations  of  human  behaviour  in  decision  making. 
Soft  uncertainty  or  risk  is  used  to  define  situations  where  1)  the  set  of  all  possible  outcomes  of  an  action  are 
known  and  2)  the  probabi  lity  distribution  of  all  possible  outcomes  is  also  known  (see  section  33.2.1). Chapter  1:  Introduction  4 
In  attempting  to  deal  with  the  realities  of  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making,  a 
practical  as  well  as  theoretical  approach  has  been  employed.  It  was  this  reason  that 
motivated  the  use  of  a  case  study  to  apply  the  Shackle  model  of  decision  making  in  a  real 
world  experiment.  The  fieldwork  and  subsequent  data  that  were  collected  focused  on  the  way 
that  uncertainty  about  the  environmental  effects  of  development  projects  was  dealt  with  by  a 
developing  country,  Belize  and  by  the  Inter  American  Development  Bank.  The  interviews 
conducted  allowed  the  practical  application  of  an  alternative  model  of  uncertainty,  as  well  as 
providing  valuable  observations  on  the  more  general  nature  of  dealing  with  uncertainty  in 
Development  agencies  such  as  the  Inter-  American  Development  Bank,  the  British 
Development  Division  in  the  Caribbean  and  the  World  Bank.  The  quantitative  and  qualitative 
data  collected  have  also  provided  a  useful  insight  into  questions  surrounding  whether  or  not 
the  Shackle  model  is  useful  in  explaining  the  way  that  decision  makers  deal  with  uncertainty. 
To  the  author's  knowledge  this  is  the  first  major  application  of  the  Shackle  model  in  the 
context  of  environmental  uncertainty3and  is  the  first  application  to  a  real  world  decision  rather 
than  in  laboratory  experiment. 
Before  dealing  with  the  problem  of  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making  however,  it  is 
necessary  to  outline  the  research  framework  that  is  chosen,  what  such  a  framework  implies 
and  the  theoretical  issues  that  will  need  to  be  addressed.  Consequently  the  rest  of  this 
chapter  will  be  concerned  with  positioning  this  research  within  the  overall  context  of 
sustainable  development  and  biodiversity.  The  first  part  of  the  chapter  will  be  concerned  with 
some  of  the  theoretical  issues  that  sustainability  and  biodiversity  pose  for  this  research.  After 
a  brief  outline  of  some  of  the  origins  and  the  main  issues  posed  by  sustainability,  the  notion  of 
the  interconnectedness  between  the  ecological  and  economic  systems  will  be  highlighted. 
Having  a  greater  understanding  of  key  characteristics  of  this  system  is  important  in  the  debate 
regarding  the  form  of  sustainability  advocated,  and  in  particular  in  emphasising  the  difficulty  in 
assuming  the  substitutability  of  natural  and  other  forms  of  capital.  The  key  issue  of  the 
uncertainty  raised  due  to  the  public  good  nature  of  many  environmental  services  will  also  be 
reviewed  and  the  problem  of  irreversibility  and  the  appropriateness  of  equilibrium  analysis 
tackled.  The  implications  of  the  precautionary  principle  in  the  context  of  sustainable 
development  will  be  briefly  considered,  before  a  framework  for  research  is  outlined  and  the 
main  hypotheses  to  be  addressed  are  formulated. 
The  only  exception  was  its  use  by  Perrings,  (1989)  in  a  theoretical  paper,  see  chapter  3 Chapter  1:  Introduction  5 
1.2  Introduction:  Sustainable  development 
The  problem  of  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making  stems  from  growing  concerns 
about  the  impact  of  human  activity  on  the  environment,  encapsulated  in  the  ever  growing 
discourse  on  sustainable  development.  The  significance  of  this  debate  for  the  research  is  that 
it  makes  the  issue  of  dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty  in  decision  making  imperative 
and  it  is  within  the  context  of  meeting  sustainability  objectives  that  the  problem  of 
environmental  uncertainty  will  be  addressed.  Understandably  the  complexity  of  the 
relationship  between  humans  and  their  environment  has  produced  a  wide  set  of 
interpretations  of  sustainability,  all  with  a  number  of  either  implicit  or  explicit  implications  that 
merit  careful  consideration.  However  sustainability  is  defined,  it  will  inevitably  involve  making 
trade-offs  between  a  number  of  concerns,  which  are  often  competing.  It  is  the  making  of  the 
trade-offs  and  the  role  that  uncertainty  plays  in  some  of  the  main  concerns  of  sustainability 
that  forms  the  focus  of  this  chapter. 
1.2.1  The  research  context:  Sustainable  development  and  biodiversity 
With  the  publication  of  the  Bruntland  Report  in  the  1980's  the  sustainability  discourse  came  to 
the  fore  of  the  world  political  agenda  (  Common,  1995).  The  report  tried  to  reconcile  some  of 
the  earlier  development  failures  based  purely  on  economic  growth  with  a  development 
paradigm  in  which  social  and  inter-generational  objectives  were  recognised  as  distinct  and 
given  equal  weight  to  economic  efficiency  and  in  which  the  long  -  term  degradation  of  the 
environment  was  seen  as  a  barrier  to  development  (Munasinghe,  1993b).  Thus,  according  to 
the  Repore: 
"Sustainable  Development  seeks  to  meet  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  the  present  without 
compromising  the  ability  to  meet  those  of  the  future"  (WCED.  1987). 
Inherent  in  the  concept  of  sustainable  development  is  therefore  an  ethical  condition  that  future 
generations  have  a  right  to  be  passed  on  the  capacity  to  generate  for  themselves  a  level  of 
well-being  no  less  than  that  enjoyed  by  the  current  generation  (Barbier  et  al,  1995).  Another 
important  issue  is  whether  at  present  rates  of  consumption  it  is  indeed  possible  for  economic 
growth  and  sustainability  to  go  hand  in  hand.  For  Herman  Daly  it  is  crucial  to  distinguish 
between  development  in  terms  of  qualitative  change  and  growth  which  is  defined  purely  in 
4  The  report  is  officially  titled  Our  Common  Future  (World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development 
1987)  but  derived  its  popular  title  from  the  name  of  the  chairman  of  the  Commission,  Gro  Harlem Bruntland. Chapter  1:  Introduction  6 
quantitative  terms  (Daly  &  Cobb  1989).  What  is  most  important  is  that  the  sustainable 
development  debate  represents  an  attempt  to  focus  on  the  nature  and  type  of  economic 
growth  that  would  be  compatible  with  sustainable  development  and  on  how  traditional 
development  objectives  could  be  reconciled  with  concerns  for  environmental  quality  and  inter 
temporal  equity. 
The  promotion  of  environmental  concerns  in  the  sustainable  development  discourse  is  itself 
perhaps  best  manifested  in  the  increasing  prominence  given  to  biodiversity.  One  of  the  first 
calls  for  this  link  can  be  seen  in  the  First  World  Conservation  Strategy  which  argued  that: 
"the  maintenance  of  essential  ecological  processes  and  life  support  systems,  the  preservation 
of  genetic  diversity,  and  the  sustainable  utilisation,  of  species  and  ecosystem  have  the  overall 
aim  of  achieving  sustainable  development  through  the  conservation  of  living  resources"' 
(IUCN/  UNEP/  WWF  1980  in  Barbier  et  al,  1994) 
The  issue  of  biodiversity  gained  international  recognition  as  a  result  of  the  Biodiversity 
convention  signed  under  the  auspices  of  the  UNCED  at  Rio  in  June  1992.  The  concept  of 
biodiversity  involves  a  complexity  of  meanings,  although  all  imply  some  measure  of  distance 
(Barbier  et  al,  1995).  Based  on  this  principle,  three  main  perspectives  can  be  seen.  The  first 
is  that  of  genetic  diversity,  which  refers  to  the  heritable  variation  within  and  between 
populations,  or  the  sum  of  the  genetic  information  contained  in  the  genes  of  plants  and  micro- 
organisms.  The  second  is  that  of  species  diversity,  which  refers  simply  to  the  number  of 
species  in  a  particular  habitat.  The  third,  ecosystem  diversity,  refers  to  the  diversity  both 
within  and  between  ecological  processes,  such  as  habitats,  biotic  communities  and  ecological 
processes  (  such  as  photosynthesis,  nutrient  cycling  and  nitrogen  fixing)  (Blaikie,  1996)  and  is 
based  on  the  concept  of  the  functional  role  of  species  in  supporting  critical  structuring 
processes.  Arguably  it  is  this  concept  of  functional  diversity  that  is  the  most  crucial  to  the 
sustainable  development  debate.  Unfortunately  it  is  more  difficult  to  classify  than  the  other 
categories  of  diversity.  Functional  diversity  can  be  defined  in  two  main  ways:  firstly  in  terms  of 
the  diversity  of  ecological  functions  performed  by  different  species;  and  secondly  in  terms  of 
the  diversity  of  species  performing  a  given  ecological  function  (Barbier  et  al,  1995). 
A  rationale  exists  therefore  for  linking  biodiversity  and  the  sustainable  development  discourse 
on  scientific,  economic  and  moral  grounds,  in  that  biological  diversity  is  the  underlying 
component  in  our  life  support  system,  that  biological  diversity  provides  us  with  many  direct 
and  indirect  economic  benefits  and  that  all  species  require  respect  regardless  of  their  use  in Chapter  1:  Introduction  7 
humanity.  As  will  be  highlighted  in  this  and  future  chapters,  the  large  degree  of  uncertainty 
inherent  in  decisions  regarding  biodiversity,  means  that  the  issue  merits  particular  attention  in 
the  context  of  environmental  uncertainty. 
However  operationalised,  the  concept  of  sustainability  necessarily  involves  making  a  number 
of  trade-offs  between  for  example  ecological  objectives  such  as  the  maintenance  of 
biodiversity,  economic  objectives  such  as  economic  growth,  and  social  cultural  objectives 
such  as  wealth  distribution.  Fig  1.1  highlights  some  of  the  trade-offs  that  may  be  required  to 
be  met,  with  the  boxes  contained  in  the  middle  of  the  arrows,  indicating  issues  that  need  to  be 
resolved  in  order  to  facilitate  the  making  of  trade-offs.  The  context  for  this  thesis  is  restricted 
however  to  focusing  on  the  uncertainty  which  arises  as  a  result  of  the  interactions  between  the 
highly  interconnected  and  complex  economic  and  ecological  system,  and  the  accompanying 
trade-offs  between  the  economic  and  ecological  objectives,  within  sustainable  development'. 
Inevitably  especially  when  the  role  of  uncertainty  in  decision  making  is  considered,  socio- 
cultural  and  political  issues  will  be  raised,  but  due  to  the  scope  of  these  issues,  the  bulk  will 
remain  outwith  the  consideration  of  this  thesis. 
7.3  Sustainable  development  and  uncertainty:  key  issues 
One  of  the  pivotal  arguments  in  this  thesis  is  that  uncertainty  is  central  to  the  sustainable 
development  discourse  and  will  need  to  be  addressed  if  sustainability  objectives  are  to  be 
met.  Indeed  given  certainty  about  the  future,  the  attainment  of  sustainability  goals  would 
arguably  be  relatively  straightforward.  The  next  section  considers  some  of  the  most  important 
uncertainty  issues  raised  by  the  sustainable  development  discourse.  As  will  be  seen,  it  is  in 
stressing  the  importance  of  these  issues  within  the  sustainability  debate  that  such  a  potentially 
explosive  mix  for  environmental  decision  making  is  implied  (Facheux  &  Froger,  1995). 
5  While  attention  is  focused  on  the  economic  and  ecological  sustainability  aspects  of  this  framework,  it  is 
important  to  emphasise  the  important  contribution  of  the  socio  -  cultural  view  to  the  sustainability  debate. 
(See  for  example  0'  Connor,  1988,1989;  Escobar,  1996;  Oslender,  1997). Chapter  1:  Introduction  8 
Fig  1.1.  Trade-offs  among  the  three  main  objectives  of  sustainable  development6 
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1.3.1  The  complexity  and  the  interconnectedness  of  the  ecological  -  economic 
system 
While  academically  it  may  be  more  convenient  to  analyse  the  economic  and  ecological 
systems  separately,  increasingly  many  environmental  and  ecological  economists  have  began 
to  emphasise  the  fact  that  the  economic  system  is  both  highly  connected  with  and  dependent 
on  the  ecological  system.  Increasing  evidence  points  to  linkages  between  economic  activity 
and  the  environment  which  are  pervasive  and  complex.  The  more  highly  connected 
Figure  1.1  is  based  on  the  structure  of  the  diagram  contained  in  Munasinghe  (I  99-33b:  p2)  but  has  been 
subsequently  adapted  to  take  into  account  the  authors  own  vie,.  vs. Chapter  1:  Introduction  9 
ecological  and  economic  systems  are,  the  more  change  in  one  implies  change  in  the  other,  or 
as  Norgaard  (1984)  terms  it,  the  more  they  'coevolve'.  The  implications  of  this  is  that  it  is 
necessary  to  look  at  the  economy  not  as  a  closed  system  but  as  a  component  of  a  wider 
system.  Thus,  matter  and  energy  used  up  in  human  production  and  consumption  activities 
must  eventually  end  up  in  environmental  systems  and  result  in  significant  forms  of 
environmental  and  economic  damage,  such  as  pollution,  (Perman  et  al,  1996).  Furthermore 
the  entropic  nature  of  the  system  ensures  that,  while  the  total  amount  of  mass  or  energy 
remains  the  same,  its  structure  does  not.  The  consequences  of  this  is  that  economic- 
ecological  interactions  may  lead  to  irreversible  losses  (see  section  1.3.5). 
The  recognition  of  the  possibility  that  there  may  in  fact  be  limits  to  the  impacts  of  economic 
activity  on  the  environment  is  based  on  the  realisation  that  environmental  resources  provide  a 
number  of  both  direct  and  equally  crucial  indirect  services  and  functions  which  do  in  fact  affect 
human  welfare.  Moreover,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  regulatory  functions  performed  by 
ecosystems,  such  as  waste  assimilation  indirectly  support  all  economic  activity  (Barbier  et  al, 
1995).  The  processes  among  and  within  the  physical,  biological  and  chemical  components  of 
an  ecosystem  result  in  specific  types  of  ecosystem  function  or  property,  such  as  nutrient 
cycling,  biological  productivity,  hydrology  and  sedimentation.  These  interactions  or  life 
support  functions  in  turn  generate  many  ecological  resources  and  services  that  are  of 
fundamental  value  in  that  they  sustain  human  societies  (See  table  1.1). 
The  highly  interconnected  nature  of  the  economy  and  of  the  environment  and  the  complex 
series  of  feedbacks  between  the  two,  further  complicate  the  sustainability  problem.  Thus 
meeting  an  ecological  objective  such  as  the  maintenance  of  key  ecological  functions  and 
services  is  complicated  by  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  effects  of  increased  economic 
activity  on  these  ecological  functions.  This  fundamental  issue  of  uncertainty  boils  down  to  the 
problem  of  ecosystem  thresholds  and  resilience.  It  is  sufficient  to  remember  that  the  effects  of 
economic  activity  have  very  real  consequences  for  the  environment,  which  due  to  the 
complexity  of  the  interactions  pose  considerable  problems  in  defining  quantitatively  the  extent 
and  type  of  economic  activity  that  is  consistent  with  ecological  sustainability.  As  Michael 
Common  argues: 
"the  level  of  human  impact  on  the  national  environment  is  now  such  that  its  capacity  to 
support  future  economic  activity  at  the  level  required  by  the  human  population  and  its 
aspirations  is  questionable.  The  issues  arising  are  characterised  by  ignorance  and 
uncertainty"  (Common,  1995:  p4) Chapter  1:  Introduction  10 
Table  1.1  Ecosystem  functions  and  their  uses  in  the  economic  system 
Regulation  Production  Carrier  Information 
functions 
Providing  support  for 
economic  activity  and 
human  welfare 
through 
-  protection  against 
harmful  cosmic 
influences 
functions 
Providing  basic 
resources  such  as: 
-oxygen 
-  food,  drinking  water 
and  nutrition 
functions 
Providing  space  and  a 
suitable  substrate 
inter  alia  for: 
-habitation 
-  agriculture,  forestry, 
fishery,  aquaculture 
functions 
Providing  aesthetic, 
cultural  and  scientific 
benefits  through: 
-  climatic  regulation 
-  watershed  protection 
and  catchment 
-maintenance  of 
evolutionary  potential 
to  adapt  to  change 
-  water  for  industry, 
households 
-clothing  and  fabrics 
-building,  construction 
and  manufacturing 
materials 
-  industry 
-engineering  projects 
such  as  dams  and 
roads 
-recreation 
-aesthetic  information 
-  Spiritual  and 
religious  information 
-  cultural  and  artistic 
inspiration 
-educationaland 
scientific  information 
-erosion  preventing 
and  soil  protection 
-storage  and  recycling 
of  industrial  and 
human  welfare 
-maintenance  of 
biological  and 
genetic  diversity 
-biological  control 
-energy  and  fuel 
-minerals 
-minerals  resources 
-biochemical 
resources 
-genetic  resources 
-  nature  conservation 
-potential  information 
-ornamental 
-providing  a  resources 
migratory,  nursery 
and  feeding  habitat 
Source:  adapted  from  Barbier  et  al,  1995. 
Although  ecosystems  contain  hundreds  and  thousands  of  species  interacting  amongst 
themselves  and  with  their  physical  system,  the  consensus  is  that  the  system  is  driven  by  a 
relatively  small  number  of  biotic  and  abiotic  variables  on  whose  interactions,  the  overall 
balance  of  the  species  within  the  ecosystem  depends  (Holling,  1992).  This  idea  has  led  to  the 
distinction  between  species  which  are  drivers  and  those  which  are  passengers.  The 
implication  is  that  the  loss  of  only  certain  species  could  have  a  massive  effect  on  the  viability 
of  an  ecosystem  and  the  ecosystem  functions  which  it  supports.  Thus,  only  a  small  set  of 
structuring  processes  made  up  of  biotic  and  physical  processes  are  seen  as  critical  in Chapter  1:  Introduction  II 
influencing  the  structure  and  overall  behaviour  of  the  ecosystems;  processes  that  are 
supported  by  different  groupings  of  animals  and  plants  with  often  complementary  functions 
(Holling  et  al,  1995).  A  major  problem  though  is  that  there  is  a  significant  lack  of  information 
on  which  species  are  in  fact  key,  due  to  the  lack  of  long-term  ecosystem  studies  (Barbier  et  al, 
1995). 
It  is  this  issue  of  uncertainty  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  biodiversity  problem  and  results  in  the 
conclusion  that  at  present  the  consequences  of  reductions  in  the  number  of  species  and 
specific  combinations  of  species  in  terms  of  human  welfare  is  often  unclear.  The  argument 
that  a  reduction  can  be  presumed  to  be  negative  can  be  presented  on  two  counts.  Firstly, 
while  certain  species  may  appear  to  be  redundant  at  a  present  ecological  state,  they  may  be 
of  crucial  importance  in  providing  ecological  functions  of  use  to  man  in  future  evolved  states. 
Secondly,  genetic  diversity  is  the  basis  on  which  the  process  of  natural  selection  works,  so 
that  any  reduction  in  biodiversity  in  effect  hinders  the  evolutionary  process  which  can  be 
regarded  as  a  key  life  supporting  function  of  the  biosphere.  Thus,  under  the  assumption  that 
the  environment  is  dynamic  and  will  change  over  time,  the  reduction  in  the  evolutionary 
potential  of  an  ecosystem  reduces  its  ability  to  adapt  to  change  and  most  importantly  to 
external  shocks  (Common,  1995).  In  effect  such  a  process  can  be  seen  as  reducing  the 
options  of  future  generations  to  adapt  to  future  changes  in  environmental  conditions.  This 
problem  of  ecological  uncertainty  and  its  implications  will  be  further  developed  in  Chapter  3. 
An  important  point  to  stress  is  that,  with  the  realisation  of  the  interconnectedness  and  co- 
dependence  of  the  economic  and  environmental  system  as  a  joint  system,  it  is  evident  that  the 
joint  system  responds  very  differently  to  perturbation  depending  on  where  the  economy  and 
the  environment  are  relative  to  the  local  system  equilibria,  as  well  as  the  characteristics  of 
those  equilibria.  The  dynamics  of  the  joint  system  will  reflect  the  structure  of  the  connections 
between  each  subsystem.  The  existence  of  multiple  locally  stable  equilibrium  (or  basins  of 
attraction)  which  are  separated  by  unstable  equilibria  means  that,  as  economic  and  ecological 
systems  pass  from  one  basin  to  another  , 
the  central  characteristics  of  the  system  may 
undergo  a  profound  change.  If  a  system  is  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a  particular  unstable 
equilibrium  or  threshold,  minor  perturbations  of  its  state  variables  may  have  catastrophic 
consequences  for  its  structure  and  organisation.  The  capacity  of  the  system  to  absorb  such 
shocks  without  losing  stability  is  captured  in  the  concept  of  resilience,  which  was  briefly 
introduced  earlier.  The  main  implication  of  this  characteristic  is  that  the  joint  system  dynamics 
may  not  be  either  continuous  or  gradual,  but  may  flip  in  the  face  of  particular  shock.  It  is  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  resilience  of  the  joint  system  that  biodiversity  has  been  given  central  stage Chapter  1:  Introduction  12 
(Perrings  et  al,  1995).  The  importance  of  this  in  relation  to  this  thesis  is  that  there  is  a  high 
level  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  propensity  and  implications  of  particular  phase  changes, 
which  may  indeed  only  be  recognised  after  they  have  occurred. 
While  the  ecological  and  economic  systems  can  be  seen  to  be  highly  interconnected,  a  further 
source  of  uncertainty  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  the  two  different  systems  do  not  interact 
evenly  over  time  or  space.  Taking  the  latter  issue,  it  is  evident  that  many  ecosystems  cut 
across  the  structure  of  human  society  For  example  the  Amazon  Basin  spans  several 
countries  and  interacts  with  many  economic  sectors  (Munasinghe,  1993a).  Often,  therefore, 
the  situation  arises  that  the  spatial  extent  of  the  environmental  resource  is  more  limited  than 
the  ecosystem  from  which  they  are  derived.  This  problem  of  the  juxtaposition  of  different 
spatial  scales  poses  considerable  questions  for  the  sustainability  debate,  such  as  how  should 
we  evaluate  changes  in  the  scale  of  an  economy  vis-a  -vis  its  ecological  and  physical  context. 
The  issue  of  time  similarly  causes  difficulties  for  sustainability.  Uncertainties  over  time  lags  in 
the  cumulative  environmental  consequences  of  economic  activity,  present  and  future 
preferences  and  values  as  well  as  future  possible  substitution  possibilities  all  pose  significant 
constraints  for  meeting  sustainable  development  objectives.  As  Perrings  (1987)  points  out,  it 
is  therefore  possible  for  components  of  the  joint  ecological  -  economic  system  to  be  entirely 
unconnected  over  one  temporal  or  spatial  horizon,  but  highly  connected  when  viewed  over 
some  other  spatial  or  temporal  horizon. 
1.3.2  The  public  good  nature  of  the  environment  and  uncertainty 
The  public  good  nature  of  many  environmental  resources  and  the  problems  that  this  poses  in 
relation  to  market  failure  is  well  documented  in  the  environmental  economics  literature.  What 
is  important  to  note  for  this  thesis  is  that  as  the  environmental  service  or  function  tends 
towards  that  of  a  public  good,  familiarity  decreases  and  information  surrounding  its  value  is 
often  absent  (Turner,  1993).  Consequently  the  level  of  uncertainty  is  often  greatest  when  the 
environmental  service  in  question  is  a  pure  public  good  (  see  Fig  1.2). 
The  existence  of  public  goods  and  the  resulting  problem  of  market  failure  leads  to  a  gap 
between  the  market  price  of  environmental  resources  and  the  true  value  to  individuals  and 
societies.  It  is  this  absence  of  a  market  price  that  is  one  of  the  main  problems  in  terms  off 
defining  environmental/  economic  trade-offs  for  sustainable  development  objectives.  One  of 
the  main  causes  of  this  gap  is  ignorance  or  uncertainty  regarding  the  social  consequences  of 
private  actions  with  respect  to  the  environment.  The  implication  of  the  disparity  in  the  market 
price  and  the  'true'  social  costs  of  environmental  change  creates  difficulties  for  meeting Chapter  1:  Introduction  13 
Fig  1.2  The  environmental  commodities  continuum 
Pure  Private  Goods  Quasi-Private  Goods  Quasi  Public  Goods  Pure  Public  Goods 
Rivalness  in 
consumption; 
excludability; 
property rights, 
market  prices 
regular  payments 
in  form  of  taxes 
or  charges  are 
made  to  finance 
supply 
up  to  some  capacity 
constraint  (carrying 
capacity)  non- 
rivalness  in 
consumption 
increasing  information  requirements/  uncertainty 
non-rivalness 
in  consumption; 
non-excludability, 
or  excessive  costs 
of  excludability 
Source:  adapted  from  Tumer  (1993) 
sustainable  development  objectives,  due  to  uncertainty  about  the  value  of  environmental 
change  on  human  welfare.  While  the  environmental  economics  literature  has  made 
significant  developments  in  this  field,  through  the  use  of  valuation,  as  will  be  shown  in  Chapter 
2,  significant  uncertainties  remain  which  are  due  in  part  to  the  pure  or  quasi  public  good 
nature  of  many  environmental  problems  such  as  biodiversity.  This  is  essentially  because  the 
burden  of  the  negative  effects  of  uncertainty  with  regard  to  many  environmental  services  will 
lie  with  society  as  a  whole  rather  than  with  the  individual  or  private  company  carrying  out  the 
activity. 
7.3.3  Uncertainty  and  the  substitutability  of  ecological  functions 
The  question  of  substitutability  between  the  elements  of  man-made  and  natural  capital  in  the 
sustainable  development  discourse  is  a  core  component  of  the  uncertainty  problem.  Neo- 
classical  economics  tends  to  assume  away  the  question  of  uncertainty  regarding  substitution 
policies,  implying  that  uncertainty  about  the  supply  of  essential  environmental  functions  and 
services  is  not  crucial,  as  lost  environmental  functions  and  services  can  be  replaced  by  man- 
made  capital  (Common,  1995).  Recent  reassessments  about  the  extent  to  which  substitution 
possibilities  do  actually  exist  refute  this  (see:  Daly,  1986;  Common,  1995;  Costanza  1991; 
Mason,  1996;  Pearce  et  al  1990;  Pearce  and  Turner,  1990).  Moreover  any  assumptions 
about  future  technological  advances  and  possibilities  for  substitution  are  pervaded  by 
uncertainty.  Likewise  uncertainty  exist  about  which  elements  constitute  critical  capital,  due  to Chapter  1:  Introduction  14 
the  fact  that  elements  that  appear  not  to  be  critical  currently  may  in  fact  be  critical  in  future 
evolved  states  or  unanticipated  states.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  issue  of  biodiversity  plays  a 
crucial  role.  The  role  of  biodiversity,  in  providing  an  opportunity  set  in  maintaining  the 
evolutionary  potential  of  the  joint  ecological-  economic  system,  is  once  again  seen  as  crucial. 
There  is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  over  whether  it  is  possible  to  substitute  for  the  role  that 
individual  species  play  in  the  functioning  of  critical  environmental  services,  in  present  and 
future  unanticipated  states.  Subsequently  the  structures  and  processes  of  physical  systems 
are  seen  as  vulnerable  to  incremental  human  choices.  These  changes  may  not  have  an 
immediate  impact 
, 
but  at  some  spatial  or  temporal  scale  the  destruction  of  critical  ecological 
systems  will  result  in  direct  impacts  on  human  welfare  (Norton,  1995).  As  Common  argues, 
there:  "remain  great  uncertainties  regarding  substitution  possibilities"  (Common,  1995:  p47). 
While  it  can  be  conceded  that  some  substitution  possibilities  do  in  fact  exist,  there  remain 
some  critical  elements  of  natural  capital,  for  which  substitution  is  either  not  technically 
possible  or  would  be  too  expensive,  and  that  a  reduction  in  this  critical  base  of  natural  capital 
in  effect  reduces  the  opportunity  set  on  which  future  generations  can  adapt  and  evolve  to 
stress  and  shock  exerted  on  the  joint  ecological  economic  system. 
The  need  to  sustain  an  adequate  level  of  natural  capital  means  that  there  is  therefore  a  need 
to  deal  with  uncertainties  regarding  the  effects  of  economic  activity  on  natural  capital, 
uncertainty  over  future  values  and  preferences  as  well  as  uncertainty  over  the  impact  of  future 
technological  change.  Although  some  argue  that  the  question  of  substitutability  will  only  be 
resolved  empirically,  many  of  the  most  important  issues  will  only  be  resolved  ex-  post 
Furthermore  due  to  the  fact  that  many  critical  elements  of  natural  capital  are  subject  to 
irreversibility,  by  the  time  the  uncertainty  has  been  resolved  it  will  be  too  late.  It  is  to  the  issue 
of  irreversibility  and  its  role  in  the  uncertainty  problem  that  the  discussion  now  turns. 
1.3.4  Irreversibility  and  uncertainty 
The  irreversibility  of  the  damaging  effects  of  economic  activity  with  respect  to  many  critical 
environmental  functions  is  one  of  the  most  important  problems  to  be  faced  in  the  sustainable 
development  and  biodiversity  discourses.  Indeed  it  is  the  issue  of  irreversibility  that 
necessitates  the  need  to  recognise  uncertainty.  If  irreversibility  did  not  in  fact  exist,  then  the 
question  of  uncertainty  would  not  be  of  such  paramount  importance.  If  a  mistake  was  made,  it 
would  be  possible  to  reverse  the  effects  of  a  particular  decision,  in  effect  giving  another 
opportunity  to  roll  the  dice  that  constitutes  economic  activity.  However,  unlike  financial 
markets,  for  environmental  problems  it  may  not  be  possible  to  absorb  and  eventually  reverse Chapter  1:  Introduction  15 
previous  losses.  The  presence  of  irreversibility  therefore  requires  that  sustainable 
development  explicitly  deals  with  the  issue  of  uncertainty. 
The  importance  attached  to  the  issue  of  irreversibility  relies  on  the  argument  that  has  been  put 
forward  that  substitution  possibilities  for  critical  environmental  services  and  functions  are  in 
fact  limited.  On  this  basis  it  is  therefore  important  to  maintain  the  crucial  set  of  ecosystem 
properties  that  form  the  basis  of  the  essential  life  supporting  functions  (Barbier  et  al,  1995).  It 
is  apparent  that,  if  the  ecosystem  is  pushed  beyond  the  stage  that  it  is  able  to  effectively  cope 
with  externally  induced  shocks,  then  its  capacity  to  support  the  flow  service  may  be  severely 
diminished  or  removed.  For  example  once  a  large  area  of  rain  forest  is  removed,  then 
although  over  a  very  long  period  the  action  may  be  slowly  reversible,  the  course  of  action  over 
at  least  a  time  period  of  one  generation  is  irreversible. 
An  example  of  an  action  that  at  present  appears  to  be  completely  irreversible  is  that  of  the 
destruction  of  the  ozone  layer,  in  which  at  present  it  is  thought  that  the  process  cannot  be 
reversed  nor  the  ecosphere  repaired  by  human  effort  (Hinterberger  et  al,  1997).  In  the  case  of 
biodiversity  of  species,  the  extinction  of  species  is  by  definition  irreversible.  The  argument 
that  transformations  of  natural  capital  are  for  all  intents  and  purpose  irreversible  is  also 
derived  from  Georgescu  -  Roegen  (1973).  From  an  economic  perspective  the  fact  that  a 
process  may  be  reversible  upon  the  expenditure  of  infinite  energy  is  of  no  relevance  if  the 
costs  are  beyond  the  means  of  the  decision  maker.  In  which  case  in  the  joint  ecological  - 
economic  system,  it  is  economically  irreversible.  This  form  of  irreversibility  reflects  the  fact 
that  the  cost  of  rehabilitation  or  restoration  exceeds  the  resources  available  (Perrings,  1997a). 
The  issue  of  irreversibility  has  attracted  a  wide  -  ranging  literature  in  environmental 
economics,  which,  in  contrast  to  traditional  economics,  does  not  tend  to  assume  that  resource 
use  decisions  are  irreversible.  The  literature  on  irreversibility  (Krutilla  &  Fisher  (1975)  and 
Arrow  &  Fisher  (1974)  has  tended  to  focus  on  the  option  of  development.  In  particular  a 
fundamental  asymmetry  has  been  identified  that,  while  a  decision  to  develop  in  the  presence 
of  irreversibility  can  not  be  reversed,  a  decision  not  to  develop  can  be  reversed.  Thus  taking 
the  later  option  leaves  open  the  option  to  develop  in  the  future.  While  such  approaches 
provided  innovative  and  valuable  insights  into  the  problem  of  irreversibility,  the  linking  of 
irreversibility  and  uncertainty  is  through  the  reliance  on  probability  and  the  concepts  of  option 
and  quasi-option  value.  As  Chapter  3  will  go  on  to  argue  however,  this  linking  of  irreversibility 
to  the  use  of  probability  may  only  be  applicable  to  certain  cases  of  risk  or  what  will  be  termed 
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An  additional  aspect  of  irreversibility  is  in  relation  to  the  decision  making  process  in  which,  as 
Vickers  (1994)  points  out,  each  decision  moment  is  itself  not  only  unique  but  is  also 
embedded  in  the  unidirectional  flow  of  time.  Shackle  (1961)  views  such  decisions  as  "self 
destructive"  in  that  by  taking  them,  this  forever  changes  the  possible  structure  of  future 
decisions.  Georgescu-Roegen  (1973)  and  Perrings  (1987)  highlight  this  aspect  of  the 
irreversibility  with  respect  to  the  entropic  processes  at  the  heart  of  economic  activity. 
Accordingly  in  a  world  governed  by  the  laws  of  thermodynamics,  the  irreversibility  of  entropic 
processes  ensures  that  the  system  will  necessarily  evolve  through  a  sequence  of  states  that 
are  not  predictable  from  its  history.  In  the  case  of  ecological-economic  relationships  the 
dynamic  nature  of  both  domains  will  reinforce  this  inherent  irreversibility  as  an  essential 
element  of  uncertainty.  The  impact  of  economic  decisions  on  ecosystems  necessarily  involve 
changes  in  ecosystem  structure  that,  however  small  force  acceptance  of  a  new  set  of  decision 
events  which  in  themselves  will  be  unique  and  irreversible.  The  uniqueness  and  irreversibility 
of  the  decision  context  and  its  implications  for  decision  making  under  uncertainty  will  be 
looked  at  in  more  detail  in  Chapters  4  and  5. 
1.3.5  Equilibrium  analysis  in  economic  and  ecological  systems 
The  issue  of  equilibrium  and  its  assumptions  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  analysis  of  the 
economic-  ecological  system.  A  key  factor  in  the  recognition  of  the  importance  of  uncertainty 
in  ecological-economic  analysis  is  the  shift  from  a  equilibrium  framework  to  one  which 
emphasises  concepts  of  disequilibrium.  If  we  take  the  issue  of  equilibrium  in  the  ecological 
system,  it  is  evident  that  while  there  was  a  traditional  tendency  to  use  a  equilibrium  or  static 
stability  concept,  increasing  evidence  has  shifted  the  focus  to  that  of  a  dynamic  system.  The 
traditional  view  advocated  for  example  by  Clements  (1905)  and  Forbes  (1880)  was  that  in  the 
case  of  species  populations,  while  the  populations  oscillated,  the  oscillations  were  kept  within 
bounds,  tending  towards  an  equilibrium.  Although  these  views  were  firmly  in  the  equilibrium 
or  balance  of  nature  camp,  they  did  contain  within  them  the  seeds  of  a  more  modern 
conception  of  equilibrium  based  on  the  concept  of  resilience  mentioned  in  earlier  sections. 
The  weight  of  evidence  against  a  static  balance  was  such  that  by  the  middle  of  this  century 
the  idea  of  dynamic  balance  gained  emphasis.  However  even  this  concept  has  become 
discredited  (See  Shrader-Frechette  &  McCoy,  1993).  It  has  been  argued  by  Shrader- 
Frechette  &  McCoy  that  it  may  be  better  to  move  away  from  employing  stability  terms  such  as 
'balance',  'equilibrium',  'homeostasis'  or'stability'  and  towards  the  notion  of  resilience  or  what 
they  term  'persistence'.  The  emphasis  on  the  persistence  or  resilience  of  the  system 
highlights  the  notion  of  a  dynamic  rather  than  static  system,  in  which  the  ecosystem  or Chapter  1:  Introduction  17 
community  may  not  in  fact  return  to  some  'normal  condition'  (Shrader-Frechefte  & 
McCoy,  1993).  Recent  contributions  have  reinforced  the  notion  that  ecosystems  are  not  in  fact 
equilibrium  systems  but  rather  dynamic  systems,  in  which  the  presence  of  large-scale 
dynamics  and  ecosystem  organisation  indicates  that  ecosystems  behave  in  a  non  -  linear 
rather  than  a  linear  manner  (Norton,  1995). 
While  in  ecology  there  has  been  a  shift  away  from  equilibrium  analysis,  in  economics  there 
has  been  a  tendency  to  rely  on  the  notion  of  a  static  equilibrium,  such  as  those  which  form  the 
basis  of  neo-classical  models.  Although  there  has  been  a  recent  break  with  this,  shown  by 
the  approaches  of  evolutionary  and  ecological  economic  modelling  (see  Faucheux  et  al, 
1996),  the  emphasis  has  remained  on  the  use  of  an  equilibrium  framework.  Equilibrium 
analysis,  which  Georgescu  -  Roegen  sees  as  largely  transferred  from  classical  mechanics  is 
essentialist  or  reductionist  in  nature  and  is  based  on  the  modelling  of  all  variables  and 
relations  which  are  assumed  to  be  (at  least  probabilistically)  known  and  stable  over  time 
(Katzner,  1995).  This  reduction  of  uncertainty  in  equilibrium  models  to  probabilistic  measures 
will  be  questioned  in  Chapter  3. 
Christensen  (1996)  has  pointed  out  that  the  deterministic  equilibrium  structure  not  only  does 
not  admit  to  the  interdependence  of  individual  tastes  and  preferences,  but  perhaps  more 
importantly  for  environmental  problems,  the  neo-classical  framework  assumes  that  resources 
and  factors  of  production  are  given,  independent,  and  physically  disconnected  from  other 
resources.  In  short,  such  a  paradigm  lacks  a  specification  of  the  physiological  and  ecological 
structure  of  economic  activity.  In  this  sense  an  alternative  non-essentialistic  approach 
highlighted  by  Katzner  (1995),  can  be  extended  to  ecological-economic  issues,  in  which 
explanation  is  based  on  the  idea  that  every  conceptual  phenomenon  exists  only  as  the 
combined  result  of  the  interactions  of  all  other  conceptual  entities.  Concepts  cannot  be  said, 
therefore,  to  have  single  causes  since  they  are  understood  to  co-determine  each  other.  This 
is  very  much  in  line  with  the  notion  put  forward  earlier  of  the  co-evolution  of  economic- 
environmental  relationships  with  the  emphasis  being  on  out  of  equilibrium  positions  in  which 
the  ideas  of  transition  and  non  linearity  have  key  roles  to  play  (Faucheux  et  al,  1996). 
7.3.6  Uncertainty  and  the  precautionary  principle:  Implications  for  sustainable 
development. 
This  chapter  has  put  forward  the  arguments  that  highlight  the  nature  of  uncertainty  in  the 
sustainable  development  problem.  It  is  clear  that  the  extent  to  which  uncertainty  is  given 
importance  is  crucial  in  the  way  that  sustainable  development  is  defined.  The  argument  put Chapter  1:  Introduction  18 
forward  here  is  that  if  sustainable  development  objectives  are  to  be  met  then  the  role  of 
uncertainty  must  be  recognised  and  tackled  explicitly  within  the  decision-making  process. 
One  of  the  concepts  that  has  been  put  forward  in  relation  to  uncertainty  in  terms  of 
sustainable  development  and  particular  the  issues  of  biodiversity  is  that  of  the  precautionary 
principle. 
The  precautionary  principle  has  evolved  as  a  concept  due  to  the  presence  of  uncertainty  and 
in  particular  irreversibility.  The  precautionary  principle,  which  is  similar  to  the  principle  of  safe 
minimum  standards  (Ciriacy  Wantrup,  1963),  in  essence  is  a  kind  of  insurance  problem  that 
will  allow  for  a  higher  margin  of  error  and  as  a  buffer  against  hard  uncertainty.  The  principle 
states  that  rather  than  await  certainty,  regulators  should  act  in  anticipation  of  any  potential 
environmental  harm  in  order  to  prevent  it  from  occurring  and  stresses  the  need  to  avoid 
potentially  damaging  outcomes  (Costanza,  1994).  Like  sustainable  development  its  adoption 
in  many  international  environmental  resolutions  (for  example  the  Rio  Declaration,  of  June 
1992)  has  seen  it  evolve  as  a  basic  normative  concept  within  many  environmental  discourses. 
The  precautionary  principle  does  recognise  the  problem  of  uncertainty  as  central  to 
sustainable  development  by  stressing  our  inability  to  predict  all  the  future  consequences  of 
economic  activity  in  relation  to  human  welfare.  If,  as  has  been  posited  it  is  the  case  that  the 
dynamics  of  ecological  systems  are  not  in  fact  smooth  and  continuous,  then  the  underlying 
notion  of  the  precautionary  principle  is  one  that  seeks  to  avoid  the  thresholds  around  which 
the  resilience  of  the  system  may  in  fact  be  lost. 
0'  Riordan  (1995)  suggests  a  number  of  meanings  that  can  ascribed  to  the  precautionary 
principle  in  its  simplest  forM7 
. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  there  are  two  of  particular 
interest,  namely  that  the  precautionary  principle  constitutes: 
1)  Thoughtful  action  in  advance  of  scientific  proof  of  cause  and  effect  based  on  principles  of 
wise  management  and  cost  effectiveness.  Namely  that  it  is  better  to  pay  a  little  now  than  an 
awful  lot  later.  In  this  sense,  precaution  is  a  receipt  for  action  over  in-action  where  there  is  a 
reasonable  threat  of  irreversibility  or  of  serious  damage  to  life-support  systems. 
2)  Leaving  ecological  space  for  ignorance,  meaning  that  we  should  not  extract  critical 
resources,  even  when  they  are  there  for  the  taking,  because  we  do  not  know  what  the  longer- 
term  consequences  of  their  removal  are  (O'Riordan  (ed.  ),  1995:  p9). 
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Like  sustainable  development,  however,  a  number  of  grey  areas  exists  in  relation  to  the 
application  of  the  precautionary  principle.  In  particular  it  does  not  offer  much  in  the  way  of 
guidance  as  to  how  the  problem  should  be  dealt  with  (Common,  1995).  Foremost  is  the  fact 
that,  if  a  precautionary  principle  were  to  be  applied,  then  it  necessarily  implies  an  opportunity 
cost.  As  Barbier  et  al  (1995),  point  out  the  question  soon  becomes  one  of  what  things  should 
be  set  aside,  and  should  this  be  at  any  cost.  Moreover  the  precautionary  principle  does  not 
tell  us  which  adverse  future  outcomes  are  the  most  important.  Consequently,  while  the 
principle  advocates  a  precautionary  approach  in  the  face  of  hard  uncertainty,  it  does  not 
identify  how  to  determine  the  circumstances  in  which  uncertainty  is  such  that  a  precautionary 
approach  outweighs  the  opportunity  cost  of  its  implementation  to  society. 
This  concern  can  be  exemplified  with  the  problem  of  biodiversity.  While  it  may  be  argued  that 
maintenance  of  biodiversity  is  an  essential  element  in  sustaining  the  opportunity  set  for  future 
generations  in  the  face  of  perturbations  to  the  ecological-economic  system,  it  has  also  been 
the  case  that  biodiversity  loss,  through  natural  resource  selection,  such  as  in  agriculture  has 
in  many  cases  improved  human  welfare  (Perrings,  1994).  Clearly,  therefore  there  is  a  need  for 
a  means  of  assessing  the  trade-offs  between  adopting  a  precautionary  approach  to 
uncertainty  about  the  environmental  implications  of  development  and  the  social  benefits  of 
development.  It  is  the  need  to  deal  with  this  type  of  uncertainty  within  a  decision-making 
framework  that  will  be  highlighted  in  the  following  chapters. 
1.4.  A  research  framework 
This  chapter  has  stressed  the  crucial  role  that  uncertainty  plays  in  the  research  context  of  the 
sustainable  development  and  biodiversity  discourse.  Identifying  uncertainty  as  a  crucial  factor 
immediately  poses  a  number  of  challenges  for  traditional  scientific  research  due  to  the  very 
nature  of  the  uncertainty  problem  at  hand  as  well  as  the  subjective  nature  of  human  behaviour 
in  the  face  of  uncertainty.  Indeed  rather  than  reducing  the  level  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
ecological-economic  system,  it  should  be  realised  that  the  progress  of  science  has  in  fact 
uncovered  more  rather  than  less  uncertainty  (Costanza,  1994).  As  a  consequence,  given  that 
for  many  environmental  problems  a  large  number  of  the  facts  are  uncertain,  and  that  value  will 
be  in  dispute,  it  is  often  'soft'  scientific  information  which  will  end  up  serving  as  the  inputs  for 
'hard'  policy  decisions  to  be  made. 
The  view  taken  here  is  that  a  balance  needs  to  be  struck  between  a  critical  approach  to 
absolute  scientific  objectivity  and  rationality  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  and  those  post- 
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knowledge.  Indeed,  as  Peet  and  Wafts  (1996)  argue,  post-structuralist  thought  which 
abandons  all  reason  and  science  as  a  guides  to  human  action: 
runs  the  fisk  of  an  idealism  which  throws  the  baby  out  with  the  bath  water  Reason  must  be 
re-reasoned  rather  than  rejected,  science  should  be  changed  and  used  differently,  not 
abandoned"  (Peet&  Wafts,  1996:  pp261) 
On  this  basis  an  approach  to  the  research  will  be  taken  which  seeks  to  reformulate  rather  than 
abandon  an  appropriate  scientific  method  and  model  of  rationality. 
In  this  scheme  of  things  it  may  be  as  Norton  (1995)  argues  time  to: 
"loosen  the  intellectual  hinges,  to  try  many  different  models  and  engage  in  disciplinary 
crossovers  to  increase  communication  across  disciplines"  (Norton,  1995:  p122). 
Funtowitz  and  Ravetz  (1991)  argue  that  such  a  new  approach  might  be  termed  'post  normal 
science'  in  which  scientific  method  would  no  longer  necessarily  imply  anything  about  the 
precision  of  the  results  achieved,  and  in  which  the  concept  of  the  scientific  explanation  and  of 
what  constitutes  a  good  decision  is  being  changed.  What  it  does  imply  is  a  forum  for  open 
inquiry  which  is  absent  of  preconceived  answers  and  is  aimed  at  exploring  the  extent  of  our 
knowledge  and  the  magnitude  of  our  ignorance  (Costanza,  1994).  By  creating  a  new 
relationship  between  retaining  the  basic  principles  of  scientific  method  and  adapting  to  the 
reality  of  uncertainty,  a  new  place  for  science  in  human  affairs  can  be  fashioned.  It  is  this 
philosophy  that  will  underlie  this  research. 
1.4.7  Aims,  hypotheses  and  outline  of  research 
Although  the  topic  of  uncertainty  and  accompanying  research  framework  would  suggest  the 
difficulty  of  making  testable  hypotheses  which  can  be  verified  as  true  or  false,  it  will  be  useful 
to  outline  some  broad  hypotheses  or  research  questions  which  this  thesis  aims  to  answer  and 
to  formulate  the  nature  of  the  problem  to  be  addressed.  There  are  four  main  hypotheses 
concerns  which  are  the  focus  of  this  thesis: 
1)  Existing  conceptual  isations  of  uncertainty  and  in  particular  environmental  uncertainty  do 
not  reflect  the  full  range  of  uncertainty  faced  in  decision-  making. 
2)  By  recognising  that  there  are  in  fact  a  number  of  different  modalities  of  uncertainty,  it  is 
argued  that  the  use  of  utility  maximising  models,  based  on  the  notion  of  probability,  do  not 
adequately  deal  with  the  range  of  environmental  uncertainty  faced  by  decision  makers. Chapter  1:  Introduction  21 
3)  The  Shackle  model  better  explains  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  in  face  of  uncertainty 
and  in  the  context  of  improving  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making  process 
can  be  fruitfully  employed  in  a  prescriptive  sense. 
4)  Building  on  this,  it  is  hypothesised  that  the  Shackle  model  can  be  operationalised  in  a 
real  world  decision  context,  as  is  done  in  a  case  study  which  focuses  on  the  Belize 
Southern  Highway  Project. 
As  well  as  the  theoretical  contribution  that  this  thesis  makes,  a  core  element  is  the  application 
of  the  Shackle  model  to  environmental  uncertainty  in  respect  of  a  road  development  project  in 
Belize.  The  case  study  not  only  demonstrates  examples  of  the  type  of  uncertainty  that  are 
faced  in  decisions  of  this  type,  but  also  demonstrates  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  as 
a  means  of  explaining  decision  making  in  the  face  of  hard  uncertainty.  As  well  as  developing 
a  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  the  interviewing  of  decision  makers  and  the 
collection  of  additional  information  provides  a  rich  source  of  qualitative  data,  in  which  to 
contextualise  the  application  of  the  model.  The  case  study  also  provides  the  practical  basis 
on  which  the  model  is  used  to  develop  a  prescriptive  decision-making  framework  capable  of 
explicitly  dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty. 
This  chapter  has  given  an  introduction  to  the  problem  of  uncertainty  in  the  context  of 
sustainability  and  has  outlined  the  research  framework  that  is  to  be  adopted.  In  the  following 
chapter  the  decision  making  context  of  Cost-Benefit  Analysis,  and  the  valuation  of 
environmental  resources  will  be  briefly  reviewed.  After  that,  Chapter  3  takes  the  important 
step  of  conceptualising  uncertainty  at  a  epistemological  level  before  providing  a  framework  for 
defining  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty.  On  the  basis  of  this  framework  a  theoretical 
basis  which  highlights  the  dimensions  of  environmental  uncertainty  is  developed.  Based  on 
this,  a  critique  of  the  use  of  probability  in  environmental  decision  making  in  the  face  of  hard 
uncertainty  will  be  made,  and  the  need  for  an  alternative  framework  to  that  of  expected  utility 
forwarded  (Chapter  4).  In  Chapter  5  the  Shackle  model  will  be  introduced  as  an  innovative 
alternative  in  the  context  of  environmental  uncertainty  and  its  application  in  decision  making 
analysed.  Chapter  6  introduces  the  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  and  Chapter 
7  describes  the  methodology  adopted  to  carry  out  the  fieldwork.  Chapter  8  assesses  whether 
the  evidence  suggests  that  the  model  is  useful  in  explaining  decision  making  under 
uncertainty.  Chapter  9  looks  at  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  handled  at  a  more  general  level  in 
the  decision-making  process  and  develops  a  normative  framework  for  dealing  adequately  with 
uncertainty.  In  Chapter  10  conclusions  are  drawn. Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  22 
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CHAPTER  2:  THE  DECISION-MAKING  CONTEXT 
2.1  Introduction 
An  important  step  in  dealing  with  environmental  uncertainty  is  the  choice  of  the  framework 
which  will  provide  the  basis  for  the  decision-making  procedure.  While  there  are  many 
techniques  and  approaches  for  appraising  policies  and  projects  which  have  an  impact  on  the 
environment,  the  focus  of  this  thesis  is  restricted  to  that  of  dealing  with  environmental 
uncertainty  within  what  will  loosely  be  termed  a  cost-benefit  framework.  The  use  of  such  a 
framework  reflects  two  factors.  Firstly,  that  decision  making,  which  considers  any  investment 
in  relation  to  a  policy  or  a  specific  project,  will  involve  an  assessment,  even  at  the  most 
rudimentary  level,  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  such  a  decision.  Secondly  that,  decisions  made 
by  society  which  allocate  environmental  resources  or  services  will  necessarily  imply  valuation. 
Although  criticisms  have  been  made  regarding  the  top-down  decision-making  structure 
implied  by  the  use  of  cost-benefit  analysis,  a  complete  rejection  of  such  an  approach  ignores 
the  realities  of  decision  making. 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  raise  some  important  concerns  surrounding  the  use  of  cost- 
benefit  analysis  which  have  an  important  effect  on  the  way  in  which  a  decision  is  made.  In 
particular  it  considers  whether  cost-benefit  analysis  should  be  interpreted  as  a  decision 
criterion  or  alternatively  be  seen  more  as  a  general  framework.  In  order  to  do  this,  a  very  brief 
description  of  cost-benefit  analysis,  and  some  of  the  more  important  stages  is  firstly  provided. 
After  that  some  of  the  main  theoretical  issues  underlying  the  cost-benefit  framework  and  the 
valuation  of  environmental  resources  will  be  highlighted.  While  the  focus  of  this  thesis  is  not 
environmental  valuation  per  se,  it  is  an  important  topic  because  valuation  plays  an  important 
part  in  the  use  of  a  cost-benefit  framework  for  decisions  affecting  the  environment. 
Furthermore,  almost  all  models  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  utilise  estimates  of  the 
values  of  the  different  outcomes  considered  by  the  model.  From  a  practical  view,  although  the 
Shackle  model  could  be  used  operationally  without  values  for  the  outcomes,  operationalising 
the  model  in  the  case  study  of  Belize  required  the  use  of  valuations  of  the  different  outcomes. 
What  is  important  in  relation  to  this  chapter,  is  how  values  and  in  particular  environmental 
values  can  be  interpreted  in  the  context  of  uncertainty.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is 
therefore  to  review  some  of  the  major  issues  raised  and  to  develop  a  suitable  decision-making 
framework,  which  can  provide  the  basis,  for  the  interpretation  and  analysis  of  the  model  of 
decision  making  under  uncertainty  proposed. Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  24 
2.2  Cost-benerit  analysis 
Cost-benefit  analysis  (CBA)  is  usually  introduced  at  the  appraisal  stage  of  the  decision- 
making  process  and  is  thus  a  crucial  element  in  the  project  cycle  in  that  it  is  often  one  of  the 
key  determinants  as  to  whether  or  not  the  government  or  institution  financing  the  project  will 
go  ahead  with  the  proposal.  Normally  the  analysis  takes  a  number  of  stages,  starting  from  the 
definition  of  the  project  through,  the  identification  of  the  project  inputs,  determination  of  which 
impacts  are  economically  relevant,  the  carrying  out  the  physical  quantification  of  the  relevant 
impacts,  the  estimation  of  the  monetary  value  of  relevant  effects,  the  discounting  the  costs 
and  benefits  to  finally  the  application  of  the  net  present  value  test.  Externalities  such  as 
environmental  costs  or  benefits  for  which  no  market  prices  exist  should  be  incorporated  by  the 
use  of  environmental  valuation  techniques  where  possible,  although  in  reality  this  is  often  not 
attempted  (Munasinghe,  1993b). 
The  basic  criterion  for  comparing  the  costs  and  benefits  of  a  project,  relative  to  the  baseline 
case,  is  the  Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  test,  where  NPV  is  defined  as: 
NPV  =IB,  (l  C,  (l  +  r)-'  (2.1) 
Where  B,  and  C,  are  the  respective  benefits  and  costs  of  the  project  at  a  given  time  period 
and  the  expression  in  brackets  is  the  discount  factor  where  the  rate  of  discount  is  assumed  to 
be  the  real  rate  of  interest  rat  a  given  time  period  t.  B,  C  and  r  are  defined  in  economic  terms 
using  appropriate  shadow  prices.  The  rule  is  therefore  to  maximise  NPV  and  the  criterion  for 
the  acceptance  of  a  project  is  if  NPV  >  0.  If  projects  are  to  be  ranked  the  one  with  the  highest 
NPV  is  chosen. 
An  alternative  criterion  is  that  of  the  internal  rate  of  return  (IRR)  which  may  be  defined  as: 
., 
(B,  -  Cj  /  (1  +  IRR)  =0 
/=O 
In  effect  the  IRR  is  the  discount  rate  which  reduces  the  NPV  to  zero 
(2.2) 
The  project  is 
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2.2.1  Efficiency  and  the  use  of  CBA 
The  purpose  of  CBA  in  its  narrowest  sense  is  to  select  projects  or  policies  which  imply  an 
optimal  allocation  of  resources,  with  the  main  criterion  being  that  of  efficiency.  In  such  a 
Pareto  optimal  state,  where  prices  reflect  the  true  marginal  costs,  scarce  resources  are  said  to 
be  efficiently  allocated  for  a  given  income  distribution,  if  no  one  person  can  be  made  better  off, 
without  making  someone  else  worse  off  (Bator,  1957).  This  principle  of  efficiency  is  built  into 
the  Kaldor  -  Hicks  potential  compensation  test  which  is  at  the  heart  of  the  welfare  basis  of 
CBA.  The  test  implies  that  the  potential  (via  compensation)  should  exist  for  a  proposed 
project  to  make  at  least  one  person  better  off  and  none  worse  off.  The  use  of  the  NPV  as  a 
criteria  for  optimality,  however,  is  only  valid  in  cases  where  there  is  relatively  high  degree  of 
certainty  surrounding  the  costs  and  benefits  of  a  project.  The  issue  of  the  optimality  and 
rationality  of  the  decision  will  be  raised  further  in  Chapter  4. 
2.2.2  Sensitivity  analysis 
While  the  use  of  sensitivity  analysis  is  often  cited  as  the  means  by  which  CBA  'deals'  with 
uncertainty  it  does  not  deal  explicitly  with  uncertainty,  per  se.  For  instance,  although 
sensitivity  analysis  is  useful,  as  a  means  of  demonstrating  the  effect  of  a  variation  in  key 
parameters,  it  is  more  limited  in  relation  to  dealing  explicitly  with  uncertainties  at  the  ex  ante 
stage  of  the  decision  process.  While,  as  will  be  highlighted  in  the  next  chapter,  it  may  be 
possible  to  adequately  predict  probability  distributions  for  some  of  the  variables  within  a  cost- 
benefit  analysis,  for  many  parameters  and  in  particular  for  combinations  of  parameters  which 
make  up  the  environmental  outcomes  of  a  proposed  action,  this  is  neither  theoretically  nor 
practically  possible.  It  is  this  lack  of  predictability  of  the  many  of  the  inputs  (especially 
environmental)  that  makes  the  need  to  deal  explicitly  with  uncertainty  in  the  decision 
framework,  so  pressing. 
2.3  Theoretical  issues  behind  cost-benefit  analysis. 
The  basis  of  what  to  include  in  cost-benefit  analysis  is  bound  up  with  the  assumptions  made 
by  neo-classical  economics,  in  relation  to  the  maximisation  of  a  social  welfare  function.  The 
underlying  basis  of  CBA  is  that,  it  is  used  to  select  projects  which  will  increase  social  welfare. 
The  notion  of  welfare  is  based  on  a  distinct  conception  of  economic  value  which  defines 
economic  value  in  terms  of  utility,  i.  e.  value  arises  if  someone  is  made  to  feel  better  off  in 
terms  of  their  wants  and  desires.  Positive  economic  value  therefore  arises  when  people  feel 
better  off,  while  negative  economic  value  arises  when  people  feel  worse  off.  The  utilities  to  be Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  26 
maximised  depend  however  on  the  consumption  levels  of  both  marketed  and  non  marketed 
goods.  Thus  what  are  considered  positive  impacts  are  either  increases  in  the  quanbty  or 
quality  of  goods  that  generate  positive  utility,  or  reductions  in  the  price  at  which  they  are 
supplied.  Costs  include  any  decreases  in  the  quality  or  quantity  of  goods  that  generate 
positive  utility,  increases  in  the  price  at  which  they  are  supplied,  or  opportunity  costs  which  will 
be  incurred  as  a  result  of  the  project  (Hanley  &  Splash,  1993).  The  importance  of  valuing  both 
marketed  and  non-marketed  benefits  and  costs  of  a  particular  decision  lies  in  the  recognition 
that  an  effect  on  the  utility  of  at  least  one  individual  is  recorded. 
An  important  assumption  made  by  welfare  theory  is  that  preferences  are  substitutable.  If  the 
quantity  of  one  element  of  an  individual's  bundle  is  reduced  then  it  is  possible  to  increase  the 
quantity  of  some  other  element,  so  as  to  leave  the  individual  no  worse  off  after  the  change 
(Freeman,  1993).  Substitutability  is  at  the  core  of  the  economic  concept  of  value,  in  that  it  is 
from  the  implied  trade-offs  that  information  is  revealed  about  the  values  which  people  place 
on  these  goods.  In  order  to  carry  out  such  substitutions  individuals  are  assumed  to  rank  the 
alternative  bundles  according  to  their  preferences.  The  preference  orderings  can  be 
represented  by  an  unobservable  continuous  ordinal  preference  or  utility  function.  Any  policy 
that  changes  the  consumption  bundle,  so  that  utility  increases,  is  measured  by  consumer 
surplus.  This  can  be  expressed  either  in  terms  of  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  or  willingness  to 
accept  compensation  (WTA).  The  use  of  a  money  metric  measure  of  utility  based  on 
consumer  surplus  allows  some  expression  of  the  intensity  of  preference  to  be  exhibited  by  the 
individual. 
An  important  issue  that  must  be  raised,  is  that  of  what  the  estimates  of  consumer  surplus  or 
willingness  to  pay  are  actually  measuring  in  practice,  in  relation  to  environmental  services  or 
functions  and  in  particular  where  environmental  goods  are  only  substitutable  up  to  a  point. 
This  issue  can  best  be  explained  diagramatically.  Fig  2.1  shows  a  conventional  supply 
(marginal  cost)  and  demand  (marginal  benefit)  curves  for  a  marketed  good  or  service.  The 
area  pbqc  is  the  value  that  would  show  up  in  gross  national  product  (market  price  times 
quantity).  The  cost  of  the  production,  is  the  area  under  the  supply  curve,  cbq.  The  producer 
surplus  or  net  rent  of  the  resource  is  the  area  between  the  market  price  and  the  supply  curve, 
pbc.  The  consumer  surplus,  the  amount  of  welfare  the  consumer  receives  over  and  above  the 
price  paid  in  the  market  is  the  area  abp.  The  total  economic  value  of  the  resource  is  the  sum 
of  the  producer  and  consumer  surplus,  or  the  area  abc  (Costanza  et  al,  1997b). Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  27 
Fig  2.1:  Conventional  supply  and  demand  curves  for  marketed  good. 
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Because,  as  was  highlighted  earlier,  many  ecosystem  services  or  functions  are  only 
substitutable  up  to  a  point,  then  their  demand  curves  in  reality  may  look  more  like  Fig  2.2.  In 
such  cases,  as  the  quantity  available  approaches  zero,  demand  and  therefore  consumer 
surplus  (as  well  as  total  economic  value)  approaches  infinity.  A  number  of  uncertainties  exist 
due  to  substantial  practical  difficulties  in  estimating  demand  curves  (Costarnza  et  al,  1997b). 
Furthermore  supply  curves  of  ecosystem  services  which  cannot  be  increased  or  decreased  by 
actions  of  the  economy  are  more  nearly  vertical  as  shown  in  Fig  2.2.  Difficulties  in  estimation 
therefore  result  in  the  likelihood  that  the  estimates  gained  will  be  lower  bound  valuations  of 
the  'true'  value  of  a  particular  ecosystem.  This  is  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  the  valuation 
assumes  that  there  are  no  thresholds,  discontinuities  or  irreversibilities  in  the  ecosystem 
response  functions,  when  in  reality  there  is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
presence  and  impacts  of  dis-equilibrium  effects.  As  a  result  in  practice  valuation  methods 
assume  that  the  demand  and  supply  curves  will  look  something  like  Fig  2.1,  whereas  in  reality 
supply  curves  for  ecosystems  are  more  nearly  inelastic,  approaching  infinity  as  the  quantity  of 
the  environmental  resource  goes  to  zero.  In  such  cases  the  consumer  and  producer  surplus 
and  thereby  the  total  value  of  ecosystem  services  would  also  approach  infinity  (Costanza  et 
al,  1997b). 
Uncertainty  surrounding  the  supply  of  ecosystem  services  and  functions  and  the  presence  of 
possible  thresholds  could  therefore  have  serious  implications  on  the  reliability  of  valuation 
estimations  gained.  Moreover,  while  ideally  the  unit  value  of  a  ecosystem  would  be  calculated 
from  the  sum  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus,  often  the  net  rent  or  producer  surplus  and/  or 
price  times  quantity  is  used  as  a  measure  when  the  first  measure  is  not  available.  Given  that 
the  demand  curve  for  ecosystem  services  looks  more  like  Fig  2.2  than  Fig  2.1  then  the 
estimate  of  area  pbqc  is  a  conservative  estimate  of  abc.  All  these  factors  point  us  towards  the 
reality  that  valuation  estimates  will  be  lower  bound  estimates  of  the  total  economic  value  of  an 
ecosystem,  with  the  potential  size  of  the  error  increasing  in  relation  to  the  degree  of 
uncertainty  surrounding  a  particular  ecosystem. 
2.3.1  Commensurability  and  consumer  sovereignty  in  decision  making 
A  fundamental  basis  of  the  measurement  of  economic  value  is  the  assumption  of 
commensurability.  Commensurability  implies  that  it  is  possible  to  equate  environmental  value 
expressed  through  monetary  preferences  with  ordinary  goods  and  services.  Implicit  in  the  use 
of  environmental  valuation  and  cost-benefit  analysis  is  therefore  the  assumption  that 
individuals  regard  features  and  uses  of  the  natural  environment  as  consumption  commodities 
on  an  equal  footing  with  ordinary  commodities  purchased  in  markets.  This  is  the  equivalent  of Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  29 
saying  that  an  individual  is  best  able  to  decide  between  a  preference  for  say,  improved  air 
quality  over  that  for  a  new  car.  This  property  of  substitutability  is  at  the  core  of  the  economic 
concept  of  value  in  that  it  is  from  the  trade-off  ratios  implied  by  the  substtution  of  goods  that 
information  is  revealed  about  the  values  that  people  place  on  these  goods. 
There  are  a  number  of  issues  relating  to  the  assumption  of  commensurability  that  merit  further 
attention.  The  first  is  that  individuals  may  be  unwilling  to  trade-off  increases/  decreases  in  the 
quantity  of  an  environmental  good  against  losses/gains  in  income.  For  example  individuals 
may  refuse  to  trade  off  the  loss  of  particular  species  against  a  measure  of  income,  i.  e.  they 
exhibit  lexicographic  preferences  (Splash  &  Hanley,  1995).  Lexicographic  preferences  are 
such  that  WTA  would  be  infinite  and  WTP  would  equal  the  entire  budget,  and  imply  that  an 
approach  built  around  the  Kaldor-Hicks  potential  compensation  test  becomes  inoperable  once 
the  compensatory  amounts  become  infinite  (Splash  &  Hanley,  1995). 
A  second  issue,  that  is  very  important  in  relation  to  the  problem  of  uncertainty  is  that  many 
individuals  may  not  sufficiently  understand  a  complex  issue  such  as  biodiversity  loss  and 
hence  may  not  be  able  to  make  the  trade-off  decisions  required.  Furthermore,  even  when 
consumers  are  sufficiently  informed,  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  particular 
benefits,  for  example,  of  biodiversity  restricts  their  ability  to  make  such  choices. 
Environmental  goods  such  as  biodiversity  often  have  characteristics  which  are  unclear,  and 
the  relationship  that  biodiversity  has  in  terms  of  the  individual's  welfare  or  utility  is  often  vague 
and  removed  from  every  day  experiences  of  life.  As  a  result  many  consumers  may  not 
understand  all  of  the  attributes  of  the  ecosystem  that  are  necessary  to  support  the  ability  of 
the  natural  system  to  produce  those  services  from  which  they  benefit  directly  or  indirectly 
(Bingham  et  al,  1995). 
Consequently,  while  for  certain  well  defined  environmental  goods  it  would  be  fair  to  argue  that 
they  can  be  seen  as  commensurable  with  marketed  goods,  for  other  less  tangible  services, 
provided  by  ecosystems,  this  may  be  more  problematic.  Furthermore  the  assumption  of 
commensurability,  if  applied  directly  to  the  use  of  CBA  as  a  decision-making  criteria  (based  on 
NPV)  would  imply  that  all  resources  are  substitutable,  breaking  any  constraints  imposed  by  a 
definition  of  sustainability  which  implies  non-  declining  natural  capital.  As  Russell  (1995) 
argues,  the  acceptance  of  physically  characterised  constraints  as  part  of  the  definition  of 
sustainability,  for  example  in  the  identification  of  a  non-substitutable  element  of  natural  capital, 
may  not  be  able  to  be  characterised  in  the  language  of  individual  preferences.  Consequently, Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  30 
the  use  of  cost-benefit  analysis  as  a  strict  decision  criterion,  especially  in  relation  to  crucial  life 
supporting  functions  that  are  not  substitutable,  would  appear  problematic. 
Consumer  sovereignty 
Closely  linked  to  the  assumption  of  commensurability  is  the  notion  of  consumer  sovereignty, 
which  implies  that  the  individual  is  best  able  to  make  choices  with  respect  to  preferences 
between  marketed  and  non-marketed  goods  that  are  consistent  with  his/  her  own  welfare. 
However,  in  relation  to  environmental  goods  particularly,  where  a  high  degree  of  uncertainty  is 
faced,  questions  are  raised  over  the  extent  to  which  consumers  should  be  given  sovereignty 
over  alternative  states  of  nature,  by  making  choices  based  on  the  assumption  of 
commensurability  (Common,  1995).  Questions  are  frequently  raised  from  disciplines  outside 
of  economics,  such  as  ecology,  over  whether  economic  valuation  alone  can  adequately 
capture  all  that  decision  makers  need  to  know  to  confront  irreversible  ecosystem  modifications 
that  could  have  long-term  economic  and  social  repercussions.  It  would  appear  that  as  yet  we 
do  not  have: 
"  anything  like  a  full  picture  of  the  mutually  exclusive  set  of  motivations  underlying  individual 
preferences  for  environmental  goods"  (Barbier  et  al,  1995:  p836) 
Even  if  one  believes  that  the  assumption  of  commensurability  does  hold,  objections  to 
consumer  sovereignty  can  be  made  on  a  ethical  basis  (Blarney  and  Common,  1994).  One 
major  division,  highlighted  by  Sagoff  (1988),  is  in  the  distinction  between  individual  and  citizen 
preferences.  Thus,  for  example,  it  is  argued  that  an  individual  will  distinguish  between  acting 
as  a  consumer  and  a  citizen.  It  is  important  to  recognise  that  people  may  play  different  roles 
when  valuing  goods,  for  example  as  a  decision  maker  or  as  a  private  agent  (Bingham  et  al, 
1995). 
The  different  economic  and  ecological  scales  at  work  pose  further  problems  over  the  reliability 
of  using  economic  preferences  as  a  basis  for  welfare  measurement  in  that  the  broader 
ecological  effects  of  environmental  change  often  go  beyond  the  traditional  calculation  and 
aggregation  of  welfare  measures.  Problems  therefore  remain  regarding  the  extent  to  which 
focusing  on  the  individual  level  of  welfare  is  indeed  compatible  with  valuing  the  whole 
ecosystem  (Norton,  1995).  This  argument  can  be  extended  to  situations  of  environmental 
uncertainty  in  that  it  could  be  argued  that  the  way  that  an  individual  adjusts  his/  her 
preferences  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  is  very  different  to  that  of  a  citizen  acting  on  behalf  of Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  _31 
society.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  this  poses  a  number  of  largely  unanswered  problems  for  the 
valuation  of  public  goods  such  as  biodiversity  conservation. 
While  Sagoff  (1988)  may  overstate  his  case  by  denying  that  many  decisions  are  made  on  an 
economic  basis  he  does  highlight  some  of  the  limitations  and  uncertainties  that  will  still  be 
present  when  dealing  with  valuation  estimates  from  complex  ecosystems.  Although  it  is 
important  not  to  disregard  individual  preferences,  it  should  be  also  recognised,  as  Common 
(1995)  argues,  that  individual  preferences  are  in  a  large  way  socially  determined. 
Consequently  those  preferences  alone  cannot  be  used  as  independent  criteria  (as  implied  by 
the  use  of  an  additive  social  welfare  function  in  CBA)  for  social  ranking  arrangements.  Again 
these  arguments  would  suggest  that  cost-benefit  analysis  should  be  interpreted  more  as  a 
framework  for  a  decision-making  rather  than  as  strict  decision-making  rule. 
2.3.2  Using  an  additive  welfare  function 
An  important  issue  that  will  be  briefly  noted  is  that  net  present  value  is  used  as  a  additive 
value  function,  where  the  different  dimensions  are  aggregated  using  a  simple  linear  weighting 
rule.  The  assumption  of  commensurability  implies  that  the  attributes  of  the  utility  function, 
which  is  maximised  by  the  individual,  exhibits  the  property  of  preference  independence  in  that 
the  substitutability  or  trade-off  ratios  implied  between  two  attributes  are  independent  of  the 
values  of  the  other  attributes  (Munda,  1996).  This  implies  the  ability  to  separate  values,  and 
the  use  of  the  additive  value  function  permits  the  assessment  of  the  marginal  contribution  of 
each  attribute  separately.  The  marginal  value  of  each  attribute  can  then  be  added  together  to 
yield  a  total  value. 
In  relation  to  many  environmental  attributes  this  approach  would  not  be  consistent  with  the 
dynamics  of  ecosystems  which  are  often  non  linear.  Thus,  for  example,  the  combined  costs 
of  the  loss  of  particular  mix  of  species,  essential  in  relation  to  the  resilience  of  an  ecosystem, 
is  likely  to  be  more  than  the  marginal  cost  of  the  loss  of  one  particular  species.  Because  there 
is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  interaction  and  mixing  of  species  as  well  as 
the  exact  nature  of  the  biological  and  chemical  flows  in  an  ecosystem,  poses  problems  for  the 
use  of  a  linear  additive  function,  in  that  it  may  underestimate  the  overall  consequences  of  a 
particular  impact.  To  illustrate  it  is  likely  that  the  cumulative  affect  of  species  loss  in  relation  to 
the  effect  on  ecosystem  services  and  functions  is  greater  in  value  terms  than  the  addition  of 
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The  assumption  of  perfect  substitutability  inherent  in  the  notion  of  commensurability  would 
therefore  seem  to  be  at  odds  with  the  dynamics  of  complex  ecosystems  in  that  one-for-one 
substitutions  between  environmental  attributes  and  marketed  goods  may  not  be  valid  when 
the  cumulative  impact  of  losses  in  environmental  attributes  are  taken  into  account. 
Alternatively  as  was  pointed  out  in  Chapter  1,  the  substitution  between  key  ecosystem 
components  and  human  capital  may  simply  not  be  technically  possible  or  desirable.  The  use 
of  CBA  as  a  decision  criteria  based  on  NPV  would  therefore  be  faced  with  additional 
theoretical  problems,  which  would  again  point  to  its  interpretation  as  a  more  general  decision 
framework. 
2.3.3  Discounting 
The  use  of  discounting  in  Cost-  Benefit-An  a  lys  is  takes  into  account  two  underlying 
assumptions,  firstly  that  individuals  exhibit  a  time  preference  for  present  rather  than  future 
consumption,  and  secondly  there  is  a  positive  rate  of  return  on  capital  (which  is  normally 
taken  as  the  rate  of  interest)  (Munasinghe,  1993a).  Discounting  is  used  by  economics  in 
order  to  compare  the  total  stock  of  capital  over  time  and  thus  assess  values  measured  at 
different  time  intervals.  Although  the  use  of  discounting  raises  a  number  of  contentious  issues 
such  as  its  effect  on  inter-generational  equity  the  main  concern  here  is  that  from  a  theoretical 
perspective,  the  choice  of  discount  rate  would  appear  to  have  major  implications  with  respect 
to  uncertainty.  A  high  discount  rate  will  in  effect  banish  uncertainty  regarding  future  outcomes 
from  detailed  consideration.  In  this  sense  a  high  rate  of  discount  may  in  fact  screen  away 
many  of  the  long-term  uncertainties  of  a  project.  However,  as  will  be  highlighted  in  the 
following  chapter,  it  is  often  the  long-term  results  of  the  cumulative  effects  of  a  project  that  are 
the  potentially  most  catastrophic.  The  problem  of  discounting  from  an  ecological  perspective 
is  that  species  with  a  growth  rate  less  than  the  mortality  rate  will  be  optimally  driven  to 
extinction  unless  the  growth  rate  of  the  value  of  the  species  sufficiently  compensates  for  this 
difference  or  their  extraction  is  regulated  (Barbier  et  al,  1995).  However,  such  theoretical 
problems  are  countered  by  the  practical  issue  of  choosing  an  alternative  'correct'  discount 
rate,  which  inevitably  implies  the  making  of  value  judgements.  This  again  weakens 
arguments  that  favour  the  use  of  CBA  as  a  decision  rule  and  points  to  the  realisation  that 
concerns  over  the  uncertainties  present  in  any  project  will  have  to  be  accounted  for  in  the 
context  of  a  more  general  framework  and  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty. Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  _33) 
2.4  Introduction  to  environmental  valuation 
Chapter  1  noted  that  there  are  a  number  of  critical  environmental  services  or  functions  which 
have  a  significant  impact  in  terms  of  human  welfare,  but  which  are  external  to  the  market. 
The  non-existence  of  well  functioning  markets  for  biological  resources  means  that  there  is  no 
ready  index  of  value  and  that  the  true  value  of  the  environment  to  society  is  often  not 
represented  adequately  through  market  signals  or  more  specifically  prices  (Pearce  &  Turner 
1990).  This  issue  poses  a  problem  for  standard  cost-  benefit  analysis  in  that,  for  the  cdteria  of 
efficiency  to  be  met,  all  the  relevant  dimensions  underlying  the  costs  and  benefits  must  be 
identified  (Munda,  1996).  So  long  as  the  environmental  impacts  of  a  project  or  policy  causes 
an  increase  or  decrease  in  the  level  of  welfare  of  at  least  one  person  in  the  relevant 
population,  or  changes  the  level  or  quality  of  some  positively  valued  commodity,  then  they 
must  be  included  in  the  analysis  (Hanley  &  Splash,  1993).  It  is  in  response  to  the  need  to 
gain  estimates  of  the  social  value  of  environmental  services  and  functions  that  the  field  of 
environmental  valuation  had  been  developed. 
In  a  more  general  sense  the  need  to  value  the  environment  stems  from  the  perception  that  the 
allocation  of  biological  resources  on  the  basis  of  current  market  signals  is  inefficient  and 
inequitable  and  leads  to  losses  in  social  welfare  (Barbier  et  al,  1995).  The  valuation  exercise 
therefore  aims  to  confront  resource  users  with  the  full  social  cost  of  their  behaviour  and 
enables  those  who  invest  in  conservation  to  appropriate  the  benefits  (Barbier,  et  al,  1995). 
The  debate  surrounding  the  theory  and  practice  of  environmental  valuation,  however,  is 
without  doubt  the  most  controversial  aspect  of  environmental  economics.  Although,  this 
thesis  side-steps  the  extensive  literature  surrounding  this  debate,  it  is  argued  that  all  decisions 
concerning  the  allocation  of  environmental  resources,  will  necessarily  imply  some  form  of 
valuation.  Thus  the  use  of  money  as  a  unit  of  valuation  is  merely  a  device  of  convenience, 
rather  than  an  implicit  statement  that  money  is  all  that  matters  (Hanley  &  Splash,  1993).  The 
choice  comes  down  to  one  of  whether  or  not  such  valuations  should  be  made  explicit  or  not. 
Thus: 
it  we  can  do  them  with  an  explicit  acknowledgement  of  the  huge  uncertainties  involved  or  not,, 
but  as  long  as  we  are  forced  to  make  choices  about  the  use  of  resources  we  are  valuing  those 
resources"  (Costanza,  et  al,  1997b:  p  xxi) 
The  use  of  valuation  does,  where  reliable,  improve  the  amount  and  quality  of  the  information 
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upon  by  most  models  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  and  indeed  as  has  been  pointed 
out,  are  utilised  in  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  to  the  case-study  in  Belize.  The 
purpose  of  this  section  is  not  to  provide  an  in-depth  review  of  the  many  theoretical  and 
methodological  problems  faced  in  environmental  valuation,  but  instead  to  provide  a  basis  on 
which  the  notion  of  valuation  uncertainty  can  be  developed  in  the  next  chapter.  The  debate 
on  valuation  as  well  as  evaluations  of  the  particular  methods  employed  is  left  to  the  extensive 
literature  on  the  topic. 
2.4.1  Derining  value 
Value  can  be  seen  to  have  two  major  components  which  can  then  be  further  subdivided 
depending  on  the  particular  resource.  The  first  type  of  value  is  intrinsic  value,  which  is  value 
that  exists  independent  of  the  valuer  , 
i.  e.  that  a  environmental  resource  or  attribute  has  a 
value  of  its  own  right.  The  second  type  of  value  is  anthropocentric  value.  This  does  not  mean 
however,  that  all  ecosystem  values  derive  from  direct  human  use,  nor  that  there  is  no  intrinsic 
value  in  the  environment,  only  that  it  is  impossible  to  measure  non-anthropocentric  value.  As 
Chapter  1  highlighted,  many  of  the  most  important  functions  are  in  fact  related  to  the 
underlying  life  supporting  services  that  are  provided.  Of  crucial  importance  therefore  will  be 
the  need  to  gather  sufficient  information  about  ecosystem  values  that  include  production 
functions  that  are  broadly  enough  defined  to  include  structures  and  processes  that  transform 
matter  and  energy  inputs  into  ecosystem  services  that  are  either  directly  valued  by  people  or 
are  important  in  supporting  the  underlying  features  of  the  ecological  system  that  is  valued 
(Bingham  et  al,  1995).  However,  the  value  of  ecological  services,  for  example  those 
encapsulated  by  biodiversity,  will  depend  on  many  other  things  besides  its  ecological 
significance.  Value  will  vary  from  one  place  to  another  and  with  different  cultures. 
Consequently  the  value  given  for  example  to  biodiversity  will  not  only  determine  its  worth  in 
any  given  society,  but  also  how  it  is  used  or  abused  (Barbier,  et  al,  1995). 
2.4.2  A  typology  of  value 
Biological  resources  can  be  seen  to  be  of  value  either  directly  (they  are  used  directly  in 
consumption  or  production)  or  indirectly  (they  support  measures  which  have  direct  value).  In 
addition  ecological  resources  also  have  non-use  or  passive  use  value,  which  are  motivated  by 
ethical  considerations.  If  we  take  the  example  of  a  forest,  direct  use  value  (DUV)  is  derived 
from  the  extraction  of  timber  and  other  goods  from  the  forest,  and  indirect  use  value  (IUV) 
would  relate  to  the  employment  and/or  recreation  that  is  created  from  primary  use.  Two  other 
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value  (OV)  and  quasi  option  value  (QOV).  Option  value  relates  to  the  value  of  retaining  an 
option  for  making  use  of  a  resource  in  the  future,  where  losses  would  be  irreversible. 
(Weisbrod,  1964:  Bishop,  1982:  Kristrom,  1990).  Quasi-option  value  is  defined  as  the  value  of 
the  future  information  protected  by  preserving  a  resource  (Arrow  &  Fisher,  1974;  Fisher  & 
Haneman,  1987).  Option  value  and  quasi-option  values  have  been  cited  as  means  of 
'dealing'  with  uncertainty  within  the  valuation  process,  and  will  be  critically  assessed  in 
Chapter  4. 
Environmental  economists  have  extended  utilitarian  use  value  by  including  the  notion  of  non  - 
use  values.  Non  -use  value  can  be  subdivided  into  two  further  categories,  namely  bequest 
value  (BV)  and  existence  value  (EV)  (Brown,  1990;  Randall,  1991).  Bequest  value  can  be 
defined  as  the  desire  to  pass  on  to  the  next  generation  or  heirs  the  ability  to  use  or  enjoy  a 
environmental  resource,  to  the  same  extent  as  at  present.  Existence  value  refers  to  the  worth 
that  an  individual  places  on  the  preservation  of  some  asset  which  will  never  be  directly  used 
by  future  generations.  By  its  very  nature  existence  value  is  altruistic,  covering  for  instance  the 
pleasure  that  is  derived  from  knowing  that  certain  species  exist,  for  example  blue  whales.  It  is 
also  evident  that  many  environmental  resources  will  also  be  attributed  with  a  number  of 
cultural  and  spiritual  values  (Young,  1995).  Cultural  values  may  encompass  use  values  , 
through  direct  use  of  an  environmental  resource  which  may  be  particular  to  a  particular 
indigenous  group  and/  or  non-use  values  in  terms  of  the  spiritual  use  or  attachment  of 
spiritual/cultural  feelings  towards  a  particular  environmental  resource.  The  difficulty  in 
estimating  these  values  is  that  often  it  is  difficult  to  equate  them  with  monetary  value  as  well 
as  to  be  sure  to  what  extent  they  are  included  by  environmental  valuation  as  a  component  for 
example  of  existence  value  (Young,  1995). 
These  values  constitute  a  broadly  accepted  taxonomy  of  values  used  by  environmental 
economists  which  when  aggregated  can  be  termed  'total  economic  value'  (TEV).  The 
components  of  which  are  illustrated  in  Fig  2.3.  What  is  important  to  point  out  is  that  TEV  does 
not  constitute  total  value(TV).  This  latter  concept  is  measured  by  the  anthropocentric  value 
(TEV)  and  the  non-anthropocentric  instrumental  or  primary  value  (PV).  This  point  underlines 
the  sense  that  economic  valuation  of  the  environment  will  represent  only  a  partial  value. 
On  a  conceptual  as  well  as  practical  basis,  the  most  difficult  values  to  deal  with  are  those 
values  which  are  not  consumed  directly.  Firstly  these  consist  of  indirect  use  values,  for 
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commodity.  The  role  of  mangroves  as  a  nursery  for  seafood  stocks  is  a  good  example  of  this. 
The  second  category  consists  of  non-use  values,  which  are  not  consumed 
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directly  or  indirectly  and  are  often  highly  intangible.  Underlying  all  this  full  range  of  values  is 
what  has  been  termed  by  Turner  (1995)  as  primary  value  or  insurance  value  (Barbier,  et  al, 
1995).  Primary  value  encapsulates  the  prior  value  of  the  system  or  the  components  that 
maintain  the  resilience  of  the  system  that  is  the  basis  for  the  flow  of  other  direct  and  indirect 
values.  In  this  sense  the  system  has  an  insurance  value  in  allowing  the  system  to  maintain 
the  flow  of  valued  services  and  functions  in  the  face  of  change.  The  notion  of  primary  value  is 
crucial  in  relation  to  the  problem  of  uncertainty,  in  that  it  is  often  the  primary  value  of  biological 
resources  on  which  the  flow  of  all  other  values  depend,  which  is  dependent  on  the  complex 
interactions  of  species  within  the  ecosystem.  Traditionally  there  have  been  a  lack  of 
mechanisms  to  incorporate  such  values  into  decision  making  and  many  have  been  ignored 
due  to  limited  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  the  values  to  ecological  sustainability.  This 
emphasises  the  point  that  total  economic  value  only  forms  a  lower  band  on  the  social  value  of 
biological  resources  (Barbier  et  al,  1995). 
In  practice  the  range  of  services  provided  by  ecosystem  functions  i.  e.  climate  moderation  and 
water  purification,  lies  somewhere  between  primary  and  secondary  values,  as  although  they 
are  tangible  they  are  poorly  estimated  by  environmental  scientists  and  incompletely  valued  by 
current  valuation  methods.  It  is  apparent,  however,  that  the  value  of  these  poorly 
characterised  services  are  potentially  quite  large  (Bingham  et  al,  1995:  p  79).  The  existence 
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resource  results  in  the  problem  of  valuation  uncertainty,  which  will  be  dealt  with  in  detail  in  the 
next  chapter. 
2.5  Cost-benefift  analysis  as  an  integrated  decision  making  framework. 
In  this  chapter  some  of  the  potential  weaknesses  and  limitations  surrounding  both  the  theory 
and  practice  of  cost-benefit  analysis  and  valuation  have  been  pointed  out.  The  majority  of  the 
criticisms  of  CBA  are  based  on  its  use  as  a  strict  decision  criterion  based  on  the  NPV  rule.  It 
is  this  strict  interpretation  of  CBA  in  terms  of  efficiency  and  optimality  that  is  most  questionable 
in  relation  to  the  problem  of  environmental  uncertainty.  As  highlighted  in  Chapter  1,  the 
objective  of  efficiency  is  not  necessarily  compatible  with  sustainability  objectives  such  as 
ecosystem  resilience,  requiring  trade-offs  to  be  made.  Moreover,  while  the  incorporation  of 
environmental  values  into  cost-benefit  analysis  aids  the  attainment  of  the  efficiency  criteria,  no 
special  treatment  of  the  environment  is  given  (Hanley,  1995).  Thus  passing  the  KaIdor-Hicks 
test  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  sustainability  of  a  project  or  policy,  if  the  sustainability 
objective  is  one  of  non-declining  natural  capital.  Furthermore,  the  dynamic  interdependence 
of  the  ecological  economic  system  highlighted  in  Chapter  1  may  imply  that  strict  economic 
optimising  may  actually  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  resilience  of  ecosystems,  contradicting 
another  objective  of  sustainability  (Perrings,  1987;  Common  &  Perrings,  1992). 
It  is  the  presence  of  uncertainty,  however  that  is  crucial  in  relation  to  how  the  use  of  cost- 
benefit  analysis  is  interpreted.  In  the  presence  of  uncertainty,  its  ability  to  deal  with  problems 
of  non-declining  natural  capital,  and  irreversibility  will  be  limited.  Consequently  the  use  of 
NPV  as  a  single  decision  criterion  in  order  to  find  a  optimal  solution,  to  maximising  social 
welfare  is  problematic  and  at  worse  non-sensical  for  situations  where  the  set  of  project/  policy 
alternatives  considered  are  not  well  defined  and  the  alternatives  are  all  mutually  exclusive. 
The  reality  for  many  environmental  policies  or  projects  is  that  the  necessary  conditions  which 
allow  CBA  to  be  used  as  an  optimal  decision  framework  are  not  present,  due  to  uncertainties 
about  both  the  environmental  effects  of  a  particular  project  or  policy  and  the  lack  of 
information  about  the  value  of  any  changes. 
However,  rather  than  rejecting  the  use  of  cost-benefit  analysis  outright,  a  wider  interpretation 
of  CBA  can  be  given  in  which  the  focus  is  not  so  much  on  its  use  as  an  absolute  decision 
criterion,  but  as  a  way  of  organising  and  consolidating  all  the  available  data  on  a  project 
(Common,  1995).  This  is  especially  the  case  where  multiple  sources  of  market  failure  are 
evident  and  there  is  no  confidence  about  the  use  of  the  NPV  criteria  as  a  means  of  ranking 
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that  ecosystem  services  are  perfectly  understood  and  accordingly  evaluated  in  monetary 
units,  it  is  unlikely  that  monetary  valuation  alone  would  adequately  capture  all  that  decision 
makers  need  to  know  to  confront  irreversible  ecosystem  modifications  that  could  have  serious 
long-term  economic  and  social  repercussions.  As  a  result  an  important  issue  in  any 
integrated  framework  for  making  decisions  is  the  need  to  clarify  the  situations  where 
conventional  economic  values  are  sufficient  and  where  broader  human  values,  including  non- 
monetary  values,  are  more  appropriate.  As  a  consequence  rather  than  focusing  on  CBA  as  a 
strict  efficiency/  optimality  criterion,  a  more  general  framework  needs  to  be  adopted  to 
consider  projects  in  relation  to  socially  agreed  objectives. 
With  the  emphasis  on  the  use  of  CBA  shifted  from  that  of  a  simple  decision  rule  to  that  of  a 
framework  which  incorporates  a  set  of  procedures  to  help  organise  available  information, 
many  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  concerns  of  using  traditional  cost-benefit  analysis  are 
answered.  Moreover  valuation  is  given  a  different  role  that  need  not  necessarily  imply  making 
trade-offs  between  marketed  and  non-marketed  goods.  A  further  advantage  of  interpreting 
CBA  simply  as  a  tool  for  organising  and  expressing  information  about  a  particular  project  or 
policy  under  consideration  is  that  room  is  given  for  more  explicit  attention  to  uncertainty,  once 
estimates  of  the  relevant  costs  and  benefits  (including  environmental  costs  and  benefits)  have 
been  obtained. 
A  framework  that  can  therefore  be  envisaged  is  one  in  which  a  number  of  stages  in  the 
decision-making  process  can  be  identified.  For  example,  in  the  first  stage  the  project  could  be 
put  through  a  strict  economic  analysis  where  the  use  of  a  NPV  criteria  will  be  of  value.  As  the 
number  of  considerations  that  CBA  focuses  on  increases,  the  project  will  have  to  be 
considered  in  respect  of  different  objectives,  so  the  second  stage  could  be  the  use  of  a 
extended  cost-benefit  analysis  which  would  incorporate  environmental  valuation  estimates.  In 
this  stage  the  use  of  the  NPV  criterion  would  be  of  limited  use,  if  at  all  applicable.  Further 
stages  could  include  consideration  of  the  non-com  mensu  rable  life-supporting  services  and 
social  objectives  such  as  equity  considerations,  a  schematic  model  of  such  an  approach  is 
shown  in  Fig  2.4. Chapter  2:  The  decision-making  context  39 
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What  any  decision-making  framework  inevitably  involves  is  the  equating  of  often 
incommensurable  units  or  different  objectives.  Whatever  form  the  ranking  of  alternatives 
takes,  it  cannot  be  conducted  without  the  introduction  of  value  judgements.  Consequently 
rather  than  focusing  on  the  actual  decision  per  se  which  will  inevitably  involve  some  form  of 
value  judgement,  the  emphasis  turns  to  an  analysis  of  the  decision  making  process.  This 
recognition  is  important  in  providing  a  context  for  explaining  the  way  that  environmental 
decisions  are  made,  as  well  a  context  in  which  prescriptions  on  the  way  that  decisions  should 
be  made  can  be  advanced.  Within  such  a  decision-making  framework  the  concern  in  this 
thesis  is  on  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  evaluated  within  the  decision-making  process.  '. 
Inevitably  any  decision  making  process  will  deal  with  personal  and  political  agendas,  stakeholder  and 
complex  power  relationships.  A  caveat  is  made  here  in  that  while  crucial  to  the  decision  makIng  process, 
this  essential  political  element  of  the  decision  making  is  outwith  the  scope  and  focus  of  the  thesis,  and  will 
only  be  dealt  ,,  6th  in  a  cursory  manner. Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  40 
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CHAPTER  3:  ENVIRONMENTAL  UNCERTAINTY 
3.1  IntroducHon 
In  the  previous  chapters  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty  problem  faced  in  many  environmental 
issues  has  been  highlighted  and  the  decision-making  context  in  which  environmental 
uncertainty  will  ultimately  dealt  with,  outlined.  A  basic  premise  of  this  thesis  is  that  the  type  of 
uncertainty  faced  in  many  decisions  concerning  the  environment  is  such  that  an  alternative 
approach  to  risk-based  models  will  be  required.  This  assertion  is  based  on  the  realisation  that 
there  are  a  number  of  different  modalities  of  uncertainty,  reflecting  the  notion  that  in  any  given 
decision  the  type  and  level  of  uncertainty  will  often  vary.  This  chapter  is  concerned  therefore 
with  developing  a  more  comprehensive  theory  and  definition  of  uncertainty  and  in  particular 
environmental  uncertainty,  which  gives  a  firm  basis  on  which  a  critique  of  existing  models  can 
be  developed. 
This  chapter  is  organised  into  two  main  sections.  The  first  considers  the  concept  of 
uncertainty  in  a  general  fashion,  before  developing  a  framework  which  will  allow  the  different 
modalities  of  uncertainty  to  be  identified.  The  next  stage  is  to  use  this  framework  to  highlight 
some  of  the  different  types,  of  uncertainty  such  as  ecological  uncertainty  and  valuation 
uncertainty,  faced  in  environmental  policy  making. 
3.2  Conceptualising  uncertainty 
The  presence  of  uncertainty  in  many  choices  and  decisions  taken  both  by  individuals  and 
society  would  appear  irrefutable.  Before  an  attempt  can  be  made  to  provide  explanations  or 
prescriptions  of  how  decision  makers  do  and  should  account  for  uncertainty  and  more 
specifically  environmental  uncertainty,  a  crucial  step  is  to  conceptualise  uncertainty  at  an 
epistemological  level.  It  is  only  by  developing  a  thorough  conceptualisation  of  what  is  meant 
by  uncertainty  and  what  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  imply  for  decision  makers  that 
an  adequate  basis,  on  which  to  evaluate  the  different  models  which  attempt  to  deal  with 
uncertainty,  will  be  provided. 
Most  mainstream  economic  approaches  tend,  however,  to  treat  the  way  that  uncertainty  is 
conceptualised  as  a  secondary  task.  While  some  changes  are  evident  in  the  environmental- 
economics  literature  too  often  the  tendency  is  to  treat  uncertainty  as  a  phenomenon  which  can Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  42 
be  handled  within  a  probability  framework,  without  questioning  whether  such  an  approach  is 
suitable  or  applicable  to  the  particular  uncertainty  problem  in  question.  More  recently  a 
number  of  contributions  from  environmental  economics  and  in  particular  ecological  economics 
have,  began  to  recognise  the  problem  of  uncertainty  (See  for  example  the  important 
contributions  made  by:  Perrings  1997b,  1989;  Costanza,  1994;  Ehrlich,  1994;  Vercelli,  1995; 
Faucheux  &  Froger,  1995).  This  implies  an  increasing  readiness  to  accept  that,  for  particular 
uncertainty  problems,  there  may  be  a  need  to  go  beyond  to  the  use  of  probability  and 
accompanying  traditional  decision-making  paradigms.  This  admission  highlights  a  recurrent 
theme  in  the  environmental  literature,  namely  that  traditional  economic  modelling  approaches 
are  not  well  equipped  to  deal  with  the  type  of  uncertainty  often  faced  in  environmental 
decision  making. 
Amongst  these  authors  Vercelli  (1995)  and  Faucheux  &  Froger  (1995)  are  notable  in 
recognising  the  need  to  conceptualise  uncertainty  and  its  place  in  a  rational  decision-making 
framework.  Perrings  (1989,1997b)  and  Dalmazzone  (1995)  have  emphasised  the  need  to 
recognise  the  problem  of  uncertainty  explicitly  and  suggest  that  there  is  a  need  to  look  to 
alternative  frameworks  such  as  Shackles' 
. 
Even  so,  much  of  the  literature  in  which 
conceptual  isations  of  uncertainty  are  found  forms  part  of  the  wider  economic  literature  relating 
to  expectations  and  uncertainty.  Such  work  has  a  long  history  stretching  from  Keynes  (1921), 
Knight  (1921)  and  of  course  Shackle  (1949,1955,1961)  to  more  recent  contributions  from 
Ford  (1983,1987,1994),  Lawson  (11988,1997)  and  Davidson  (1996). 
Underlying  the  different  definitions  and  usages  of  uncertainty  are  different  conceptualisations 
of  the  reality  within  which  an  individual  operates  and  on  which  his  or  her  expectations  in  the 
face  of  uncertainty  are  formed.  It  is  these  different  conceptual  isations  which  influence  the 
extent  to  which  uncertainty  is  tied  up  with  the  notion  of  probability.  In  essence  two  main 
concepts  of  reality  can  be  identified  and  these  are  highlighted  by  Fig  3.1.  The  first  is  that  of  an 
immutable  reality  which  is  not  susceptible  to  change  induced  by  human  actions  and  which  can 
be  fully  described  by  unchanging  objective  conditional  probability  functions  (Davidson,  1996). 
A  distinction  is  often  made  between  models  which  assume  that  the  future  is  known  or  is  at 
least  knowable,  and  those  which  accept  that  in  the  short  run  the  future  is  not  completely 
known  due  to  limitations  in  the  ability  of  humans  to  process  all  of  the  available  information.  It 
is  this  latter  type  of  model  which  encompasses  the  dominant  literature  in  economics  based  on 
expected  utility.  Thus,  in  this  concept  of  reality  the  economic  and  environmental  system  is 
viewed  as  ergodic,  in  that  the  presumption  is  made  of  a- 
'  This  important  contribution  will  be  reviewed  in  greater  depth  in  chapter  5. Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  43 
"pre-programmed  stable,  conservative  system  where  the  past,  present  and  future  reality  are 
predetermined  whether  the  system  is  stochastic  or  not"  (Davidson,  1996:  p481) 
Fig  3.1:  Concepts  of  economic  reality 
A.  Immutable  reality 
Type  1.  Rational  Expectations  school  The  future  is  known  or  at  least  knowable  in 
both  the  short  and  long  run. 
Probability  as  knowledge  is  an  object  of 
external  knowledge. 
Reality  is  predetermined. 
Type  2.  Subjectivists 
B.  Transmutable  reality 
In  the  short  run  the  future  is  not  completely 
known,  even  although  in  the  long  run  reality  is 
predetermined  and  thus  knowable. 
Probability  is  a  property  of  knowledge. 
Creative  reality.  Some  aspect  of 
reality  will  be  created  by  human 
action  or  other  stimuli  today  or  in  the 
future.  The  future  can  not  be  corralled  by 
probability. 
Source:  Adapted  from  Davidson  (1996)  and  Lawson  (1988) 
This  concept  of  reality  lends  itself  to  a  solely  probabilistic  interpretation  of  uncertainty,  in  which 
all  future  outcomes  are  captured  either  by  an  objective  probability  distribution  or  a  subjective 
distribution.  The  subjective  expectations  are  captured  usually,  although  not  always  in  the 
form  of  Bayesian  subjective  probabilities.  As  will  be  highlighted  later,  the  crucial  assumption 
is  that,  although  in  the  short  run  subjective  probabilities  need  not  coincide  with  the  presumed 
immutable  objective  probabilities,  in  the  long  run  the  objective  and  subjective  probabilities  will 
tend  to  coincide.  Although  Knight  (1921)  is  slightly  ambiguous  on  the  matter,  it  would  appear 
that  his  distinction  of  risk  and  uncertainty  can  be  linked  to  the  distinction  between  the  two 
types  of  immutable  reality  concepts.  Thus,  uncertainty  comes  down  to  a  lack  of  knowledge 
about  a  predetermined  external  reality.  Uncertainty  only  exists  because  of  the  failure  of 
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The  second  conceptualisation  of  reality,  which  Davidson  (1996)  terms  transmutable  or 
creative  reality,  is  that  in  which  some  aspect  of  the  economic  and,  by  extension, 
environmental  future  will  be  created  by  human  action  today  or  in  the  future.  In  Keynes'  (1973) 
view,  reality  is  one  in  which  individuals,  groups  or  societies  can  permanently  change  the 
future.  In  such  a  non-ergodic  environment,  even  if  agents  or  decision  makers  have  the 
capacity  to  obtain  and  statistically  process  information  regarding  past  and  current  outcomes, 
this  information  does  not  and  cannot  provide  reliable  data  for  forecasting  the  future.  Hicks 
(1979)  for  example  concludes  that  stochastic  methods  are  inapplicable  in  this  situation.  Ifthe 
system  is  ergodic  and  the  future  of  such  a  system  is  not  only  uncertain  but  transmutable  then 
as  Keynes  wrote: 
uThere  is  no  scientific  basis  to  form  any  calculable  probability  whatever  We  simply  do  not 
knovV'  (Keynes,  1973b:  p  114) 
These  two  different  conceptualisations  of  the  nature  of  reality  are  mirrored  when  we  look  at 
problems  in  a  ecological  context.  For  instance  for  Perrings  (1997b)  uncertainty  is  derived 
from  measurement  error,  due  to  the  difficulty  of  constantly  measuring  state  variables.  The 
presumption  being  of  an  immutable  reality  in  which,  although  the  system  is  too  complex  to 
understand  fully,  the  relationship  between  the  key  elements  of  the  system  is  pre-determined. 
The  second  conceptual  isation  of  uncertainty  in  relation  to  ecosystems  stresses  what  Shackle 
would  term  the  uniqueness  of  reality.  This  is  derived  from  the  evolutionary  nature  of  the 
ecological  system,  in  that  even  if  the  structure  of  such  a  system  was  knowable,  the  dynamics 
and  interactions  of  the  system,  as  well  as  its  interaction  with  the  economic  system,  result  in  a 
constantly  changing  structure.  As  such  changes  in  the  system  are  not  predetermined  from 
past  changes. 
Although  tackling  the  question  of  uncertainty  at  a  epistemological  level  is  a  crucial  first  step  in 
helping  us  to  handle  uncertainty  and  eventually  the  problem  of  environmental  uncertainty, 
practical  problems  in  modelling  emerge  because  there  is  a  tendency  to  apply  only  one 
concept  of  reality  to  all  parts  of  the  economic-ecological  system.  Such  an  approach  leads  to  a 
position  whereby  all  situations  of  uncertainty  are  characterised  by  the  use  of  a  probability 
distribution,  or  where  the  system  is  so  transmutable  and  fundamentally  uncertain  that 
uncertainty  can  never  be  reduced  to  situations  of  probabilistic  risk.  A  central  hypothesis  in 
this  thesis,  is  that  in  order  to  deal  practically  with  uncertainty  in  decision  making,  any 
conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  must  recognise  that  elements  of  the  environmental  - 
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characterised.  Certain  variables  may  indeed  be  reducible  to  situations  where  the  use  of 
probability  may  be  relevant.  Clearly,  however,  when  combinations  of  variables  or  outcomes 
are  considered  or  even  the  dynamics  of  the  whole  system  itself,  it  is  necessary  to  accept  that 
we  are  dealing  with  a  future  that  is  not  predetermined  in  the  sense  that  the  dynamics  of  the 
system  itself,  combined  with  the  actions  and  activities  of  humans,  means  that  the  use  of  a 
probability  framework  is  in  effect  meaningless.  An  important  step  in  developing  a  framework 
for  dealing  with  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making  will  therefore  be  in  defining  the 
nature  of  the  uncertainty  which  is  faced  in  a  particular  decision  problem. 
3.2.1  Derining  uncertainty 
Once  the  notion  of  uncertainty  has  been  approached  at  a  epistemological  level  it  becomes 
more  apparent  that,  while  uncertainty  is  often  cited  by  authors  in  relation  to  a  particular 
problem,  what  they  imply  by  uncertainty  is  invariably  not  clarified.  Most  notably  'risk'  and 
'uncertainty'  are  often  used  interchangeably  in  the  literature.  An  attempt  will  be  made  in  this 
section  to  disentangle  the  competing  notions  of  uncertainty  and  to  provide  the  basis  on  which 
a  more  thorough  conceptual  isation  of  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  can  be  provided. 
A  useful  starting  point  for  defining  uncertainty  is  provided  by  the  classical  contributions  of 
Knight  (1921)  and  Keynes  (1936),  who  distinguished  between  a  weak  version  of  uncertainty, 
which  they  termed  'risk'and  a  stronger  version  which  they  termed  'uncertainty'.  Unfortunately 
neo-classical  economics,  starting  with  Von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  (1944),  has  constantly 
blurred  this  distinction,  resulting  in  the  two  terms  being  used  interchangeably  in  the  literature, 
with  uncertainty  usually  referring  to  Knight  -  Keynes  risk  (Williams  &  Findlay,  1986).  This 
confusion  stems  from  three  basic  interpretations  of  risk  in  relation  to  uncertainty.  The  first 
usage  encompasses  all  modalities  of  uncertainty  (all  uncertainty  being  reducible  to  risk).  In 
such  cases  the  notion  of  uncertainty  is  used  interchangeably  with  that  of  risk.  The  second 
definition  of  risk  is  based  on  situations  in  which  the  full  set  ofj  outcomes  is  known  and  for 
which  a  probability  distribution  can  be  defined,  so  uncertainty  is  defined  as  a  situation  where 
the  full  range  of  outcomes  is  unknown.  The  third,  which  is  important  to  note  on  a  more 
practical  level,  refers  to  the  possible  negative  consequences  of  an  uncertain  action. 
According  to  this  last  usage  any  type  or  modality  of  uncertainty  can  therefore  imply  risk 
(Vercelli,  1995). 
Building  on  the  work  of  Vercelli  (1995),  Froger  and  Zyla  (1994),  and  Faucheux  and  Froger 
(1995),  to  attempt  to  clarify  this  situation  particularly  in  relation  to  the  first  two  definitions,  the 
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of  all  possible  outcomes  or  future  states  is  unknown,  (Dow,  1993)  or  2)  where  the  full  set  of 
outcomes  is  known,  but  the  probability  distribution  of  all  possible  outcomes  of  the  action  are 
unknown  or  are  not  fully  definable  for  a  lack  of  reliable  information.  Soft  uncertainty  or  risk  is 
used  to  define  situations  where  1)  the  set  of  all  possible  outcomes  of  an  action  are  known 
and  2)  the  probability  distribution  of  all  possible  outcomes  is  also  known.  To  keep  matters 
clear  in  the  following  text,  'risk'will  imply  the  negative  consequences  of  an  uncertain  action. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  definition  of  hard  uncertainty  will  encompass  both  the  second  type 
of  model  based  on  conceptions  of  immutable  reality  and  conceptions  based  on  transmutable 
reality.  Whether  one  believes  that,  because  reality  is  so  complex,  decision  makers  cannot 
have  more  than  a  partial,  possibly  incorrect,  perception  or  knowledge  about  relevant 
behavioural  matters  of  the  past  and  the  present,  or  that  the  future  cannot  be  known,  due  to  the 
transmutable  nature  of  reality,  a  situation  of  hard  uncertainty  is  still  faced. 
3.2.2  The  different  modalities  of  uncertainty 
Arguably  many  of  the  difficulties  in  both  conceptualising  uncertainty,  as  well  as  the  use  of 
particular  models  of  uncertainty  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  in  reality  the  type  or  modality  of 
uncertainty  faced  in  any  given  choice  or  decision  varies  (Faucheux  &  Froger,  1995).  It  is  the 
recognition  that  there  are  in  fact  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  that  will  help  us  to  move 
forward  in  dealing  explicitly  with  environmental  uncertainty.  This  section  provides  a 
framework  in  which  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  can  be  classified.  In  the  process  it 
is  hoped  that  some  of  the  confusion  surrounding  definitions  of  uncertainty  will  be  cleared  up. 
Based  on  the  above  distinction  between  hard  uncertainty  and  soft  uncertainty,  a  number  of 
different  criteria  can  be  used  to  distinguish  between  the  different  modalities  faced  in  any 
uncertain  situation.  Fig  3.2  shows  diagramatically  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  as 
classified  by  four  different  criteria,  namely  divisibility,  reliability,  distributionality  and  additivity. 
From  situations  of  complete  certainty  there  is  a  range  of  situations  running  through  soft 
uncertainty  or  risk  to  hard  uncertainty  and  finally  ignorance  (Faucheux  &  Froger,  1995  2).  It  is 
progressively  more  difficult  for  the  decision  maker  to  come  to  a  decision  as  one  moves  form 
the  right  hand  corner  to  the  upper  left  corner  of  the  figure. 
Froger  &  Zyla  (1994)  and  Faucheux  &  Froger  (1995)  distinguish  between  ignorance,  strong  uncertain 
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The  different  characteristics  which  define  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  are 
summarised  as  follows: 
Degree  of  knowledge  of  future  outcomes 
The  first  means  of  distinguishing  between  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  is  based  on 
the  degree  of  knowledge  about  the  future  outcomes  of  any  action.  In  the  case  of  certainty  the 
possible  effects  of  an  action  have  been  reduced  to  one  outcome  or  variable.  In  soft 
uncertainty  the  complete  set  of  possible  outcomes  of  any  action  is  known.  In  contrast  in Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  48 
Gases  of  hard  uncertainty  only  an  incomplete  set  of  outcomes  is  hypothesised,  with  some  of 
the  outcomes  remaining  unanticipated.  In  the  extreme  case  of  uncertainty,  all  possible 
outcomes  are  unanticipated,  so  that  the  decision  is  characterised  by  ignorance. 
Divisibility 
A  further  modality  of  uncertainty  is  based  on  whether  the  action  is  divisible  or  not.  Divisible 
actions  relate  to  ones  that  are  possible  to  repeat  under  the  same  underlying  conditions  to 
produce  a  range  of  outcomes.  This  is  based  on  the  notion  of  relative  frequency  and  is  only 
applicable  to  roulette-type  experiments  for  which  it  is  possible  to  generate  objective 
probabilities.  It  should  be  pointed  out  however,  that  this  type  of  property  is  of  little  use  if  we 
want  to  know  what  the  next  outcome  will  be.  This  point  is  particularly  true  for  irreversible 
actions  with  respect  to  the  environment,  where  the  notion  of  relative  frequency  probability  is 
meaningless,  because  the  action  cannot  be  repeated.  Moreover,  due  to  the  dynamic  nature 
of  economic-environmental  interactions,  the  structure  or  generating  mechanism  is  not  fixed  as 
is  the  case  for  roulette-type  experiments.  This  means  that  however  small  the  change,  the 
action  cannot  be  repeated  under  exactly  the  same  conditions.  A  non-divisible  action  is 
therefore  defined  as  one  which  is  unprecedented  or  non-repeatable. 
Seriability 
Some  events,  while  non-divisible,  can  be  pooled  with  other  non-divisible  experiments.  The 
classic  example  of  this  is  that  of  life  expectancy,  which  for  any  particular  individual  is 
necessarily  uncertain.  However  from  the  perspective  of  an  insurance  company  the 
endowment  policy  of  an  individual  can  be  pooled  with  endowment  policies  on  other  peoples 
life.  These  are  termed  seriable  actions  or  experiments.  In  such  situations  the  uncertainty  is 
effectively  redistributed  among  a  class  of  subjects.  Pooling  environmental  services  is  often 
impossible  due  to  their  inherent  public  good  nature.  For  example  the  effect  of  biodiversity  loss 
will  affect  society  as  a  whole  rather  than  just  one  individual.  In  addition  the  uniqueness  of 
many  environmental  services  or  functions  makes  polling  impossible. 
Distributionality  and  additivity 
The  final  criteria  on  which  the  different  types  of  uncertainty  are  based  are  those  of 
distributionality  and  additivity.  The  distributionality  condition  requires  that  the  complete  set  of 
events  is  known  and  that  the  probabilities  (subjective  or  objective)  should  add  up  to  unity.  In 
the  case  of  a  additive  event,  because  the  full  set  of  outcomes  is  known,  it  is  possible  to  add 
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of  each  alternative.  This  is  in  effect  the  equivalent  of  taking  a  weighted  average  of  all  the 
possible  outcomes.  in  the  case  of  hard  uncertainty  where  the  action  is  non-divisible,  Shackle 
(1961)  argues  that  this  approach  makes  no  sense,  in  that  the  outcomes  are  rivals  which  deny 
and  exclude  each  other. 
Probability  distribution 
The  presence  of  the  above  characteristics  determines  whether  probability  can  be  applied  or 
not  as  the  appropriate  measure.  As  will  be  argued,  the  different  modes  of  uncertainty  are 
fundamental  in  answering  this  question.  What  it  is  sufficient  to  say  at  this  point  is  that  in 
situations  characterised  by  certainty  a  unique  and  fully  reliable  (Faucheux  &  Froger,  1995) 
probability  distribution  is  reduced  to  one  variable.  In  the  case  of  soft  uncertainty  a  unique  and 
reliable  probability  distribution  is  available  for  all  the  outcomes.  In  the  case  of  hard 
uncertainty  the  use  of  probability  is  not  applicable.  The  limiting  case  of  hard  uncertainty,  that 
of  near  ignorance,  is  seen  as  'crucial'  by  Shackle(1955,1961)  as  there  exists  no  historical 
precedents  for  a  certain  activity.  Consequently  there  exists  no  basis  on  which  to  identify  all 
the  possible  outcomes  or  to  construct  a  probability  distribution  of  those  outcomes. 
3.3  Environmental  uncertainty 
Now  that  a  framework  for  defining  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  has  been  developed, 
it  will  be  possible  to  go  into  greater  depth  into  the  problem  of  environmental  uncertainty  faced 
in  many  policy  decisions  and  to  demonstrate  that  often  decisions  regarding  the  environment 
are  within  the  realm  of  hard  uncertainty  or  ignorance,  rather  than  soft  uncertainty.  Arguably 
there  are  none  or  very  few  environmental  decisions  which  are  made  in  the  context  of  certainty. 
Environmental  uncertainty  comprises  of  both  ecological  uncertainty  and  valuation  uncertainty. 
The  former  relates  to  uncertainty  about  the  dynamics  of  the  ecological  system  and  the 
ecological  consequences  of  human  induced  change.  The  latter  arises  as  a  result  of 
uncertainty  over  the  welfare  implications  for  societies  or  the  value  to  society  of  changes  to 
existing  ecological  systems.  Environmental  uncertainty  is  conditioned  therefore  by  the 
interconnectedness  of  the  ecological-economic  system  discussed  in  the  first  chapter.  More 
particularly  uncertainty  exists  in  relation  to  how  changes  to  the  dynamics  of  one  system  will 
affect  the  other.  Although  in  what  will  follow,  what  have  been  termed  ecological  and  valuation 
uncertainty  will  be  discussed  separately,  it  should  be  stressed  that  both  derive  from  the 
interconnectedness  of  the  ecological  and  economic  system  over  different  spatial  and  temporal 
scales.  The  interrelation  of  the  two  will  be  demonstrated  intuitively  in  the  next  section  on 
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3.3.1  Biodiversity 
One  of  the  main  concerns  of  the  sustainable  development  discourse  highlighted  in  Chapter  1 
is  that  of  biodiversity.  Decisions  which  could  result  in  biodiversity  loss  are  particularly  good 
examples  of  policy  choices  which  are  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  rather  than  soft 
uncertainty  or  risk.  The  loss  of  a  particular  species  as  well  as  combinations  of  species  that 
could  be  vital  in  relation  to  the  production  of  certain  ecological  functions  or  services,  is  a 
unique  event  which  cannot  be  repeated  (i.  e.  is  not  divisible).  It  is  irreversible  and  only  an 
incomplete  set  of  outcomes  for  the  action  can  be  anticipated.  Such  an  event  would  be 
incorrectly  represented  by  an  additive  and  distributional  measure  of  uncertainty  such  as 
probability  (subjective  or  objective).  Moreover,  even  if  on  a  theoretical  basis  it  was  correct  to 
apply  the  notion  of  probability,  the  lack  of  information  would  mean  that  on  a  practical  basis  the 
derivation  of  probabilities  would  not  only  be  very  difficult,  but,  even  if  obtained,  unreliable. 
The  decision  maker  is  therefore  faced  with  the  situation  that  there  is  hard  uncertainty 
regarding  not  only  the  ecological  implications  of  species  loss  in  the  long  term,  but  also  the 
value  of  those  changes  to  society.  Furthermore,  it  is  conceivable  that,  although  particular 
functions  or  services  provided  by  species  or  combinations  of  species  may  not  be  seen  by 
society  as  vital  now,  they  could  be  of  crucial  importance  in  future  evolved  states,  such  as  may 
be  induced  by  climate  change.  In  this  sense,  biodiversity  loss  could  result  in  unanticipated 
losses. 
Biodiversity  problems  are  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  for  a  number  of  further  reasons. 
Foremost  is  that  as  a  public  good,  biodiversity  cannot  be  characterised  as  seriable,  in  that 
biodiversity  loss  on  a  large  scale  will  effect  human  welfare  at  a  societal  level  rather  than  at  the 
level  of  the  individual.  So,  for  example,  the  extinction  of  a  species,  which  could  have  held  the 
cures  for  a  particular  disease,  affects  the  whole  of  society.  In  evaluating  the  consequences  of 
biodiversity  loss,  it  is  also  difficult  to  draw  together  a  sufficient  number  of  actions  or  trials 
which  have  similar  characteristics  as  is  possible  in  the  insurance  industry.  An  example  of  this 
is  that,  while  the  effect  of  the  introduction  of  genetically  modified  crops  on  biodiversity  may  be 
benign  in  Northern  Europe,  due  to  the  presence  of  different  ecosystems  and  species  in  say 
East  Asia,  the  resulting  outcome  of  the  same  action  is  likely  to  be  very  different.  Moreover  the 
irreversible  and  entropic  nature  of  many  environmental  processes  means  that  the  underlying 
characteristics  or  structures  of  the  ecosystem,  which  respond,  to  a  particular  action  are 
constantly  changing.  Therefore  not  only  are  problems  which  involve  biodiversity  loss  non- 
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but  they  are  also  non  -divisible,  in  the  sense  that  they  cannot  be  repeated  in  exactly  the  same 
conditions. 
3.3.2  Ecological  uncertainty 
Ecological  uncertainty  derives  from  the  dynamics  of  the  ecological  system,  which  due  to  the 
complex  nature  of  the  interactions  between  its  key  elements  means  that  the  effects  of 
economic  activity  or  natural  perturbations  are  more  often  than  not  conditioned  by  hard 
uncertainty.  In  particular,  the  presence  of  thresholds,  beyond  which  the  resilience  of  a  system 
is  lost,  is  to  a  large  degree  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  This  is  because  not  only  does 
hard  uncertainty  exist  with  respect  to  the  point  at  which  a  threshold  will  be  passed  and  thus 
the  ability  of  system  to  absorb  shocks,  but  is  also  present  in  relation  to  predicting  the 
functioning  of  an  ecosystem  after  it  has  flipped  and  moves  to  a  new  equilibrium  (or  basin  of 
attraction).  This  is  because  the  way  that  a  particular  ecosystem  functions  may  be  radically 
different  from  the  way  it  operated  before  the  threshold  was  passed.  It  is  to  investigate  the  role 
that  the  resilience  of  a  system  and  the  presence  of  thresholds  plays  in  the  environmental 
uncertainty  problem  that  the  discussion  now  turns. 
3.3.2.1  Ecosystem  resilience 
An  important  concept  in  relation  to  ecological  uncertainty  is  that  of  the  resilience  of  the 
biological  and  physical  systems  (Holling,  1973,1986).  For  present  purposes  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  define  resilience  as  the  capacity  of  a  system  to  retain  its  organisational  structure  and  thus 
productivity  (of  all  its  services  and  functions)  following  perturbations.  Holling's  definition  and 
measure  of  resilience  focuses  on  the  size  of  the  stability  domain  which  is  defined  as  the 
perturbation  that  can  be  absorbed  before  the  system  converges  on  another  equilibrium  state 
(Holling,  1973).  A  closely  related  interpretation  is  concerned  with  the  time  taken  to  return  to 
an  initial  equilibrium  (Pimm,  1984).  The  focus  is  therefore  on  the  capacity  of  the  system  to 
absorb  shocks  without  losing  stability  (Dalmazzone  and  Perrings,  1997).  Such  a  concept,  in 
contrast  to  that  of  equilibrium,  stresses  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  system  in  which  more  than 
one  stable  equilibrium  state  or  domain  is  possible.  Moreover,  the  behaviour  of  the  elements 
of  a  system  which  move  from  one  domain  to  another  is  discontinuous,  because  they  become 
attracted  to  a  different  equilibrium  condition  (Holling,  1986).  When  perturbation  leads  to 
smaller  stability  domains,  then  the  resilience  of  the  system  to  shocks  is  reduced. 
If  the  example  of  rain-forest  ecosystem  is  taken,  then  the  perturbation  could  relate  to  logging  a 
relatively  large  part  of  a  particular  system,  or  the  removal  of  certain  species  or  combinations  of Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  52 
species.  The  resilience  of  the  system  would  therefore  refer  to  the  ability  of  the  system  to  keep 
functioning  in  the  way  that  it  did  prior  to  the  disturbance.  So  for  example  in  the  case  of  a  rain- 
forest,  the  extent  to  which  nutrient  recycling  and  thus  the  productive  capacity  of  the  system  is 
maintained  will  depend  on  the  resilience  of  the  system  in  the  face  of  the  disturbance.  Fig  3.3. 
shows  in  a  very  simplified  manner,  the  effect  of  resilience  on  the  productivity  of  an  ecosystem. 
ig  3.3  System  resilience 
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Source:  Adapted  from  Common,  1995:  p52-53 
In  the  first  diagram  the  perturbation  is  within  the  stability  domain  of  the  system,  and  thus 
although  in  the  short  term  the  productivity  of  the  system  is  affected  (which  in  terms  of  the 
policy  horizon  may  be  of  crucial  importance),  over  time  the  system  returns  to  the  local Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  53 
equilibrium  and  the  productivity  of  the  system  returns  to  its  original  level.  In  the  second 
diagram  where  the  particular  system  is  not  as  resilient,  the  effect  of  a  perturbation  is  such  that 
the  previous  local  equilibrium  is  not  returned  to  and  instead  a  new  local  equilibrium  is  reached 
in  which  productivity  is  at  a  much  lower  level. 
In  the  case  of  the  rain-forest,  large-scale  clearance  of  the  forests  for  conversion  to  cattle 
ranching  results  in  the  loss  of  a  number  of  key  functions  crucial  to  maintaining  the  productivity 
of  the  system.  The  removal  of  the  canopy,  which  not  only  is  the  source  of  leaf  litter  but  also 
protects  the  soils  from  erosion,  can  result  in  the  system  no  longer  being  able  to  recycle 
sufficient  nutrients  to  sustain  the  system  at  its  previous  equilibrium.  A  new  series  of  features, 
such  as  increased  nutrient  leaching  in  soils  and  reduced  supply  of  nutrients  from  the  previous 
forest  litter,  mean  that,  while  in  the  short  term  productive  grasslands  are  established,  after  a 
few  years  the  key  elements  of  the  system  are  attracted  to  a  new  basin  or  equilibrium,  which  is 
conditioned  by  much  lower  nutrient  levels.  In  the  new  state  only  certain  species  of  plants 
(which  are  less  suitable  for  cattle  rearing)  can  survive.  The  difficulty  in  recreating  all  the 
conditions  required  for  the  system  to  converge  on  the  previous  equilibrium  means  that  in 
many  cases  the  process  is  irreversible  without  significant  intervention. 
Holling  (1986)  characterises  a  natural  ecosystem  in  terms  of  the  sequential  interaction 
between  four  system  functions.  The  first  is  'exploitation',  which  is  the  process  responsible  for 
the  rapid  colonisation  of  disturbed  ecosystems.  The  second  is  'conservation'  which  is  a 
climax  process  associated  with  the  accumulation  of  biomass.  The  third  is  'creative 
destruction'  caused  by  an  external  disturbance  which  releases  energy  and  matter.  The  fourth 
is  renewal  or  reorganisation  which  may  involve  changes  that  may  or  may  not  involve  a  new 
structure.  It  is  this  stage  that  is  crucial  to  the  uncertainty  problem.  If  reorganisation  is  based 
on  a  new  structure  (i.  e.  the  system  moves  to  a  new  local  equilibrium  of  stability  domain),  a 
whole  new  set  of  functional  relationships  and  feedbacks  between  the  different  components  of 
the  ecosystem  are  created,  implying  that  previous  historic  records  will  no  longer  be  valid  in 
attempting  to  predict  future  events.  In  such  cases  the  system  has  crossed  some  threshold 
and  is  converging  on  a  different  locally  stable  equilibrium  (Dalmazzone  &  Perrings,  1997). 
However,  the  property  of  resilience  in  a  system  can  only  be  determined  ex  post  by  observing 
the  behaviour  of  the  system  in  the  face  of  disturbance  (Common,  1995).  Ex  ante  it  is  very 
difficult  to  anticipate  or  predict  under  what  conditions  a  system  will  no  longer  be  resilient.  For 
example  the  effect  of  incremental  degradation  of  an  ecosystem  may  only  become  apparent 
after  the  effects  of  a  large  perturbation.  So,  for  example,  while  small-scale  conversion  of Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  54 
wetlands,  removal  of  mangroves  and  forest  clearance  may  not  appear  in  the  short  term  to  be 
of  major  consequence,  the  accumulated  effects  of  these  stresses  may  cause  a  loss  of 
resilience  in  the  system.  As  a  result,  if  the  system  is  subject  to  a  large  disturbance  such  as 
that  caused  by  a  hurricane,  a  threshold  is  passed  and  the  system  flips  with  possible 
catastrophic  consequences.  Predicting  the  effect  of  the  hurricane  is  also  conditioned  by  hard 
uncertainty,  because  the  underlying  structure  of  the  system  has  changed,  and  thus  the  effect 
of  the  perturbation  will  also  be  different  from  passed  instances.  An  example  of  this  is 
Hurricane  Mitch  and  its  devastating  effect  on  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Guatemala  and  El 
Salvador  in  November  1998  (The  Guardian,  1998).  Although  the  region  had  been  subjected 
to  previous  hurricanes,  the  ability  of  the  environment  to  absorb  the  perturbation  was  reduced 
by  the  effects  of  a  long  period  of  environmental  degradation,  and  as  a  result  the  destruction  it 
caused  was  of  a  far  higher  magnitude  than  that  caused  by  previous  hurricanes. 
The  reason  that  it  is  crucial  to  deal  with  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  resilience  of  an 
ecosystem  is  that  resilience  is  seen  as  a  key  property  in  relation  to  the  sustainability  of  a 
system.  This  is  because  maintaining  resilience  helps  sustain  the  regenerative  capacity  of  the 
ecological  system  on  which  humans  depend  for  a  wide  range  of  services  and  functions  (as 
highlighted  in  Chapter  1).  A  reduction  in  the  resilience  of  a  system  means  that  the  system,  in 
the  face  of  a  shock,  is  more  likely  to  flip  to  a  different  equilibrium  level  (Dalmazzone  & 
Perrings,  1997).  Where  the  new  equilibrium  level  is  associated  with  lower  productivity  or  a 
lower  range  of  key  services  than  previously,  then  this  may  result  in  negative  consequences  for 
society.  Moreover  the  importance  of  dealing  with  hard  uncertainty  ex  ante  is  reinforced  by  the 
irreversibility  of  moving  from  one  locally  stable  equilibrium  to  another  associated  with  lower 
productivity.  An  example  of  this  is  the  degradation  of  rangelands  in  Northern  Africa,  where  it 
would  appear  that  the  process  of  desertification  is  irreversible  or  only  slowly  reversible. 
Reducing  the  resilience  of  a  system  also  limits  the  extent  to  which  that  system  will  be  able  to 
adapt  or  evolve  in  the  face  of  future  unanticipated  changes.  This  is  apparent  in  relation  to  the 
effects  of  climate  change.  The  consequences  of  shifts  in  climate  patterns  will  depend  on  the 
ability  of  different  ecosystems  to  absorb  those  changes.  In  this  manner,  reducing  the 
resilience  of  the  ecological  system  limits  the  options  available  to  future  generations,  in  that 
greater  resilience  implies  that  the  system  is  more  likely  to  adapt  to  future  change. 
There  is  also  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  key  factors  which  are  thought  to  be 
crucial  in  determining  the  resilience  of  a  system.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the  concept  of 
biodiversity  has  been  given  greater  weight.  This  is  because,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  there 
exists  some  sort  of  relationship  between  functional  diversity  and  ecosystem  resilience  (UNEP, Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  55 
1995).  It  is  therefore  hypothesised  that  maintaining  the  functional  diversity  of  species  will  help 
to  maintain  the  resilience  of  a  system  in  the  face  of  shocks.  The  question  then  turns  to  what 
level  of  biodiversity  needs  to  be  maintained  in  order  to  guarantee  the  resilience  of  the 
ecosystems  on  which  human  consumption  and  production  and  in  turn  human  welfare  depend 
(Perri  ngs,  1994).  This  question,  however,  is  not  as  clear  cut  as  it  sounds.  In  certain  Gases  a 
reduction  in  biodiversity  may  lead  to  greater  productivity,  as  has  been  the  case  in  the 
agricultural  systems  of  Northern  Europe.  This  though  could  be  due  to  a  greater  resilience 
present  in  temperate  ecosystems  as  a  result  of  an  evolutionary  process  based  on  a  history  of 
climatic  variability  and  less  stability  of  population  sizes  of  species  (Common,  1995).  In 
contrast  tropical  systems  are  thought  to  generally  have  a  lower  resilience  and  thus  lower 
ability  to  cope  with  disturbances,  such  as  forest  clearance. 
The  problem  that  policy  makers  are  faced  with  is  that  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  exists  over 
how  to  evaluate  the  ability  of  an  ecosystem  to  respond  to  stresses.  For  example,  although  the 
use  of  food  web  structure  complexity  and  density  has  been  suggested,  there  are  considerable 
uncertainties  regarding  their  relative  significance  (Bockstael  et  al.,  1995).  Indeed  often  only  a 
few  functional  relationships  have  been  quantified.  What  appears  to  be  evident  is  that  the 
resilience  of  ecosystems  depends  on  the  range  of  species  capable  of  supporting  the  critical 
structuring  processes  of  those  systems  under  different  environmental  conditions.  The 
problem  to  consider  in  terms  of  the  uncertainty  arising  from  human  action  is  that,  while  in  a 
current  state  of  nature  certain  species  and  combinations  of  species  may  play  a  more 
important  role  in  the  functioning  and  organisation  of  an  ecosystem  (driver  species)  than  other 
passenger  species  (Walker,  1992),  this  does  not  imply  that  all  other  species  are  redundant. 
As  Barbier  et  al  (1995)  point  out: 
"The  importance  of  the  mix  or  diversity  of  species  for  the  resilience  of  ecosystems  lies 
precisely  in  the  fact  that  species  which  are  passengers  under  one  state  of  nature  may  have  a 
key  structuiing  role  to  play  under  other  states  of  nature.  "  (Barbier  et  a  1,1995:  p833) 
As  a  result  species  which  are  not  seen  as  crucial  in  relation  to  the  resilience  of  an  ecosystem 
may  have  unanticipated  (and  thus  uncertain)  value  in  future  evolved  equilibrium  states. 
To  summarise,  the  uncertainty  problem  faced  by  decision  makers  is  that,  although  maintaining 
resilience  in  the  ecological  system  would  appear  to  be  an  important  policy  objective,  the  whole 
issue  of  resilience  is  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  As  yet  there  is  insufficient  knowledge 
about  the  cumulative  effects  of  reducing  the  resilience  of  key  ecosystems  in  relation  to  the Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  56 
functioning  of  the  global  system.  There  is  also  uncertainty  regarding  what  are  the  key 
indicators  and  factors,  which  determine  the  resilience  of  an  ecosystem.  As  a  result  when 
considering  the  results  of  human  actions  in  terms  of  its  implications  for  the  resilience  of  the 
system,  there  is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  which  actions  are  more  likely  to 
cause  the  resilience  of  an  ecosystem  to  perturbations  to  be  lowered.  Moreover,  ex  ante  the 
consequences  of  the  reduction  of  resilience  are  unknown.  This  is  because  whether  a  system 
can  return  back  to  its  local  equilibrium  after  an  shock,  as  well  as  the  length  of  time  that  it  will 
take  to  reach  a  local  equilibrium,  can  only  be  determined  in  many  cases  ex  post  due  to  the 
uniqueness  of  the  particular  system  at  any  one  point  in  time  and  space.  The  problem  that  this 
poses  is  that  the  decision  maker  is  faced  with  hard  uncertainty  over  the  consequences  of  a 
particular  action,  if  the  system  is  not  resilient  enough  to  return  to  the  local  equilibrium  state. 
The  shift  to  a  new  equilibrium  state  could  have  major  negative  consequences  for  society,  in 
terms  of  the  value  of  the  services  and  functions  that  it  is  able  to  provide.  Furthermore  in  this 
state  the  ability  of  the  system  to  evolve  to  new  conditions  (economic  or  environmental)  may 
also  be  significantly  reduced.  The  key  uncertainty  issues  is  the  point  at  which  a  system  in  the 
face  of  a  perturbation  will  flip  out  of  its  current  equilibrium  state.  It  is  to  the  issue  of  thresholds 
and  their  implications  for  environmental  decision  making  that  is  the  focus  of  the  next  section. 
3.3.2.2  Ecological  thresholds 
Lowering  the  resilience  of  a  ecosystem  implies  that  the  system  is  closer  to  a  particular 
threshold  beyond  which  the  system  will  flip  and  move  to  another  local  equilibrium.  Part  of  the 
hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  resilience  of  an  ecosystem  to  large  shocks  such  as  land 
clearance,  mineral  exploration,  hurricanes  or  floods,  is  therefore  derived  from  uncertainty  over 
the  ability  to  observe  thresholds  in  ecosystems  Schulze  and  Mooney,  1993).  Thresholds  are 
important,  because  passing  a  system  threshold  can  result  in  dramatic  changes  in  the 
organisation  and  structure  of  the  ecosystem.  This  is  because  complex  ecosystems  are 
usually  characterised  by  strong  and  non-linear  interactions  between  the  constituent  parts,  the 
dynamics  of  which  are  such  that  they  are  discontinuous  in  the  neighbourhood  of  system 
thresholds  (Perrings  &  Pearce,  1994). 
Thresholds  can  consist  of  certain  critical  values  for  populations  of  organisms  or  biochemical 
cycles.  Threshold  values  may  exist  for  example  for  the  minimum  population  size  of  the 
different  species  (species  of  trees,  pollinators  etc.  )  in  an  ecosystem,  which  are  required  for  the 
system  to  remain  resilient  to  change  and  be  stable.  As  it  stands,  at  present  it  is  often  not 
possible  for  science  to  specify  the  minimum  viable  populations  and  the  minimal  habitat  sizes 
for  the  survival  of  species  (Hohl  &  Tisdell,  1993),  until  a  threshold  or  carrying  capacity  has Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  57 
been  exceeded.  Consequently  at  the  ex  ante  stage  of  any  decision,  which  could  result  in  the 
passing  of  a  system  threshold,  the  decision  is  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  as  the  change 
is  irreversible  and  the  evolutionary  response  of  the  natural  system  unpredictable  (Barbier  et 
al,  1995).  If,  however,  any  one  population  drops  below  a  critical  level  then  the  system  may  be 
pushed  beyond  a  particular  threshold  and  the  system  flips  from  one  locally  stable  equilibrium 
(or  basin  of  attraction)  to  another.  This  is  particularly  so  when  the  species  in  question  are 
driver  species,  i.  e.  determinants  of  the  system  of  which  they  are  part  (Nilsson  &  Grelsson, 
1995).  Reductions  in  the  populations  of  key  species,  such  as  for  example  forest  litter 
invertebrates  in  rain-forests,  may  result  in  the  self  organisation  of  the  ecosystem  being 
irreversibly  and  radically  altered  (Dalmazzone  &  Perrings,  1997).  Hard  uncertainty  exists 
therefore  about  both  the  margins  regarding  the  threshold  level  at  which  the  system  may  flip 
(Schindler,  1990;  Frost  et  al.  1994)  as  well  as  regards  the  implication  of  crossing  of  thresholds 
for  human  welfare. 
The  possible  existence  of  a  threshold  relationship  between  biodiversity  and  ecosystem 
functioning  is  shown  by  Fig  3.4.  When  biodiversity  is  relatively  high,  the  ecosystem  is  in  a 
stable  basin  of  attraction  or  equilibrium  and  the  ecosystem  process  rate  which  corresponds  to 
the  level  of  production  of  ecosystem  services  is  high.  This  is  shown  by  the  upper  limb  of  the 
curve  in  Fig  3.4.  In  the  face  of  a  modest  perturbation  the  ecosystem  will  return  to  the  stable 
state  indicated  by  the  solid  lines.  If  biodiversity  decreases  to  level  A,  then  a  threshold  is 
passed  and  the  system  is  perturbed  across  the  breakpoint  shown  by  the  dashed  line,  it  will 
move  to  the  other  stable  state,  which  is  characterised  by  a  much  lower  process  rate.  To 
restore  the  ecosystem  to  the  higher  stable  state  biodiversity  will  have  to  be  raised  above 
threshold  B  (Mooney  et  al.,  1995a).  The  extent  to  which  this  could  happen  would  again 
depend  on  the  irreversibility  of  the  threshold  change. 
In  many  cases  human  action  may  have  unobservable  effects  on  key  species  or  ecosystem 
functions.  For  example,  although  the  degradation  of  sea-grass  beds  in  a  maritime  ecosystem, 
may  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  affect  the  productivity  of  a  coral-reef  system  such  as  that 
present  off  the  coast  of  Belize,  sea  grass  plays  what  is  thought  to  be  a  crucial  role  in  trapping 
sediment,  which  can  cause  damage  to  the  coral  system  (McField,  Wells  &  Gibson,  1995). 
The  problem  is  that  the  strength  of  the  relationship  between  the  two  is  poorly  defined,  and  as 
a  result  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  exists  in  relation  to  the  thresholds  beyond  which  sea 
grass  beds  can  cope  with  extra  sedimentation,  from  erosion  caused  by  the  removal  of  forest 
systems  in  the  terrestrial  system.  Once  a  phase  change  occurs  as  a  result  of  a  threshold 
being  passed,  then  the  system  structure  will  often  be  radically  altered.  Continuing  with  our Chapter  3:  Environmental  uncertainty  58 
Fig  3.4  Threshold  relationship  between  an  ecosystem  process  rate  and 
biodiversity. 
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Source:  (Mooney  et  al,  1995a) 
example,  degradation  of  coral  past  a  certain  threshold  may  be  impossible  (in  a  human  life- 
time)  to  reverse.  In  this  sense  any  environmental  decision  which  results  in  altering  the 
characteristics  of  the  ecosystem  is  in  Shackle's  words  'unique'.  This  is  because,  once  the 
action  has  been  carried  out,  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  go  back  and  repeat  the  decision  under 
the  same  conditions. 
The  presence  of  thresholds,  as  well  as  significant  time  and  space  lags  over  which  the  effects 
of  a  threshold  being  passed  are  felt,  means  that  it  becomes  very  difficult  for  scientists  to 
simply  add  up  or  aggregate  small-scale  behaviour  to  arrive  at  large-scale  results.  Precisely 
because  it  is  not  possible  to  observe  the  underlying  structure  of  the  dynamic  system  (for 
example  population  sizes  of  all  critical  species  and  rates  of  nutrient  recycling),  the  ability  of  a 
system  to  bear  stress  once  a  threshold  is  exceeded  is  surrounded  by  uncertainty  both  in 
relation  to  the  system  dynamics,  as  well  as  the  measurement  of  data  (  Dalmazzone  & 
Perrings  1997).  Although  in  an  undisturbed  system  it  is  possible  to  observe  the  stable 
equilibrium,  other  equilibria  (and  their  possible  implications  for  human  welfare)  are  not 
observed.  Increased  stress,  however,  will  bring  the  system  closer  to  the  boundary  of  the 
stability  domain,  at  which  there  is  a  greater  danger  that  the  system  will  flip  and  that  irreversible 
or  only  slowly  reversible  change  will  occur.  Nevertheless,  because  it  is  not  possible  to 
observe  how  close  the  system  is  to  a  boundary  (as  for  example  indicated  from  observable 
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environmental  quality),  nor  the  exact  position  of  the  threshold,  decisions  which  may  result  in  a 
threshold  boundary  being  crossed  are  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  As  such  policy 
approaches  which  seek  to  set  limits,  in  relation  to  harvesting  say,  or  emissions  are  not 
applicable  where  the  boundaries  of  a  threshold  are  not  observable  and  thus  conditioned  by 
hard  uncertainty. 
Consequently  human  action  which  (intentionally  or  unintentionally)  affects  the  structure  of 
ecosystems  may  result  in  unanticipated  movement  from  one  stable  domain  to  another,  less 
stable  domain.  Often  this  may  be  the  result  of  cumulative  action  such  as  forest  clearance, 
logging  and  mining,  or  combinations  of  disturbances  such  as  the  effect  of  human  actions  or  a 
natural  disturbance,  such  as  a  hurricane.  Interestingly  Holling  (1986)  highlights  the  surprises 
inherent  in  ecological  systems.  A  concept  that  has  many  close  parallels  to  the  notion  of 
surprise  in  Shackle's  model.  Dalmazzone  &  Perrings  (1997)  demonstrate  that  continuously 
increasing  levels  of  environmental  pressure  will  inevitably  increase  the  danger  of  causing  a 
collapse  of  the  natural  system  by  overstepping  critical  thresholds.  Thus,  at  the  margins  at 
which  the  system  is  locally  stable,  the  importance  of  taking  into  account  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  the  point  at  which  irreversible  change  will  occur  becomes  all  the  more  important. 
Bearing  in  mind  that  both  economic  and  ecological  systems  often  exhibit  these  characteristics 
when  they  interact,  the  lack  of  predictability  becomes  increasingly  apparent.  Precisely 
because  the  complex  structures  and  connections  of  complex  ecosystems,  such  as  a  wetland 
system,  are  not  fully  understood,  uncertainty  surrounding  the  precise  thresholds  values  of  a 
system  combined  with  the  potential  for  irreversible  and  unprecedented  change,  means  that 
the  use  of  probability  based  models  to  predict  the  long-range  changes  in  the  multiple  functions 
of  natural  systems  arising  from  human  actions,  such  as  the  draining  of  wetland  areas,  is 
severely  limited  (Russell,  1997). 
The  limitations  in  our  ability  to  predict  the  consequence  of  exceeding  a  threshold  is  derived 
from  two  main  factors.  Firstly,  in  many  instances  the  passing  of  a  particular  threshold  may  not 
have  occurred  previously  in  a  similar  ecosystem.  Consequently  there  are  no  previous  records 
from  which  to  infer  the  consequences  of  such  an  action.  The  extensive  clearance  and  burning 
of  upland  vegetation  in  Great  Britain,  which  resulted  in  a  shift  from  forest  cover  (such  as  the 
great  Caledonian  forest)  to  blanket  bogs  (Moore,  1982),  is  an  historic  example  of  an  action 
which  resulted  in  a  new  equilibrium  state.  The  difficulty  in  pooling  often  unique  or  very 
different  ecosystems  to  derive  comparable  information  on  the  consequences  of  a  particular 
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passing  a  particular  threshold  are  non-seriable.  Furthermore,  if  the  threshold  has  never  been 
exceeded  before,  the  likelihood  that  there  will  be  unanticipated  outcomes  means  that  the  full 
range  of  outcomes  will  not  be  known. 
The  second  factor  which  contributes  to  the  uncertainty  problem  is  derived  from  the  dynamic 
nature  of  ecosystems.  The  key  variables  and  relationships,  from  which  it  might  be  possible  to 
determine  the  effects  of  a  particular  action,  such  as  the  effect  of  fertiliser  effluent  on  sea  grass 
beds,  will  often  radically  change  after  a  threshold  has  passed,  and  the  system  moves  to 
another  basin  of  attraction.  Once  a  system  has  passed  a  threshold,  a  new  set  of  key 
variables  and  relationships  between  the  ecosystem  components  will  often  evolve.  Consider 
for  example  the  changing  response  of  a  semi-arid  zone,  such  as  the  sahel  to  droughts  after 
intensive  grazing  has  taken  place  and  the  irreversible  switch  to  woody  vegetation  (Holling, 
1986).  This  means  that  historical  records  from  previous  equilibria  states  will  no  longer  be 
relevant  and,  if  used  to  derive  probabilities  for  the  consequence  of  a  particular  event  (such  as 
the  consequence  of  drought  on  a  particular  species  of  grass),  may  even  mislead  the  decision 
maker.  This  is  particularly  the  case  where  a  system  is  already  close  to  a  particular  threshold, 
and  the  event  or  action  which  is  attempted  to  be  predicted  may  result  in  the  system  flipping 
from  one  equilibrium  to  another. 
It  is  increasingly  apparent  therefore  that  environmental  decisions  can  often  result  in  the 
crossing  of  a  particular  threshold  which  cumulatively  may  lead  to  the  reduction  of  the 
resilience  of  a  system  to  large-scale  perturbations.  Due  to  the  reasons  outlined  above,  in 
many  decisions  the  resilience  of  a  particular  ecosystem,  the  point  at  which  a  threshold  may  be 
passed,  and  the  consequences  of  the  system  flipping  are  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  and 
ignorance  rather  than  soft  uncertainty  or  risk.  While  the  negative  consequences  of  an  action, 
which  causes  the  system  to  move  to  alternative  equilibrium  state,  may  not  always  be  negative 
(or  at  least  temporarily),  in  many  cases,  exemplified  by  the  examples  outlined,  a  move  to 
alternative  equilibrium  can  result  in  the  loss  of  key  services  and  functions  as  well  as  reducing 
the  resilience  of  the  system  to  cope  with  stress.  In  many  cases  it  is  only  after  a  large  shock  to 
the  system,  such  as  caused  by  flooding  or  drought,  that  the  full  ecological  consequences  of 
moving  to  a  new  equilibrium  state  are  realised. 
3.3.3  Valuation  uncertainty 
In  the  last  chapter,  the  development  of  environmental  valuation  methods,  as  a  response  to  the 
absence  of  a  set  of  market  prices  for  the  ecological-economic  system,  was  highlighted. 
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largely  side-stepped,  it  is  important  to  address  the  question  of  the  uncertainty  which  arises. 
The  first  type  of  valuation  uncertainty  arises  as  a  result  of  the  limitations  of  current  methods  in 
estimating  the  total  value  of  environmental  services  or  functions.  This  can  include  uncertainty 
derived  from  methodological  issues  which  question  the  reliability  of  the  resultant  estmates,  as 
well  as  from  uncertainty  surrounding  future  values  and  preferences.  The  second  type  of 
valuation  uncertainty  is  more  fundamental  in  that,  even  if  theoretical  and  practical 
considerations  surrounding  valuation  are  overcome,  much  of  the  economic-ecological  system 
is  unobservable  (Perrings,  1997b).  An  important  aspect  relating  to  this  difficulty  of  observing 
all  the  elements  of  the  economic-ecological  system  derive  from  the  problems  faced  in  valuing 
the  primary  or  pdor  value  of  an  ecosystem.  It  is  this  second  type  of  valuation  uncertainty 
which  will  be  the  focus  of  this  section. 
A  good  example  of  an  important  attribute  which  contributes  to  the  primary  value  of  an 
ecosystem  is  the  mix  of  species  that  enable  that  system  both  to  provide  the  flow  of  ecosystem 
services  and  to  maintain  that  flow  over  a  range  of  environmental  conditions.  Primary  value 
includes  the  ability  of  the  system  to  evolve  and  remain  resilient  in  the  face  of  stress  (Marie- 
Gren  et  al,  1994).  In  such  a  sense,  many  environmental  services,  although  not  directly 
consumed,  are  nevertheless  necessary  for  the  functioning  of  ecosystems  which  in  turn 
produce  products  or  services  valued  by  society.  Thus,  a  large  component  of  the  value  of  an 
ecosystem  or  biodiversity  lies  in  its  role  in  supporting  the  productivity  of  the  system,  from 
which  individual  species  are  extracted  or  which  provide  functions  which  are  useful  to  man. 
So,  for  example,  forest  litter  invertebrates  may  not  themselves  be  seen  as  a  valuable 
resource,  but  are  essential  to  the  regeneration  of  forests  from  which  timber  can  be  extracted. 
However,  the  complex  nature  or  links  between  individual  species,  ecosystem  functions  and 
feedback  mechanisms  means  that  the  primary  value  of  what  are  often  unappealing  species  is 
very  difficult  to  ascertain. 
The  issues  of  ecological  uncertainty  raised  in  the  previous  section  have  a  profound  effect  on 
our  ability  to  value  different  ecosystem  services.  Although  a  change  in  the  composition  of 
species  or  the  crossing  of  a  threshold,  that  affects  the  key  structuring  processes  within  an 
ecosystem,  may  have  major  implications  for  the  ability  of  an  ecosystem  to  provide 
economically  valued  services,  a  large  degree  of  hard  uncertainty  about  the  link  between  key 
species  and  the  critical  processes  of  the  ecosystem  must  be  faced.  Furthermore,  certain 
species  may  have  unanticipated  values  (i.  e.  ex  ante  the  decision  maker  does  not  have  the  full 
range  of  outcomes,  nor  any  previous  history  to  base  his  expectations  on),  in  that  they  can  take 
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exceeding  a  threshold  and  the  reduction  of  resilience,  in  relation  to  human  welfare,  is 
conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty. 
A  healthy  ecosystem  will  contain  a  latent  reserve  of  'keystone  species'  which  are  required  for 
system  maintenance  in  the  face  of  stress  and  shock  (Barbier  et  al,  1995).  However,  the  value 
of  this  reserve  is  fundamentally  uncertain,  because  until  the  system  is  put  under  stress,  the 
species  which  will  play  a  key  role  are  unknown.  As  a  result,  the  valuation  exercise  is  faced 
with  hard  uncertainty,  in  that  the  potential  value  of  the  range  of  species  capable  of  performing 
particular  functions  under  different  environmental  conditions  is  not  readily  observable.  The 
only  way  that  it  is  possible  to  estimate  the  primary  value  of  the  mix  of  species,  on  which  the 
provision  of  key  ecosystem  services  and  functions  depend,  is  to  specify  an  appropriate 
production  function,  taking  account  of  the  presence  of  all  interactions,  feedback's  and 
thresholds  in  the  ecological-economic  system  (Perrings  et  al,  1993).  As  a  result  of  uncertainty 
about  specifying  the  functional  form  of  such  relationships,  as  well  as  uncertainties  which  arise 
in  the  aggregation  from  local  systems  to  welfare  effects  at  a  societal  level,  this  task  is  to  a 
large  degree  impossible  at  present. 
All  use  and  non-use  values,  are  therefore  contingent  on  the  prior  existence  of  a  healthy  and 
evolving  ecosystem.  As  such,  there  is  a  prior  or  primary  value  which,  because  it  does  not 
constitute  a  productive  output,  cannot  be  measured  in  conventional  economic  terms.  As  a 
result  there  will  always  be  a  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  exact  value  of 
environmental  change  as  a  result  of  any  policy  change,  even  if  all  the  other  corresponding  use 
and  non-use  values  were  estimated  accurately.  Because  of  this  difficulty  in  observing  the 
value  of  human  action  with  respect  to  the  organisation  and  structure  of  an  ecosystem,  as 
Perrings  (1997b)  points  out,  the  distribution  of  outcomes  (and  corresponding  values) 
associated  with  such  developments  cannot  be  inferred  from  history  due  to  the  lack  of  relevant 
observations.  Moreover,  the  novelty  of  many  human  actions  in  the  face  of  evolving  and 
dynamic  ecosystems  emphasises  the  nature  of  the  hard  uncertainty  faced. 
3.4  Summary  and  conclusions 
The  central  theme  of  this  chapter  is  that  the  type  of  uncertainty  or  modality  faced  in  a  given 
situation  will  vary.  Accordingly  a  framework  upon  which  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty 
can  be  classified  has  been  proposed.  Recognising  that  different  uncertainty  problems  will 
have  different  underlying  characteristics  immediately  implies  that  an  approach  to  decision 
making,  which  does  not  recognise  the  full  range  of  the  modalities  of  uncertainty,  will  be 
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regarding  the  environment  we  are  faced  with  hard,  rather  than  soft,  uncertainty.  By 
demonstrating  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty  faced,  it  underlies  that,  when  decision  makers 
attempt  to  determine  the  environmental  consequences  of  a  proposed  action  and  the  value  of 
any  resulting  changes  to  society,  there  is  a  need  to  deal  explicitly  with  hard  uncertainty.  This 
lays  the  foundations  for  the  next  chapter  which  reviews  existing  decision  models  and  extends 
the  critique  of  the  applicability  of  probability  based  models,  such  as  expected  utility,  to 
environmental  decisions  which  are  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  64 
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CHAPTER  4:  UNCERTAINTY  AND  DECISION  MAKING 
4.1  Introduction 
The  previous  chapters  have  outlined  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty  problem  and  put  forward  the 
argument  that  many  environmental  problems  are  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  The 
realisation,  however,  that  there  are  a  number  of  modalities  of  uncertainty  and  that  in  the 
context  of  environmental  decision-making,  most  decisions  are  characterised  by  hard 
uncertainty  or  ignorance  rather  than  soft  uncertainty,  poses  a  number  of  problems  both  in 
terms  of  the  interpretation  and  the  use  of  traditional  models.  In  particular,  recognising  the 
presence  of  hard  uncertainty  in  many  environmental  decisions  requires  a  different  approach  to 
how  models  of  decision  making  are  interpreted  and  evaluated.  This  issue  is  dealt  with  in 
section  (4.2).  It  is  argued  that  in  the  presence  of  hard  uncertainty  the  underlying  rationality  of 
any  decision  is  necessarily  bounded.  As  such,  only  the  rationality  of  the  decision  making 
process  rather  than  the  decision  itself,  can  be  evaluated. 
Although  the  majority  of  traditional  decision  making  models  rely  on  the  use  of  probability 
(either  objective  or  subjective')  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty,  recognising  the  different  modes 
of  uncertainty  implies  that  that  the  use  of  one  all-encom  passing  measure  will  be  limited. 
Although  the  use  of  probability  may  be  valid  in  cases  of  soft  uncertainty  or  risk,  it  cannot  be 
applied  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty.  The  second  section  therefore  aims  to  further  the 
critique  of  using  a  probability  framework  to  deal  explicitly  with  hard  uncertainty  and  to  argue 
that  objective  and  subjective  probability  can  often  not  be  applied  to  environmental  decisions. 
The  third  and  fourth  sections  focus  on  two  alternative  decision-making  mechanisms  which 
utilise  probability.  The  third  section  specifically  focuses  on  attempts  to  deal  with  uncertainty 
within  the  valuation  stage  through  the  concepts  of  option  value  and  quasi-option  value.  It  is 
shown  that,  in  addition  to  their  reliance  on  probability,  these  approaches  have  a  further 
number  of  theoretical  and  practical  difficulties  which  limit  there  applicability  to  decisions 
characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. 
The  fourth  section  forwards  a  critique  of  the  dominant  paradigm  of  decision  making  under 
uncertainty,  based  on  expected  utility  theory.  In  particular  it  is  argued  that  the  expected  utility 
approach  is  not  applicable  to  environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty, 
because  of  its  reliance  on  probability,  as  well  as  the  mechanism  by  which  it  weights  the Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  66 
uncertain  outcome.  The  lack  of  applicability  of  expected  utility  theory  to  decisions 
characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  is  reinforced  by  experimental  evidence,  which  questions 
some  of  the  theoretical  constructs  on  which  expected  utility  theory  is  based.  Moreover, 
although  a  number  of  variations  on  expected  utility  theory  have  been  proposed,  none  provide 
a  suitable  mechanism  for  weighting  the  outcome  and  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the 
outcome.  The  final  section  of  the  chapter  concludes  that  an  alternative  decision-making 
framework  is  required  for  decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. 
4.2.  Rationality  and  the  decision-making  process 
The  interpretation  of  decision-making  models  in  a  normative  or  behavioural/  positivist  manner 
is  crucial  in  evaluating  the  use  of  such  models  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty.  The 
distinction  defines  whether  the  aim  of  the  model  is  to  explain  the  way  that  decisions  are  made 
in  the  face  of  uncertainty  (i.  e.  a  behavioural  approach)  or  to  prescribe  the  way  that  decisions 
ought  to  be  made  in  the  face  of  reality  (a  normative  approach).  The  latter  implies  a  set  of 
value  judgements  about  an  individual  or  institution,  as  well  as  a  notion  of  rationality.  In 
practice  however,  in  the  literature  there  is  a  blurring  of  the  distinction  between  the  two,  with 
behavioural  models  being  used  to  either  help  construct  or  alternatively  deconstruct  normative 
models.  Therefore  the  two  questions  that  need  to  be  addressed,  are  firstly  how  decisions 
under  environmental  uncertainty  should  be  made  and  secondly  do  these  models  reflect  the 
realities  of  how  decisions  are  made.  The  second  question  implies  the  testing  of  models  or  the 
use  of  other  evidence  to  assess  their  applicability.  This  approach  is  employed  in  the  case 
study  concerned  with  the  decision  to  improve  an  existing  road  in  Southern  Belize. 
This  section  aims  to  deal  more  with  the  first  question,  and  in  particular  how  in  any  normative 
approach  the  'rationality'  of  a  decision  should  be  judged.  Again  the  stance  taken  here  will  be 
that  it  is  not  advantageous  to  completely  separate  questions  of  what  should  happen  with  what 
does  happens.  Normative  approaches,  if  they  are  to  have  any  relevance,  must  recognise  the 
limits  of  human  cognitive  ability,  as  well  as  the  limits  and  realities  inherent  in  decision-making 
structures  and  institutions.  They  must  also  be  tempered  by  an  understanding  of  what  is  the 
best  that  the  decision-making  process  can  hope  to  achieve  in  any  given  circumstances.  This 
is  particularly  the  case  in  situations  of  hard  uncertainty  where  notions  of  optimality  are  often 
meaningless. 
Likewise,  taking  a  purely  behavioural  approach  to  explaining  the  way  that  decisions  are  made, 
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limits  the  usefulness  of  such  models  in  providing  guidance  for  dealing  with  uncertainty.  These 
concerns  come  down  to  what  in  effect  are  ex  post  and  ex  ante  approaches  to  the  decision- 
making  problem  at  hand.  Behavioural  models  are  in  effect  seeking  to  explain  ex  post  the  way 
that  decisions  are  made.  By  which  time,  many  of  the  uncertainties  facing  the  decision  maker 
will  in  fact  have  been  resolved.  Only  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight  can  the  decision  itself  be 
judged  as  'good'  orbad'.  In  the  face  of  uncertainty,  whether  or  not  the  resultant  decision  was 
in  fact  optimal  or  not  can  only  be  judged  ex  post.  This  is for  the  simple  reason  that  the  ex  post 
set  may  contain  outcomes  that  are  preferable  to  all  those  outcomes  in  the  ex  ante  set.  Ex 
ante,  in  situations  of  hard  uncertainty  or  ignorance,  the  decision  cannot  be  judged  as  optimal 
or  not.  Notions  of  optimality  therefore  only  relate  to  situations  of  certainty.  For  example,  if  we 
look  at  decisions  which  could  result  in  the  crossing  of  a  particular  ecosystem  threshold,  ex 
ante  the  consequences  of  such  an  action  cannot  be  predicted.  As  was  argued  in  the  previous 
chapter  such  a  decision  is  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  As  such,  this  poses  serious 
problems  for  notions  of  choosing  the  optimal  policy  or  course  of  action. 
4.2.1  Bounded  rationality  and  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making 
process 
Following  Simon  (1964,1972),  a  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  substantive  rationality, 
where  rationality  refers  exclusively  to  the  results  of  the  decision,  and  procedural  rationality 
where  concern  is  focused  on  the  rationality  of  the  decision-making  process  itself.  Existing 
decision  theories  have  tended  to  focus  on  notions  of  substantive  rationality,  based  on  finding 
the  best  solution  through  the  use  of  a  constrained  optimisation  framework  (Simon  1982).  The 
assumption  being  of  course  that  the  individual  or  collective  agents  possess  perfect  information 
or  act  as  if  they  do  (in  the  case  of  Bayesian  theory).  The  realisation,  however,  that  ex  ante  in 
many  decisions  affecting  the  environment,  the  decision  maker  is  constrained  by  the  presence 
of  hard  uncertainty,  implies  that  the  rationality  of  any  decision  will  be  necessarily  bounded. 
Abbott  (1955)  and  Simon  (1957)  recognised  that  limits  and  lags  inherent  in  the  individual 
learning  process  about  the  dynamic  environment,  in  which  decisions  are  taken,  result  in  a 
more  limited  rationality,  normally  referred  to  as  'bounded  rationality'.  Because  the  full  set  of 
outcomes  associated  with  any  action  is  unknown,  it  cannot  be  determined  ex  ante  whether  the 
decision  is  optimal  or  not.  As  a  result  the  emphasis  in  evaluating  environmental  decisions 
faced  with  hard  uncertainty,  will  be  on  procedural  rationality.  This  formally  recognises,  that 
the  different  modalities  of  any  uncertain  decision  will  affect  the  way  that  any  model  can  be 
evaluated;  a  point  often  overlooked  in  the  literature,  so  that  as  Faucheux  and  Froger  (1995) 
argue  many  authors  have  denied  that  any  distinction  exists  between  the  different  types  of 
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Applying  the  notion  of  substantive  rationality  to  decision-making  models  implies  a  notion  of 
reality  which  is  immutable  or  predetermined  in  which  all  events  are  predictable.  This  position 
is  not  valid  from  two  perspectives;  first  complexity  results  in  a  situation  of  incomplete 
knowledge  due  to  lack  of  information;  second,  there  are  inherent  indetermencies  in  economic- 
ecological  processes,  and  so  the  future  is  to  a  certain  extent  transmutable.  Using  the  notion 
of  procedural  rationality  recognises  these  issues  and  allows  the  focus  to  be  directed  to 
questions  regarding  how  to  improve  the  basis  on  which  decisions  are  made.  In  this  vein, 
Simon  emphasises  methods  which  make  satisfactory  choices  rather  than  optimal  choices. 
Specifically  he  stresses  that  the  aim  is  to  provide  further  insights  into  the  trade-offs  inherent  in 
decision  making  and  to  make  explicit  the  mechanisms  and  assumptions  on  which  a  decision 
is  made. 
It  should  be  noted  that  for  a  decision  to  be  made,  even  on  the  basis  of  the  limited  rationality 
implied  by  the  use  of  a  procedural  rationality  framework,  a  certain  amount  of  information  must 
be  available.  While  the  decision  is  bounded,  because  the  full  range  of  outcomes  is  unknown, 
at  least  a  partial  set  of  possible  or  hypothesised  outcomes  must  be  present.  Thus,  although 
some  authors  have  highlighted  the  notion  of  ignorance  in  decision-making  models  and  have 
emphasised  the  notion  of  ignorance  in  Shackle's  work  (for  example,  Vickers,  1994;  Katzner 
1989a,  1989b,  1995),  in  decisions  characterised  by  complete  ignorance  no  notion  of 
rationality  can  be  attached  to  either  the  resultant  decision  nor  the  decision-making  process 
itself.  Unless  the  consequences  of  an  action  can  be  at  least  partially  bounded,  the  future  is 
completely  unknown.  Defining  a  conceptual  basis  on  which  the  rationality  of  decisions  made 
in  complete  ignorance  can  be  evaluated  is  thus  very  difficult.  In  such  cases,  a  position  of 
reserved  rationality  and  a  precautionary  approach  may  have  to  be  taken  (Perrings,  1997b), 
until  such  time  as  enough  information  is  present  to  reduce  the  situation  to  one  in  which  at 
least  a  partial  set  of  outcomes  can  be  hypothesised. 
4.2.2  Individual  and  public  decision-making  in  the  face  of  uncertainty. 
The  majority  of  decision-making  models  under  uncertainty,  including  the  Shackle  model,  focus 
on  individual  decision-making.  However,  in  developing  such  models  in  any  normative  sense, 
inevitably  there  will  be  an  overlap  with  institutional  decision  making.  Moreover,  the  nature  of 
many  decisions  regarding  the  eco  nom  ic-envi  ron  mental  system,  even  if  made  by  individuals, 
will  affect  society  as  a  whole.  In  other  words,  the  negative  consequences  of  an  uncertain 
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It  soon  becomes  apparent  that  the  amount  of  decisions  that  are  purely  personal  is  very  small 
due  to  the  interconnected  ness  of  society,  the  economy  and  the  environment.  Even  so,  many 
decision  models  typify  the  situation  as  one,  in  which  the  individual  makes  a  series  of  gambles, 
in  which  no  one  stands  to  lose  from  the  use  of  a  flawed  normative  model  (Russel,  1997). 
However,  precisely  because  the  use  of  a  flawed  normative  model  may  have  significant 
societal  consequences,  it  is  crucial  that  such  models  be  evaluated  in  relation  to  whether  they 
deal  adequately  with  hard  uncertainty.  So  the  use  of  an  expected  value  or  utility  model  in  the 
context  of  an  environmental  decision  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  may  result  in  severe 
negative  consequences.  An  example  of  this  could  be  the  large-scale  removal  of  mangroves 
for  tourist  development  or  shrimp  farming.  This  action  could  have  severe  repercussions  in  the 
face  of  an  uncertain  event,  such  as  a  severe  hurricane.  The  reduction  of  the  ability  of  the 
ecological  system  to  act  as  a  buffer  against  storm  damage  would  have  large  societal 
consequences.  As  a  result,  in  terms  of  evaluating  ex  ante  the  procedural  rationality  of  such 
decisions,  it  will  be  important  to  place  individual  decisions  taken  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  in  a 
wider  context.  This  recognises  that  individual  decision  makers,  especially  those  agencies 
with  public  responsibilities,  do  not  behave  as  if  they  are  making  a  private  decision. 
4.3.  Probability  and  decision  making  under  h  ard-  uncertainty. 
Decision-making  models  which  attempt  to  deal  with  uncertainty  normally  rely  on  two  central 
mechanisms.  The  first  involves  a  measure  of  uncertainty,  and  the  second  involves  a 
mechanism  for  evaluating  the  outcome  and  its  associated  measure  of  uncertainty.  Although 
the  latter  stage  may  vary  in  different  models,  the  use  of  probability  (either  in  an  objective  or 
subjective  manner)  is  by  far  the  dominant  measure  by  which  an  uncertain  event  is 
characterised.  This  hegemony  of  probability,  in  both  decision-making  and  other  models  which 
attempt  to  represent  the  ecological-economic  system,  is  questioned.  Consequently,  before 
the  applicability  of  expected  utility  models  is  assessed,  a  fundamental  critique  of  the 
probability  foundations  is  provided. 
The  dominance  of  the  probability  framework  can  be  partly  accounted  for  by  the  limited 
conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  in  the  traditional  literature,  based  on  a  view  of  reality  as 
fundamentally  indeterminate  and  immutable.  Such  an  approach  does  not  tend  to  recognise 
that  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  will  affect  the  way  that  the  problem  can  be 
approached  and  leads  to  a  position  where  the  use  of  a  probability  framework  is  advocated  for 
all  cases  of  uncertainty  (Faucheux  &  Froger,  1995).  However,  as  previously  argued,  the 
presence  of  hard  uncertainty  in  many  environmental  decisions  precludes  such  an  approach. 
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does  not  deal,  explicitly  with  uncertainty  per  se.  On  the  basis  of  the  different  cdteda  on  which 
the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  were  defined  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  next  sections 
will  put  forward  a  critique  on  the  basis  of  using  both  frequency  and  subjectivist  interpretations 
of  probability  in  the  case  of  hard  uncertainty. 
4.3.1  Objective  probability 
The  use  of  objective  probabilities  (actual  or  implicitly  assumed)  is  in  essence  based  on  a 
frequency  approach.  Based  largely  on  the  work  of  von  Mises  (1936,1939),  objective 
probability  is  usually  defined  to  be  the  limit  of  its  relative  frequency  as  the  number  of  trials 
increases  without  limit  (Ford,  1994).  The  crucial  criterion  is  that  the  event  must  be  divisible, 
namely  that  it  can  be  repeated  in  constant  and  unchanging  circumstances.  The  classic 
example  of  this  are  roulette  wheel  type  experiments,  which,  because  the  generating 
mechanism  remains  unchanging,  an  infinite  number  of  trials  can  be  carried  out.  The 
generation  of  objective  probabilities  therefore  relies  upon  the  assumption  of  a  static 
framework  in  which  there  exists  a  history  of  repeated  trials  against  nature.  In  this  sense  they 
require  a  high  degree  of  knowledge  rather  than  being  characterised  by  a  lack  of  knowledge, 
as  Shackle  argues: 
"Probability  as  relative  frequency  is  surely  a  form  of  knowledge 
... 
By  contrast  there  can  be  a 
need  to  delineate  and  delimit  unknowledge.  The  decision  maker,  the  chooser  of  action  or  of  a 
comprehensive  and  far  reaching  policy,  is  conscious  that  even  the  foreground  of  his  field  of 
action  in  time-to-come  is  a  shifting  mist  and  that  all  beyond  it  melts  into  a  void.  Choice  of 
course  of  action  is  not  an  experiment  which  can  be  repeated  under  broadly  unchanging 
conditions  ... 
Relative  frequency  cannot  apply  to  it 
..  relative  frequencies  are  knowledge 
because  the  classes  of  outcomes  they  refer  to  are  not  rivals.  The  truth  of  one,  by  no  means 
denies  the  truth  of  another.  "  (Shackle,  1979:  p100-11) 
The  notion  of  decisions  which  can  be  characterised  as  a  series  of  infinitely  repeatable 
experiments  cannot  be  applied  to  all  the  modalities  of  uncertainty  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
Shackle  (1949,1955)  provides  a  telling  critique  of  such  notions,  in  that  for  many  economic 
situations,  the  decision  is  'unique'.  Many  decisions  will  in  essence  be  unprecedented  in  that 
there  exists  no  historical  precedent  on  which  objective  probabilities  can  be  specified. 
Shackle's  notion  of  uniqueness  in  economic  decisions  can  be  extended  to  the  ecological- 
economic  system  which,  because  of  lack  of  information  due  to  complexity  or  fundamental 
indetermencies  in  the  system,  many  actions  will  not  have  historical  precedents.  Because 
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it  is  not  possible  to  construct  a  probability  distribution  for  these  outcomes.  An  example  of  this 
is  the  decision  to  discharge  radioactive  waste  from  Sellafield,  which  has  resulted  in  the 
unpredictable  deposition  of  radio-nuclides  in  the  Solway  Firth  salt  marshes. 
Even  if  it  is  possible  to  assume  that  the  conditions  under  which  an  outcome  is  generated  are 
consistent,  and  non-changing,  then  Shackle  (1949)  is  still  critical  of  the  probability  calculus  as 
a  mechanism  for  handling  choice  in  single  decisions  (Ford,  1994).  This  is  because,  even  if 
the  frequency  probability  of  a  mutually  exclusive  set  of  events  is  derived,  this  does  not  tell  us 
what  the  probability  of  the  next  event  will  be: 
"All  concepts  of  numerical  probability  are  alike  in  involving  the  ideas  of  uniformity  in  some 
specified  sense  in  the  conditions  of  the  experiments  ... 
Now  for  many  important  kinds  of 
decisions  which  must  be  taken  in  human  affairs  it  will  be  possible  to  find  a  sufficient  number  of 
past  instances  which  occuffed  under  appropriately  similar  conditions.  This  difficulty,  however, 
is  a  minor  one  compared  with  the  fact  that,  even  by  vicarious  experience  a  probability  is 
established,  many  kinds  of  decision  are  for  each  individual  virtually  unique;  the  die  is  thrown 
once  and  for  all  ... 
Is  'probability'  in  this  frequency  ratio  sense  a  relevant  consideration  at  all 
when  only  one  or  virtually  one  'throw  of  the  die'is  going  to  be  allowed  to  us?  It  is  universally 
agreed  that  the  numerical  probability  of  a  single  isolated  event  has  no  meaning.  " 
(Shackle,  1949:  pl  09-110) 
So,  for  example,  although  the  probability  of  a  hurricane  in  a  particular  area  may  be  known 
(with  varying  degrees  of  reliability),  this  does  not  tell  us  when  or  where  the  next  hurricane  will 
occur,  nor  the  magnitude  of  its  consequences.  Predicting  the  consequences  of  the  hurricane 
by  means  of  a  probability  distribution  for  all  the  outcomes  is  not  possible  due  to  the  complex 
and  ever-changing  structures  and  interconnections  between  socio-economic  and  ecological 
system.  One  only  has  to  look  at  the  consequences  of  Hurricane  Mitch  in  1998  on  Honduras, 
Nicaragua,  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador,  to  see  evidence  of  this  (The  Guardian,  1998). 
Thus,  a  fundamental  and  far  reaching  critique  of  the  applicability  of  frequency  probability,  in 
the  context  of  the  environmental-economic  system,  lies  in  the  requirement  of  a  static 
generating  structure  from  which  objective  probabilities  are  derived.  While  the  past  may 
influence  the  future,  the  irreversibility  of  both  human  actions  and  movements  from  one 
ecosystem  state  to  another  means  that  the  structure  of  the  present  economic-ecological 
system,  and  thus  the  conditions  which  generate  future  outcomes  are  constantly  changing. 
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particular  threshold.  Where  crossing  a  threshold  involves  irreversible  change  in  the  structures 
of  the  ecological  system  and  its  connections  with  the  economic  system,  due  to  the  entropic 
nature  of  such  change,  the  action  is  not  repeatable  in  identical  circumstances. 
Nevertheless,  when  a  system  is  in  a  local  equilibrium,  it  may  be  possible  over  time  to  build  up 
a  historical  record  of  the  outcomes  of  economic  activity.  That  is  to  say,  after  a  sufficient 
period  of  time  a  decision  which  was  previously  unprecedented  may  become  more  routine,  in 
which  case  it  may  gradually  change  from  being  a  situation  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty 
to  one  of  soft  uncertainty.  Examples  of  this  would  include  the  use  of  many  pesticides,  for 
which  the  full  consequences  of  their  use  in  relation  to  the  environment  is  only  now  becoming 
understood,  more  than  50  years  after  their  widespread  application.  What  must  be 
remembered,  however,  is  that  as  the  system  progresses  the  derivation  of  probabilities  from 
static  historical  records  may  become  more  unreliable.  Alternatively  if  the  system  passes  a 
threshold  or  flips,  then  the  structures  may  change  so  radically,  that  it  will  not  be  possible  to 
specify  the  full  set  of  outcomes  from  past  data.  In  some  instances,  the  irreversibility  and 
uniqueness  of  the  decision  process  will  mean  that  objective  probabilities  cannot  be  derived.  A 
good  example  of  this  would  be  in  the  extinction  of  a  particular  species,  which  by  definition  is 
unprecedented. 
Non-divisible  actions,  which  cannot  be  repeated,  can  in  certain  cases  be  pooled  with  other 
actions  to  form  a  number  of  seriable  experiments.  However,  for  an  experiment  to  be  seriable, 
the  conditions  under  which  the  event  occurs  should  be  unchanging.  The  more  that  this 
condition  is  relaxed,  the  more  unreliable  any  probability  distribution  generated  becomes.  The 
insurance  industry  thrives  on  identifying  such  poolable  events,  the  classic  example  being  that 
of  life  expectancy.  In  the  case  of  environmental  decision  making,  due  to  the  complex  and 
evolving  nature  of  ecosystems,  such  a  process  is  fraught  with  difficulties.  This  is  particularly 
so  when  faced  with  determining  the  consequences  of  a  particular  event  such  as  species  loss, 
rather  than  defining  an  actual  event,  such  as  the  number  of  species  lost.  Because  the 
outcomes  of  a  particular  action  tend  to  be  derived  from  the  combination  of  different  attributes 
or  key  variables  in  the  ecological-economic  system,  the  resulting  consequences  of  these 
combinations  is  often  unique.  Thus,  for  example,  pooling  the  consequences  of  the  loss  of 
individual  species  is  not  possible,  because  of  the  presence  of  hard  uncertainty  surrounding 
the  loss  of  one  species  or  combinations  of  species,  which  is  unprecedented.  There  are  no 
other  worlds  to  which  Such  an  'experiment'  can  be  pooled.  In  situations  of  hard  uncertainty, 
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4.3.2  Subjective  probability 
In  addition  to  objective  probability,  the  concept  of  subjective  probability,  inspired  by  the  work 
of  Ramsey  (1926,1931)  de  Finetti  (1951)  and  Savage  (1954),  is  the  other  dominant  measure 
of  uncertainty  used  in  literature  on  decision-making2.  Subjective  probability  is  the  means  by 
which  the  individual  specifies  the  degree  of  belief  that  they  attach  to  the  occurrence  of  the 
different  possible  outcomes  of  any  action.  The  requirement  of  objective  probability  for  a 
divisible  decision,  with  a  historic  record,  is  overcome  by  the  use  of  subjective  measure  of 
probability  based  on  belief.  The  use  of  subjective  probabilities  assumes  that  even  if  objective 
probabilities  are  not  available,  the  individual  can  subjectively  allocate  a  probability  distribution 
to  all  the  consequences  of  an  action.  As  such,  it  does  allow  room  for  different  individuals  to 
have  different  degrees  of  belief  in  any  given  hypothesis.  In  such  a  framework  all  forms  of 
uncertainty  are  reduced  to  soft  uncertainty  or  risk. 
The  use  of  subjective  probabilities  is  consistent  with  the  notion  of  a  predetermined  reality,  in 
that  even  if  in  the  short-run  subjective  probabilities  do  not  coincide  with  the  presumed 
immutable  objective  probabilities,  in  the  long  run  subjective  probabilities  tend  to  converge  to 
the  assumed  (but  unknown)  underlying  objective  probability  distributions.  In  the  case  of 
Bayesian  theory,  where  initially  subjective  probabilities  differ  from  objective  probabilities, 
agents  learn  over  time  and  can  revise  previous  formed  subjectively  probabilities.  Under 
Bayesian  theory  economic  actors  behave  as  if  they  had  complete  knowledge  of  the 
parameters  of  the  real  world.  The  subjectivist  view  advocated  by  Shafer  (1976)  stresses  the 
notion  of  probability  as  a  property  of  belief  or  knowledge,  so  that,  while  in  the  long  run 
subjective  probabilities  will  tend  to  coincide  with  objective  probabilities,  in  the  short  term  it  is 
possible  for  the  individual  to  calculate  subjective  probabilities  that  are  statistically  reliable  on 
the  basis  of  existing  information.  Accordingly  Bayesian  theory  supposes  that  agents  will  make 
decisions  as  if  they  knew  the  collection  of  future  states  of  nature  or  the  probabilities  of  the 
occurrence  for  the  future  states  (Faucheux,  &  Froger,  1995). 
While,  through  this  approach  the  requirement  of  divisibility  is  circumvented,  the  use  of 
subjective  probability  in  the  case  of  hard  uncertainty  can  be  attacked  in  that,  in  common  with 
objective  probability,  subjective  probability  presupposes  that  the  complete  set  of  outcomes 
can  be  hypothesised.  Again  it  is  Shackle  (1969),  who  was  foremost  in  voicing  concern  at  this 
2  Two  other  measures  of  probability  exist,  one  based  on  the  work  of  Keynes  (1921),  Jeffreys  (1939,1948) 
and  Camap  (1945)  and  the  other  based  on  the  propensity  interpretation  expounded  by  Popper  (1959-60, 
1972,1990).  However  due  to  their  limited  use  in  decision  making  models,  they  are  not  reviewed  in  this  M, 
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presupposition.  On  the  basis  of  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  outlined  in  chapter  3,  it 
is  evident  that  in  cases  of  hard  uncertainty  a  full  set  of  outcomes  cannot  be  specified  and  thus 
cannot  be  represented  by  a  distributional  variable.  Even  if  subjective  probability  is  used  the 
individual  is  assumed  to  compile  an  exhaustive  list  of  all  the  consequences  of  any  particular 
action  (Ford,  1994).  The  crucial  property  whether  subjective  or  objective  probability  is  used, 
in 
that  the  list  is  exhaustive.  Thus,  where  applied  to  environmental  decision-making  the  decision 
maker  must  be  able  to  specify  all  the  possible  states  of  the  world  that  could  occur  as  a 
consequence  of  a  particular  decision.  From  the  preceding  chapters,  given  the  complex  and 
dynamic  nature  of  the  ecological-economic  system,  it  is  apparent  that  this  will  only  be  the 
case  in  a  small  number  of  environmental  decisions. 
Where  the  full  range  of  outcomes  cannot  be  specified,  the  situation  is  characterised  by  hard 
uncertainty,  or  where  none  of  the  outcomes  are  known,  ignorance.  In  the  case  of  soft 
uncertainty  or  risk  in  contrast,  there  is  no  room  for  what  Shackle  (1969)  terms  a  'residual 
hypothesis'  (the  possibility  that  an  unspecified  outcome  might  occur),  as  all  possible  outcomes 
are  enumerated.  In  hard  uncertainty,  in  addition  to  the  outcomes  which  can  be  hypothesised 
or  imagined,  there  is  the  possibility  of  an  unanticipated  outcome  (a  residual  hypothesis). 
Accordingly  in  this  context  it  does  not  make  sense  for  the  measure  of  uncertainty  (objective  or 
subjective)  to  be  additive  and  add  to  unity.  The  use  of  probability  in  cases  of  hard  uncertainty 
would  in  effect  ignore  the  presence  of  the  residual  hypothesis,  in  that  because  the 
probabilities  are  constrained  to  add  to  unity,  probabilities  are  only  specified  for  the  set  of 
known  outcomes.  As  a  result,  if  applied  to  cases  of  hard  uncertainty,  one  flaw  in  using  a 
subjective  or  objective  probability  measure  is  that  it  does  not  deal  explicitly  with  the 
uncertainty  per  se.  Outcomes  that  are  not  specified  are  in  effect  ignored  from  the  decision 
process. 
The  interpretation  of  probability  in  a  subjectivist  manner  emphasises  the  notion  of  probability 
as  a  property  of  belief  (Lawson,  1988).  Stressing  the  role  of  the  individual  in  relation  to  his  or 
her  belief  in  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  event  (as  opposed  to  probability  being  used  to 
characterise  an  objective  phenomena)  has  led  to  a  number  of  criticisms  of  the  use  of 
subjective  probability  being  advanced.  While,  less  fundamental  than  the  issue  of  knowledge 
regarding  the  full  set  of  outcomes  and  the  divisibility  of  the  action,  Shackle  puts  forward 
further  arguments  against  the  use  of  probability  as  a  measure  for  uncertainty.  The  basis  of 
these  criticisms  rests  on  whether  subjective  probability  is  appropriate  as  a  measure  which 
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outcomes.  Foremost  is  the  criticism  that  in  a  probability  framework  the  degree  of  belief 
attached  to  the  occurrence  of  an  event  is  dependent  on  the  other  outcomes.  This  property  of 
additivity  (as  a  result  of  which  probability  is  constrained  to  add  to  unity)  is  problematic  in  that, 
as  Shackle  (1969)  argues,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  probability  of  one  outcome  should  affect 
the  probability  of  another  outcome  in  a  mutually  exclusive  set,  when  the  outcomes  are  rivals. 
In  other  words,  if  one  outcome  occurs,  then  the  other  hypothesised  outcomes  cannot  occur. 
While  Shackle  perhaps  over-extended  the  argument  of  non-rivalness  to  all  cases  of 
uncertainty,  a  more  appropriate  application  will  be  to  restrict  the  assumption  of  non-rivalness 
to  situations  characterised  by  soft  uncertainty  or  risk.  Take  the  case  of  a  repeatable  action 
such  as  throwing  a  dice  for  example,  where  the  outcomes  are  not  in  fact  rivals,  and  thus  a 
frequency  probability  approach  is  perfectly  valid.  So,  for  example,  rolling  a  six  on  a  dice  does 
not  preclude  rolling  another  six.  In  contrast  for  situations  of  hard  uncertainty,  non  rivalness 
cannot  be  assumed,  accordingly  the  decision-maker: 
It  recognises  his  knowledge  as  merely  setting  bounds  to  a  wide  spectrum  of  mutually  exclusive 
ideas"  (Shackle,  1969:  p92) 
Because  as  is  the  case  of  many  environmental  decisions,  non-rivalness  cannot  be  assumed, 
a  further  argument  against  the  use  of  a  subjective  or  objective  probability,  approach  is 
presented. 
For  many  uncertain  situations  the  belief  attached  to  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  a 
particular  outcome  need  not  necessarily  be  influenced  by  its  rivals.  A  simple  example  of  this 
is  the  inability  of  probability  to  deal  with  an  individual  belief  that  three  candidates  have  a  50-50 
chance  of  winning  a  presidential  election  (Ford,  1994).  The  condition  that  the  sum  of 
probabilities  must  add  to  unity  is  also  problematic  for  Shackle  (1952,1969),  because  even  if 
an  individual  believes  that  the  occurrence  of  two  outcomes  is  perfectly  possible  (and  would 
thus  want  to  assign  them  a  high  probability  or  even  both  a  probability  of  1)  (s)he  is  constrained 
to  give  the  two  outcomes  a  maximum  probability  of  0.5.  The  critique  therefore  follows  that  the 
decision  maker's  belief  in  the  possible  occurrence  of  the  outcomes  is  not  adequately  reflected 
in  a  probability  of  0.5.  Furthermore,  if  further  hypotheses  are  added  to  the  individuals  list  of 
outcomes,  then  under  a  subjective  probability  framework,  the  probability  of  the  other 
outcomes  must  be  lowered  (unless  a  probability  of  zero  is  allocated  to  the  new  hypothesis), 
even  if  with  the  addition  of  another  possible  outcome  the  individual's  belief  in  the  occurrence 
of  the  original  outcome  has  not  been  reduced.  This  strict  condition  of  subjective  probability  is 
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because,  when  the  decision  maker  subjectively  estimates  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  a 
particular  outcome,  its  relation  to  the  occurrence  of  the  other  outcome  is  often  poorly  defined. 
4.4.  Decision  making  and  evaluating  uncertain  consequences. 
Although  probability  is  the  dominant  measure  of  uncertainty  used  in  models  of  decision 
making  there  are  two  main  alternative  ways  of  evaluating  the  values  of  the  outcomes  and  their 
associated  uncertainty.  The  first  involves  attempts  to  deal  with  uncertainty  within  the 
valuation  stage  and  subsequent  cost-benefit  analysis  by  means  of  estimating  option  or  quasi- 
option  values.  The  second  centres  on  dealing  with  uncertainty  outwith  the  valuation  stage.  In 
such  approaches  any  valuations  attached  to  the  various  outcomes  are  done  first  and  then  a 
mechanism  is  adopted  which  allows  the  individual  to  evaluate  the  competing  options.  In  this 
latter  section  particular  attention  will  be  given  to  the  dominant  model  of  decision  making  under 
uncertainty,  namely  those  based  on  expected  utility  (EU).  It  will  be  argued  that  in  cases  of 
hard  uncertainty,  the  valuation  stage  can  not  adequately  deal  with  the  problem  because  of  its 
reliance  on  probability.  Similarly,  even  although  it  may  be  advantageous  to  attempt  to  deal 
with  uncertainty  outwith  the  valuation  stage,  the  use  of  an  expected  utility  approach  is  not 
suitable  for  many  environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty. 
4.4.1  Dealing  with  uncertainty  within  the  valuation  stage 
If  it  were  possible  to  deal  with  uncertainty  within  the  valuation  stage,  then  the  values  obtained 
could  be  then  inserted  into  a  cost-benefit  framework  directly.  The  development  of  this 
approach  has  been  largely  within  the  environmental  economics  literature  and  focuses  on  the 
concepts  of  option  and  quasi-option  value.  Although  there  have  been  a  number  of 
interpretations  attached  to  the  notion  of  option  value  (Ready,  1995)  option  value  or  more 
correctly  option  price  (Cicchetti  &  Freeman,  1971)  addresses  the  correct  measurement  of 
welfare  change  under  uncertainty,  with  the  emphasis  on  the  additional  value  that  is  attached 
to  maintaining  the  future  supply  of  a  good  or  service  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  (Graham- 
Tomasi,  1995).  In  contrast  quasi-option  value  can  be  defined  as  the  expected  value  of  future 
information,  which  is  conditional  on  delaying  an  irreversible  decision  to  develop  an 
environmental  resource.  To  a  certain  extent  they  also  take  a  different  level  of  analysis  in  that 
option  value  focuses  on  the  individual  economic  agent,  whereas  quasi-option  value  focuses 
attention  at  the  level  of  the  public  decision  maker  evaluating  policies  or  projects.  It  should  be 
noted  immediately  that  at  a  conceptual  level  both  the  option  value  and  quasi-option  value 
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assumption  is  made  that  they  are  potentially  applicable  to  all  case  of  uncertainty.  The 
concept  of  quasi-option  value  does,  however  stress  the  importance  of  irreversibility. 
While  the  debates  on  option  value  and  quasi-option  value  have  generated  an  extensive 
literature,  the  question  to  be  addressed  here  is  whether  or  not  they  provide  a  suitable 
framework  for  dealing  with  hard  uncertainty  and  thus  whether  hard  uncertainty  can  be 
incorporated  within  the  valuation  stage  at  all. 
4.4.1.1  OpHon  value 
The  literature  surrounding  the  notion  of  option  value  (OV)  is  concerned  with  identifying  a 
welfare  measure  that  logically  and  consistently  estimates  the  benefits  and  costs  from  a  policy 
change,  whose  impacts  are  uncertain  (Ready,  1995).  To  answer  whether  such  an  approach 
is  viable  and  will  deal  adequately  with  environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard 
uncertainty,  some  of  the  theoretical  issues  which  have  cast  doubt  on  the  applicability  of  option 
value  must  be  raised.  Foremost  of  these  is  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  the  benefits  and  costs 
of  a  policy  under  uncertainty  are  being  analysed  ex  ante  or  ex  post.  From  the  previous 
sections  it  is  apparent  that  the  problem  for  decision  makers  facing  uncertainty  is  at  the  ex  ante 
stage.  Analysis  of  the  optimality  of  any  decision  and  the  resulting  welfare  implications  can 
only  be  carried  out  ex  post.  It  is  this  distinction  between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  analysis  that 
plays  a  pivotal  role  in  determining  the  usefulness  of  the  concept  of  option  value. 
In  particular  on  closer  scrutiny  it  becomes  apparent  that  what  option  value  represents  is 
simply  the  difference  between  an  ex  ante  measure  of  welfare  and  the  expected  value  of  an  ex 
post  measure.  Thus  the  option  price  (OP)  is  the  maximum  that  an  individual  would  ex  ante 
be  willing  to  pay  to  keep  open  the  option  of  using  a  particular  service  or  good  and  can  be 
defined  by: 
m 
nkV(y  - 
OP051,  Sk)=  7ýMyy  80,  SO  (4.1) 
where  6=  policy  vector  (e.  g.  50  develop  the  resource  and  61  =  conserve  the  resource),  s= 
state  of  the  world  vector  (e.  g.  so  does  not  need  to  use  the  resource  in  future  and  sl=  does 
want  to  use  resource  in  future),  71k=  ex  ante  probability  of  state  k  where  Y-71k=1  and  it  is 
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In  contrast  expected  consumer  surplus  (E(CS))  is  the  expected  value  of  the  ex  post  welfare 
benefits  of  the  use  of  the  particular  resource.  Thus,  if  consumer  surplus  is  defined  as: 
V(Y-CSky  51,  SO  ý  VO(l  809  SO  (4.2) 
where  V(Y,  8,  s)  represents  an  ex  post  indirect  utility  function,  then  expected  consumer 
surplus  is  defined  by: 
m 
E(CS)  7CkCSk  (4.3) 
What  Cicchetti  and  Freeman  (1971)  realised  is  that  the  two  alternative  welfare  measures  need 
not  be  equal  or  that  more  formally: 
OV  =  OP  -  E(CS)  (4.4) 
It  is  immediately  apparent  from  the  above,  that  option  value  is  purely  the  algebraic  difference 
between  consumer  surplus  and  the  state  independent  option  price,  and  cannot  be  measured 
as  a  separate  component  of  value. 
If,  as  was  stated,  the  primary  concern  is  with  the  ex  ante  evaluation  of  uncertainty,  then  the 
corresponding  compensation  test  should  also  be  ex  ante  (Ulph,  1982;  Ready,  1995,  Freeman, 
1986,  Bishop,  1982.  )  Thus,  option  price  rather  than  expected  consumer  surplus  is  the 
relevant  welfare  measure.  The  problem  is  that  on  a  practical  basis  OP  is  difficult  to  measure 
due  to  a  lack  of  observable  behaviour.  The  debate  in  the  literature  therefore  turns  to  one  of 
whether  E(CS)  could  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  OP.  This  of  course  will  depend  on  the  size  and 
the  sign  of  the  option  value.  However,  as  Schmalalensee  (1972)  argued  for  demand  side 
uncertainties  and  Freeman,  (1985,1993)  showed  for  supply  side  uncertainties,  it  is  not 
possible  to  determine  the  sign  nor  magnitude  of  any  option  value.  This  problem  poses  a 
severe  obstacle  to  applying  the  concept  of  option  prices  in  any  meaningful  way. 
Moreover,  whether  the  concept  of  option  value  is  any  use  in  relation  to  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  rests  on  whether  a  probability  framework  is  accepted.  From  both  equations  4.1 
and  4.3  it  is  apparent  that  the  assumption  is  made  that  all  possible  states  of  the  world  are 
known  and  that  these  are  captured  by  a  reliable  probability  distribution.  Thus,  even  if  it  was 
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as  has  been  argued,  is  not  applicable  in  cases  of  hard  uncertainty.  An  interesting  attempt  by 
Graham(1981),  who  focused  on  the  concept  of  the  willingness  to  pay  (WTP)  locus  to 
overcome  the  difficulties  faced  by  using  option  value,  also  relies  on  the  specification  of 
probabilities  for  the  known  states  of  nature.  The  practical  use  of  the  WTP  locus  as  means  of 
measuring  welfare  changes  under  uncertainty  is  further  weakened  by  the  argument  that  state 
dependent  compensation  payments  must  also  be  observed  (Ready,  1995),  if  aggregate 
willingness  to  pay  for  an  uncertain  policy  change  is  not  to  be  over-estimated.  Thus,  although 
the  notion  of  option  value  appears  intuitively  attractive,  it  offers  little  as  a  practical  means  for 
dealing  with  the  welfare  consequences  of  uncertainty,  and  even  on  a  theoretical  basis  would 
only  be  applicable  to  cases  of  soft  uncertainty  or  risk.  As  such,  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  the 
kind  of  hard  uncertainty  commonly  experienced  in  environmental  decision  making,  its 
usefulness  would  appear  limited. 
4.4.1.2  Quasi-opffon  value 
A  different  approach  to  that  of  option  value,  is  the  notion  of  quasi-option  value,  developed  by 
Arrow  &  Fisher  (1974).  What  these  authors  demonstrated  was  that  relative  to  a  situation  in 
which  the  decision  maker  ignores  opportunities  for  learning,  an  extra  value  is  attached  to  the 
preservation,  when  it  is  realised  that  it  is  possible  to  learn  the  true  benefits  of  preservation. 
This  is  termed  quasi-option  value  (QOV).  Like  option  value  the  concept  is  intuitively 
appealing,  and  in  the  context  of  irreversible  change  and  uncertainty  about  the  consequences 
of  that  change,  advocates  a  precautionary  approach.  QOV  is  then  the  value  of  the  extra 
information  gained  by  postponing  the  development  of  a  resource.  It  does  not  deal  therefore 
with  uncertainty  per  se,  but  aims  to  highlight  the  potential  value  of  information  gained  from  not 
irreversibly  developing  a  resource.  An  example  could  be  the  quasi-option  value  derived  from 
the  decision  to  preserve  a  species,  where  time  allows  knowledge  about  the  true  value  of  the 
species  to  be  obtained.  Although  further  research  could  result  in  knowledge  that  a  particular 
species  Is  not  especially  valuable,  the  mere  prospect  of  improved  research  on  the  value  of  a 
particular  species  or  ecosystem  should  lead  to  greater  conservation.  Thus,  in  a  sense  the 
application  of  QOV  (if  positive)  acts  as  a  buffer  against  irreversible  decisions,  until  the  point  at 
which  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  decision  is  considerably  reduced.  It  should  be 
emphasised  that  quasi-option  value  does  not  measure  the  net  benefit  of  preservation  (Fisher 
&  Hanemann,  1987). 
Arrow  and  Fisher  (1974)  showed  that,  as  quasi-option  value  is  not  dependent  on  risk 
aversion,  it  can  be  present  when  the  decision  maker  makes  choices  on  the  basis  of  the 
expected  monetary  values  of  benefits  and  costs.  However,  the  discussion  of  uncertainty  in Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  80 
the  context  of  quasi-option  value  is  based  on  a  narrow  conceptual  isation  of  uncertainty  which 
implies  that  all  situations  are  reducible  to  risk  or  soft  uncertainty.  As  such  in  the  model  the 
probability  of  the  net  benefits  of  the  different  options  in  the  second  time  period  is  assumed  to 
be  known  and  can  be  specified.  Although  quasi-option  value  does  introduce  a  dynamic 
aspect  to  the  decision-making  process,  in  that  the  decision  maker  can  update  their 
probabilities  using  Bayesian  rules  (Graham-Tomasi,  1995),  it  is  still  constrained  within  a 
probability  framework,  in  which  the  full  set  of  outcomes  is  known.  As  such  given  the 
preceding  arguments,  it  is  not  applicable  to  situations  of  hard  uncertainty. 
Moreover,  as  an  ex  ante  decision  framework  for  dealing  with  hard  uncertainty  it  would  appear 
of  limited  use.  As  Freeman  (1993)  has  argued,  quasi-option  value  is  not  a  separate 
component  of  an  individual's  utility  function  (if  known)  and  as  such  cannot  be  estimated 
separately  and  added  into  cost-benefit  analysis  calculations.  What  quasi-option  value 
attempts  to  measure  is  the  benefit  of  adopting  better  decision  procedures.  As  such  its 
magnitude  can  only  be  revealed  ex-post  by  comparing  two  strategies,  where  one  involves 
optimal  sequential  decision  making,  to  take  advantage  of  the  information  obtained  by  delaying 
irreversible  resource  commitments.  Even  then  such  ex  post  analysis  is  restricted  by  notions 
of  optimality  which  require  the  specification  of  probabilities,  and  so  is  inappropriate  for 
environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  As  an  ex  ante  decision  framework 
for  dealing  with  hard  uncertainty  it  is  clearly  redundant,  because  it  does  not  help  to  assess  the 
uncertainties  surrounding  the  consequences  of  an  irreversible  decision. 
4.5.  Expected  utility  approaches  to  decision  making  under  uncertainty 
The  second  approach  in  decision  making-models  is  to  value  the  outcomes  first  (with  no 
explicit  attention  given  to  uncertainty)  and  then  to  account  for  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
occurrence  of  that  outcome  separately.  The  majority  of  decision-making  models  under 
uncertainty  come  under  this  category  and  rely  on  a  separate  mechanism  under  which  the 
value  of  the  outcomes  and  some  measure  of  uncertainty  associated  with  the  specific 
outcomes  are  specified  and  some  form  of  weighting  procedure  carried  out  in  order  to  order  the 
different  outcomes.  Although  the  Shackle  model  also  deals  with  uncertainty  by  means  of  a 
weighting  mechanism  outwith  the  valuation  process,  because  of  its  significant  differences 
from  the  traditional  framework  it  will  be  introduced  in  greater  detail  in  Chapter  5.  Instead, 
because  of  the  relative  hegemony  that  expected  value  and  expected  utility  approaches  have 
achieved  in  the  literature,  this  section  will  be  devoted  to  a  critique  of  their  applicability  in 
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The  immediate  assumption  that  both  expected  value  and  utility  approaches  make  is  that  of  the 
applicability  of  probability.  The  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  is  such  that  for  any  acton  or 
policy  an  exhaustive  list  of  possible  outcomes  or  consequences  can  be  specified,  each  with 
an  associated  probability,  with  the  constraint  that  the  probabilities  will  sum  to  unity.  In  the 
case  of  expected  value  the  decision  regarding  the  prospect3  is  evaluated  in  terms  of  the 
expected 
value  (Y  )  of  a  gamble  offering  payoffs  (outcomes)  (x,,...,  Xj  with  probabilities  (p,,...,  p,,  )  by 
using  the  formula: 
xipi  (4.5) 
Setting  aside  for  the  moment  the  issue  of  probability,  the  expected  value  approach  has  been 
criticised  in  the  mainstream  literature  in  relation  to  its  inadequacy  as  a  measure  of  the 
attractiveness  of  a  monetary  prospect.  This  is  because  expected  value  infers  that  the 
decision  maker  and  his/  her  constituents  are  in  fact  risk  neutral. 
Accordingly  an  alternative  formulation  based  on  the  assumption  that  a  risky  prospect  is 
evaluated  by  reference  to  not  only  the  mathematical  expectation  of  an  outcome  but  also  the 
level  of  the  individual's  subjective  utility  (at  given  levels  of  wealth)  from  that  outcome. 
Consequently  the  expected  utility  of  an  outcome  (EU)  is  calculated  by  the  expression: 
EU  U(xi)pi  (4.6) 
where  U(.  )  is  termed  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  after  the  work  carried  out 
by  von  Neuman  and  Morgestern  (1947)4 
. 
The  choices  of  the  individual  are  then  analysed  by 
assuming  that  he  maximise  his  preferences  which  are  represented  by  a  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern  Utility  function. 
The  von  Neuman-Morgenstern  utility  function  differs  from  the  ordinal  utility  function  of 
3A  prospect  is  defined  in  the  expected  utility  literature  as  a  vector  of  probabilities  that  given  states  of  the 
I 
world  will  occur.  With  the  corresponding  vector  of  outcomes  associated  with  such  states  of  the  world. 
Dalmazzone,  1995). 
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standard  consumer  theory  in  that  the  only  transformations  possible  are  positive  linear  ones. 
Thus,  only  transformations  which  do  not  change  the  shape  of  the  functions  are  possible.  A 
concave  function  represents  risk  aversion,  a  linear  function  represents  risk  neutrality  and  a 
convex  utility  function  represents  a  risk-loving  individual.  The  von  Neumann-Morgenstem 
function  assumes  that  preferences  between  prospects  are  transitive,  continuous  and 
independent.  These  three  properties  are  embodied  in  the  following  axioms: 
i)  Compiete  ordering  axiom.  For  two  alternatives  A  and  B  one  of  the  following  must  be  true: 
the  consumer  either  prefers  A  to  B,  prefers  B  to  A,  or  is  indifferent  between  them.  The 
consumer's  evaluation  of  alternatives  is  transitive  if,  preferring  A  to  B  and  B  to  C,  they  also 
prefer  A  to  C. 
ii)  Continuity  axiom.  Let  A  be  preferred  to  B  and  B  to  C.  The  axiom  asserts  that  there  exists 
some  probability  p,  (0<p<1),  such  that  the  consumer  is  indifferent  between  outcome  B  with 
certainty  and  a  lottery  (p,  A,  C) 
iii)  Independence  axiom.  Let  A  be  preferred  to  B  and  C  be  any  outcome  whatever.  If  one 
lottery  L, 
,  offers  outcomes  A  and  C  with  probabilities  p  and  1-  p  respectively,  and  another  L2 
offers  the  outcomes  B  and  C  with  the  same  probabilities  p  and  1-p,  then  the  consumer  will 
prefer  L, 
. 
This  is  the  equivalent  of  saying  that  that  preferences  (utilities)  over  outcomes  are 
independent  of  the  probabilities  of  those  outcomes. 
In  the  subjective  utility  model  advanced  by  Savage  (1954),  who  developed  the  work  of  De 
Finetti  and  Ramsey  in  the  early  1930's,  the  use  of  an  objective  probability  is  substituted  for  the 
use  of  subjective  probability.  This  step  introduces  the  possibility  of  learning  following 
Bayesian  decision  rules.  The  utility  framework  and  its  underlying  axioms  remain,  however.  In 
both  expected  utility  and  subjective  utility  approaches,  the  basis  of  the  underlying  axioms  of 
utility  provide  a  framework  under  which  the  rationality  of  the  resulting  decision  is  judged.  The 
emphasis  is  very  much  on  the  substantive  rationality  of  the  decision  itself.  So  that  in  order  to 
act  rationally  (or  optimally)  an  agent  should  maximise  his  or  her  utility  value  associated  with 
the  outcome  from  the  particular  scheme. 
4.5.1  A  critique  of  expected  utility  models  of  decision  making  in  relation  to  hard 
uncertainty 
Expected  utility  (EU)  theories  and  their  variants,  can  be  critically  evaluated  in  relation  to  three 
basic  factors:  firstly  on  the  basis  of  their  use  of  objective  or  subjective  probabilities;  secondly 
on  whether  the  axioms  used  to  represent  the  utility  of  the  individual  accurately  reflect  reality, 
and  thirdly  on  how  the  probability  and  utility  function  are  combined  in  order  to  weight  the Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  83 
different  outcomes.  The  first  factor,  that  of  the  applicability  of  both  objective  and  subjective 
forms  of  probability  for  situations  of  hard  uncertainty  was  dealt  with  in  section  4.3.  From  the 
preceding  arguments  it  is  evident  that  in  decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  as  is 
present  in  many  environmental  problems,  the  reliance  on  probability  within  expected  utility 
models  appears  problematic  to  say  the  least.  The  second  and  third  arguments  against  the 
adoption  of  EU  models  of  decision  making  have  not  yet  been  addressed  however,  and  are 
therefore  tackled  in  the  two  following  sections.  Again,  the  discussion  will  inevitably  involve  an 
overlap  between  a  normative  or  prescriptive  position  of  how  individuals  ought  to  behave  and  a 
behavioural  approach  reflecting  how  individuals  actually  make  choices  under  uncertainty.  In 
the  second  section  the  question  that  will  need  to  be  addressed  is  whether  or  not  they  are 
suitable  mechanisms  in  relation  to  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision  process.  The 
focus  in  this  context  will  be  on  whether  or  not  they  capture  the  nature  of  the  trade-off  between 
uncertainty  and  the  costs  andbenefits  of  a  decision. 
4.5.1.1  Expected  utility  theory  and  experimental  evidence  relating  to  its 
applicability 
In  addition  to  the  critique  of  the  applicability  of  expected  utility  approaches  to  cases  of  hard 
uncertainty,  due  to  their  reliance  on  a  probability  framework,  further  criticisms  of  expected 
utility  have  been  made  on  the  basis  of  experimental  evidence.  What  the  empirical  evidence 
suggests  is  that  many  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  or  axioms  embodied  in  expected  utility 
theory  do  not  reflect  the  reality  of  how  individuals  make  decisions  in  the  face  of  uncertainty 
(Dalmazzone,  1995).  The  emphasis  is  therefore  often  on  testing  the  behavioural  predictions 
of  the  model.  Interestingly  much  of  the  evidence  has  been  collected  from  artificial  or  simulated 
choices  in  laboratory  conditions.  Very  few'real  world'  decision  examples  have  been  applied. 
Many  of  the  results  of  the  evidence  point  to  the  weakness  at  an  empirical  level  of  EU  and 
subjective  EU  in  dealing  with  all  the  modalities  of  uncertainty.  However,  instead  of 
recognising  the  effect  that  the  different  types  of  uncertainty  may  have  on  the  applicability  of 
EU  theory,  the  tendency  in  the  literature  is  to  label  such  situations  as  ambiguous  (Camerer  & 
Weber,  1992).  Thus,  rather  than  using  the  experimental  evidence  as  a  reason  to  question  the 
limited  conceptual  isation  of  uncertainty,  or  to  move  completely  outside  the  EU  framework 
(See  Ford  &  Ghose,  1995a,  for  a  notable  exception),  alternatives  tend  to  work  on  the 
relaxation  of  the  assumption  in  question.  Some  of  these  variants  will  be  briefly  discussed  in 
the  next  section. 
The  classic  experimental  evidence  relating  to  'ambiguity'  is  that  of  the  Ellsberg  Paradox.  In 
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with  the  predictions  of  EU  theory.  Of  most  importance  was  the  observation  that  people  prefer 
to  bet  on  states  that  they  know  more  about,  even  if  they  have  the  same  subjective  probability. 
Some  authors  have  interpreted  this  as  second  degree  uncertainty  or  lack  of  confidence  in 
one's  first  degree  judgements.  An  alternative  interpretation  could  be  that  subjective 
probability  did  not  capture  or  best  descdbe  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  in  such  a  decision 
(Ford  &  Ghose,  1995a).  Thus  rather  than  there  being  ambiguity  about  the  probability,  the  use 
of  probability  and  the  expected  utility  mechanism  for  evaluating  such  outcomes  may  simply 
not  have  been  used  by  the  individuals  to  deal  with  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  in  the 
experiment. 
What  some  of  the  evidence  does  point  to,  in  addition  to  the  weaknesses  of  the  assumption  of 
the  use  of  probability  for  all  situations  of  uncertainty,  is  weaknesses  in  the  way  that  EU  theory 
characterises  'rational'  behaviour,  and  in  particular  behaviour  in  relation  to  the  outcome  (or 
value)  of  an  uncertain  action.  One  of  the  first  critiques  levelled  by  Friedman  and  Savage 
(1948)  was  that  individual  attitudes  to  risk  are  highly  sensitive  to  levels  of  income.  Thus, 
people  of  low  incomes  tend  to  be  'risk'  averse  (they  are  averse  to  the  negative  consequences 
of  an  uncertain  action)  while  high  income  individuals  tend  to  be  'risk'  seekers.  Whether  this  is 
the  case  for  hard  uncertainty  remains  to  be  seen.  Are,  for  example,  low  income  countries 
more  averse  to  the  uncertain  consequences  of  biodiversity  loss  than  high  income  countries  ? 
Another  important  result  is  that  empirical  research  has  shown  that  people  may  in  fact  have 
asymmetric  attitudes  to  gains  and  losses.  Prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979) 
suggests  that  outcomes  are  actually  interpreted  by  agents  with  reference  to  their  current  asset 
position.  This  is  because  the  consequence  of  a  loss  may  influence  individuals  more  than  any 
increase  in  utility  of  the  same  amount.  This  may  be  particularly  important  in  the  context  of 
environmental  decisions,  because  it  would  suggest  that  individuals  would  assign  a  greater 
weight  to  the  loss  of  an  environmental  service  relative  to  the  current  state  of  nature  than  they 
would  to  a  gain  in  environmental  quality.  The  majority  of  experiments  seeking  to  test  the 
validity  of  EU  theory  however  are  only  based  on  gain  lotteries  because  of  the  simple  problem 
that  it  is  more  difficult  to  organise  laboratory  experiments  where  the  participants  are  subject  to 
actual  financial  losses.  This  would  again  point  to  the  need  for  more  'real  world  'experiments 
to  be  carried  out. 
The  famous  Allais  paradox  (Allais,  1953)  also  poses  difficulties  for  the  expected  utility 
approach  in  that  it  suggests  that  attitudes  to  different  prospects  may  not  in  fact  be 
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probability,  the  more  that  one  prospect  will  leave  an  individual  better  off,  the  more  risk  averse 
they  become  about  the  other.  This  effect  also  commonly  known  as  'common  consequence 
effect'  clearly  breaks  the  independence  axiom  at  the  heart  of  EU  theory  (see  for  example 
Kahmeman  &  Tversky,  1979  and  Ford,  1994). 
A  final  and  more  practical  problem,  and  one  particularly  relevant  in  the  context  of 
environmental  decision  making,  is  that  the  power  of  the  expected  utility  hypothesis  tends  to 
decline  as'the  probabilities  of  the  outcomes  tend  to  unity  or  zero.  One  reason  for  this  is  that 
people  facing  a  very  unlikely  event  tend  to  either  over-estimate  its  likelihood  of  occurrence  or 
alternatively  assume  that  it  is  zero.  This  would  also  appear  to  break  the  assumption  that  the 
utility  associated  with  an  outcome  is  independent  of  the  probability  attached  to  the  outcome. 
When  low  probability  events  are  combined  with  possible  catastrophic  events,  then  expected 
utility  has  even  more  difficulty  in  dealing  with  the  choices  of  individuals.  In  such  cases  it  can 
be  argued  that  expected  utility  does  not  account  for  behaviour,  which  seeks  to  avoid  the 
consequences  of  a  catastrophe,  even  when  the  probability  attached  to  such  a  consequence  is 
particularly  low.  This  echoes  one  of  Shackle's  (1969)  concerns  that  expected  utility  does  not 
handle  unique  and  irreversible  decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  very  well.  The 
notion  of  the  focus  value  approach  utilised  in  Shackle's  model  will  be  introduced  in  the  next 
chapter  as  a  possible  means  of  dealing  with  this  type  of  situation. 
4.5.1.2  Evaluating  an  uncertain  outcome:  Difficulties  with  the  weighting 
mechanism  in  expected  utility  models  and  other  averaging  based  models 
While  much  of  the  empirical  research  carried  out  on  expected  utility  tests  whether  EU  theory  is 
a  good  descriptive  theory,  there  is  very  little  analysis  devoted  to  whether  it  is  normatively 
adequate.  This  is  even  although,  as  Camerer  and  Weber  (1992)  point  out,  most  of  the 
alternatives  are  meant  to  be  normative  improvements  too.  As  a  result  unclear  standards  exist 
by  which  the  proposed  models  are  evaluated.  With  the  aim  of  improving  the  procedural 
rationality  of  decision-making,  a  normative  improvement  will  be  equated  with  the  explicit 
recognition  of  uncertainty.  Accordingly,  this  section  will  be  limited  to  reviewing  the  central 
mechanism  by  which  the  models  evaluate  uncertain  outcomes,  rather  than  the  different 
models  themselves  or  the  experimental  evidence  that  led  to  their  development  (see  Ford  & 
Ghose,  1998,  &  Camerer  &  Weber,  1992).  Instead  the  objective  will  be  to  provide  a  critique 
of  the  way  that  the  outcome  value  and  its  respective  measure  of  uncertainty  (probability  in  the 
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The  problems  inherent  in  the  underlying  axioms  of  probability  and  the  expected  utility 
approach  have  led  to  the  relaxation  of  some  of  the  assumptions  which  form  the  basis  of  EU 
theory,  as  well  as  the  subsequent  development  of  a  number  of  variants.  While  the  different 
approaches  are  often  ingenious  attempts  to  overcome  the  difficulties  of  EU  theory,  as  Ford  & 
Ghose,  (1998)  correctly  point  out,  none  move  fully  outside  the  paradigm  of  expected  utility. 
Following  Ford  &  Ghose  (1998)  it  is  possible  to  tabulate  the  functional  forms  of  EU  theory  and 
some  of  the  main  suggested  alternatives  within  what  can  be  grouped  collectively  as 
averaging-based  utility  theories  which  are  presented  in  table  4.1. 
The  following  notation  applies  to  the  table.  First  the  n  outcomes  (which  are  taken  to  be 
monetary)  in  any  uncertain  choice  are  represented  by  xi  I  while  A  denotes  probability, 
U(.  )denotes  utility  and  ir  denotes  a  non-linear  probability  function.  In  Hey's  (1984)  theory 
g(.  )  denotes  a  probability  transformation  function.  In  respect  of  Regret  Theory  let  the  two 
lotteries  be  A  and  B  and  the  objective  functional  be  V(.  ),  then  there  be  i=1,....  n  states  of  the 
world  and  the  utility  from  an  outcome,  x,  ,  will  be  u(x,  ),  where  j=A,  B.  The  objective 
functional  is  a  modified  form  of  expected  utility  and  is  written  as  VAB  where  it  represents  the 
choice  of  lottery  A  over  that  of  lottery  B,  and  vice  versa.  M(.  )  denotes  the  modified  utility 
function  which  balances  the  attainment  of  one  outcome  against  the  regret  of  not  having  the 
other  outcome. 
The  equations  in  Table  4.1  define  the  preference  functional  or  action-choice  index  of  each 
theory,  and  as  such  are  the  central  mechanisms  for  evaluating  the  outcome  of  an  uncertain 
action.  What  is  common  to  all  these  models  is  that,  as  Ford  &  Ghose  (1998)  point  out,  the 
underlying  mechanisms,  take  a  weighted  average  of  the  set  of  hypothesised  outcomes.  The 
important  issue  to  consider,  when  interpreting  such  models  in  a  normative  sense  in  the 
context  of  hard  uncertainty  is  the  way  in  which  the  different  outcomes  and  their  corresponding 
uncertainty  measures  (probabilities  in  the  above)  are  weighted  by  a  decision  maker.  Because 
of  the  limits  imposed  by  hard  uncertainty,  the  emphasis  in  this  judgement  will  be  on  the 
procedural  rather  than  substantive  rationality  of  the  evaluation  mechanism.  In  other  words,  do 
the  weighting  functions  explicitly  deal  with  both  the  outcome  of  a  particular  action,  and  the 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome?  What  is  common  to  EU  theory  and 
the  its  variants  in  Table  4.1  is  that  they  all  employ  a  weighted  average  to  arrive  at  an 
evaluation  of  the  outcomes.  They  also  make  the  crucial  assumption  that  the  weight,  or  utility 
associated  with  a  particular  outcome  is  independent  of  the  degree  of  uncertainty  associated 
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Table  4.1  Expected  utility  theories  and  other  averaging-based  alternatives 
Theory  Functional:  Authors 
Expected  Utility 
IU  (Xi  )Pi 
Theory 
von  -Neuman  &  Morgernstern  (1947) 
Separable  Prospect 
U  (Xj  );  r  Pi  Theories 
Edwards  (1955);  Kahneman  -  Tversky  (1979);  Viscusi  (1989) 
U(xi)lr  (p) 
(A 
Karmarkar  (1978) 
U(xi)P, 
I]TWA 
Chew  (1983;  Fishburn  (1983) 
IU  (Xi)  9(Pi;  XI  5  X2  5  X3  -  -5  Xn) 
Hey  (1984) 
Cumulative  U(Xi)[g(P]  +  P2  +***+Pi)  -  9(PI  +A  +**'+Pi-1)] 
Prospect  Theory 
Quiggin  (1982);  Yaari  (1987);  Green-Julien  (1988);  Segal  (1989); 
Luce  (1991);  Luce-Fishburn  (1991);  Tversky-Kahneman  (1992) 
Machina's  Theory  U(Xi  )p 
i+I 
)Pi  2 
Machina  (1982) 
Regret  Theory  vB 
.4 
_": 
I 
Pi  M(U(XAi)! 
'U(XBi) 
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of  uncertainty  (probability  in  all  the  above  cases).  As  such  it  is  doubtful  if  they  will  make 
explicit  any  adjustment  that  is  made  in  the  mind  of  the  decision  maker  between  different 
outcomes  with  correspondingly  different  values,  and  the  differing  degrees  of  uncertainty 
attached  to  those  outcomes.  For  an  approach,  where  the  weighting  attached  to  an  action 
depends  both  on  the  outcome  and  measure  of  uncertainty,  we  will  turn  to  the  next  chapter  to 
the  focus  value  approach  advocated  by  Shackle. 
4.5.2  Expected  utility  approaches  and  their  applicability  to  environmental 
decision  making 
The  argument  has  been  made  that  different  types  of  decisions  are  characterised  by  different 
underlying  modalities  of  uncertainty  and  that  for  many  environmental  decisions  the  dominant 
mode  is  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty.  Drawing  together  our  critiques  of  expected  utility, 
it  becomes  apparent  that  expected  utility  models  will  have  limited  scope  in  relation  to  their 
application  to  environmental  decisions.  Part  of  the  problem  with  expected  utility  theory  has 
been  its  application  to  all  types  of  decisions  regardless  of  the  mode  of  uncertainty 
encountered  in  the  particular  decision.  This  lack  of  attention  paid  by  many  exponents  of  EU  to 
sufficiently  exploring  the  different  dimensions  of  uncertainty  and  thus  recognising  the 
limitations  of  its  application  is  surprising  given  that  Savage  (1954,  pl  5)  stressed  that  expected 
utility  theory,  because  of  the  complete  ordering  axiom  presumes  that  a  finite  set  of  outcomes 
can  be  specified  by  the  individual.  In  this  sense  EU  is  not  a  general  theory  of  decision 
making,  because  it  does  not  explicitly  deal  with  uncertainty  per  se  (Davidson,  1996).  Savage 
admits  therefore  that  his  'look  before  you  leap'  analysis  may  not  be  applicable  in  all  cases  of 
uncertainty  because: 
Ua  person  may  not  know  all  the  consequences  of  the  acts  open  to  him  in  each  state  of  the 
worid"  (Savage,  1954,  p15) 
Savage  (1954,  p15-16)  accordingly  concedes  that  there  is  a  practical  necessity  to  confine  the 
use  of  EU  and  subjective  EU  to  relatively  simple  situations.  Not  only  will  expected  utility 
theory  be  limited  in  explaining  behaviour  in  situations  not  characterised  by  soft  uncertainty  or 
risk,  but  it  also  may  give  flawed  prescriptions  of  how  decision  makers  should  act.  As  a  result 
as  in  the  case  of  hard  uncertainty,  the  full  range  of  outcomes  cannot  be  specified,  and  there 
exists  insufficient  a  priori  information  on  which  to  assign  subjective  or  objective  probabilities. 
If  expected  utility  models  are  used  in  decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty,  then  as 
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the  use  of  an  expected  utility  framework  may  result  in  an  'optimal'  decision  when  evaluated  in 
terms  of  its  substantive  rationality,  even  if  for  example,  such  an  action  results  in  the  loss  of 
resilience  to  an  ecosystem.  Such  a  scenario  could  occur  because  the  decision  maker 
incorrectly  assumed  that  all  the  consequences  of  a  particular  action  or  policy  were  known 
sufficiently  well  to  define  accurate  probability  distributions  for  their  occurrence.  If  the 
probabilities  attached  to  the  decision  are  unreliable,  then  the  resulting  expected  utility 
associated  with  any  action  will  be  necessarily  misleading.  It  may  be  that  because  of  the 
difficulty  of  observing  system  thresholds,  the  possibility  of  exceeding  such  a  threshold  and  of 
the  system  flipping  has  not  been  anticipated  (an  exhaustive  set  of  outcomes  was  incorrectly 
assumed)  or  only  a  very  low  probability  has  been  allocated.  In  such  cases  both  the 
assumption  that  it  is  possible  to  define  an  accurate  probability  distribution,  as  well  as  the 
(substantive)  rationality  on  which  the  decision  is  judged  are  fundamentally  flawed.  Moreover, 
if  it  is  known  that  an  action  may  cause  profound  and  irreversible  damage  which  permanently 
reduces  the  welfare  of  future  generations,  but  the  objective  probability  of  such  damage  is  not 
known  then  it  is  as  Perrings  (19917b,  p160)  states  "inequitable  to  act  as  if  the  probability  is 
known".  Thus,  the  assumption  made  in  subjective  expected  utility  theory  that  the  decision 
maker  can  assume  that  subjective  probabilities  will  accurately  represent  objective  probabilities 
may  result  in  very  serious  consequences  for  society. 
In  addition  to  the  problem  of  the  reliance  of  EU  and  subjective  EU  on  probability,  further 
doubts  have  been  raised  about  its  assumptions  that  expected  utility  theory  makes.  While  the 
evidence  collected  is  not  specific  to  environmental  decisions,  many  of  the  results  would 
appear  even  more  valid  in  the  context  of  environmental  decisions.  In  contrast  to  expected 
utility  theory  it  would  seem  intuitive  that  environmental  losses  will  be  treated  differently  to 
environmental  gains.  Some  of  the  evidence  also  points  out  some  of  the  problems  that  EU 
theory  has  in  dealing  with  events  about  which  little  is  known  (an  all  too  common  situation  in 
complex  environmental  decisions).  These  behavioural  limitations  of  the  theory  overlap  with  its 
normative  limitations.  In  the  last  section  the  fact  that  EU  weights  the  outcome  and  the 
measure  of  uncertainty  associated  with  the  outcome  separately  was  highlighted.  It  is  evident 
that  this  does  not  allow  the  decision  maker  to  pay  explicit  attention  to  uncertainty,  because  the 
decision  maker  cannot  adjust  the  overall  weighting  correspondingly.  Moreover,  rather  than 
attaching  importance  to  the  weighted  average  of  the  outcomes,  the  decision  maker  may  be 
drawn  to  a  specific  outcome.  So,  for  example,  even  although  an  outcome  with  a  very  large 
negative  consequence  may  be  given  the  minimum  utility  possible,  if  a  very  small  probability 
has  been  allocated  that  outcome  will  play  a  very  limited  role  in  the  evaluation  of  the  particular 
action  or  policy.  This  will  be  the  case  even  if  the  decision  maker  believes  that  the  negative Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  90 
consequence  of  the  outcome  outweighs  the  low  probability  associated  with  that  outcome. 
This  type  of  behaviour,  where  the  decision  maker  focuses  on  a  particular  outcome,  could  be 
for  envisaged  in  decisions  to  build  nuclear  power  stations  after  the  Chernobyl  disaster. 
The  significant  problems  that  expected  utility  models  face  in  terms  of  their  application  to 
environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  suggest  that  it  will  not  be  sufficient  to 
simply  relax  certain  assumptions  or  modify  slightly  the  model.  Instead,  an  alternative  model  to 
those  encompassed  by  the  expected  utility  umbrella  will  be  needed.  Foremost  in  such  an 
alternative  model  of  environmental  decision  making  will  be  the  requirement  that  it  does  not 
rely  on  either  objective  probability  or  subjective  probability  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty. 
Secondly,  its  assumptions  and  axioms  will  need  to  more  accurately  reflect  the  behaviour  of 
decision  makers  when  faced  with  hard  uncertainty  and  finally  it  will  need  to  be  based  on  an 
alternative  mechanism  for  weighting  both  the  outcome  and  its  associated  measure  of 
uncertainty. 
4.6  Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  argued  that  the  problem  of  hard  uncertainty  implies  that  concepts  of 
rationality  must  necessarily  be  bounded.  Because  the  full  set  of  outcomes  cannot  be 
specified,  it  is  not  possible  to  evaluate  ex  ante  the  optimality  of  a  decision.  As  a  result 
because  of  the  presence  of  hard  uncertainty  in  many  environmental  decisions,  the  focus 
needs  to  be  on  the  procedural  rationality  rather  than  substantive  rationality  of  the  decision- 
making  process.  This  distinction  between  ex  ante  and  ex  post  evaluation  is  crucial  and 
highlights  in  many  senses  some  of  the  confusions  apparent  in  both  the  approaches  taken  to 
decision  making  under  uncertainty  and  whether  or  not  a  normative  or  purely  behavioural 
framework  is  adopted.  While  explaining  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  ex  post  is 
undoubtedly  a  useful  exercise,  if  decision-making  models  are  to  contribute  in  any  meaningful 
sense  to  the  making  of  ex  ante  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty,  then  they  will  need 
to  be  interpreted  or  adapted  in  a  normative  or  prescriptive  sense  as  well. 
Building  on  the  previous  chapter  the  use  of  both  objective  probability  and  subjective 
probability  have  been  criticised  as  inappropriate.  The  most  important  factors  in  this  critique, 
being  that  of  the  non-divisibility,  or  uniqueness  of  environmental  decision  conditioned  by  hard 
uncertainty,  as  well  as  the  argument  that  in  many  such  cases,  it  is  not  possible  to  specify  the 
full  set  of  outcomes  of  an  action.  Consequently,  it  has  been  shown  that  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  within  the  valuation  process  is  not  possible,  because  of  the  reliance  on  a Chapter  4:  Uncertainty  and  decision  making  91 
probability  framework,  as  well  as  problems  relating  to  the  estimation  of  separate  option  and 
quasi-option  values. 
The  dominant  paradigm  in  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  based  on  expected  utility  and 
its  subjective  form,  is  also  flawed  in  the  context  of  modelling  decisions  under  hard  uncertainty, 
in  that  once  again  it  relies  on  the  use  of  probabilities.  The  lack  of  recognition  in  such  models 
of  the  different  modalities  of  uncertainty  can  be  seen  as  a  major  factor  in  their  failure;  a  point 
echoed  by  the  experimental  evidence  which  would  seem  to  suggest  that  many  of  the 
fundamental  axioms  or assumptions  of  EU  theory  do  not  in  fact  reflect  reality.  A  more  limited 
critique  can  be  put  forward,  in  that  both  the  underlying  mode  of  rationality  and  other 
assumptions,  while  perhaps  applicable  in  case  of  soft  uncertainty  or  risk,  cannot  be  extended 
to  situations  of  hard  uncertainty.  A  final  point  was  made  regarding  the  extent  to  which  the 
evaluation  mechanisms  used  by  EU  theory  and  its  variants,  provide  explicit  attention  to 
weighting  both  the  value  of  an  action  and  its  uncertainty  surrounding  its  occurrence.  This 
critique,  of  the  dominant  decision-making  paradigm  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making  leads  us  to  a  to  a  review  of  an  alternative 
approach,  based  on  the  work  of  George  Shackle,  in  the  next  chapter. Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  92 
CHAPTER  5:  THE  SHACKLE  MODEL 
5.1  Introduction  93 
5.1.1  Interpreting  Shackle's  theory  of  decision-making  94 
under  uncertainty:  An  alternative  approach. 
5.2  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  95 
5.3  Operationalising  Shackles  theory  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty  701 
5.4  The  key  elements  of  the  Shackle  model  of  decision-making  104 
under  uncertainty 
5.4.1  An  Alternative  measure  of  uncertainty:  Potential  surprise  104 
5.4.1.1  Shackles  axioms  for  potential  surprise  106 
5.4.1.2  Operationalising  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty  110 
5.5  The  evaluation  mechanism  110 
5.5.1  The  Separation  of  gains  and  losses 
5.5.2  Uncertainty  aversion:  Ascendancy  indifference  curves 
5.5.3  The  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function  113 
5.5.4  Specifying  the  ascendancy  function  115 
5.5.6  The  ascendancy  function  as  a  focusing  device  117 
5.5.7  The  standardised  focus  values  118 
5.5.8  Stochastic  dominance  119 
5.5.9  The  gamblers  preference  map  120 
5.6  Summary  of  the  variation  of  the  Shackle  model  forwarded  121 
5.6.1  Operationalising  Shackle's  model  in  the  context  122 
of  environmental  uncertainty Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  93 
CHAPTER  5:  THE  SHACKLE  MODEL 
5.1.  Introduction 
The  thesis  argued  so  far,  is  that,  the  application  of  decision-making  models,  such  as  expected 
utility  (EU),  which  rely  on  a  probability  framework  and  which  are  based  on  the  notion  of 
substantive  rationality,  will  be  limited  to  decisions  characterised  by  soft  uncertainty  or  risk. 
Where  the  decision  is  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty,  as  is  the  case  in  many  environmental 
decisions,  the  need  for  an  alternative  approach  becomes  apparent.  In  this  chapter  an 
alternative  model,  based  on  the  work  of  Shackle,  is  introduced  and  critically  assessed  in 
relation  to  its  applicability  to  environmental  decision  making. 
Shackle's  theory  is  -attractive  in  the  context  of  environmental  decision  making,  because  it  is 
one  of  the  few  models  that  steps  completely  out  side  the  expected  utility  and  probability 
frameworks.  This  is  because  Shackle's  model  not  only  rejects  the  use  of  the  probability 
calculus  and  suggest  its  replacement  with  an  alternative  measure  of  uncertainty,  but  it  also 
puts  forward  an  alternative  mechanism  for  evaluating  the  outcomes  associated  with  an  action 
and  their  corresponding  measures  of  uncertainty.  This  mechanism,  which  can  be  interpreted 
as  a  focus  value  approach  (Ford,  1994;  Ford  &  Ghose,  1998),  is  markedly  different  to  the 
weighted  average  models  utilised  by  expected  utility  and  its  variants. 
The  application  of  the  Shackle  model  can  be  demonstrated  in  two  contexts.  The  first  is  its  use 
as  a  descriptive  tool  for  explaining  the  way  that  environmental  decisions  characterised  by  hard 
uncertainty  are  made.  This  hypothesis  is  tested  by  the  use  of  a  case  study  involving  a  road 
building  project  in  Belize.  The  second,  which  builds  on  the  arguments  made  in  the  preceding 
chapters,  is  that  the  application  of  Shackle's  ideas  in  a  normative  sense  can  be  used  as  a 
basis  for  the  development  of  an  improved  framework  which  can  help  to  improve  the 
procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making  process.  As  such  it  holds  a  number  of 
advantages  over  its  rivals.  Before  these  hypotheses  can  be  put  to  the  test,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  provide  a  detailed  theoretical  exposition  of  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making 
under  uncertainty.  This  chapter  therefore  has  two  main  purposes:  firstly,  to  outline  the  main 
tenents  of  Shackle's  approach;  and  secondly  to  critically  assess  the  model  in  relation  to 
providing  a  suitable  operational  framework  for  analysing  decision  making  in  the  context  of Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  94 
hard  uncertainty.  It  does  not  offer  a  comprehensive  review  of  Shackle's  theory  and  its 
critiques  per  se  but  an  interpretation  of  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty'. 
5.1.1  Interpreting  Shackle's  theory  of  decision-making  under  uncertainty:  An 
alternative  approach. 
In  the  preceding  chapters  some  of  the  main  critiques  that  Shackle  forwarded  against  the 
probability  and  expected  utility  framework  have  been  outlined.  While  Shackle's  main 
concerns  were  restricted  to  more  economic  concerns  such  as  the  making  of  investment 
decisions,  many  of  his  arguments,  can  be  fruitfully  extended  to  the  environmental-economic 
system.  Shackle's  ideas  are  particularly  applicable  to  irreversible  environmental  decisions 
characterised  by  hard  uncertainty,  in  which  the  decision  moment  can  be  characterised  as 
unique  and  embedded  in  the  unidirectional  flow  of  time  (Vickers,  1986).  This  problem  of 
historical  time  exists  where  there  are  no  historical  precedents  for  the  constituent  actions,  or 
where  the  boundary  conditions  change  as  a  result  of  the  activity.  The  passing  of  an 
ecological  threshold  is  a  prime  example  of  such  a  decision. 
In  addition  to  the  uniqueness  and  time  dependence  of  the  external  conditions  that  a  decision 
maker  faces,  the  entire  epistemological  baggage  and  status  of  the  individual  is  characterised 
by  Shackle  as  unique.  This  is  because  in  the  flow  of  time,  knowledge,  a  unique  series  of 
information  and  experiences,  is  acquired  by  the  decision  maker  and  cannot  be  unlearned. 
Decisions  are  therefore  seen  by  Shackle  as  'self-destnictive'  (Shackle,  1961)  in  that  the  taking 
of  them  forever  changes  both  the  possible  structure  of  future  decision  environments  and  the 
knowledge  status  of  the  decision  makers  himself.  As  such  therefore,  in  Shackle's  framework, 
the  notion  that  identical  decision  conditions  are  'never  to  be  repeated'  (Shackle,  1955,  p7)  is  a 
key  element  in  his  theory.  The  future  is  transmutable  precisely  because  it  is  created  by  crucial 
choice  decisions. 
Although  Shackle  did  allow  for  the  notion  of  some  decisions  becoming  routine,  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  repeated  in  more  or  less  unchanging  circumstances,  he  did  not  accept  that  in 
such  cases  it  might  be  possible  to  represent  the  decision  within  the  confines  of  a  probability 
framework,  such  as  that  adopted  by  EUT.  At  the  same  time,  traditional  economics  has 
stubbornly  refused  to  characterise  uncertainty  by  anything  other  than  probability.  Arguably, 
part  of  the  reason  for  Shackle's  failure  to  persuade  his  peers,  was  that  he  regarded  all 
decisions  as  unique  and  as  such  there  was  no  room  for  any  alternative  theories,  particularly 
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those  based  those  based  on  the  probability  calculus.  Thus  no  explicit  attention  was  given  in 
the  debate  to  consider  more  fully  the  question  (first  posed  by  Knight,  1921)  over  whether  there 
may  in  fact  be  a  distinction  between  different  situations  of  uncertainty.  While  traditional 
economics  has  been  reluctant  to  move  away  from  the  idea  that  all  forms  of  uncertainty  could 
be  captured  by  the  probability  concept  (Ford,  1994),  Shackle  (1949,1961)  as  well  as  Katzner 
(1995)  and  Vickers  (11994)  appear  equally  to  stress  that  Shackle's  theory  should  be  applied  to 
all  modes  of  uncertainty.  There  is  a  degree,  therefore,  to  which  the  two  sides  of  the  debate 
have  been  in  some  instances  talking  past  each  other,  while  ignoring  questions  surrounding 
the  different  underlying  modalities  of  uncertainty  that  are  faced  in  any  given  decision. 
The  recognition,  that  there  are  a  number  of  different  modalities  of  uncertainty,  with  a  particular 
distinction  being  drawn  between  situations  characterised  by  soft  uncertainty  and  hard 
uncertainty,  implies  the  need  for  decision-making  models  to  reflect  the  different  underlying 
modalities  of  uncertainty.  Thus,  while  Shackle's  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  is  very 
persuasive,  particularly  where  a  decision  maker  is  drawn  to  focus  on  one  particular  outcome 
(Dalmazzone,  1995),  it  is  conceded,  that  for  certain  situations,  characterised  by  soft 
uncertainty  or  risk,  the  use  of  a  probability  framework  is  possible.  In  contrast,  where  a 
decision  is  to  be  taken  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty,  as  was  demonstrated  in  the  last 
chapter,  the  use  of  a  probability  based  approach,  such  as  expected  utility,  is  clearly  not 
applicable.  By  taking  a  position  which  does  not  advocate  the  use  of  one  all-encom  passing 
decision  model  it  may  help  to  re-focus  the  debate.  Indeed  more  recent  signs  from  economics, 
environmental  economics  and  ecological  economics  is  that  there  is  a  greater  willingness  to 
consider  alternative  conceptualisations  of  uncertainty.  Combined  with  the  redefinition  of 
Shackle's  theory  in  relation  to  hard  uncertainty  employed  here  this  suggests  that  Shackle's 
theory  can  play  a  fruitful  role  within  the  discourse. 
5.2.  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty 
Shackle's  theory,  when  it  was  published  in  the  1940's  constituted  one  of  the  most  original 
approaches  to  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  and  a  powerful  alternative  to  the  application 
of  expected  utility  theory  to  cases  of  hard  uncertainty.  While,  Shackle's  theory  has  been 
largely  ignored  by  mainstream  economics,  a  number  of  authors  have  been  notable  in 
developing  and  applying  his  ideas.  Most  notably  Ford  (1994)  has  provided  an  excellent 
review  of  Shackle's  work,  which  along  with  his  other  major  contributions  (1983,1987)  have 
arguably  provided  a  clarity  to  Shackle's  theory,  often  missing  in  much  of  the  literature.  Vickers 
(1994)  and  Katzner  (1995)  have  also  published  extensively  on  Shackle,  and  have  made 
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the  framework  of  behavioural  economics.  The  literature  and  development  of  Shackle's  theory 
in  the  context  of  environmental-economic  decisions  is  more  limited  however.  Although 
Dalmazzone  (1995)  has  highlighted  the  possibility  of  applying  the  Shackle  model  in  the 
context  of  environmental  uncertainty  and  Perrings  (1989)  introduced  the  model  in  the  context 
of  environmental  bonds,  an  in-depth  analysis  and  application  of  Shackle's  theory  in  the 
context  of  environmental  uncertainty  has  not  been  carried  out. 
Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  is  based  on  three  main  pillars.  The 
first,  is  the  replacement  of  probability  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty,  by  an  alternative,  degree  of 
surprise,  which  indicates  the  individual's  degree  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  hypothesised 
outcomes  resulting  from  a  particular  action,  with  gains  and  losses  being  considered 
separately.  The  second  is  the  decision  or  action  choice  index,  which  is  the  mechanism  by 
which  the  different  outcomes  and  their  corresponding  degree  of  surprise  are  evaluated.  This 
is  the  procedure  by  which  the  decision  maker  simplifies  and  edits  the  expectational  elements 
of  any  strategy  and  focuses  on  two  outcomes,  one  the  focus  gain  and  the  other  the  focus  loss. 
The  third  element  is  the  gamblers  preference  map,  which  is  put  forward  as  a  means  of 
comparing  two  different  policies  or  actions.  In  the  gamblers  preference  map,  each  prospect 
would  in  effect  be  represented  by  a  focus  gain  and  focus  loss.  The  purpose  of  the  gamblers 
preference  map  is  therefore  to  allow  the  balancing  of  the  worst  and  best  that  can  happen  with 
any  action,  with  an  alternative  course  of  action.  Before  a  more  detailed  exposition  and 
critique  of  these  separate  elements  in  relation  to  their  operationalisation  is  undertaken,  a  brief 
synopsis  of  how  these  elements  function  together  in  Shackles  model  will  be  provided. 
The  first  element  of  Shackle's  model  is  his  replacement  of  probability  as  a  measure  of 
uncertainty,  with  that  of  what  he  terms  'potential  surprise'.  Potential  surprise  indicates  the 
individuals'  degree  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  hypothetical  outcomes  of  any  action-scheme;  with 
gains  (positive  returns)  and  losses  (negative  returns)  being  considered  separately.  To 
illustrate  the  concept  of  degree  of  surprise,  which  Shackle  invariably  denotes  by  the  symbol  y 
then  imagine  that  a  decision  maker  is  confronted  by  a  particular  choice  or  action  which  has  a 
range  of  outcomes  xi  (i  =  1,....,  n).  In  most  of  Shackle's  examples  x  is  taken  to  be  a 
monetary  amount,  such  as  the  gross  value  of  an  outcome.  The  value  assigned  to  the  degree 
of  surprise,  which  reflects  the  individual's  degree  of  belief  in  a  given  outcome,  can  range  from 
zero  to  some  subjective  maximum  value,  normally  indicated  by  Y(  Shackle  also  uses  the 
notation  y)  On  the  basis  of  this,  a  potential  surprise  function  can  be  assigned  over  all 
outcomes: Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  97 
y=  Y(X)  (5.1) 
Because  outcomes  are  separated  by  gains  and  losses,  there  is  effectively  two  branches  of  the 
potential  surprise  function,  namely  one  for  positive  outcomes  g,  (i  =I......  n)  and  one  for  the 
negative  outcomes  1,  (i  =  1,...,  n).  The  potential  surprise  function  can  in  pdnciple  assume 
any  form  over  either  the  gain  or  loss  branch,  and  can  be  continous  or  discontinuous  over 
gains  and  losses  depending  on  the  expectations  of  the  individual.  This  function  is  often  drawn 
by  Shackle  in  the  form  of  an  inverted  bell  (see  fig  5.1)  although  it  can  in  theory  take  any 
shape.  It  is  because  Shackle  often  drew  the  potential  surprise  function  in  this  way  that  some 
authors  mistakenly  took  potential  surprise  as  merely  representing  the  inverse  of  probability, 
although  this  is  not  in  fact  the  case  (Ford  1994). 
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The  next  stage  in  Shackle's  model  is  the  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function,  which  is  the 
means  by  which  both  the  outcome  and  corresponding  degree  of  surprise  are  weighted  by  the 
individual.  The  ascendancy  function  indicates  the  weight  that  any  outcome/  degree  of 
surprise  pair  or  element  (x,  y)  is  given,  or  in  Shackle's  terminology  the  power  of  any  pair  to 
arrest  the  attention  of  the  individual.  The  individual's  ascendancy  function  is  therefore 
denoted  by: 
(x,  (5.2) 
Where  x  again  denotes  either  a  positive  (gain)  outcome  (g)  or  a  negative  (loss)  outcome  (1  ). 
The  properties  of  the  ascendancy  function  are  such  that  the  partial  derivative  of  0  (.  )  is 
positive  with  respect  to  x  and  negative  with  respect  to  y: 
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where,  if  x  happens  to  be  denoted  by  a  loss,  it  is  measured  by  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the 
loss.  As  is  the  case  for  potential  surprise  equation  (5.2),  it  need  not  be  defined  the  same  over 
gains  and  losses.  As  a  result  all  things  being  equal,  the  higher  the  gain  in  any  investment,  the 
higher  will  its  power  be  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  decision  maker,  or  the  higher  will  be  the 
weight  attached  to  the  outcome;  equally  the  larger  the  loss,  the  larger  will  be  its  ascendancy 
or  weight  in  the  mind  of  the  decision  maker.  If  everything  else  remains  constant,  as  the 
potential  surprise  attached  to  a  gain  or  loss  increases,  then  that  outcome  will  increasingly 
loose  its  ascendancy  or  weighting  in  the  mind  of  the  decision  maker. 
The  process  by  which  the  individual  is  hypothesised  to  use  the  ascendancy  function  to  edit 
the  set  of  outcomes  and  to  focus  on  one  gain  and  one  loss  outcome  (  the  focus  values)  is  best 
explained  diagramatically  (see  fig  5.2).  If  the  assumption  is  made  that  the  ascendancy 
function  is  continuous  then  we  can  derive  for  each  possible  level  of  0  an  indifference  curve 
which  traces  out  for  us  the  combinations  of  (g,  y)  or  (1,  y)  consistent  with  a  given  level  of 
0.  The  resultant  indifference  curves  will  have  positive  slopes  in  their  respective  gain  and 
loss  quadrants.  These  are  represented  in  fig  5.2  by  the  dashed  lines,  and  in  the  positive 
orthant  of  the  diagram  the  level  of  0  increases  as  we  move  to  the  right,  and  in  the  negative 
orthant  the  level  of  0  increases  as  we  move  to  the  left.  The  shape  of  the  indifference  curves 
will  be  determined  by  the  second  order  conditions,  which  are  assumed,  by  Shackle  to  be  such 
that  permits  us  to  construct  the  0  indifference  curves  as  portrayed  in  fig  5.2. 
Fig  5.2:  The  ascendancy  indifference  curves  and  potential  surprise  function 
YA 
2-'\ 
:: 
OL, 
2 
N-- 
-------------------  -  ------------ 
Y=)fX) 
_, 
2 
ell  4 
5 
OG,  Xgain Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  99 
Based  on  the  existence  of  the  different  levels  of  0  represented  by  the  indifference  curves, 
the  individual  is  assumed  to  maximise  0  subject  to  the  constraint  placed  on  it  by  the  potential 
surprise  function,  which  represents  the  degree  of  uncertainty  attached  to  the  outcomes 
associated  with  any  action;  this  is  represented  by  the  solid  line  drawn  in  fig  5.1.  So  for 
example  at  point  E  the  individual  has  maximised  the  level  of  0  subject  to  the  constraint  of  the 
potential  surprise  function.  The  ascendancy  function  is  therefore  defined  by  the  points  at 
which  the  potential  surprise  function  (based  on  the  range  of  outcomes)  is  tangential  to,  or 
intersects  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves.  The  derivation  of  the  ascendancy  function  in 
this  manner  is  usually  represented  by  Shackle  (e.  g.  1961,  p159)  in  the  manner  reproduced  in 
fi  g  5.3. 
Fig  5.3  The  ascendancy  funcHon  and  focus  values 
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1,2,...,  5  are  levels  of  0,  with  5  corresponding  to  the  highest  level. 
The  ascendancy  function  is  therefore  defined  by  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  potential 
surprise  function  as  well  as  the  underlying  shape  of  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves. 
Thus,  the  diagram  which  lies  in  the  bottom  half  of  fig  5.3  epitomises  the  properties  of  0  (.  ), 
when  the  function  has  been  specified  solely  in  term  of  the  outcome,  x,  and  where  the 
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potential  surprise  value  is  effectively  replaced  by  means  of  the  potential  surprise  function 
y=  y(x)  by  the  value  of  x  to  which  y  is  assigned. 
By  this  process,  the  ascendancy  function  is  the  means  by  which  the  decision  maker  is 
envisaged  to  focus  or  edit  the  different  outcome/  uncertainty  pairs  and  focus  on  two  outcomes 
(one  from  the  gain  branch  and  one  from  the  loss  branch)  which  maximise  the  ascendancy 
function  and  arrive  at  two  focus  values,  namely  the  focus  gain  G,  and  the  focus  loss  L, 
I 
which  are  collectively  termed  the  primary  focus  values.  These  values  represent  the  best  to  be 
hoped  for  and  the  worst  to  be  feared,  in  any  prospect,  where  a  prospect  is  defined  as  a 
possible  course  of  action  with  at  least  a  partial  set  of  hypothesised  outcomes. 
The  next  and  final  step  in  the  decision  or  action  choice  stage  of  the  model  is  the  calculation  of 
the  standardised  focus  values.  This  is  achieved  by  removing  the  potential  surprise  argument 
from  the  primary  focus  values,  the  purpose  of  which  is  as  Shackle  contends,  to  allow  the 
decision  maker  to  compare  the  gains  and  losses  from  competing  investments  or  projects  on  a 
equal  footing  (Shackle,  1949).  The  emphasis  of  this  stage  is  to  allow  comparison  of 
competing  projects  or  investments.  Equivalence  measures  for  the  focus  gain  and  focus  loss 
values,  which  remove  the  potential  surprise  element,  are  obtained  by  locating  that  gain  or  loss 
value  with  attached  zero  degree  of  surprise.  This  is  identical  to  the  focus  gain  /  loss,  in  that  it 
produces  the  same  level  of  0  (i.  e.  it  is  on  the  same  ascendancy  indifference  curve)  as  the 
focus  gain  or  loss  value.  This  is  shown  by  OG,  (the  standardised  focus  gain  and  01, 
(standardised  focus  loss)  in  fig  5.2.  This  places  the  best  and  the  worst  hypothesised  outcome 
in  any  competing  action  on  comparable  monetary  values,  one  gain  and  loss,  sometimes 
referred  to  as  the  'certainty  equivalents'  (Shackle,  1955). 
The  final  pillar  or  stage  of  Shackle's  model  is  the  process  by  which  for  competing  actions  or 
investments,  the  different  standardised  focus  gain  and  focus  loss  values  are  compared.  This 
ranking  of  the  different  focus  pairs  of  any  one  project  against  those  of  another  is  achieved  by 
the  introduction  of  the  gambler's  preference  map,  which  epitomises  the  balancing  of  the  best 
against  the  worst  that  can  happen  as  the  result  of  any  action.  The  gambler  preference  map 
can  be  represented  by  fig  5.4  and  consists  of  a  series  of  gambler  -preference  indifference 
curves,  which  are  ranked  in  ascending  order  from  South  West  to  North  West.  The 
indifference  curves  implicitly  represent  different  levels  of  preferences  for  combinations  of  gain 
loss  pairs  and  can  be  regarded  as  an  indicator  of  utility  or  some  other  index  (Ford,  1994).  The 
standardised  focus  gain/  loss  pair  that  lies  on  the  highest  curve  will  determine  the  investment 
which  is  chosen.  The  gambler's  preference  indifference  curves  represent  an  extra  opportunity Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  101 
in  Shackle's  model  for  the  individual  to  express  his  or  her  preference  or  aversion  to  losses  or 
what  Shackle  terms  as  risk  preference  (Shackle,  1949). 
Fig  5.4  The  gambler  preference  map 
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Shackle  (1949)  argues  that  no  one  indifference  curve  is  forced  to  be  uniquely  related  to  any 
other,  and  as  such  they  are  free  to  depict  the  individuals  varying  attitude  to'risk'.  In  this  sense 
he  does  not  specify  the  existence  of  a  gambler's  preference  function  (Ford,  1994,  Ford  & 
Ghose  1998).  Where  the  indifference  curves  may  in  fact  be  constrained,  by  some  threshold 
could  be  for  example  maximum  loss  that  can  be  tolerated  relative  to  the  individual's  wealth  or 
the  maximum  losses  that  could  be  experienced  (Shackle,  1961). 
5.3  Operation  alising  shackles  theory  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty 
Shackle's  theory  of  decision  making  has  been  interpreted  in  a  number  of  different  manners. 
As  was  stated  at  the  start  of  the  chapter,  Shackle's  theory  is  best  applied  to  the  context  of 
hard  uncertainty  rather  than  to  the  other  modes  of  uncertainty.  Limiting  the  application  of 
Shackle's  theory  to  hard  uncertainty  is  important  in  relation  to  operationalising  his  model  of 
decision-making  under  uncertainty  in  that  allows  some  of  the  main  criticisms  that  Shackle's 
theory  faces  to  be  tackled  head  on.  Moreover,  because  Shackle's  model  is  to  be 
operationalised  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty  as  opposed  to  ignorance,  soft  uncertainty  or 
certainty,  then  this  implies  a  different  discourse  to  that  employed  by  the  dominant  language  of 
probability  and  which  recognises  the  fundamentally  different  modality  on  which  hard 
uncertainty  is  based.  Consequently  the  evaluation  of  the  model  can  only  take  place  within  the 
bounds  of  a  limited  rationality.  This  is  because  in  hard  uncertainty  only  an  incomplete  set  of 
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outcomes  is  known,  and  only  a  non-exhaustive  set  of  hypothesised  outcomes,  which  may 
result  from  any  action  or  policy  can  be  specified. 
In  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty  there  can  be  no  meaning  attached  to  the  difference  between 
making  an  optimal  decision  between  say  policy  A  and  B.  Precisely  because  an  exhaustive  set 
of  outcomes  cannot  be  specified,  there  may  always  be  at  least  one  outcome  which  is  more 
optimal  than  the  outcomes  specified  in  action  A  or  B.  Thus,  as  has  been  argued  previously  in 
the  context  of  hard  uncertainty,  the  discussion  is  limited  in  relation  to  evaluating  Shackle's 
model  purely  in  terms  of  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making  process.  Therefore 
the  emphasis  will  be  on  the  decision  model  in  relation  to  the  evaluation  of  the  different 
outcomes  of  a  single  action  or  policy  rather  than  its  evaluation  of  alternative  actions  or  policies 
(such  as  A  or  B).  Similarly,  where  the  outcomes  that  are  to  be  considered  are  what  Shackle 
(1952)  would  term,  rival  outcomes,  it  makes  no  sense  to  'choose'  between  rival  outcomes, 
because  only  one  will  occur. 
Operational  isi  ng  the  model  in  the  context  of  the  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  environmental 
problems,  again  raises  the  question  of  the  interpretation  of  the  model  in  a  behavioural  or 
normative  sense.  Operationality  implies  in  both  interpretations  that  the  model  should  be 
demonstrably  relevant  to  the  real  world  and  thus  relate  to  real  world  phenomena  (Katzner, 
1995).  If  the  model  is  to  be  operationalised  in  a  behavioural  sense  then  the  aim  is  to  shed 
light  on  actual  behaviour.  As  such,  therefore,  to  be  operational,  a  theory  should  be  capable  of 
being  empirically  tested  or  their  propositions  evaluated  subjectively.  It  is  important  to 
recognise  as  Katzner  (1995)  points  out,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  submit  behavioural  models  to 
an  absolute  test  which  will  determine  whether  the  propositions  of  the  model  are  true  or  false 
nor  is  it  possible  to  deduce  that  a  model  is  the  single  correct  analysis  of  the  phenomena  in 
question.  All  that  can  be  deduced  is  that  under  certain  criteria  and  particular  sets  of  data,  the 
propositions  that  the  model  makes  are  verified  or  falsified  under  these  conditions. 
Shackle  argues  that  there  are  three  main  ways  that  theories  of  uncertainty  can  be  tested 
empirically.  The  first  is  by  conducting  experiments,  the  second  is  by  analysing  time  series 
data  and  the  third  is  by  case  studies  compiled  by  watching  decision  takers  making  real  world 
decisions  (Ford,  1994).  Shackle  also  cautions  against  any  conclusions  made  with  respect  to 
results  from  experiments  testing  theories,  particularly  due  to  the  problems  of  avoiding  framing 
or  context  factors,  as  well  as  the  reward  structures  and  the  fact  that  experimental  tests  will 
never  truly  mirror  real  world  decisions  (Ford,  1994).  The  majority  of  commentators  have 
focused  on  Shackle's  model  in  a  behavioural  sense  and  have  criticised  the  constructs  and Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  1033 
axioms  on  which  it  is  built,  from  a  theoretical  view  point,  in  relabon  to  how  they  explain 
decision  making  under  uncertainty.  In  a  few  notable  cases  (Hey,  1985,  Ford  &  Ghose,  1994a, 
1994b,  1995a,  1995b,  1995c)  successful  attempts  have  been  made  to  test  empirically  the 
predictions  that  Shackles  model  makes;  the  majority  of  these  have  been  carried  out  in 
laboratory  experiments.  The  focus  of  these  studies  has  been  in  uncovering  evidence  of  the 
use  of  Shackle's  constructs  and  attempts  to  distinguish  between  whether  choices  between 
lotteries  conform  with  Shackle's  theory  or  to  expected  utility  and  its  variants  (see  Ford  & 
Ghose,  1998).  In  general,  however,  there  has  been  a  lack  of  studies  directed  towards  case 
studies  of  real  decisions  and  none  directed  to  environmental  decisions. 
The  operation  aI  isati  on  of  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  in  a  normative 
sense  has  received  much  less  attention.  Indeed  a  number  of  authors  (e.  g.  Earl,  1983,  Ford, 
1994)  have  emphasised  the  application  of  Shackle's  theory  in  a  behavioural  rather  than  a 
normative  sense.  Although,  it  is  doubtful  whether  Shackle's  theory  can  be  interpreted  in  a 
normative  context  in  relation  to  providing  optimising  decision  criteria  (based  on  a  notion  of 
substantive  rationality),  it  is  argued  that  in  the  context  of  procedural  rationality  it  is  possible  to 
apply  it  in  a  normative  sense.  The  normative  interpretation  of  the  model  of  decision  making 
under  hard  uncertainty  is  based  on  the  extent  that  the  model  establishes  propositions 
indicating  how  the  uncertainty  present  in  a  decision  should  be  evaluated.  In  this  sense  the 
model  will  be  normatively  operational  if  it  can  generate  rules  of  thumb  which  will  guide  what 
ought  to  be  done  in  relation  to  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision  making  process  itself. 
It  is  argued  that,  although  less  frequently  discussed,  Shackle's  model  of  decision-making 
under  uncertainty  can  make  an  important  contribution  when  applied  in  this  sense. 
While  the  positive  predictions  of  a  model  can  be  to  a  certain  degree  tested  empirically,  this 
information  is  only  of  use  in  a  normative  sense  in  that  it  will  indicate  if  a  model  or  the  particular 
features  of  a  model  will  lend  itself  to  being  practically  implemented.  Normatively  operational 
criteria  may  or  may  not  be  positively  operational.  As  Katzner  (1995)  argues  however: 
"The  only  way  to  discover  if  an  individual  is  actually  using  a  nonnatively  operational  criterion 
to  guide  his  behaviour  is  to  ask  him"  (Katzner,  1995,  p239) 
While  this  type  of  questioning  is  not  sufficient  to  verify  completely  whether  a  model  is 
positively  operational,  it  does  give  an  indication  of  what  an  individual  thinks  that  (s)he  is  doing. 
Moreover  if  the  individual  is  aware  of  what  (s)he  is  doing  then  they  are  aware  that  they  are 
following  some  criterion  in  a  normative  sense.  These  issues  will  be  raised  again  in  Chapter  7. Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  104 
What  is  sufficient  to  say  at  the  present,  is  that  operationalising  a  model  normatively,  may  imply 
a  different  relationship  between  theory  and  reality  than  does  positive  operationality  (Katzner, 
1995).  It  is  with  a  view  to  operational  ising  Shackle's  model  of  decision  making  under 
uncertainty  (positively  and  normatively),  that  the  following  section  reviews  the  different 
elements  of  the  model  before  a  variation  of  Shackle's  original  model  is  developed. 
5.4  The  key  elements  of  the  Shackle  model  of  decision-making  under  uncertainty 
Now  that  the  context  in  which  the  Shackle  model  will  be  interpreted  has  been  outlined, 
attention  is  focused  on  the  main  elements  of  Shackle's  model.  It  should  be  emphasised  that 
this  section  does  not  attempt  to  review  all  the  critiques  of  Shackle's  theory  (see  Ford,  1994 
for  a  comprehensive  review)  but  is  limited  to  those  elements  which  can  be  operationalised 
and  applied  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty  in  both  a  behavioural  and  normative  manner. 
As  such  it  will  draw  not  only  on  the  work  of  Shackle  but  also  the  contributions  made  by  Ford 
(1983,1987,1994)  as  well  as  Katzner,  (1995)  and  Vickers,  (1994)  in  suggesting  variations  of 
Shackle's  original  model  as  outlined  previously.  The  possible  adaptation  of  the  model  will 
remain  however  within  the  interpretative  framework  outlined  above  and  also  contrasts  in  the 
form  taken  to  those  variations  proposed  by  Ford  (1983),  Katzner  (1995)  and  Vickers  (1994). 
In  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  the  Shackle  model  in  relation  to  hard  uncertainty,  there  are  two 
underlying  features  of  the  model  which  intuitively  appear  attractive.  Firstly,  the  model 
replaces  probability  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty  with  an  alternative  measure  based  on  degree 
of  surprise.  The  concept  of  degree  of  surprise  will  be  evaluated  in  this  section.  Secondly,  the 
model  proposes  an  alternative  mechanism  for  evaluating  outcomes  and  their  corresponding 
uncertainty.  Shackle's  original  formulation,  relies  on  two  components,  namely  the  use  of  an 
ascendancy  function  which  weights  both  the  outcome  and  its  related  degree  of  surprise  and 
secondly  the  gamblers  preference  map.  It  is  to  review  these  individual  elements  that  this 
thesis  now  turns. 
5.4.1:  An  alternative  measure  of  uncertainty:  Potential  surprise 
Potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty  is  conceived  on  a  cardinal  scale  such  as 
degrees  Celsius  (Ford,  1994)  and  is  used  with  upper  and  lower  bounds  (Shackle,  1961). 
Thus,  the  occurrence  of  the  alternatives  are  conceived  as  ranging  from  the  perfectly  possible 
at  one  end  of  the  scale  through  to  the  impossible.  The  degrees  of  potential  surprise  assigned 
by  the  decision  maker  in  Shackle's  schema  are  meant  to  be  direct  reflections  of  the  degree  of Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  105 
possibility  the  decision  maker  thinks  resides  in  the  realisation  of  the  alternative  outcomes 
which  can  result  in  any  outcome.  As  Shackle's  argues: 
"A  man  cannot,  in  general,  tell  what  will  happen,  but  his  conception  of  the  nature  of  things,  the 
nature  of  men  and  their  institutions  and  affairs  of  the  non-human  worid  enables  him  to  form  a 
judgement  as  to  whether  any  suggested  thing  can  happen.  In  telling  himself  that  such  and 
such  a  thing  can  happen,  he  means  that  its  occurrence  would  not  surprise  him;  for  we  are 
surprised  at  the  occurrence  of  what  we  had  supposed  to  be  against  nature  ... 
If  a  man  feels 
that 
.. 
the  occurrence  of  a  given  thing  would  not  surprise  him  in  the  slightest  degree 
... 
that  thing 
is  perfectly  possible.  We  are  taking  the  certainty  of  the  wrongness  of  a  proposition  to  be  a 
state  of  mind  familiar  to  everyone  and  needing  no  definition 
... 
This  state  of  mind  ... 
is  a 
judgement  that  the  thing  in  question  is  impossible 
... 
(it  has)  an  absolute  maximum  degree  of 
suipfise  ... 
If  surprise  corresponds  to  possibility,  then  we  can  say  that  there  are  degrees  of 
possibility  .. 
Surpiise  provides  us  with  a  means  of  knowing  how  strongly  we  doubted  the 
possibility  of  a  given  happening  or  a  given  outcome  of  some  act  of  our  own" 
(Shackle,  1961:  p67-68) 
The  construction  of  degree  of  surprise  as  an  alternative  measure  of  uncertainty  is  based  on 
Shackle's  critique  of  probability.  Unlike  the  notion  of  probability,  potential  surprise  is 
applicable  to  unique  or  crucial  events.  As  a  subjective  concept  in  the  mind  of  the  decision 
maker,  its  derivation  does  not  rely  on  the  replication  of  a  series  of  trials  under  unchanging 
conditions  (i.  e.  it  is  non-divisible).  Because  degree  of  surprise  has  an  independent  existence, 
as  a  notion  of  belief,  it  is  applicable  to  unique  events  (Venn,  18881).  More  fundamental  in  its 
critique  of  both  objective  and  subjective  probability  is  that  an  appropriate  measure  of 
uncertainty  should  not  require  that  the  complete  set  of  outcomes  is  known  and  can  be 
specified.  Shackle  therefore  constructed  potential  surprise  as  a  non-distributional  variable, 
where  because  of  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty,  the  decision  maker  is  only  able  to  draw  up  a 
necessarily  incomplete  list  of  outcomes.  As  a  non-distributional  variable  then  it  possess 
meaning,  unlike  probability,  in  hard  uncertainty.  This  is  because  Shackle  (1949,1961)  allows 
room  for  the  notion  of  a  'residual  hypothesis'  which  allows  for  a  conception  of  reality  in  which 
unanticipated  events  may  occur.  The  future  is  not  corralled  by  the  complete  set  of  outcomes 
required  for  the  use  of  probability,  so  the  assumption  is  not  made  that  the  universe  is  fully 
known.  As  such  potential  surprise  is  not  constrained  to  add  up  to  unity. 
2  The  notion  of  surprise  introduced  by  John  Venn  the  founder  of  frequency  probability,  can  perhaps  be  seen 
as  the  parent  of  the  concept  of  potential  surprise  later  introduced  by  Shackle  (Carter,  1950,  Ford,  1994). Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  106 
The  importance  of  potential  surprise  being  a  non-distributional  variable  is  reflected  in  the  fact 
that  Shackle  also  defines  it  as  non-additive.  Because  only  an  incomplete  set  of  outcomes  is 
known  it  makes  no  sense  for  them  to  be  added  together.  Furthermore,  where  the  incomplete 
set  of  outcomes  are  in  effect  mutually  exclusive,  no  meaning  can  be  attached  to  permitting  the 
alternative  outcomes,  which  are  in  effect  rivals,  to  have  a  share  in  the  evaluation  of  a  specific 
action.  As  a  result,  degree  of  surprise  is  constructed  as  a  non-additive  variable  and  is  not 
constrained  to  add  up  to  unity.  The  degree  of  surprise  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  one 
outcome  is  not  conditional  on  the  degree  of  surprise  attached  to  other  outcomes.  The 
decision  maker  therefore  is  unrestricted  in  allotting  degrees  of  surprise  to  the  competing 
outcomes.  As  Ford  (1994)  points  out,  situations  can  be  imagined  in  which  the  degrees  of 
potential  surprise  allotted  to  an  outcome  may  change  as  the  number  of  rivals  changes.  The 
crucial  difference  between  Shackle's  concept  and  that  of  probability,  however,  is  that, 
because  it  is  non-additive,  the  individual  is  not  forced  to  make  adjustments  to  the  degrees  of 
potential  surprise  accorded  to  the  different  outcomes.  Moreover,  as  a  non-  additive  measure, 
no  meaning  can  be  attached  to  its  multiplication  with  any  outcome  as  the  basis  for  a  decision 
index,  as  is  found  in  the  weighted  averaging  mechanism  utilised  in  expected  utility  models. 
5.4.1.1  Shackle's  axioms  for  potential  surprise 
Underlying  the  intuitive  rationale  for  the  use  of  potential  surprise  as  an  alternative  measure  of 
uncertainty,  Shackle  (1949,1952,1961)  detailed  a  number  of  other  features  of  the  variable  in 
his  formal  axiom  system.  It  is  the  axioms  of  potential  surprise  that  give  a  strictly  distinct 
meaning  to  probability,  and  which  mean  that  it  can  in  no  way  be  taken  as  the  inverse  of 
probability  (See  Ford,  1994,  Katzner,  1986).  These  axioms  are  presented  as  follows,  with  the 
majority  taken  from  Shackle  (1952,  pl  30-1)  except  axiom  7  which  comes  from  Shackle  (1949) 
and  Shackle,  (1961,  p83).  This  is  arguably  the  clearest  version  of  Shackle's  axioms  (Ford, 
1994). 
1.  An  individual's  degree  of  belief  in  a  hypothesis  can  be  thought  of  as  consisting  in  a  degree 
of  potential  surprise  associated  with  the  hYPothesis,  and  in  another  degree  associated  with  its 
contradictory. 
2.  Degrees  of  potential  surprise  can  be  zero  or  greater  than  zero.  No  meaning  is  assigned  to 
a  degree  of  potential  surprise  less  than  zero.  Degrees  of  potential  surprise  are  bounded  by 
that  degree  called  the  absolute  maximum  of  potential  surprise,  which  signifies  the  absolute 
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suggested  answer  to  a  question  or  the  possibility  of  the  suggested  outcome  of  an 
I expenmenti. 
3.  Equality  between  the  respective  degrees  of  belief  felt  by  an  individual  in  two  hypothesis  will 
then  require,  for  its  expression  in  tenns  of  potential  surprise,  two  statements,  viz.  that  some 
given  degree  of  potential  surprise  is  attached  to  both  hypotheses,  and  that  some  given  degree 
is  attached  to  the  contradictories  of  both. 
4.  The  degree  of  potential  surpfise  associated  with  any  hypothesis  will  be  the  least  degree 
amongst  all  those  appropriate  to  different  mutually  exclusive  sets  of  hypotheses  (each  set 
considered  as  a  whole)  whose  truth  appears  to  the  individual  to  imply  the  truth  of  this 
hypothesis. 
5.  All  the  members  of  an  exhaustive  set  of  rival  hypothesis  can  cany  zero  degrees  of 
potential  surprise. 
6.  When  H  is  any  hypothesis,  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  attached  to  the  contradictory  of 
H  is  equal  to  the  smallest  degree  attached  to  any  rival  of  H. 
7.  The  degree  of  surprise  assigned  to  the  joint  (simultaneous)  truth  of  two  hypothesis  is  equal 
to  the  greater  of  the  respective  degrees  assigned  to  the  separate  hypothesis. 
or  expressed  alternatively: 
7.  Given  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  Y7  assigned  to  a  hypothesis  A,  and  the  degree  Ybo 
which  would  be  assigned  to  a  hypothesis  B  if  Y  were  zero,  the  degree  in  fact  assigned  to  B 
Ybo 
will  be  the  greater  of  Y 
8.  Any  hypothesis  and  its  contradictory  together  constitute  an  exhaustive  set  of  rival 
hypotheses. 
9.  At  least  one  member  of  an  exhaustive  set  of  rival  hypothesis  must  car7y  zero  potential 
surptise. 
The  interpretation  and  the  verification  of  the  axioms  will  depend  in  part  on  whether  they  are 
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whether  in  a  normative  sense  they  adequately  capture  the  nature  of  hard  uncertainty  and  as 
such  whether  potential  surprise  is  an  appropriate  measure  of  hard  uncertainty.  A  number  of 
problems  are  present  in  respect  of  Shackle's  original  axioms,  which  Ford  (1994)  argues  do 
not  appear  sufficiently  precise  for  this  purpose.  Axiom  7  in  particular  has  been  subject  to 
critical  discussion  from  Levi  (1966)  (See  Ford,  1994  for  a  comprehensive  review).  Katzner 
(1986)  notably  attempted  a  formalisation  of  Shackle's  axioms  systems.  However  a  number  of 
problems  exist  in  his  exposition  (Ford,  1994),  because  the  mirroring  of  Shackle's  original 
axioms  attempted  does  not  allow  for  the  valid  critiques  Shackle's  original  exposition  of 
potential  surprise. 
The  important  feature  of  potential  surprise  as  far  as  hard  uncertainty  is  concerned  is  that  it  is  a 
non-distributional,  non  additive  variable.  Given  therefore,  that  potential  surprise,  when  applied 
to  situations  of  hard  uncertainty,  is  constructed  as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  surprise  that  an 
individual  would  feel  at  the  occurrence  of  an  incomplete  set  of  outcomes,  then  there  are  a 
number  of  key  features  or  axioms  that  can  be  stated: 
Al.  Degree  of  potential  surprise  is  dependent  on  the  extent  that  an  individual  believes  that  a 
particular  outcome  is  possible.  Zero  degree  of  surprise  indicates  that  the  individual  believes 
that  it  is  perfectly  possible  that  the  outcome  will  occur,  while  the  absolute  maximum  degree  of 
surprise  y  indicates  that  the  individual  believes  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome  to  be 
impossible. 
A2.  At  least  one  member  of  an  exhaustive  set  of  rival  hypotheses  must  carry  zero  degree  of 
potential  surprise. 
A3.  Every  member  of  an  exhaustive  set  of  rival  hypotheses  can  be  assigned  a  zero  degree  of 
potential  surprise. 
A4.  The  potential  surprise  of  either  outcome  x,  or  outcome  X2  is  equal  to  the  minimum 
potential  surprise  of  y(x,  )  or  y(x,  ). 
A5  The  degree  of  surprise  assigned  to  any  outcome  need  not  depend  on  the  degree  of 
surprise  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  its  rivals. 
The  first  axiom  defines  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the 
occurrence  of  an  incomplete  set  of  outcomes.  The  emphasis  is  therefore  placed  on  potential 
surprise  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty,  which  is  consistent  with  the  features  of  hard  uncertainty) 
rather  than  a  direct  measure  of  the  belief  of  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  hypothesis.  Much 
of  the  original  criticism  (see  for  example  Carter,  1953  and  Dorfman,  1955)  directed  at 
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measure  of  belief.  While  it  may  be  correct  to  emphasise  the  role  of  belief  in  probability  (as  a 
measure  of  knowledge),  arguably  the  notion  of  belief  is  not  so  crucial  when  we  are  dealing 
with  hard  uncertainty  defined  by  a  lack  of  knowledge.  Part  of  Shackle's  original  concern  was 
that  any  measure  of  uncertainty  cannot  include  a  certainty  of  rightness,  because  the  complete 
set  of  outcomes  is  not  fully  known.  This  concern  is  reflected  in  the  above  axioms  in  that, 
although  there  is  a  measure  of  certainty  of  wrongness  which  is  expressed  by  assigning  the 
maximum  degree  of  potential  surprise,  there  is  no  indicator  for  certainty  of  rightness  because 
more  than  one  outcome  can  be  assigned  zero  degrees  of  surprise.  It  should  also  be  noted 
while  potential  surprise  is  envisaged  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty,  it  is  defined  in  terms  of  the 
subjective  expectations  of  the  individual.  As  such  therefore  it  does  not  measure  the  absolute 
level  of  uncertainty  per  se.  This  is  done  at  the  start  of  the  decision  making  process  when  the 
level  and  mode  of  uncertainty  encountered  in  any  decision  is  subjectively  evaluated  by  the 
decision  maker. 
Recognising  that  probability  and  potential  surprise  are  measures  which  correspond  to 
fundamentally  different  modes  of  uncertainty  implies  that  the  basis  of  the  measures  (such  as 
belief,  possibility,  credibility)  of  the  different  modes  of  uncertainty  can  also  be  expected  to  vary 
accordingly.  Moreover  given  the  subjective  nature  of  the  way  that  the  hard  uncertainty 
surrounding  the  occurrence  of  a  outcome  is  evaluated,  it  is  perhaps  unrealistic  to  expect  that 
individuals  will  consistently  apply  the  same  interpretation  to  any  measure  of  uncertainty.  On  a 
practical  note  it  is  also  difficult  to  determine  in  a  positive  manner  on  what  the  alternative 
measures  of  uncertainty  are  actually  based  (see  Ford  &  Ghose,  1994b).  The  emphasis  will 
therefore  be  on  testing  the  positive  operationality  of  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  hard 
uncertainty,  as  well  as  indicating  the  normative  constructs  on  which  a  measure  of  hard 
uncertainty  should  be  based. 
The  second  axiom  (Ford  &  Ghose,  1994a),  A2,  directly  corresponds  to  the  ninth  axiom  in 
Shackle's  list  and  emphasises  the  point  that  in  an  exhaustive  set  of  outcomes  at  least  one 
must  be  regarded  as  perfectly  possible.  Of  course,  in  situations  of  hard  uncertainty  defined  by 
a  non-exhaustive  set,  by  definition  this  requirement  is  not  necessary.  Axiom  A3  corresponds 
to  Shackle's  fifth  axiom.  This  axiom  is  important  in  defining  a  partial  ordering  only  and  is  also 
important  in  defining  potential  surprise  as  a  non-  distributional  variable.  Axioms  A4  and  A5 
epitomise  a  central  notion  in  Shackle's  model,  namely  that  the  measure  of  uncertainty  should 
be  non-additive  and  non-distributional.  Although  in  some  cases  hard  uncertainty  will  be 
dealing  with  policies  defined  by  sets  of  mutually  exclusive  outcomes,  there  may  also  be 
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nature  of  the  connection  between  any  two  outcomes  may  itself  be  uncertain.  As  such  axiom 
A5  leaves  sufficient  room  for  such  situations,  in  that  the  only  constraint  is  the  necessity  to 
adjust  the  degrees  of  potential  surprises  attached  to  the  other  outcomes,  because  the 
potential  surprise  of  one  of  the  outcomes  changes.  Because  potential  surprise  is  not 
constrained  to  add  to  unity  then  it  is  non-distributional  variable. 
5.4.1.2  Operationalising  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty 
Although  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty  resides  in  the  mind  of  the 
decision  maker  it  is  possible  to  elicit  a  potential  surprise  function  for  an  individual  and  so  test 
the  extent  to  which  individuals  correspond  to  the  axioms  that  have  been  set  out.  The 
emphasis,  as  Katzner  (1995)  points  out,  is  that  for  the  concept  of  potential  surprise  to  be 
operational  in  some  positive  sense,  then  all  that  is  required  is  that  some  implied  or  assumed 
aspects  of  potential  surprise  be  testable  against  observed  behaviour  in  principle.  The  case 
study  discussed  later  in  this  thesis  aims  to  extends  this  to  testing  observed  behaviour  in 
practice.  Operationalising  potential  surprise  normatively  involves  evaluating  its  suitability  as  a 
measure  which  captures  the  nature  of  hard  uncertainty.  The  crucial  issue  is  whether  or  not  it 
reflects  the  various  characteristics  of  uncertainty,  that  hard  uncertainty  encompasses.  The 
key  here  is  in  relation  to  interpreting  the  axioms  as  giving  guidance  or  rules  of  thumb  to 
assigning  degrees  of  surprise  to  the  different  outcomes.  The  clear  advantage  that  potential 
surprise  has  over  probability  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty  is  that  it  explicitly  deals  with 
uncertainty,  in  that  it  allows  for  the  presence  of  a  residual  hypothesis,  namely  that  the 
complete  set  of  hypothesised  outcomes  is  not  assumed.  As  a  non-additive,  non-distributional 
subjective  variable,  applicable  to  unique  decisions,  potential  surprise  would  appear  logically 
consistent  with  the  underlying  characteristics  of  hard  uncertainty. 
5.5  The  evaluation  mechanism 
The  second  main  difference  in  Shackle's  model  of  uncertainty  to  that  utilised  by  expected 
utility  models  and  variants  is  in  relation  to  the  mechanism  by  which  the  outcome  and 
corresponding  measure  of  uncertainty  are  evaluated.  To  recap,  in  Shackle's  model  there  are 
two  main  stages,  firstly  the  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function  as  a  means  of  editing  the 
different  outcomes  and  secondly  the  use  of  the  gamblers  preference  map.  Like  the  concept 
of  potential  surprise,  these  elements  do  not  go  unscathed  by  the  literature.  This  section 
therefore  goes  into  more  detail  about  the  construction  of  these  different  elements,  as  well  as 
evaluating  their  applicability  to  the  problem  of  hard  uncertainty  (and  thus  the  environmental Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  III 
problems  on  which  this  thesis  is  focusing).  A  critical  view  will  be  then  be  taken  as  regards 
which  elements  of  these  two  pillars  of  Shackle's  model  should  be  carried  forward. 
5.5.1  The  separation  of  gains  and  losses 
The  ascendancy  function  is  the  means  by  which,  for  any  decision,  the  incomplete  set  of 
outcomes  and  their  corresponding  measure  of  uncertainty  are  evaluated.  Because  both  the 
potential  surprise  function  and  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves  are  separated  by  gains 
and  losses,  this  process  immediately  differs  from  that  of  expected  utility.  This  allows  the 
individual  to  have  a  different  potential  surprise  function  for  gains  and  losses  and  allows 
differing  degrees  of  uncertainty  aversion  to  be  exhibited  by  the  decision  maker  in  relation  to 
the  construction  to  the  different  elements,  where  an  element  is  defined  as  a  outcome  and  its 
corresponding  degree  of  potential  surprise.  The  main  insight  that  Shackle  provided  here  is 
psychological  (Ford,  1994),  in  that  individuals  being  safety  first  will  consider  gains  and  losses 
separately. 
5.5.2  Uncertainty  aversion:  Ascendancy  indifference  curves 
The  most  important  point  about  the  separation  of  gains  and  losses  is  that  by  combining  the 
potential  surprise  function  with  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves  by  means  of  the 
ascendancy  function,  it  allows  different  degrees  of  uncertainty  aversion  or  preference  to  be 
shown  over  gains  and  losses.  It  would  appear  intuitive  that  decision  makers  making  public 
decisions  may  show  a  greater  aversion  to  uncertainty  surrounding  large  losses  in  relation  to 
uncertainty  over  gains,  and  thus  weight  them  higher  or  give  them  greater  ascendancy.  Even  if 
decision  makers  showed  uniform  preference  or  aversion  over  gains  and  losses  under  hard 
uncertainty,  the  ascendancy  function  does  give  the  opportunity  for  variations  to  be  exhibited. 
This  important  feature  plays  an  integral  part  in  the  other  crucial  element  of  the  ascendancy 
function,  in  that  it  provides  a  mechanism  for  evaluating  both  the  gain/  loss  outcome  and  the 
corresponding  measure  of  uncertainty'. 
3  Ford's  (1987)  perspective  theory  as  well  as  Hey's  (1994)  theory  are  more  recent  variations  which  utilise  the 
same  procedure  but  remain  within  the  probability  framework.  As  such  while  they  are  not  applicable  to 
situations  of  hard  uncertainty,  they  may  indeed  be  applicable  to  decisions  characterised  b-,  -,  risk  or  soft 
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This  is  in  contrast  to  the  expected  utility  model  and  variants  highlighted  in  the  previous 
chapter,  which  only  weight  the  outcome,  or  in  some  cases  the  outcome  and  the  probability 
separately4.  The  crucial  property  is  that  the  ascendancy  function  encapsulates  the  subjective 
trade-off  in  the  mind  of  the  decision  maker  between  the  extent  to  which  an  outcome  on  one 
hand  and  the  measure  of  uncertainty  (potential  surprise)  on  the  other,  contribute  to  the  overall 
weighting  of  the  outcome  in  the  decision  makers  mind. 
This  property  of  the  ascendancy  function  is  defined  from  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves 
from  which  it  is  derived.  Each  indifference  curve,  where  0  (x,  y)  =  constant  >  0,  implicitly 
associates  a  degree  of  potential  surprise  with  each  specific  outcome,  x.  As  this  degree  of 
surprise  is  defined  differently  to  the  potential  surprise  function,  y=  y(x)  , 
based  on  the  set  of 
actual  hypothesised  outcomes  (although  it  remains  on  the  same  scale  and  is  thus  drawn  on 
the  same  axis  in  fig  5.2  and  5.3)  it  will  be  labelled  y'  =  y'(x)  . 
Thus  each  indifference  curve 
can  be  defined  as: 
ýx,  y'(x)l  -=constant 
(5.4) 
Differentiating  the  above  we  get: 
do  =-  0  -= 
go 
dx  + 
690  dy  (5.5) 
Ox  OY  I 
so  that  everywhere  on  such  a  contour  line  the  slope  or  the  curve  which  represents  the  trade 
off  between  potential  surprise  and  the  outcomes,  xjs  defined  by: 
dy' 
- 
90/90  (5.6)  -  -7xl  gy  dx 
Thus  as  indicated  in  fig  5.2  and  fig  5.3,  when  x>0  and  ýý-o  >0  and  -ý-o  <  0,  then  ! Ly 
ox  gy,  dx 
will  everywhere  be  positive  and  the  contour  line  will  slope  upwards.  For  losses,  where  x<0 
(rather  than  the  absolute  value  of  x  defined  within  the  ascendancy  function),  similarly  the 
indifference  or  contour  line  will  slope  upwards  towards  the  left.  The  actual  form  of  the 
'  Katzner's  (1995)  variation  of  Shackle's  theory  weights  the  outcome  (by  a  form  of  utility  function)  and  then 
weights  both  the  weighted  outcome  and  the  potential  surprise  by  means  of  the  ascendancy  or  what  he  terms 
II 
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indifference  curves  are  indicated  by  the  second  derivative  of  the  above  relabons,  and  are 
drawn  in  fig  5.2  and  fig  5.3,  which  indicate  increasing  uncertainty  aversion,  i.  e.  at  successively 
higher  values  of  potential  surprise,  progressively  larger  increments  in  outcomes  are  required 
to  maintain  a  given  level  of  0.  This  can  be  defined  by; 
d2y< 
CbC2 
(5.7) 
This  in  effect  reflects  what  is  portrayed  in  fig  5.2  as  increasing  uncertainty  aversion  on  both 
the  gain  side  and  loss  side.  As  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  increases,  it  exerts  an 
increasing  negative  effect  on  the  weight  or  ascendancy  attached  to  the  particular 
(x,  y)  element.  So  while  for  low  potential  surprise  values,  increasing  magnitudes  of  the 
outcomes  will  tend  to  increase  the  weighting  allocated  to  a  particular  element,  as  the  degree 
of  surprise  becomes  higher,  it  will  begin  to  outweigh  the  magnitude  of  the  outcome  in 
determining  the  ascendancy  of  the  element.  It  is  by  the  making  of  these  subjective 
adjustments  between  the  power  of  the  outcome  and  its  degree  of  surprise  in  determining  the 
overall  weight  given  to  the  element  in  the  decision  process,  that  explicit  attention  is  given  to 
hard  uncertainty. 
Shackle  (1952)  allows  room  for  differing  forms  of  the  uncertainty/  outcome  trade-off  to  be 
exhibited  by  the  individual.  However,  what  is  important  to  emphasise,  is  that,  because  any 
given  weighting  or  level  of  ascendancy  corresponds  to  combinations  of  both  the  outcome  and 
the  degree  of  surprise  (as  a  measure  of  uncertainty),  changing  the  level  of  0  captures  the 
nature  of  the  trade-off  between  the  two  factors.  It  will  be  emphasised,  as  will  soon  be  made 
evident  however,  that  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves  are  not  a  stand  alone  element  in 
Shackle's  theory,  but  just  a  demonstration  in  a  formal  analytical  manner  of  the  rationale  which 
underlies  the  derivation  of  an  ascendancy  function,  which  will  be  considered  now. 
5.5.3  The  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function 
To  recap  the  ascendancy  function  0=  (x,  y)  is  the  process  by  which  the  individual  is 
envisaged  to  consider  the  different  gain  and  loss  (x,  y)  elements  in  order  to  arrive  at  a 
subjective  evaluation  of  the  range  of  uncertain  outcomes,  which  could  occur  as  a  result  of  a 
particular  action  or  policy.  This  ranking  procedure  then  allows  the  decision  maker  to  arrive  at 
a  focus  gain  value  and  focus  loss  values.  These  points  represent  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios 
which  the  decision  maker  attaches  most  weight  to  when  considering  the  merits  of  a  particular 
course  of  action.  The  ascendancy  function  is  derived  theoretically  from  all  the  points  on  the Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  114 
different  ascendancy  indifference  curves  which  lie  tangential  to  or  intersect  the  potential 
surprise  function,  y=  y(x)  (see  fig  5.3).  The  decision-maker  therefore  weights  the  different 
outcomes  and  their  corresponding  degree  of  surprise,  assigning  the  greatest  weight  to  that 
element  (the  set  of  which  is  constrained  or  limited  to  those  elements  previously  defined  by  the 
potential  surprise  function),  which  lies  on  the  maximum  0  indifference  curve  (see  fig  5-3). 
Although  the  notion  of  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves  are  useful  in  an  analytical  sense, 
as  Shackle  concedes  (1952),  it  is  unlikely  that  an  individual  would  go  through  the  process  of 
defining  a  series  of  ascendancy  indifference  curves  before  specifying  his  or  her  ascendancy 
function.  Moreover,  although  the  ascendancy  function  is  derived  from  the  concept  of  a  series 
of  indifference  curves,  the  actual  process  by  which  the  different  hypothesised  outcomes  of  any 
action  are  edited,  to  allow  the  decision  maker  to  focus  on  the  'worst  to  be  feared'  and  the  'best 
to  be  hoped  for,  is  sufficiently  captured  by  the  ascendancy  function.  Although,  therefore,  the 
ascendancy  indifference  curves  are  a  useful  analytical  tool  and  provide  a  formal  presentation 
of  the  process  envisaged  in  Shackle's  model,  they  are  superseded  in  an  operational  sense  by 
the  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function'.  It  is  the  ascendancy  function  that  will  therefore 
take  centre  stage  in  the  variation  of  Shackle's  model  developed  in  this  thesis. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  interpretation  of  ascendancy  taken  here  does  not  in  any  sense 
relate  to  the  notion  of  a  utility  function.  It  is  the  interpretation  of  the  ascendancy  function  by 
some  authors  as  a  representation  of  a  kind  of  utility  function  (Mars,  1950a,  1950b),  as  well  as 
its  conflation  with  the  gamblers  preference  map  (which  would  appear  to  be  evident  in  Vickers, 
1994  model'),  which  has  resulted  in  some  of  the  confusion  surrounding  Shackle's  model.  The 
maximisation  of  the  ascendancy  function  to  arrive  at  the  focus  values  does  not  represent  the 
gain  and  loss  elements  with  the  highest  utility.  Instead  they  represent  those  elements  on 
which  the  decision  makers  attention  is  focused  (Shackle,  1949)  or  what  can  be  interpreted  as 
those  elements  which  are  given  the  highest  weight  in  the  decision  maker's  mind.  The 
ascendancy  function,  does  not,  therefore,  rank  the  gain  and  loss  elements  according  to  the 
highest  utility  (based  on  the  trade-off  relationship  between  uncertainty  and  the  monetary 
outcome).  This  type  of  process  is  limited  to  the  choice  between  actions  or  policies,  (rather 
'  The  difficulty  of  positively  operational  is  ing  indifference  curves  will  be  returned  to  in  Chapter  7. 
'  In  Vickers  (1994)  model  the  ascendancy  function  is  replaced  by  an  attractiveness  function.  Although  I  It) 
Vickers  recognises  that  Shackle's  ascendancy  function  is  in  no  way  related  to  the  notion  of  a  utility  function, 
his  interpretation  of  his  attractiveness  function  and  what  he  terms  iso-attractiveness  contours  vvould  appear  to 
be  one  which  incorporates  elements  of  an  utility  function,  for  example  larger  negative  values  of  x  will  -t) 
decrease  the  value  of  the  attractiveness  function.  The  decision  index  is  then  in  essence  a  linear  version  of  the 
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than  the  evaluation  of  the  incomplete  set  of  outcomes  and  the  uncertainty  attached  to  their 
occurrence). 
Although  it  is  Possible  to  choose  between  different  actions  or  policies,  it  is  not  possible  to 
determine  or  choose  between  the  possible  occurrence  of  the  outcomes  associated  with  an 
action.  Which  outcome  occurs  will  depend  on  the  resulting  state  of  nature,  which  is  by 
definition  not  known  in  situations  of  hard  uncertainty.  The  ascendancy  function  as  interpreted 
in  this  research  is  therefore  limited  to  the  evaluation  of  the  set  of  outcomes  and  their 
associated  uncertainty  which  could  occur  as  the  result  of  a  particular  action,  rather  than  some 
form  of  ranking  method  to  guide  choices  between  policies.  In  Shackle's  schema,  the  notion  of 
utility  is  limited  to  making  decisions  between  policies  or  different  prospects,  and  is  therefore 
captured  in  the  notion  of  the  gamblers  preference  map.  In  Katzner's  (1993)  model  the 
outcomes  which  form  part  of  the  argument  in  the  ascendancy  function  is  replaced  by  a  value 
which  corresponds  to  the  utility  of  that  outcome.  Before  the  ascendancy  function,  which  is 
given  a  similar  interpretation  as,  that  which  is  incorporated  in  Shackle's  original  model,  is  then 
maximised,  and  the  focus  values  derived  in  the  usual  manner.  Katzner  then  formulates  a 
decision  index  similar  to  Vickers,  (1994)  which  is  in  essence  a  linear  form  of  the  gamblers 
preference  map,  the  difference  being,  that  any  asymmetrical  weighting  of  the  outcomes  and 
losses,  is  captured  in  the  utility  function  over  the  outcomes.  Although  this  is  an  interesting 
approach,  from  an  operational  perspective  the  specification  of  a  utility  function  over  the 
outcomes,  adds  a  further  degree  of  complication  to  the  process.  Moreover,  as  has  been 
argued,  the  validity  of  attaching  a  utility  to  situations  where  the  outcomes  are  rival  is  also 
questionable. 
5.5.4  Specifying  the  ascendancy  function 
The  ascendancy  or  weighting  function  as  defined  by  equation  (5.2)  and  with  the  properties 
denoted  by  equation  (5.3)  can  be  seen  operationally  as  the  process  by  which  the  different 
elements  of  any  action  are  weighted.  In  Shackle's  terminology  this  weighting  will  correspond 
to  the  power  of  any  outcome/  surprise  element  to  arrest  the  attention  of  the  individual 
(Shackle,  1952).  The  element  on  the  gain  side  with  the  highest  weighting  will  therefore 
correspond  to  the  focus  gain  (the  best  to  be  hoped  for)  and  the  element  on  the  loss  branch 
with  the  highest  weighting,  the  focus  loss  (the  worst  to  be  feared).  The  properties  of  the 
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functional 
forM7: 
0.5 
-b  ax  ýY2  (5.8) 
where  a  and  b  are  the  coefficients  with  respect  to  the  outcome  x  and  the  degree  of  potential 
surprise  y  and  where  x  is  the  defined  as  the  absolute  value  of  the  outcome  (for  example 
monetary  value).  Although  the  ascendancy  function  can  be  defined  separately  over  gains  and 
losses,  for  ease  of  exposition  it  is  assumed  to  take  the  same  form  over  gains  and  losses.  The 
proposition  that  the  ascendancy  function  will  increase  with  respect  to  increasing  outcome 
magnitudes  (i.  e.  higher  outcome  values  will  be  assigned  a  higher  weighting)  and  decrease 
with  respect  to  increasing  levels  of  potential  surprise  is  shown  by  the  first  order  partial 
derivatives: 
. 
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(5.9) 
The  second-order  partial  derivatives  of  0  (.  )  will  indicate  the  underlying  shape  of  the 
indifference  curves,  (which  are  not  observable),  and  thus  the  following  propositions  can  be 
constructed.  Firstly  the  proposition  that  when  y  remains  constant,  the  effect  of  larger 
outcome  magnitudes  although  increasing  the  level  of  0  will  do  so  at  a  decreasing  rate,  is 
shown  by: 
o2  0= 
-0.25ax 
-1.5  <0 
dX2  (5.10) 
Secondly  the  proposition  that  while  x  remains  constant,  as  the  degree  of  potential  surprise 
increases  it  will  decrease  the  level  of  0  but  do  so  at  an  increasing  rate,  is  shown  by: 
--2b>  0  dy  2  (5.11) 
In  addition  the  extent  to  which  the  outcome  magnitudes  and  potential  surprise  contribute  to 
the  overall  weighting,  and  so  the  specification  of  the  focus  gain  and  focus  loss,  will  be  defined 
by  the  sizes  of  the  respective  coefficients.  As  such  these  propositions  are  positively 
operational  and  testable  and  can  be  defined  normatively  to  derive  appropriate  rules  of  thumb. 
'  The  choice  of  and  assumptions  behind  the  functional  form  in  equation  5.8  will  be  described  in  more  detail 
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In  terms  of  the  normative  properties  of  the  ascendancy  function,  the  key  statements  which  will 
need  to  be  evaluated  are  the  extent  to  which  the  ascendancy  function  allows  varying  degrees 
of  uncertainty  aversion  to  be  shown.  Because  Shackle's  theory  is  separated  by  gains  and 
losses,  this  allows  aversion  or  preference  for  uncertainty  to  also  vary  in  terms  of  gains  and 
losses.  Moreover,  as  a  mechanism  which  considers  both  the  outcome  and  degree  of  surprise 
jointly,  the  decision  maker  can  balance  or  make  trade-offs  in  allocating  weights  to  the 
prospective  outcomes.  Therefore,  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  hypothesised  outcomes 
is  considered  explicitly  and  the  decision  maker  can  adjust  for  this  uncertainty  in  weighting  the 
possible  outcomes  associated  with  a  policy  before  deciding  whether  to  proceed  or  not.  This 
process  is  normatively  consistent  with  the  aim  of  improving  the  procedural  rationality  of 
decision  making. 
5.5.6  The  ascendancy  function  as  a  focusing  device 
The  ascendancy  function  offers  a  completely  different  means  of  evaluating  or  weighting  the 
different  possible  hypothesised  outcomes  of  any  action  to  that  proposed  by  the  weighted 
averaging  mechanism  used  in  the  expected  utility  model  and  its  variants.  Shackle  was  very 
critical  of  using  any  form  of  averaging  mechanism  over  rival  outcomes  and  as  such  the 
ascendancy  function  is  the  mechanism  by  which  the  individual  sifts  through  the  different 
outcomes  to  arrive  at  only  two  values,  namely  the  focus  gain  and  focus  loss  value.  This  non- 
averaging  mechanism  is  derived  in  part  from  the  definition  of  potential  surprise  as  a  non  - 
additive  measure  of  uncertainty,  which  is  itself  an  argument  in  the  ascendancy  function. 
Shackle's  proposition  that,  when  considering  a  range  of  hypothesised  outcomes  which  could 
occur  as  a  result  of  an  action  or  policy,  the  decision  maker  will  focus  on  one  gain  and  one  loss 
outcome  is  a  proposition  that  is  positively  operational,  as  will  be  shown  with  the  case  study.  It 
can  be  tested  whether  individuals,  when  faced  with  a  range  of  outcomes,  do  indeed  edit  the 
range  of  outcomes  and  focus  on  just  two  values. 
On  a  normative  basis  the  use  of  a  focusing  device  would  seem  to  have  some  merit  in  relation 
to  improving  the  way  that  decisions  are  made,  in  that  there  is  a  need  to  make  a  particular 
decision  manageable.  It  is  unlikely  that  any  decision  maker  will  be  able  to  evaluate 
comprehensively  every  possible  outcome,  but  will  find  it  necessary  to  have  some  mechanism 
for  ranking  or  simplifying  the  different  prospects  of  a  decision.  For  example,  a  decision  maker 
may  feel  so  surprised  at  the  possibility  of  an  outcome  occurring  that  they  want  to  exclude  that 
outcome  from  consideration.  By  editing  the  range  of  outcomes  associated  with  any  policy,  the 
decision  maker  provides  a  basis  by  which  s/he  can  summarise  the  best  and  worst  of  any 
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5.5.7  The  standardised  focus  values 
Once  the  focus  gain  and  focus  loss  values  have  been  derived  by  means  of  the  ascendancy 
function,  the  next  step  in  Shackle's  model  is  to  remove  the  potential  surprise  element  from  the 
focus  values  by  the  process  described  previously.  The  aim  of  this  step  to  allow  comparison  of 
different  policies  on  a  different  footing  (Shackle,  1949).  However,  in  the  variation  of  the  model 
developed  here  this  step  will  be  dispensed  with,  as  is  the  case  with  a  number  of  variations  on 
Shackle's  model  (e.  g.  Ford,  1983,1987;  Vickers  1994).  There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for 
doing  this.  Firstly,  as  stated  the  purpose  of  standardising  the  focus  elements  is  to  allow 
comparisons  between  actions  or  policies  to  be  made.  However,  the  interpretation  of  the 
variation  on  Shackle's  model  developed  here  is  in  relation  to  explaining  the  way  that  the 
uncertainty  in  any  decision  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  is  evaluated  and  a  decision  is 
taken  to  proceed  or  to  reject  a  particular  policy.  The  interpretation  of  the  model  put  forward 
here  does  not  attempt  to  explain  choices  between  policies,  but  only  to  test  whether  the  model 
helps  to  explain  the  basis  on  which  environmental  policies  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  are 
made  i.  e.  it  is  limited  in  relation  to  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  model. 
By  limiting  the  development  of  the  model  to  the  decision-making  process,  rather  than  the 
decisions  themselves,  the  model  is  not  being  used  to  compare  choices  between  policies. 
Consequently  the  need  to  standardise  the  focus  elements  is  removed.  Even  if  we  were  to  use 
Shackle's  model  in  relation  to  making  choices  between  policies  or  actions  under  uncertainty, 
as  Ford  (1994)  forcefully  argues,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  standardised  equivalents  will  in  any 
case  remove  the  uncertainty.  By  using  an  equivalent  element  in  terms  of  the  level  of 
ascendancy,  the  decision  maker  would  appear  to  be  acting  in  defiance  of  their  expectations, 
because  such  an  element  has  not  been  hypothesised  as  a  possible  scenario  of  the  policy.  To 
regard  the  potential  surprise  of  the  standardised  focus  gain,  and  so  attempt  to  remove  the 
uncertainty  which  is  of  vital  consideration  when  choosing  between  policies  (as  well  as 
evaluating  the  range  of  prospects  associated  with  a  policy),  would  appear  logically 
inconsistent. 
Further  arguments  for  dropping  the  standardised  focus  values  derive  from  concerns  over  the 
operationality  of  the  concept.  From  a  normative  perspective,  if  the  aim  is  to  deal  explicitly  with 
the  uncertainty  when  evaluating  a  given  decision,  it  would  appear  illogical  to  advance  a 
procedure  which  aftempts  to  remove  the  uncertainty.  On  a  practical  level  the  derivation  of  a 
rule  of  thumb  to  guide  how  decision  makers  should  do  this  would  also  appear  difficult.  The 
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operation  aI  ised.  The  process  of  defining  the  standardised  focus  values  is,  as  will  be  recalled, 
derived  from  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves,  which  are  in  themselves  difficult  to 
operationalise.  Although  they  may  be  assumed  to  exist  from  an  analytical  perspective,  for  the 
purpose  of  operationalising  the  model,  we  have  bypassed  their  construction  and  proceeded 
directly  with  the  specification  of  the  ascendancy  function. 
5.5.8  Stochastic  dominance 
A  large  part  of  the  critique  directed  at  the  use  of  the  ascendancy  function  in  Shackle's  model 
is  directed  at  the  role  of  the  ascendancy  function  in  arriving  at  the  focus  values.  In  particular  it 
is  argued  that  as  a  means  of  ranking  the  different  prospects  or  elements  of  any  action  in 
relation  to  the  attention  or  weight  accorded  to  them,  the  ascendancy  function  by  focusing  on 
only  one  gain  and  one  loss  value  ignores  the  full  range  of  information  associated  with  a  policy 
that  is  captured  by  the  potential  surprise  function.  This  critique  (Graaff  &  Baumol,  1949,  p339) 
is  directed  once  again  at  the  role  of  the  ascendancy  function  in  arriving  at  the  focus  values, 
which  by  means  of  the  gambler's  preference  map,  allows  the  focus  values  of  different  policies 
or  actions  to  be  compared.  The  problem  that  this  poses  for  Shackle's  model  is  termed 
stochastic  dominance  and  is  best  explained  by  the  use  of  fig  5.5.  What  fig  5.5  shows  is  the 
potential  surprise  curves  of  two  actions  or  policies  A  and  B.  While  on  the  loss  side  they  are 
identical,  on  the  gain  side  all  of  the  possible  outcomes  for  A  offer  equal  or  higher  gains  at 
lower  or  equal  degrees  of  potential  surprise.  In  this  sense  project  A  stochastically  dominates 
project  B.  However  if  point  G,  is  defined  as  the  focus  gain,  i.  e.  it  is  defined  by  the  ascendancy 
function  as  the  maximal  element,  then  when  the  policies  are  compared  by  the  means  of  the 
gambler's  preference  map,  then  the  decision  maker  will  be  indifferent  to  the  outcomes. 
Alternative  scenarios  could  be  hypothesised  where  the  all  the  outcomes  of  a  policy  are  seen 
as  having  a  lower  weighting  than  any  other  policy  except  one  which  is  given  the  greatest 
weight.  In  this  sense  one  strategy  can  dominate  another  when  their  potential  surprise 
functions  are  compared  yet  when  interpreted  in  this  way  the  model  can  produce  an  identical 
value  of  the  0  function. 
Although  it  is  possible  that  Shackle's  model  could  be  envisaged  as  being  applied  to  many 
states  of  the  world  the  problem  of  stochastic  dominance  remains  pertinent  both  in  the  original 
model  as  well  as  the  variations  introduced  by  Katzner  (1995),  and  Vickers  (1994).  As  such 
this  reinforces  the  interpretation  of  the  Shackle  model  taken  here  in  relation  to  hard 
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Fig  5.5  Stochastic  dominance 
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may  occur  as  the  result  of  an  action  or  policy,  rather  than  as  a  model  of  the  choices  made 
between  different  policies  or  actions.  The  emphasis  is  again  on  the  development  of  the  model 
in  relation  to  the  decision-making  process,  rather  than  as  a  model  that  seeks  to  explain  the 
decisions  itself.  If  the  model  is  restricted  in  this  sense,  then  the  problem  of  stochastic 
dominance  is  circumvented. 
5.5.9  The  gambler's  preference  map 
From  what  was  said  in  the  previous  section  it  is  apparent  that  the  final  step  in  Shackle's 
theory,  encapsulated  by  the  use  of  the  gambler's  preference  map,  will  also  be  redundant. 
Although  some  form  of  the  gambler's  preference  map,  which  would  make  use  of  the  focus 
values  rather  than  the  standardised  focus  values  appears  intuitively  appealing,  the  gamblers 
preference  map  is  only  relevant  to  models  where  the  aim  is  compare  choices  between  policies 
or  actions  with  uncertain  outcomes.  In  such  a  framework  it  does  have  the  advantage  of 
incorporating  a  measure  of  utility  over  the  different  polices  or  prospects,  although  again  it 
faces  operational  problems  as  well  as  the  problem  of  stochastic  dominance.  In  our  more 
limited  interpretation  and  development  of  the  Shackle  model  in  relation  to  hard  uncertainty, 
the  gambler's  preference  map  is  of  no  use  in  relation  to  evaluating  the  different  outcomes  of 
any  policy.  Arguably  that  role,  together  with  the  ability  to  incorporate  the  differing  effects  of 
gains  and  losses  as  well  as  uncertainty  aversion,  is  captured  sufficiently  by  the  use  of  the 
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5.6  Summary  of  the  variation  of  the  Shackle  model  forwarded 
The  model  that  has  been  developed  above  differs  in  its  interpretation  of  Shackle's  original 
model,  due  its  removal  of  some  of  the  stages  included  in  the  original  version.  The  model  has 
been  also  given  a  more  limited  interpretation  in  relation  to  its  application  to  situations 
characterised  by  hard  uncertainty.  As  such,  the  model  that  has  been  developed  has  two 
interpretations.  In  a  behavioural  or  positivist  sense,  it  can  be  used  to  explain  the  way  that  the 
uncertainty  associated  with  a  particular  policy  or  action  (in  this  thesis  restricted  to 
environmental  policies)  is  evaluated  by  the  decision  maker,  in  assessing,  the  overall  merits  or 
draw  backs  of  a  particular  action.  It  is  hypothesised  that  this  process  will  result  in  the  decision 
maker  being  left  to  balance  what  is  in  effect  the  best  to  be  hoped  for,  against  the  worst  to  be 
feared.  The  development  of  the  model  is  not  applied  as  a  means  of  explaining  decisions 
between  policies  conditioned  by  uncertainty.  This  is  not  to  say  that  Shackle's  theory  has 
nothing  to  say  in  respect  of  this  issue,  nor  that  such  investigation  is  not  a  worthwhile 
endeavour,  but  that  the  interpretation  of  the  model  in  such  light  creates  a  number  of  difficulties 
(although  not  as  many  as  is  sometimes  suggested)  that  have  yet  to  be  resolved.  This  issue 
will  be  returned  to  in  the  discussion  chapter.  What  is  achieved  by  a  more  limited  development 
of  Shackle's  model  is  a  firmer  basis  on  which  it  can  be  operationalised.  This  is  the  task  in  the 
following  chapters. 
The  interpretation  of  the  Shackle  model  in  a  normative  sense  is  perhaps  clearer.  Because  of 
the  presence  of  hard  uncertainty,  we  are  limited  to  evaluating  the  procedural  rationality  of  the 
model.  The  variation  of  the  model  that  has  been  developed  in  this  chapter  is  therefore 
designed  in  relation  to  deriving  key  features  of  the  decision-making  process  that  will  improve 
the  way  that  it  deals  with  hard  uncertainty.  The  focus  is  therefore  on  the  model  in  a  normative 
sense,  is  in  relation  to  its  possible  use  as  an  evaluation  tool,  rather  than  as  means  of  making 
the  decision  for  the  decision  maker,  or  resulting  in  some  absolute  decision  criteria.  This 
interpretation  is  consistent  with  the  decision-making  framework  outlined  in  chapter  2. 
The  main  features  of  the  modified  Shackle  model  that  has  been  developed,  are  as  follows. 
Firstly,  the  level  and  mode  of  uncertainty  that  is  faced  in  a  particular  decision  is  evaluated.  If 
the  decision  surrounding  a  particular  policy  is  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  then  in  the 
second  stage,  the  individual  is  envisaged  to  assign  to  the  incomplete  set  of  outcomes 
associated  with  a  policy  or  action  a  degree  of  potential  surprise,  by  means  of  the  potential 
surprise  function.  Potential  surprise  is  defined  as  a  non-additive,  non-distributional  variable. 
As  is  followed  for  the  rest  of  the  model,  gains  and  losses  are  defined  separately.  The  next Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  122 
stage  is  the  weighting  of  the  various  (x,  y)  elements  or  prospects  of  the  action,  by  means  of 
the  ascendancy  function,  which  edits  the  range  of  possible  outcomes  to  arrive  at  the  focus 
gain  value  and  the  focus  loss  value.  It  is  these  focus  values  which  can  then  be  considered  by 
the  decision  maker  and  which  summarise  his  or  her  concerns  surrounding  the  uncertainty  of  a 
policy.  The  question  of  how  the  focus  values  can  be  incorporated  into  a  more  general 
decision-making  framework  will  be  returned  to,  in  Chapter  9. 
5.6.1  Operationalising  Shackle's  model  in  the  context  of  environmental 
uncertainty 
The  realisation  that  many  environmental  decisions  are  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty  is 
evident  from  the  arguments  made  in  the  previous  chapters.  What  is  now  also  clearer,  is  that 
in  contrast  to  expected  utility  based  models,  the  Shackle  model  would  appear  to  be  a  more 
appropriate  framework  in  which  to  tackle  the  problem  of  environmental  uncertainty.  Indeed  it 
is  apparent  that  many  of  Shackle's  concerns  over  the  nature  of  decision  making  and 
uncertainty,  as  well  as  his  critique  of  probability  based  frameworks,  can  be  fruitfully  extended 
to  environmental  decision  making.  The  interpretation  of  the  model  in  relation  to  hard 
uncertainty  has  also  brought  us  to  the  stage  where  it  will  be  possible  to  assess  in  more  detail 
the  operationalisation  of  Shackle's  theory  in  relation  to  environmental  decision  making. 
In  terms  of  the  positive  operationality  of  the  model,  the  modification  that  has  been  developed 
in  this  chapter  provides  a  number  of  testable  propositions  that  can  be  used  to  assess  the 
extent  to  which  the  model  actually  explains  behaviour.  As  such  by  focusing  on  those  aspects 
of  Shackle's  original  theory  which  can  be  operational  ised,  it  is  possible  to  put  his  theory  under 
a  greater  degree  of  scrutiny  than  has  been  possible  previously.  The  operationalisation  of  the 
theory  in  a  normative  sense  in  relation  to  environmental  decision  making  leads  to  a 
consideration  of  the  key  features  of  the  model  that  have  been  developed,  and  whether  or  not 
they  are  consistent  with  the  aim  of  improving  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making 
process  by  dealing  explicitly  with  hard  uncertainty.  The  second  issue  relates  to  whether 
normative  rules  of  thumb  or  decision-making  procedures  can  be  derived  from  the  model  that 
has  been  developed  in  this  chapter.  This  will  be  considered  in  Chapter  9. 
Returning  briefly  to  considering  at  this  stage  some  of  the  key  features  of  the  modified  Shackle 
model,  it  will  allow  us  to  link  some  of  the  main  issues  raised  by  the  presence  of  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making.  In  particular  it  is  apparent  that  as  a  measure 
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of  advantages  over  probability.  Most  importantly  as  a  non-distributional,  non-additive  vadable, 
it  does  not  require  a  previous  history  of  repeated  trials,  nor  does  it  require  that  the  full  range  of 
outcomes  is  known.  Moreover,  the  argument  that  in  many  environmental  decisions,  such  as 
those  regarding  biodiversity  loss,  we  are  dealing  with  actions  which  are  associated  with  the 
occurrence  of  mutually  exclusive  outcomes,  is  reflected  in  the  underlying  design  of  potential 
surprise. 
Another  feature  of  the  model,  which  would  appear  to  make  it  amenable  to  the  sort  of 
environmental  decisions  that  are  the  focus  of  this  thesis,  is  that  by  separating  gains  and 
losses  the  model  embodies  what  is  in  effectively  a  safety  first  feature  or  a  form  of  precaution. 
The  basis  of  this  assumption,  would  appear  to  be  tenable  in  relation  to  the  evaluation  of  a 
project  to  build  a  nuclear  power  station  for  example.  Although  the  probabilities  (which  in  this 
case  are  not  likely  to  be  reliable)  may  be  very  low  in  relation  to  a  catastrophic  event,  such  as 
occurred  at  Chernobyl,  the  outcome  and  the  resulting  losses  may  be  weighted  higher  in  the 
mind  of  the  individual  than  any  possible  gains.  On  a  practical  note,  the  fact  that  in  cost  - 
benefit  analysis,  the  costs  and  benefits  are  calculated  separately  means  that  many  decision 
makers  familiar  with  this  technique,  will  be  comfortable  in  separating  gains  and  losses  in  the 
decision-making  process. 
The  nuclear  power  example  also  encapsulates  another  key  feature  of  the  model  in  relation  to 
environmental  uncertainty,  in  that  the  ascendancy  function  weights  both  the  outcome 
magnitude  and  the  degree  of  surprise  associated  with  the  occurrence  of  that  outcome  jointly. 
By  this  process  explicit  attention  is  given  to  hard  uncertainty  in  the  evaluation  process  of  any 
policy.  Moreover  the  ascendancy  function  captures  the  trade-off  between  the  magnitude  of 
the  outcome  and  its  degree  of  surprise  in  relation  to  the  final  weighting  that  the  decision  maker 
gives  that  prospect  in  his  or  her  overall  evaluation  of  the  project.  As  such  the  model  allows 
room  for  various  degrees  of  uncertainty  aversion  to  be  exhibited  by  the  decision  maker. 
This  chapter  has  served  to  demonstrate  the  theoretical  power  of  the  Shackle  model  and  its 
applicability  in  real  world  cases.  Now  that  the  key  features  of  the  positive  and  normative 
operationality  of  the  model  of  decision  making  under  hard  uncertainty  have  been  highlighted, 
and  a  firm  basis  on  which  to  interpret  the  model  found,  we  can  move  to  the  application  of 
Shackle's  theory  to  environmental  decision  making  by  means  of  a  case  study,  based  on  the Chapter  5:  The  Shackle  model  124 
evaluation  of  a  road  project  in  Southern  Belize.  It  is  by  the  use  of  the  case  study  that  we  will 
be  able  to  test  further  the  operationality  of  the  variation  on  the  Shackle  model  developed.  It  is 
to  provide  the  background  and  decision  making  context  to  the  case  study  that  this  thesis  now 
turns. Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  125 
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CHAPTER  6:  CASE  STUDY:  THE  BELIZE  SOUTHERN  HIGHWAY 
6.1  Introduction 
In  order  to  test  the  operationality  of  the  variation  of  the  Shackle  model  that  has  been 
developed  in  the  previous  chapter,  a  suitable  case  study  was  chosen.  This  chapter  is  devoted 
to  explaining  the  background  behind  the  case  study  of  a  road  project  in  Belize  and  the 
decision  process,  to  which  the  Shackle  model  has  been  applied.  Firstly,  the  reasons  behind 
the  choice  of  the  Southern  highway  as  a  case  study  will  be  outlined  before  a  brief  description 
of  the  background  to  the  Southern  Highway  Project  is  given.  Then  a  more  detailed  summary 
of  the  development  of  the  project,  is  provided.  In  order  to  understand  the  main  environmental 
uncertainties  an  overview  of  the  dominant  ecosystems  present  in  Belize  is  then  given. 
Following  from  this,  the  main  uncertainties  that  were  present  when  evaluating  the  project  are 
highlighted  and  it  is  contented  that  the  dominant  mode  of  environmental  uncertainty  faced  by 
the  decision  makers  was  that  of  hard  uncertainty. 
Section  6.4  goes  on  to  explain  the  decision-making  and  institutional  context  to  the  Southern 
Highway  Project,  with  the  investigation  focused  on  the  Belize  government  and  the  Inter 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB).  A  third  party,  the  DFID  and  its  regional  agency  the  British 
Development  Division  in  the  Caribbean  (BDDC),  will  also  be  briefly  described.  The  decision- 
making  context,  namely  the  decision  procedures,  documents  and  reports  used  by  the  key 
decision  makers,  will  also  be  outlined.  This  is  important  as  it  sheds  light  on  the  information 
available  to  the  decision  makers  at  particular  times  in  the  decision  process.  It  is  emphasised, 
however,  that  the  research  carried  out  for  the  case  study  was  restricted  to  that  of  analysing 
the  way  with  which  uncertainty  was  handled.  It  does  not  seek  to  explain  the  decision  per  se 
nor  the  political  process  or  political  factors  inevitably  involved  in  such  a  decision.  The  focus  is 
therefore  on  the  tools  that  the  decision  makers  utilised  in  evaluating  the  project  and  in 
particular  the  environmental  uncertainty  associated  with  building  the  road  in  Southern  Belize. 
With  this  in  mind  a  brief  description  of  the  location  and  the  background  to  the  Southern 
Highway  will  now  be  given. 
6.1.1  The  choice  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  as  a  case  study 
The  first  requirement  in  choosing  an  appropriate  case  study  was  that  it  involved  a  decision, 
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uncertainty  was  the  dominant  characteristic.  As  a  result,  a  decision  involving  a  large  scale- 
development  project,  in  an  area  where  a  range  of  relatively  unmodified  ecosystems  existed, 
was  identified.  A  further  requirement  in  relation  to  the  ex  ante  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty 
was  that  the  project  should  not  have  already  been  completed  and  that  the  project  was  subject 
to  evaluation  at  the  time  of  the  fieldwork.  On  the  other  hand,  the  development  project  had  to 
be  sufficiently  advanced,  so  that  it  could  be  seriously  considered  by  a  range  of  decision 
makers.  A  further  consideration  was  the  availability  of  reports  from  which  a  range  of  possible 
of  environmental  effects  could  be  hypothesised.  This  required  the  existence  of  an 
Environmental  Impact  Assessment.  In  addition,  in  relation  to  the  application  of  the  Shackle 
model,  a  number  of  gain  and  loss  values  would  have  to  be  identified,  in  terms  of  the  possible 
rival  outcomes  should  the  project  go  ahead.  Consequently  a  cost-benefit-analysis  or 
feasibility  study  would  be  required.  A  further  concern  was  the  availability  of  data  as  well  as 
the  ease  with  which  it  would  be  possible  to  gain  access  to  the  decision  makers,  for  interviews. 
Ideally  the  decision  should  not  just  involve  a  national  government,  but  also  other  institutions 
which  had  experience  in  evaluating  a  wide  range  of  projects.  This  would  mean  that,  as  well 
as  the  contextually  specific  results  of  the  research,  it  would  be  possible  to  infer  and  make 
more  general  deductions  with  respect  to  the  handling  of  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision- 
making.  Finally  a  practical  consideration  was  the  requirement  that  the  case  study  involve  a 
country  where  the  researcher  had  a  good  knowledge  of  the  language.  This  limited  the  search 
to  countries  where  the  main  language  was  either  English  (the  authors  native  language)  or 
Spanish  (of  which  the  author  has  a  good  knowledge). 
Once  the  conditions  that  would  have  to  be  met  for  any  case  study  were  drawn  up,  a 
preliminary  search  was  conducted.  In  addition  to  relevant  literature,  a  convenient  way  of 
identifying  possible  projects  was  via  the  Internet  on  the  web  pages  of  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  and  The  World  Bank,  both  of  which  had  had  experience  in  evaluating 
development  projects.  The  Internet  proved  an  invaluable  research  tool  as  it  was  possible  to 
read  the  project  summaries  of  a  large  number  of  projects.  Subsequently  a  short  list  was 
drawn  up,  and  more  information  gathered  in  relation  to  whether  they  would  prove  viable.  This 
involved,  searching  the  web  for  additional  information,  carrying  out  literary  searches,  as  well 
as  making  preliminary  contacts  with  some  of  the  project  leaders.  A  major  factor  in  narrowing 
the  search  down  was  that  in  order  to  gain  access  to  information,  the  project  could  not  involve 
the  private  sector.  Other  considerations  involved  the  political  situation  in  the  country  of 
question,  as  well  as  the  ease  with  which  it  would  be  possible  to  travel  to  interview  the  different 
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After  scrutinising  the  list  of  possible  projects  using  the  above  criteria,  it  became  clear  that  the 
Belize  Southern  Highway  Project  would  be  well  suited.  Belize  has  the  further  advantage  Of 
English  being  the  main  language,  a  stable  democracy,  and  being  small  in  size.  Additionally 
because  of  research  which  had  already  been  carried  out  by  the  Department  of  Geography, 
University  of  Edinburgh,  a  substantial  library  of  information  on  Belize  was  available  for 
consultation.  Enquiries  were  made  with  the  Government  of  Belize  (GOBI)  and  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  about  the  possibility  of  accessing  the  key  reports,  such  as 
the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  for  the  project  and  the  feasibility  study  as  well  as  the 
possibility  of  interviewing  the  decision-makers  involved  in  the  evaluation  of  the  project.  After 
assurances  were  received  that  the  different  documents  would  be  accessible  and  that 
interviews  possible,  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  was  formally  chosen  as  the  case  study. 
6.1.2  Location  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  and  physical  setting. 
Belize  is  located  in  the  north-east  of  Central  America  and  has  an  area  of  approximately 
22,963  kM2  or  5.4  million  acres  (World  Bank,  1996).  As  such,  it  is  the  second  smallest 
country  in  Central  America  after  El  Salvador.  It  is  bordered  by  Mexico  to  the  North  and 
Guatemala  to  the  West  and  South  (See  Fig  6.1).  Its  Eastern  Coast  lies  on  the  Caribbean.  The 
Belize  Southern  Highway  is  in  the  south  of  the  country  stretching  from  the  junction  of  the 
Humming  Bird  Highway  near  Dangriga  to  Punta  Gorda  in  the  far  south  of  the  country.  Belize's 
climate  is  subtropical  with  fairly  constant  temperatures  with  a  mean  temperature  of  251C. 
Humidity  is  high  and  is  generally  above  80%  throughout  the  year.  Annual  rainfall  is  highest  in 
the  South  with  an  average  of  4000mm  compared  to  1,500  in  the  North  (,  World  Bank,  1996). 
The  dry  season  extends  from  January  till  May,  with  a  rainy  season  which  peaks  in  July  and 
October.  Annual  rainfall  does  not  vary  much,  although  the  monthly  rainfall  does  change 
considerably.  Belize  is  subject  to  two  meteorological  disturbances,  Northerners  and 
Cyclones.  Northerners  are  cold  and  wet  air  masses  pushed  south  by  Arctic  masses  from 
November  to  February.  Cyclones  form  over  tropical  waters  and  may  develop  into  hurricanes 
with  wind  speeds  of  more  than  120  km/hr.  The  hurricane  season  is  between  August  and 
October  (IDB,  1997b). 
The  south  of  the  country  is  dominated  by  two  main  physiographical  features,  the  coastal  plain 
and  the  Maya  mountains.  The  coastal  plain  skirts  the  Maya  Mountain  range  at  a  distance  of 
approximately  5-10km.  The  Maya  mountains  are  a  rugged  mountain  range  (the  highest  peak 
is  1,120m)  and  a  catchment  area  where  surface  waters  cascade  steeply  to  the  coastal  plain. 
At  the  perimeter  of  the  range,  Karst  topography  is  common.  The  soils  of  the  Maya  mountains Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  129 
Fig  6.1:  Map  of  Belize 
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are  highly  variable  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  parent  material.  Many  of  the  slopes  are 
steep.  The  coastal  plains  are  characterised  by  gentle  gradients  and  are  dissected  by 
numerous  streams  making  their  way  towards  the  coast.  Much  of  the  alluvial  soils  which 
dominate  the  coastal  area  contain  impermeable  clay  subsoils  and  as  a  result  the  area  exhibits 
frequent  water-logging  and  flooding  during  the  wet  season. 
Belize  is  high  in  biodiversity  with  over  4,000  native  flowering  plant  species,  504  species  of 
birds,  121  mammal  species,  107  species  of  reptiles  and  26  species  of  amphibians.  However, 
because  of  the  lack  of  natural  barriers,  species  endemism  is  limited.  Forest  mammals  include 
howler  monkeys,  brocket  deer,  otters,  jaguars,  ocelots,  margay  cats,  jaguarondis,  pumas  and 
tapirs.  Approximately  60%  of  Belize  is  closed  forest,  of  which  47%  is  broadleafed  cover  and 
the  majority  of  the  rest  needle  leaf.  In  Southern  Belize  (the  area  affected  by  the  road)  about 
70%  is  under  dense  cover,  particularly  in  the  inner  areas  of  the  Mayan  foothills.  The  coastal 
waters  of  Belize  (50%  of  its  national  territory)  are  also  rich  in  species  partly  due  to  the 
presence  of  the  largest  barrier  reef  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  the  second  largest  in  the 
world.  The  coastal  and  marine  ecosystems  also  include  extensive  mangroves,  coastal 
lagoons  and  seagrass  beds  (World  Bank,  1996).  Many  endangered  species  exist  in  the 
coastal  zone  such  as  the  West  Indian  manatee,  American  crocodile,  sea  turtles  and 
threatened  bird  species. 
Belize  had  a  total  population  of  236,000  persons  in  1996,  with  an  annual  population  growth 
rate  of  about  2.6%.  The  population  density  of  Belize  is  therefore  small  in  comparison  with  its 
Central  American  neighbours.  El  Salvador  a  country  of  similar  size,  has  a  population  of  5 
million  for  example.  The  ethnic  mix  of  Belize  is  very  diverse,  and  includes  Creole 
(predominant)  Carib,  East  Indian,  Kekchi,  Ladino,  Mennonite,  Yucatec  and  Mopan  peoples. 
More  than  a  quarter  of  the  population  are  considered  foreign  (World  Bank,  1996).  Rural 
population  made  up  52.6%  of  the  total  in  1996  and  is  increasing  relative  to  the  total  urban 
population. 
The  population  of  southern  Belize,  comprising  the  two  districts  of  Stann  Creek  and  Toledo, 
was  estimated  at  36,000  at  the  time  of  the  1991  census,  or  about  18%  of  the  national 
population.  Thirty  five  per  cent  of  this  is  centred  around  the  district  capital  of  Dangriga  (IDB, 
1997b).  In  Toledo  district  20%  of  the  district  population  lives  in  the  district  capital  Punta 
Gorda.  While,  the  ethnic  breakdown  of  the  population  of  Stann  Creek  reflects  the  composition 
of  Belize  as  a  whole,  the  composition  of  the  17,500  residents  of  Toledo  is  markedly  different. 
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41%.  In-migration  has  played  an  particularly  important  role  in  Stann  Creek  and  Toledo, 
especially  from  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador.  In  1993  approximately  19%  of  Stann  Creek's 
total  population  and  13%  of  Toledo's  total  population  were  immigrants  of  various  status  (IDB, 
1997b). 
6.1.3  Background  to  the  Southern  Highway  Project 
The  Southern  Highway  Project  was  initiated  by  the  Government  of  Belize  (GoBI)  as  a  key 
infrastructure  project  in  terms  of  the  country's  development.  In  the  past  decade  the  road 
network  in  Belize  has  already  been  greatly  improved.  The  Western  and  Northern  Highway 
have  been  upgraded  to  tarmac  status  and  the  Hummingbird  Highway  is  in  the  process  of 
rehabilitation.  For  all  these  projects  Belize  obtained  financing  from  external  agencies  such  as 
the  ODA,  the  World  Bank,  USAID  and  the  European  Union.  The  first  step  towards  initiating 
the  Southern  Highway  Project  was  taken  by  the  Government  of  Belize  when  it  joined  the  Inter 
American  Development  Bank  in  1992,  with  the  express  interest  of  submitting  an  application 
for  finance  for  a  section  of  road'. 
The  underlying  rationale  behind  the  road  was  based  on  the  perception  that  Southern  Belize  in 
comparison  to  the  rest  of  Belize  was  relatively  isolated  and  underdeveloped  with  poverty 
disproportionate  (IDB,  1997b).  The  aim  of  the  project  was  therefore  to  improve  the  economic 
opportunities  for  the  Southern  Region  by  facilitating  its  integration  with  the  rest  of  the  country 
and  to  improve  access  to  social  services.  More  specifically  the  aims  of  the  project  were: 
a)  To  improve  the  transport  conditions  for  agricultural  products  and  thus  reduce  production 
losses  and  transport  costs,  as  well  as  expanding  production  by  improving  access  to  markets; 
b)  To  increase  the  access  of  the  southern  region  to  an  increasingly  important  tourism  sector, 
by  improving  the  time  taken  for  the  journey  to  be  completed  as  well  as  the  level  of  comfort; 
and 
c)  To  facilitate  better  access  in  the  region  for  the  people  to  social  services  such  as  education 
and  health.  (IDB,  1997b) 
Economically,  agriculture  and  timber  production  are  the  mainstays  of  the  economy  in 
Southern  Belize,  although  tourism  and  aquaculture  production  have  been  significantly 
increasing  in  recent  years.  Agriculture  in  the  region  comprises  commercially  grown  cash 
crops  such  as  citrus,  bananas  and  irrigated  rice  and  milpa  subsistence  farming  (more  recently 
supplemented  by  cash  crops).  Approximately  10,000  ha  of  citrus  and  2,400  ha  of  banana Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  1.3)  2 
plantations  are  located  in  the  South  of  the  country,  employing  860  workers  (1,300  at 
harvesting)  and  850  workers  (500  extra  part  time)  respectively  (IDB,  1997b).  Citrus 
production  for  the  whole  country  accounts  for  5%  of  the  country's  G.  D.  P  of  US$  503  million  in 
1996  and  10%  of  total  exports,  while  banana  production  accounted  for  4%  of  G.  D.  P  and  8%  of 
total  exports.  The  identification  of  these  sectors  as  possible  growth  areas,  especially  in 
Southern  Belize,  was  a  prime  factor  behind  the  project. 
An  additional  aim  of  the  road  was  to  improve  access  to  markets  to  the  Maya  Indian  population 
which  practice  Milpa  farming,  a  form  of  shifting  agriculture  (see  fig  6.2).  In  recent  years 
subsistence  agriculture  has  been  increasingly  complemented  with  cash  crops  such  as  rainfed 
rice,  fruits  and  vegetables  as  well  as  livestock,  such  as  goats,  sheep,  pigs  and  poultry.  The 
Southern  Highway  road  project  was  seen  as  key  to  encouraging  this  trend  2. 
Another  sector  which  the  road  project  aimed  at  developing  was  Timber  production  which  has 
historically  been  the  main  source  of  foreign  exchange  earnings  for  the  region,  although  this 
has  substantially  declined.  In  contrast  to  the  historically  important  sectors  such  as  forestry, 
the  potential  for  the  future  growth  of  aquaculture  in  the  region  (see  fig  6.3)  was  also  identified 
as  a  sector  of  the  economy  which  would  benefit  from  improved  communications  in  the  area. 
The  potential  for  shrimp  farming  was  shown  by  the  existing  shrimp  production  in  the  region, 
which  in  1994  was  327,000  pounds,  with  an  estimated  export  value  of  US$  900,000. 
The  final  sector  which  was  seen  as  key  in  relation  to  the  aim  of  encouraging  economic 
development  in  the  region  as  a  result  of  the  project  was  that  of  tourism.  Tourism  was  already 
a  key  sector  in  the  economy  contributing  to  about  15%  of  GDP.  However,  although  in  1995 
133,000  tourists  visited  Belize,  in  Southern  Belize  tourism  development  has  been  significantly 
less  than  in  the  other  parts  of  the  country,  mainly  due  to  limited  accessibility. 
'Personal  communication  with  senior  decision  maker. 
2The  development  aims  bf  the  road  in  relation  to  the  Mayan  Indian  population  in  Southern  Belize  remain  one 
of  the  most  controversial  aspects  of  the  southern  highway  project.  An  analysis  of  these  issues  remains 
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Fig  6.2:  Photograph  of  milpa  farming  system  in  Toledo. 
Fig  6.3  Aquaculture  in  Toledo  district 
6.1.4  The  Southern  Highway  Project 
The  Southern  Highway  project  is  a  project  to  upgrade  64km  of  the  original  Southern  Highway, 
a  dirt  road,  to  one  of  a  paved  standard,  as  well  as  to  rehabilitate  about  176  km  of  connecting 
rural  feeder  roads.  The  road  extends  from  the  intersection  with  the  Stann  Creek  Valley  Road 
near  Dangriga  to  Belize's  most  Southern  town  Punta  Gorda  (see  fig  6.5).  The  existing  road  is Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  134 
loosely  gravelled  and  dusty  in  dry  weather,  while  in  the  wet  season  the  southern  section  is 
often  severely  flooded  (see  fig  6.4). 
The  proposed  construction  of  the  road  itself  is  split  into  five  sections,  from  South  to  North  (see 
fig  6.5): 
Section  1:  Punta  Gorda  to  Rice  Mill,  30.1  km 
Section  2:  Rice  Mill  to  Bladen  bridge,  38.9km 
Section  I  Bladen  Bridge  to  Big  Creek  Port,  41.5km 
Sections  4&5:  Mango  Creek  Junction  to  Stann  Creek  Valley  Rd,  63.4  km  (IDB,  1997a) 
Fig  6A  Flooding  of  the  Southern  Highway 
The  area  affected  by  the  road  is  taken  in  the  project  reports  as  the  area  defined  broadly  where 
the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of  the  rehabilitation  project  could  be  expected  to  occur.  The 
northern  boundary  is  defined  as  the  point  of  intersection  with  the  Stann  Creek  Valley  Road 
and  the  line  of  the  watershed  between  North  Stann  Creek  and  Sitee  River.  The  area  of  Stann 
Creek  south  of  this  is  included,  as  is  the  whole  of  Toledo  district.  The  combined  total  area  is 
approximately  696,700  ha  (IDB,  1997a). 
Although  the  case  study  and  subsequent  analysis  applies  to  the  building  of  the  whole  road 
(and  in  particular  the  effects  of  the  road  once  completed),  it  is  important  to  gain  an 
understanding  of  the  different  parties  involved  in  the  financing  of  the  different  sections, 
because  analysis  of  the  decision-making  process  is  restricted  to  those  parties  for  which  it  was Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway 
Fig  6.5:  Map  of  the  different  sections  of  the  Southern  Highway 
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possible  to  gain  access  to  senior  decision  makers  and  reportS3  . 
The  Construction  of  section  1 
was  financed  mainly  by  the  Kuwait  Fund  for  Arab  Economic  Development,  as  well  as  smaller 
contributions  from  the  OPEC  fund  for  Arab  Economic  Development  and  the  Government  of 
Belize.  Section  2,  although  initially  earmarked  (August  1996)  to  be  funded  by  what  was  then 
the  ODA  (now  DFID),  was  delayed.  Section  3,  although  initially  to  be  funded  by  a 
concessionary  loan  (August  1996)  from  the  International  Co-operation  Development  Fund 
(Taiwan),  was  funded  by  a  Grant  from  DFID,  which  was  approved  in  February  1998.  Section 
4  was  as  a  result  funded  by  financing  from  the  International  Co-operation  Development  Fund, 
and  section  5  by  the  IDB,  which  was  approved  in  January  1998.  The  Caribbean  Development 
Bank  was  also  involved  to  a  lesser  extent  in  providing  financing  although  this  was  restricted  to 
funding  for  the  administration  of  the  project.  The  Government  of  Belize  is  solely  responsible 
for  the  financing  of  the  construction  of  the  feeder  roads.  4 
Originally  the  project  was  planned  as  a  single  operation,  but  early  in  1997  the  GoBl  proposed 
that  the  project  be  carried  out  in  three  stages.  The  first  phase  involving  the  construction  of 
section  1,  the  second  phase  involving  the  construction  of  sections  3,4  and  5,  and  Phase  three 
to  include  section  2.  Construction  of  section  1  started  in  February  1996  and  was  the  only 
section  that  had  been  started,  when  the  fieldwork  was  carried  out  between  June  and 
September  1997,  although  it  had  not  yet  been  completed.  Section  2  had  been  delayed, 
Section  3,4  and  5  were  started  in  May  1998. 
Although  initially  the  focus  was  solely  on  the  physical  construction  works,  in  terms  of  the 
reports  commissioned  by  the  GoBI,  the  IDB  and  the  ODA,  by  1995  emphasis  had  shifted  to 
putting  into  place  mitigative  measures  to  prevent  possible  negative  environmental  and  social 
consequences  of  the  road'.  As  a  result  the  physical  works  project  was  delayed  and  in  1996  a 
draft  proposal,  which  would  attempt  to  take  into  account  these  considerations,  was  written.  It 
is  these  and  the  subsequent  drafts  of  the  project,  up  till  the  end  of  the  period  in  which  the  field 
work  was  carried  out  between  June  and  September  1997,  that  form  the  basis  of  the  analysis 
carried  out  here,  although  reference  will  be  made  to  later  reports  where  necessary. 
The  environmental  and  social  concerns  expressed  about  the  road  project  resulted  in  the 
setting  up  of  the  Environmental  and  Social  Technical  Assistance  Program  (ESTAP).  The 
program  is  financed  by  a  $2.6  million  loan  from  the  IDB  (initially  estimated  at  $.  1.7  million 
(IDB,  1997a)  which  was  signed  in  March  1997,  (a  project  manager  was  appointed  in 
3This  will  be  dealt  with  in  more  detail  in  chapter  7. 
'Unpublished  report 
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September  1996)  prior  to  the  agreement  to  finance  the  sections  of  the  road  financed  by  the 
IDB  and  DFID.  ESTAP  was  designed  specifically  to  help  to  mitigate  any  negative  possible 
social  and  environmental  impacts  of  the  road  and  specifically  to  prepare  a  Regional 
Development  Plan  which  will  form  the  basis  of  the  response  to  the  social  and  environmental 
transformations  that  could  possibly  occur  as  a  result  of  upgrading  the  highway.  This  includes, 
for  example,  a  temporary  freeze  on  all  new  applications  for  development  on  government  land 
along  a  2-mile  corridor  on  the  Southern  Highway.  Other  measures  to  be  taken  include 
resolving  some  of  the  main  land  tenure  issues,  declaring  Aguacaliente  as  a  protected  area,  as 
well  as  a  plan  to  improve  and  sustain  the  management  of  protected  areas  in  the  region. 
The  aim  of  ESTAP  was  to  ensure  that  the  transformation  process  associated  with  the  road 
project  would  be  consistent  with  the  optimal  allocation  of  resources,  social  equity, 
environmental  protection  and  long-term  sustainable  development  (IDB,  1997a)  Public 
consultation  was  to  be  a  key  element  of  the  ESTAP  program.  It  was  therefore  in  the  period 
from  1994  until  the  road  project  was  finally  agreed  in  1998  that  the  project  was  evaluated  in 
relation  to  its  possible  environmental  effects.  Consequently  it  is  this  period  that  the  decision 
process  associated  with  the  road  project  will  be  analysed. 
6.2  The  environmental  context 
It  is  already  evident  from  the  brief  introduction  that  the  environment  plays  an  important  role  in 
the  Belize  economy.  In  this  section  a  description  of  environmental  conditions  prior  to  the  road 
project  and  a  summary  of  the  main  physical  systems  present  in  Belize  will  be  given.  This  is 
important  as  it  highlights  the  key  services  that  the  environmental  system  provides  as  well  as 
the  complexity  of  the  linkages  between  the  ecological  and  economic  system  in  Belize. 
6.2.1  The  Mayor  physical  systems  in  Southern  Belize 
In  comparison  to  neighbouring  countries,  Belize  has  been  able  to  preserve  its  environment  to 
a  much  greater  extent.  Extensive  areas  of  natural  habitat  and  relatively  low  levels  of 
population  disturbance  means  that  Belize  harbours  viable  populations  of  a  wide  range  of 
species  which  are  under  considerable  pressure  in  the  rest  of  their  central  American  range 
(NARMAP,  1996).  The  presence  of  complete  components  of  communities  means  that  Belize 
has  a  large  number  of  fully  functioning  ecosystems.  As  such,  it  is  relatively  unique  in  the 
region  as  having  a  rich  endowment  of  natural  resources  of  global  importance  (World  Bank, 
1996).  For  its  size  Belize  is  also  very  varied,  although  three  broad  land  systems  can  be 
identified  (NARMAP,  1995).  The  first  is  that  of  upland  massif  of  the  Maya  Mountain  Land Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  1  3)  8 
System,  which  includes  both  the  Maya  Mountains  and  Mountain  Pine  Ridge,  while  the  second 
and  third  make  up  the  northern  and  southern  coastal  plains.  Belize  can  be  divided  into 
sixteen  major  catchment  areas,  eleven  of  which  rise  in  the  Maya  Mountains,  and  dissect  the 
Southern  coastal  plain  before  reaching  the  Caribbean  sea  (King  et  al,  1993). 
The  coast  has  five  major  regions,  the  Northern  Coast,  the  Northern  Lagoons,  the  Central 
Lagoons,  the  Central  Delta  and  the  Southern  Marshes.  Of  the  latter  three  which  make  up  the 
area  affected  by  the  Southern  Highway,  the  Central  Lagoons  is  an  old  lagoon  system  which 
also  includes  the  Belize  river  and  Haulover  Creek  Delta's.  The  Central  Delta  is  dominated  by 
small  river  deltas  and  inland  lagoons  with  beach  ridge  barriers.  The  rivers  are  the  major 
source  of  sediment  which  accumulates  on  the  coast.  Small  reefs  also  occur  along  this  coast, 
which  also  includes  the  Placencia  peninsula  which  is  a  long  sandy  spit.  The  lagoons  lie 
between  the  coastline  and  the  line  of  cayes  to  the  east.  The  Southern  Marshes  consists  of 
estuaries  and  swamps  such  as  the  Punta  Yacos  Lagoon  and  the  lowlands  of  the  Sarstoon 
Temash  area  (NARMAP,  1996)  and,  although  one  of  the  most  interesting  in  terms  of  coastal 
habitats,  it  also  the  least  known  (NARMAP,  1996).  This  area  includes  the  Punta  Yacos  the 
largest  estuarine  complex  in  Belize,  which  along  with  the  Temash-Sarstoon  wetlands 
constitutes  one  of  the  most  pristine  wetland  habitat  in  Belize.  Port  Honduras  is  the  site  of  the 
outfall  of  seven  rivers  and  partly  as  a  result  is  an  area  of  exceptional  diversity  and  productivity. 
Off  the  southern  coast,  the  Southern  Reef  Complex  is  considered  to  be  the  most  diverse  area 
in  the  coastal  zone,  consisting  of  sandy  shoals,  long  ribbon  reefs,  coral  pinnacles  and 
rhomboid  reefs.  Coral  atolls  are  also  represented  by  Glovers  Reef,  an  off-shore  atoll  32km 
long  and  12  km  wide. 
6.2.2  The  biological  characteristics  of  the  main  physical  systems 
Terrestrial  ecosystems: 
The  most  detailed  studies  of  vegetation  were  carried  out  by  Wright  et  al  (1959),  which 
identified  18  major  vegetation  types.  Brokaw  and  Iremonger  (1996)  revised  this  classification 
building  on  1993  LANDSAT  imagery,  as  well  as  the  Wright  study  (see  fig  6.6).  The  vegetation, 
on  the  basis  of  physiognomy,  can  be  divided  into  forest,  scrub  and  herbaceous  formations, 
which  are  further  subdivided  depending  on  whether  they  are  generally  dry,  seasonal  or 
permanent  swamp  conditions.  The  most  extensive  is  that  of  the  broad-leaf  and  needle  leaf 
forests  which  cover  approximately  57%  of  the  country  (see  table  6.1). Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  139 
Characteristic  species  of  the  broad-leaved  forests  include  rosewood  (Dalbergia  Stevensonil), 
quamwood  (Schizolobium  Parahybum),  yemeri  (Vochysia  hondurensis),  banak  (Viroli 
koschnyi),  negrito  (Simarouba  amara),  Santa  Maria  (Calophylum  brasiliense)  and  Sapodilla 
(Manilkara  spp)  (Iremonger  &  Brockaw,  1996;  IDB,  1997b,  King  et  al,  1989).  In  other  areas 
such  as  the  in  the  Columbia  and  Maya  Mountain  Forest  Reserves,  species  include  Mahogany, 
Cedar  and  Iron-wood.  Whether  or  not  the  forest  occurs  over  limestone  is  a  major  factor  in 
species  composition  (King  et  al,  1986).  South  of  the  Sittee  river  (and  therefore  in  most  of  the 
area  affected  by  the  Southern  Highway),  the  forests  are  characterised  as  rain  forest 
(>2500mm  rainfall  per  annum),  whereas  north  of  this  the  area  is  characterised  as  moist  forest. 
Table  6.1  Vegetation  classification  of  Belize 
Forest  Type 
Broad-leaf  forest 
Needle-leaf  forest 
Swamp  forest 
Mangrove  forest 
Scrub 
Herbaceous  communities 
Agriculture 
Urban  settlement 
Area  ha  %  of  Land  Cover 
('000) 
1,173  49.53 
56  7.07 
205  9.4 
31  1.4 
318  14.6 
45  2.1 
338  15.56 
0.34 
Approx.  Total  (rounded  off)  2,173  100 
Source:  NARMAP  (1995)  Environmental  Water  Quality  Monitoring  Program  for  Belize. 
Pine  forests,  which  include  very  open  formations  classed  as  Savannah's  are  particularly  well 
represented  in  the  south  of  Belize  (NARMAP,  1996).  On  the  pine  savannahs  the  dominant 
species  is  Pinus  Callbea  (IDB,  1997b).  The  swamp  forests,  which  are  particularly  well 
represented  in  Southern  Belize,  include  mangrove  (i.  e.  saline  swamp  forest)  seasonal  swamp 
forests,  seasonal  riparian  swamp  forests  along  watercourses  and  permanently  waterlogged 
forests  which  are  restricted  to  the  south  only  (NARMAP,  1996).  Three  main  types  of 
mangrove  communities  are  present,  namely  i)  periodically  inundated  mangroves  with 
buttonwood  (Conocarpus  erectus),  red  mangrove  (Rhizophora  mangle)  and  white  mangrove 
(Lagunculatia  racemosa);  ii)  permanently  inundated  with  red  mangroves;  and  iii)  salt  water 
dominated  mangroves  with  red  and  white  mangroves  and  black  mangrove  (Avicennia 
germinans). Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  140 
Fig  6.6  Natural  vegetation  of  southern  Belize,  (revised  1994,1995) Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  141 
Legend 
Lowland  Broadleaf  Rain  Forest  Mountain  Pine  Ridge 
Over  limestone  Needle-leaf  hill  forests  over  poor  soils 
Over  moderately  lime-rich  alluvium  G!  2  Mixed  hill  forests  over  poor  soils 
Montane 
ý)vpr  imp-pnoralluvium 
Palm  forest  over  volcanics 
ov"  r  poor  or  sandy  soils 
Lowland  Needle-Leal  ED  Scrub  forest  over  limestone 
Moist  dense  forests  over  poor  soils  1=3  Scrub  forest  over  volcanics 
forests  ý3our  'nJls  -L)r,  -  _-!  il,  i:  i 
i-oor  :  ý)oiis 
Lowland  Broadleal  Moist  Evergreen 
Seasonal  Forests  Over  Limestone, 
Fire  Induced  Graminoid  Vegetation  On  Hills 
North  eastern  variant 
Agriculture 
Central  eastern  variant 
Seasonal  Swamp  Forests  (Marsh  Forests) 
North  western  variant 
IZZI  Of  Northern  Belize,  Variant  i 
Centrial  western  variant 
M  Of  South  &  Central  Belize,  typical  variant 
Belize  River  variant 
r-1  Of  South  &  Central  Belize,  Aguacaliente  variant 
Over  moderately  lime-rich  alluvium 
EE5  Of  Northern  Belize,  coco  plum  variant 
Over  moderately  lime-poor  alluvium 
Salt  Marsh 
Over  Poor  soils 
IEEI  Riparian  Seasonal  Swamp  Forests 
Freshwater  Swamp  Frvesto  /Perm 
A.  ,  JI)  !:  (),  i2st 
M  Typical  variant 
,  oastal  Beach  Sand  Scrubs 
Iroadleal'  Hill  Forests  Over  Limestone 
M  Cornfrey  Palm  variant 
i  rolling  or  flat  terrain  Water 
I  steep  terrain 
r--I  Coastal  Fringe  Rhizophora  Mangle  Dominated 
roadleal  Hill  Forests  Over  Non-G  alcareous 
Forests 
ocks 
EM  Riverine  Mangrove  Forests 
'ann  Creek  variant 
Basin  Mangrove  Forests 
ýmeri-NargLiSta  variant 
1111a  Maria  variant 
IM  Permanently  Waterlogged  Freshwater  Scrubs 
grito-Nargusla  variant  E-11  Dwarf  Mangrove  Scrub 
An  r--A  Mixed  Mangrove  Scrub 
Disturbed  Scrub 
Seasonally  Waterlogged 
Scrub  dominated  by  legurninni  j,;  shrUb; 
CM  Scrub  with  abundant  miconia  spp. 
Em  Fire  induced  shrubland  of  the  plains 
M  Tall  He,  b  INP.  Hand  Communities 
Swamp  Grassland 
Source:  NARMAP,  1996 Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  142 
The  scrubs  are  characterised  by  a  community  of  multi-  stemmed  woody  species  with  a  canopy 
below  5m  tall.  Several  of  the  categories  are  transitional  with  forest  or  herbaceous  formations 
which  occur  as  a  result  of  natural  or  anthropogenic  disturbances.  Within  this  group  there  are 
a  number  of  freshwater  swamp  scrubs,  which  include  permanently  waterlogged  areas  with 
relict  inland  mangroves  comprising  stunted  larger  trees.  Shrublands  on  the  wefter  plains  are 
transitional  between  open  pine  forest  and  savannah  grassland,  varying  according  to  fire  and 
clearance  regime.  On  the  more  extensive  scrub  formations  on  better  drained  land,  dryer 
versions  of  the  shrublands  exist  bearing  scattered  pines  and  oaks  are  again  representative  of 
a  disturbance  regime  (NARMAP,  1996).  Included  in  this  group  is  what  is  sometimes  termed 
as  coastal  littoral  forest  (McField  et  al,  1996),  for  which  very  little  information  exists. 
Herbaceous  formations  include  both  the  open  swamps  and  marshes  as  well  as  the  more  open 
savannahs,  where  both  trees  and  scrubs  make  up  less  than  30%  of  the  system.  Many  of  the 
freshwater  communities  have  not  as  yet  been  described  in  detail  (NARMAP,  1996).  However, 
three  groups  can  be  distinguished  based  on  tall-herb,  short-herb  and  swamp  grassland;  the 
last  is  represented  in  the  Aguacaliente  Swamp.  In  saline  waters  salt  marsh  communities  have 
developed  that  are  closely  related  to  mangrove  scrubs.  Dominant  in  the  herbaceous  category 
is  the  open  grasslands  of  the  savannah  (NARMAP,  1996). 
The  vegetation  of  Southern  Belize  has  a  close  affinity  with  that  of  Peten  in  Guatemala  and  the 
lowland  states  of  Mexico.  Overall  58  species  have  been  identified  as  endemic,  with  particular 
concentrations  in  pine  ridge,  and  savannah,  which  suggests  the  relative  importance  of  these 
ecosystems  in  terms  of  biodiversity.  Most  of  the  other  areas  where  endemics  are  located  are 
mainly  in  Southern  Belize,  especially  in  the  Toledo  district,  Maya  Mountains  and  Chiquibul. 
Marine  ecosystems 
The  coastal  system  of  Belize  is  particularly  important  part  of  Belize's  natural  endowment  and 
is  integrated  into  the  terrestrial  system  by  the  wetland,  river  delta  and  saline  communities 
present.  The  main  feature  of  the  marine  ecosystem  of  Belize  is  coral  reef  which  extends  for 
approximately  220-250km.  The  best  developed  reef  is  off  the  Stann  -Creek  region,  with  it 
becoming  more  discontinuous  further  south.  Further  east  of  the  reef,  lie  a  number  of  coral 
atolls.  In  total  65  species  of  coral  have  been  identified  in  Belize,  including  52  reef-building 
varieties  and  12  non-reef  building  (McField  et  al,  1995).  Between  the  mainland  coast  and 
barrier  reef  and  inside  the  coral  atolls,  shallow  lagoons  are  the  sites  of  often  extensive 
seagrass  communities.  Turtle  grass  (Thalassia  testudinum)  is  the  dominant  seagrass  in 
Belize  and  exists,  depending  on  conditions,  as  dense  meadows,  sparser  flats,  or  mixed  beds Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  14  3 
interspersed  with  other  seagrass  species,  algae,  small  corals  and  sponges  (McField  et  al, 
1995)  In  addition  to  Turtle  grass,  four  other  species  have  been  recorded.  These  include 
manatee  grass  (Sytingodium  filiforme),  shoal  grass  (Halodule  wrighth),  midrib  seagrasss 
(Halophila  baillonis)  and  Halophila  beaudetei.  In  addition  two  other  species  may  occur 
Halophila  engelmanni  and  Halopila  decipiens.  The  other  major  component  of  the  marine 
ecosystem  and  the  interface  with  the  terrestrial  system  is  that  of  the  estuaries,  wetlands  and 
watersheds,  which  have  been  largely  covered  in  the  section  on  terrestrial  systems. 
Fauna 
Belize  is  important  in  harbouring  viable  populations  of  a  range  of  species  under  pressure  in 
the  rest  of  Central  America.  It  is  also  a  centre  of  endemicity  and  lies  on  important  migration 
routes  for  both  Neoarctic  and  Neotropical  species.  Most  importantly  many  of  these  species 
are  vital  components  of  fully  functioning  ecosystems.  In  Belize,  over  150  mammal  species 
have  been  recorded,  including  eighty  species  of  bats.  Belize  is  also  an  important  stronghold 
for  big  cats  such  as  jaguar  and  puma  and  has  the  largest  manatee  population  in  central 
America  (NARMAP,  1995).  Over  540  bird  species  have  been  recorded,  of  which  20%  are 
migrants  mainly  from  North  America.  Birds  of  prey  include  the  crested  eagle  the  king  vulture, 
and  other  notable  species  such  as  the  ocellated  turkey  and  the  great  curassow.  One  hundred 
and  eleven  species  of  reptiles  have  been  documented  including  iguana,  snakes,  crocodiles 
(Morlet's  and  the  American  Crocodile)  as  well  as  six  species  of  turtles  which  are  all  vulnerable 
or  endangered.  Some  40  Amphibians  have  been  recorded  to  date,  but  this  list  is  tentative  as 
discoveries  are  still  being  made  in  areas  such  as  in  the  Maya  Mountains.  Information  on  most 
invertebrate  groups  in  Belize  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  non-existent  (NARMAP,  1995). 
6.2.3  System  dynamics  and  functions  of  the  key  ecosystems  in  southern  Belize 
Although  Iremomger  and  Brokaw  (in  NARMAP,  1996)  classified  49  different  natural  vegetation 
communities  in  Belize,  based  on  subdivisions  of  open  and  closed  forest  systems,  scrub 
systems,  and  herbaceous  communities,  a  more  general  summary  will  be  made  of  the 
dynamics  of  the  major  ecosystems  present  in  the  area  affected  by  the  Southern  Highway. 
Although  major  units  will  be  treated  separately,  it  should  be  remembered  that  many  will  have 
a  number  of  linkages  with  the  other  systems. 
Rain  forest  and  moist  forest 
Southern  Belize  has  extensive  areas  of  rain  forest  and  moist  forest  (classified  on  the  basis  of 
the  Holdridge  System,  Narmap  1996),  which  are  some  of  the  most  diverse  and  productive Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  144 
systems  in  Belize.  Their  productivity  is  dependent  on  the  rapid  recycling  of  nutrients  between 
soil  and  plants  and  most  of  the  nutrient  material  is  stored  in  the  plants.  As  such,  if  forest  cover 
is  removed,  soil  erosion  can  be  rapid  and  normal  nutrient  and  hydraulic  cycling  impeded 
(Costanza  et  al,  1997b,  Henrot  &  Robertson,  1994).  The  extent  to  which  change  to  such 
forests  is  reversible  depends  on  the  extent  of  the  damage,  and  although  secondary  forest  may 
re-colonise  deforested  areas  if  the  soil  is  not  too  degraded,  succession  to  a  composition  and 
structure  approximating  the  original  forest  may  take  hundreds  of  years  (ODA,  1996).  The 
forests  of  Southern  Belize  therefore  play  a  critical  role  in  moderating  the  impacts  of  heavy 
rainfall  in  the  area,  not  only  in  reducing  erosion  and  consequent  siltation,  but  in  providing 
pathways  for  water  retention,  reducing  the  effects  of  peak  flooding  events  common  in 
Southern  Belize.  On  a  more  general  level  the  forests  act  as  a  protective  buffer  by  diminishing 
tropical  storm  intensities. 
Information  on  the  species  composition  of  the  rain  and  moist  forest  is  being  gradually  built  up, 
especially  for  reserves  such  as  the  Colombia  Forest,  which  is  the  focus  of  a  study  by  the 
Forest  Planning  and  Management  Project,  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources.  However,  in  other 
areas,  such  as  the  Sittee  River  forest  reserve  (see  fig  6.7),  no  ecological  studies  have  been 
carried  out.  In  terms  of  understanding  the  dynamics  of  the  forest  ecosystem,  most  of  the 
research  is  at  a  preliminary  stage,  This  is  shown  by  a  study  of  the  Bladen  Nature  Reserve, 
which  identified  three  species  of  plants  new  to  science  (Iremonger  et  al,  1993),  as  well  as  two 
species  of  frogs  in  the  Columbia  forest  reserve  (Campbell  et  al,  1994).  As  a  result,  while 
information  on  the  composition  of  species  is  being  built  up,  there  is  little  information  on  key 
processes,  such  as  the  breeding  mechanisms  of  tree  flora  (Bird,  1997).  Consequently,  key 
ecological  processes  such  as  the  importance  of  different  pollination  and  seed  dispersal  agents 
is  'largely  a  matter  of  conjecture'  (Bird,  1997:  p2).  The  rain  and  tropical  moist  forests  in 
Southern  Belize  are  also  subject  to  natural  disturbances,  which  have  a  fundamental  effect  on 
the  dynamics  of  the  ecosystem.  In  addition  to  regular  tropical  storms  which  can  uproot 
unstable  trees,  hurricanes  such  as  Hurricane  Hattie  in  1961  can  cause  catastrophic  damage. 
Pine  forests  and  savannahs 
The  pine  ridge  and  pine  ridge  savannahs  are  important  in  terms  of  the  biodiversity  of  Belize 
due  to  the  relatively  high  levels  of  endemics  (NARMAP,  1996).  These  areas  are,  therefore,  a 
significant  source  of  genetic  resources  in  Belize.  The  pine  forests,  as  well  as  transitional 
areas,  are  also  important  in  acting  as  storm  buffers,  as  well  as  regulating  water  run-off. 
Because  of  the  poor  quality  of  soils  upon  which  they  are  often  found  (commonly  leached  and 
gleyed),  they  are  also  important  in  preventing  further  nutrient  leaching  and  erosion.  This  is Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway 
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because  evidence  would  appear  to  suggest  that  savannah  trees  and  shrubs  may 
preferentially  enrich  the  soil  around  them,  resulting  in  the  gradual  accumulation  of  nutrients 
(Kellman,  1979).  Moreover,  as  the  savannahs  and  pine  savannahs  tend  to  occur  on  very 
infertile  soils,  then  this  function  is  particularly  important  (Kellman  &  Sanmugadas,  1985).  The 
structure  of  the  needle  forests  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  pattern  of  the  disturbance  regime, 
with  fire  in  particular  playing  an  important  role  in  stimulating  a  progression  from  pine  forests 
and  savannah  back  to  pinelands  (Iremonger  &  Brockaw,  1996).  Savannahs  are  important 
locally  in  terms  of  climate  regulation  due  to  vegetation  cover  and  transpiration.  They  are  also 
important  in  acting  as  a  water  regulator  by  reducing  run-off.  As  such,  along  with  the  other 
main  ecosystems  in  the  area  they  are  crucial  in  providing  a  water  management  function. 
Other  functions  include  controlling  erosion  and  facilitating  soil  formation  (Costanza,  et  al, 
1996). 
Wetlands,  and  swamps 
The  fresh  water  wetlands  and  swamps  of  Southern  Belize  are  key  ecosystems,  both  in  terms 
of  area  and  the  ecological  functions  that  they  provide.  Like  the  rainforests  they  accommodate 
great  biological  diversity  and  are  highly  productive  and  dynamic,  due  to  both  abiotic  factors 
and  food  web  structures  (Costanza  et  al,  1997).  They  also  play  a  key  role  in  Southern  Belize 
in  terms  of  flood  control,  water  protection,  storm  protection,  nutrient  and  waste  recycling. 
These  functions  in  turn  play  an  important  part  in  limiting  the  effects  of  a  disturbance  caused  by 
tropical  storms  on  other  ecosystems.  The  waste  recycling  function  may  be  particularly 
important  with  respect  to  use  of  fertilisers  and  pesticides  on  citrus  and  banana  crop 
ecosystems.  Wetlands  are  also  important  in  terms  of  acting  as  a  habitat  and  refuge  for 
wildlife,  acting  for  example  as  a  nursery  for  important  fish  and  crustaceans,  as  well  as  resting 
and  feeding  areas  for  migratory  birds  (Costanza  et  al,  1997).  Many  of  the  important  wetland 
areas,  such  as  in  Sarstoon-Temash  and  Payne's  Creek  (see  fig  6.7),  have  had  little  or  no 
ecological  studies  carried  out  on  them  (Zisman,  1996).  These  would  give  a  greater 
understanding  of  the  particular  dynamics  of  the  diverse  wetland  communities  present  in 
Southern  Belize. 
Mangroves 
Mangroves  are  widespread  along  the  Belize  coast  and  cover  approximately  296  miles  or  3.4% 
of  the  land  area  (Zisman,  in  McField  et  al,  1996).  At  present  the  ecological  integrity  of  the 
mangrove  systems  is  thought  to  be  good  and,  in  comparison  to  neighbouring  countries,  Belize 
has  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  intact  mangroves.  Mangroves  are  important  as  a  protection Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  147 
against  storm  damage,  floods  and  beach  erosion.  They  are  also  important  in  acting  as  a 
natural  purification  system,  binding  fine  silts  as  well  industrial,  agrochemical  and  human 
wastes  (McField  et  al,  1996).  As  such,  they  act  as  a  important  buffer  zone,  protecting 
terrestrial  systems  from  increased  storm  damage,  as  well  as  reducing  the  effects  of  pollution 
and  sedimentation,  on  sea  grass  areas  and  outlying  coral  reef.  Mangroves  in  Belize  also 
provide  a  service  to  the  fisheries  sector  by  creating  a  habitat  for  juvenile  snapper,  grouper  and 
for  larval  recruitment  of  lobster  (McField  et  al,  1996).  They  are  also  important  for  subsistence 
fishing,  as  well  as  for  providing  a  habitat  for  endangered  species  such  as  manatee  and 
crocodiles. 
Mangroves  have  been  mapped  and  their  importance  highlighted  in  a  number  of  reports  (e.  g. 
McField  et  a[,  1996;  Zisman,  1992),  although  relatively  few  studies  provide  detailed  accounts 
of  the  dynamics  of  mangrove  systems  (Zisman,  1992).  A  key  colonising  species  is  the  red 
mangrove,  which  first  becomes  established  in  sheltered  areas,  as  its  roots  help  to  suspend 
organic  matter,  absorb  wave  energy  and  stabilise  coastal  sediments.  To  enable  breathing  in 
permanently  saturated  substrates,  it  has  developed  arching  aerial  prop  roots.  The  black 
mangrove  has  a  higher  salinity  tolerance,  although  it  is  more  susceptible  to  wind  throw 
because  of  shallow  rooting.  It  is  insect  pollinated  and  produces  floating  seeds.  Black 
mangroves  are  highly  intolerant  to  changes  in  hydrological  patterns  such  as  drought  or 
flooding  Zisman,  1992).  White  mangrove  is  found  over  a  similar  range  of  conditions,  but 
develops  best  in  low  to  moderate  saline  conditions.  Pollination  is  again  by  insects  which  visit 
its  flowers.  In  optimal  conditions  mangroves  will  grow  to  approximately  30m,  as  in  the 
Temash  river  area,  although  over  half  of  Belize's  mangroves  are  dwarf  (Zisman,  1992). 
Sea  grass 
Extensive  sea  grass  beds  have  developed  in  Belize.  However,  no  detailed  scientific  studies 
have  been  carried  out  and  their  full  distribution  is  not  known  (McField  et  al,  1996).  Generally 
in  Belize  sea  grass  beds  are  currently  thought  to  be  in  excellent  condition,  and  although 
productivity  is  dependent  on  a  number  of  factors,  they  are  understood  to  be  a  good  indicator 
of  the  health  of  the  maritime  system.  Sea  grass  beds  are  a  highly  productive  habitat  based  on 
the  trapping  of  sediments  which  contain  organic  matter,  so  they  are  important  in  the  recycling 
of  nutrients  that  would  otherwise  be  lost.  As  such,  sea  grass  beds  act  as  an  important  trophic 
link  between  the  coral  and  mangroves,  preventing  sediment  accumulating  on  the  coral 
(McField  et  al,  1996).  They  are  also  important  breeding  grounds  for  commercially  valuable 
species  such  as  lobster,  conch  and  many  fish,  as  well  as  having  a  high  conservation  value, 
providing  for  example  a  habitat  for  turtles  and  manatees.  Sea  grasses  require,  however,  good Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  148 
water  quality  and  certain  turbidity,  as  well  as  certain  temperature  and  salinity  limits. 
Thresholds  for  sediment  limits  may  occur  and  sea  grasses  may  be  particular  susceptible  to 
increased  agrochernical  runoff  from  herbicides  (McField  et  al,  1996). 
Coral  reefs 
Belize's  coral  reefs  are  generally  thought  to  be  in  good  condition,  although  more  recently 
some  reef  degradation  has  been  taken.  Since  1993  a  monitoring  program  has  been 
conducted  by  the  Coastal  Zone  Management  Unit,  which  will  increase  the  amount  of  available 
information.  As  such  no  broad  scale  assessment  of  the  current  status  of  Belize's  coral  reef 
system  has  been  conducted  and  no  long-term  data  are  available  from  which  to  infer  the 
dynamics  of  the  reef  systems.  Due  to  a  lack  of  baseline  data  and  ecological  studies,  it  is 
difficult  to  establish  and  quantify  any  clear  cause  and  effect  relationships,  involving  possible 
negative  influences  on  the  coral  (McField  et  al,  1996).  Nevertheless  a  number  of  factors  are 
thought  to  influence  their  development.  One  is  the  growth  of  algae,  which  can  overgrow 
corals  and  is  in  part  caused  by  nutrient  enrichment  of  rivers.  Another  key  factor  is  the  amount 
of  sediment  dissolved  in  the  water.  Coral  is  also  susceptible  to  water  quality  changes,  with 
diseases  such  as  black  band  disease  thought  to  be  induced  by  ecosystem  stress  and 
pollution.  In  terms  of  natural  disturbances,  the  major  threat  is  from  hurricanes  (McField  et  al, 
1996).  The  coral  reef  is  of  vital  importance  in  environmental  and  economic  terms  to  Belize.  It 
provides  an  important  habitat  for  commercial  fishing  species,  as  well  as  conservation  species. 
It  is  also  of  crucial  importance  in  terms  of  tourism,  which  is  one  of  the  mainstay's  of  the 
Belizean  economy. 
6.2.4  Main  existing  pressures  on  the  environment:  Socio-economic 
considerations. 
Although  much  of  Belize  may  have  been  modified  by  ancient  Mayan  civilisations  of  over  1000 
years  ago,  the  present  environment  has  up  until  recently  not  been  faced  with  major 
disturbances,  which  can  be  largely  attributed  to  low  population  levels.  During  the  1980's  the 
population  increased  in  the  decade  by  44.7  %.  However,  a  major  factor  in  the  population 
growth  in  the  south  of  Belize  is  the  number  of  immigrants  from  other  central  American 
countries  (NARMAP,  1996).  Although  Belize's  main  ecological  systems  are  relatively  intact, 
increasingly  a  number  of  pressures  have  been  exerted  on  them.  Deforestation  rates  for 
example  has  been  estimated  at  25,000  ha/yr  between  1989/92  and  1994/96,  which  is  a 
substantially  higher  rate  than  in  previous  estimates  (White  et  al,  1996).  The  main  cause  is 
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of  milpa  clearance  for  subsistence  farming  (IDB,  1997b).  Over  65%  of  the  annual 
deforestation  rate  is  attributed  to  commercial  agro-industry,  small-holder  farming  and  milpa 
subsistence  farming  (World  Bank,  1996).  Although  in  some  reports  the  emphasis  has  been 
on  deforestation  caused  as  a  result  of  milpa  farming,  other  research  points  to  commercial 
agriculture  as  the  major  factor  in  causing  deforestation  in  Belize  (Lopez  &  Scoseria,  1996). 
As  fig  6.7  highlights,  in  Southern  Belize  a  large  area  of  the  forests  are  under  some  form  of 
protection,  and  there  are  currently  seven  forest  reserves  and  three  national  parks  in  the 
Toledo  and  Stann  Creek  districts  (see  table  6.2).  However,  this  status  is  potentiallv 
misleading  because  the  extent  of  actual  protection  varies  significantly  (Zisman,  1996;  Schill, 
1997).  Included  in  the  national  lands  are  also  indigenous  lands,  although  the  exact 
boundaries  of  the  land  is  unclear  and  the  issue  of  Mayan  reservations  or  homelands  is  a  very 
contentious  issue'.  As  such,  forest  reserves  have  come  under  pressure  from  Milpa  farming 
Table  6.2  Existing  protected  areas  in  the  area  of  influence  of  the  Southern 
Highway 
Protected  Areas  Estimated  Management 
area  (acres)  responsibility 
Forest  reserves 
Commerce  Bights  5,452  Forest  Dept. 
Columbia  River  102,940  Forest  Dept. 
Deep  River  78,574  Forest  Dept. 
Mango  Creek  35,549  Forest  Dept. 
Maya  Mountains  128,111  Forest  Dept. 
Sittee  River  94,156  Forest  Dept. 
Swasey  Bladen  1,1779  Forest  Dept. 
Bladen  Branch  Nature  Reserve  99,678  Forest  Dept 
Monkey  Bay  National  Park  1,799  Forest  Dept. 
Sarstoon-Temash  National  Park  41,898  Forest  Dept. 
Payne's  Creek  national  Park  31,678  Forest  Dept. 
Cockscombe  Basin  Wildlife  Sanctuary  86,929  Belize  Audubon 
Society 
Source:  IDB  (1997b) 
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recently  due  to  an  increasing  trend  towards  growing  cash  crops  and  the  shortening  of  fallow 
periods  due  to  population  growth  and  migration  from  neighbouring  central  American  countries 
(IBD,  1997b). 
Timber  production  is  one  of  the  major  industries  of  Southern  Belize,  and  since  1993  the 
Forestry  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources  has  issued  16  concessions  in 
Toledo  totalling  554,989  acres  (Schill,  1997).  These  concessions  are  on  both  national  lands 
(non-protected)  and  forest  reserves.  On  forest  reserves,  such  as  the  Columbia  River  forest 
reserve,  detailed  plans  for  selective  logging  on  a  sustainable  basis  exist.  However,  for  other 
forest  reserves  and  national  lands  no  such  restrictions  currently  exist  (IDB,  1997a).  Due  to 
the  lack  of  resources  to  protect  and  manage  the  forest  areas,  it  is  also  estimated  that  illegal 
logging  has  been  substantial.  Thus,  in  1992  exports  of  mahogany  exceeded  the  official 
Forest  Department  figure  of  mahogany  fellings  by  74%  (World,  Bank,  1996). 
As  well  as  deforestation,  commercial  agriculture  and  in  particular  citrus  (grown  on  10,000  ha 
of  plantations)  and  banana  plantations  (2,400  ha),  Southern  Belize  also  has  suffered  a 
number  of  other  environmental  impacts  relating  to  pesticide  and  fertiliser  run-off,  as  well  as 
pollution  from  effluents  produced  in  the  processing  of  citrus.  The  recent  construction  of  the 
port  at  Big  Creek  has  increased  the  potential  for  increased  export  capabilities  in  the  region. 
Tourism  as  a  major  contributor  to  GDP  is,  however,  more  limited  in  the  south  of  Belize,  partly 
due  to  the  difficulty  in  accessing  the  region.  As  such,  most  of  the  existing  limited 
environmental  pressure  is felt  on  the  cayes  (IDB,  1997). 
Aquaculture  is  the  fastest  growing  segment  of  the  fisheries  industry  and  there  are  presently 
four  shrimp  farms  operating  in  Southern  Belize  at  Mullins  River,  Riversdale  and  in  the 
southern  region.  Current  farms  have  not  required  the  clearing  of  mangrove  forests  as  in  other 
parts  of  central  America,  being  constructed  on  coastal  plains,  mainly  due  to  inappropriate  soil 
conditions  in  mangrove  areas  (Zisman,  1996).  Any  destruction  of  mangrove  areas  has  been 
due  to  the  construction  of  inflow  and  outflow  canals.  Some  existing  threat  exists  from  nutrient 
enrichment  from  outflowing  water,  as  well  as  the  escape  of  non-native  species  into  coastal 
waters  (McField  et  al,  1996). 
6.3  Uncertainty  and  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project 
Now  that  a  good  understanding  of  the  environmental  context  surrounding  the  upgrading  of  the 
Southern  Highway  project  has  been  provided,  the  main  uncertainties  faced  by  the  decision 
makers  when  evaluating  the  project  can  be  highlighted.  Because  an  existing  road,  albeit  of Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  151 
rudimentary  nature,  built  in  1958  (DHV,  1994a),  was  already  present  in  Southern  Belize,  the 
majority  of  direct  impacts  of  the  road  fall  within  the  realms  of  soft  uncertainty  or  risk.  This  is 
reinforced  by  the  previous  upgrading  of  the  Northern,  Western  and  Hummingbird  Highways 
since  the  1980's.  In  contrast,  however,  it  is  the  indirect  impacts  of  upgrading  the  Southern 
Highway  that  are  to  a  large  degree  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty,  and  which  form  the  focus 
of  this  investigation. 
Although  there  is  a  past  history  in  the  upgrading  other  roads  in  Belize,  which  can  be  arguably 
drawn  on  to  predict  the  direct  effects  of  the  road,  it  is  difficult  to  draw  on  this  to  assess  the 
indirect  impacts  of  the  road  project,  because  of  the  different  social,  economic  and 
environmental  conditions  present  in  Southern  Belize,  as  well  as  differences  due  to  significant 
time  lags  between  the  upgrading  of  the  other  highways  and  the  Southern  Highway.  It  is 
because  of  the  significant  differences  in  the  conditions  that  collectively  determine  the 
consequences  of  the  project  that  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possible  outcomes  of  the 
road  exists.  The  next  section  (6.3.1)  will  therefore  identify  a  number  of  these  uncertainties, 
which  will  in  turn  influence  the  nature  of  the  environmental  uncertainties  faced  by  the  decision 
makers.  Section  6.3.2  then  goes  into  more  specific  detail  regarding  the  environmental 
uncertainties  faced  by  decision  makers  in  the  evaluation  process.  This  is  important  in 
providing  the  context  for  the  methodology  employed  in  the  case  study,  which  is  presented  in 
Chapter  7. 
6.3.1  Key  uncertainties  associated  with  the  indirect  affects  of  the  rehabilitation  of 
the  Southern  Highway. 
Many  of  the  possible  indirect  environmental  impacts  of  the  road  project  are  themselves  related 
to  a  number  of  socio-economic  uncertainties  which  provide  the  context  for  assessing  the 
impact  of  upgrading  the  Southern  Highway.  By  reviewing  these  it  is  apparent  that  a  major 
problem  for  decision  makers  is  that,  in  evaluating  the  possible  indirect  effects  of  the  road,  it  is 
only  possible  to  consider  an  incomplete  set  of  future  outcomes.  In  the  following  discussion, 
key  uncertainties  are  identified  from  the  reports  available  to  decision  makers.  In  some  cases 
the  impacts  of  more  recent  events  will  be  used  to  demonstrate  that  decisions  of  the  kind 
embodied  in  evaluating  the  Southern  Highway  Project  are  often  characterised  by  hard 
uncertainty.  The  EIA  carried  out  by  DHV  consultants  (1994)  recognised: 
"That  as  a  result  of  the  road,  accelerated  development  is  expected  for  the  southem  districts 
which  in  turn  will  have  secondary  environmental  impacts" 
. 
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The  nature  and  extent  of  such  impacts  (over  and  above  the  base  case  of  the  existing  road) 
will  depend  on  the  occurrence  of  a  combination  of  a  number  of  uncertain  factors.  As  the  IDB 
environmental  summary  (1997a)  points  out: 
"there  is  considerable  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  magnitude  of  indirect  impacts  associated 
with  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway.  Problems  in  assessing  these  indirect  effects 
is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  incomplete  data  exist  on  land  use  trends.  In  addition,  reliable 
projections  of  how  rehabilitation  will  affect  land  use  in  the  southern  region  are  not  available.  " 
(IDB,  1997a:  p34) 
Other  factors  which  contribute  to  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  consequences  of  the  road 
rehabilitation  identified  in  the  project's  evaluation  reports  are: 
1)  The  degree  to  which  the  road  will  result  in  increased  migration  internally  from  other  areas 
of  Belize,  as  well  as  from  other  Latin  American  Countries,  notably  El  Salvador  and 
Guatemala.  In  particular  increased  populations  could  lead  to  increased  deforestation,  due  to 
the  expansion  of  cultivated  land  and  illegal  squatting.  (Kocks,  1993;  DHV,  1994a,  Harrison  et 
al,  1995;  IDB,  1997a). 
2)  The  success  of  environmental  mitigation  measures  (DHV,  1994a),  in  particular  the  ESTAP 
programme  (IDB,  1997a),  and  the  commitment  to  ESTAP  for  the  duration  of  the  project  (until 
2015)7. 
3)  The  extent  to  which  increased  commercial  agricultural  expansion  (Kocks,  1993)  (citrus, 
bananas  and  rice)  will  result  in  a  reduction  of  natural  habitat,  biodiversity  and  forest  cover, 
both  as  a  result  of  increases  in  the  area  of  direct  use,  as  well  as  from  increased  cultivation  by 
the  labourers  brought  in  to  work  on  the  plantations  (Kocks,  1993;  DHV,  1994a;  Harrison  et  al, 
1995;  IDB,  1997a). 
4)  The  indirect  effects  of  the  highway  rehabilitation  on  the  traditional  Milpa  systems,  including, 
whether  the  area  of  Milpa  farming  significantly  increases  or  is  no  longer  sustainable,  due  to 
reductions  in  the  fallow  period  or  shifts  to  other  forms  of  agriculture  (IDB,  1997a). 
5)  The  extent  to  which  increased  agricultural  expansion  will  result  in  erosion,  especially  from 
uncontrolled  agriculture  on  steep  slopes  and  the  highly  erodable  surface  soils  of  the  flood 
plain  (DHV,  1994a;  Beca,  1995). 
6)  The  degree  to  which  land  clearance  and  deforestation  lead  to  increased  sedimentation  in 
the  drainage  system,  which  will  eventually  feed  into  the  marine  system  (DHV,  1994a;  Beca, 
1995;  IDB,  1997)  with  unknown  effects  on  coral  and  sea  grass  systems  (IDB,  1997a). 
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7)  The  impact  of  increased  human  settlements  in  the  area  on  losses  in  wildlife  (DHV,  1994a). 
8)  The  possible  increase  in  aquaculture  caused  by  better  economic  returns  (DHV,  1994b) 
resulting  from  improved  transportation  and  the  possibility  of  increased  erosion,  consequential 
siltation  and  sedimentation  and  nutrient  enrichment  (DHV,  1994a). 
9)  Difficulties  in  enforcing  the  existence  of  the  protected  areas,  due  to  lack  of  personnel 
caused  by  the  stretching  of  resources  to  cope  with  increased  pressures  in  the  affected  areas 
(Kocks,  1993;  DHV,  1994a;  IDB,  1997a). 
10)  The  results  of  increased  run-off  from  agrochemicals  such  as  fertilisers,  insecticides  and 
herbicides  associated  with  the  expansion  of  commercial  citrus  and  banana  production, 
particularly  in  relation  to  coastal  water  quality  (DHV,  1994a;  IDB,  1997a). 
11)  The  negative  impact  of  increased  tourism  in  the  area  and  the  resulting  development, 
especially  on  the  transitional  areas,  such  as  mangroves  and  fragile  shorelines  (DHV,  1994a; 
IDB,  1997a). 
12)  The  extent  of  land  tenure  conflicts  and  uncertainty  surrounding  land  tenure,  especially  in 
relation  to  the  Mayan  reserves  (DHV,  1994a;  Harrison  et  al,  1995;  IDB,  1997a). 
13)  The  indirect  effects  of  highway  rehabilitation  on  logging  activities  which  may  either  be 
increased  through  improved  access  or  better  controlled  as  a  result  of  more  effective 
enforcement  and  prevention  of  illegal  logging  (DHV,  1994a,  IDB,  1997a). 
14)  Changes  in  preferential  agreements  for  banana  export  to  the  European  Union  and  the 
subsequent  quota  (DHV,  1994a;  Harrison  et  al,  1995),  as  a  result  of  world  trade  talks. 
15)  The  general  economic  situation  in  Belize,  which  is  heavily  dependent  on  changes  in  US 
policy  and  more  specifically  commodity  prices  (Kocks,  1993). 
16)  The  availability  of  future  government  funds  for  additional  social  services  associated  with 
rapid  development,  particularly  in  health  and  education  (IDB,  1997a). 
These  preceding  factors  mean  that  the  Southern  Highway  project  is  characterised  by  hard 
uncertainty  on  a  number  of  grounds.  Firstly,  although  previous  experience  in  improving  the 
road  network  in  Belize  does  provide  an  indication  of  possible  consequences,  the  underlying 
conditions  and  factors  which  will  determine  the  outcome  of  this  project  are  fundamentally 
different.  It  is  not  therefore  a  seriable  decision.  The  decision  is  in  this  sense  unique,  which  is 
reinforced  by  the  fact  that  it  is  not  repeatable.  Moreover,  many  of  the  outcomes  from  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway  are  irreversible  and  the  decision  is  non-  divisible. 
When  these  factors  are  considered  in  relation  to  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  road,  only 
an  incomplete  set  of  possible  future  states  is  also  available  for  evaluation.  As  such,  any 
measure  of  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of  the  environmental  impact  will 
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uncertainty  and  valuation  uncertainty  merely  compounds  this  situation.  It  is  the  combination  of 
these  factors  connected  with  environmental  uncertainty  which  will  now  be  discussed. 
6.3.2  Environmental  uncertainty  and  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project. 
Although  the  majority  of  this  section  will  deal  with  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possible 
indirect  impacts  of  the  road,  there  are  some  important  aspects  connected  with  the  direct 
impacts  of  the  road  project,  for  which  there  is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty.  One  of  these  is  in 
relation  to  the  ability  of  the  road  construction  to  cope  with  flooding.  This  is  a  problem, 
because  very  few  reliable  records  exist  on  water  levels  and  flows  for  the  river  and  in  designing 
the  specifications  of  the  road  assumptions  such  as  the  run-off  coefficient  have  had  to  be 
made.  Hard  uncertainty  over  whether  the  assumed  value  is  a  sufficient  basis  for  designing 
the  road  will  depend  on  whether  the  indirect  impacts  of  the  roads  result  in  an  increased  run-off 
(DHV,  1994a). 
It  is,  however,  in  relation  to  the  indirect  impacts  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway, 
the  most  important  factors  facing  decision  makers  are  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. 
Given  the  complex  nature  of  the  terrestrial  and  marine  ecosystems  that  exist  in  the  affected 
area,  a  large  degree  of  ecological  uncertainty  exists  surrounding  the  effects  of  any  changes 
caused  by  the  road  (themselves  surrounded  by  uncertainty)  on  key  ecosystem  functions.  For 
example,  a  major  uncertainty  is  connected  with  the  effect  that  deforestation  may  have  in  terms 
of  flood  control,  as  well  as  in  terms  of  acting  as  a  buffer  against  damage  caused  by 
hurricanes.  Not  only  is  the  future  occurrence  and  magnitude  of  hurricanes  unclear,  but  also 
the  effects  of  a  hurricane  are  uncertain  and  will  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  the  degree  of 
deforestation  that  has  occurred,  as  well  as  other  factors  such  as  the  indirect  effects  of  the  road 
on  other  key  ecosystems  such  as  mangroves  and  wetlands  which  act  as  a  buffer  against  the 
worst  affects  of  a  hurricane.  In  the  case  of  hurricane  Mitch  (The  Guardian,  1998),  which  hit 
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador  in  1998  a  contributory  factor  to  the  scale  of 
the  disaster  would  appear  to  have  been  the  reduction  of  the  capacity  of  the  natural 
environment  to  mitigate  the  hurricane.  Reducing  the  resilience  of  key  ecosystems  in  Belize 
may  also  mean  that  their  ability  to  recover  after  the  effects  of  such  a  disturbance  is  also 
reduced.  Again,  however,  the  exact  threshold  at  which  the  resilience  of  say  a  mangrove 
system  is  lost  is  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. 
Other  ecological  uncertainties  relate  to  the  effects  of  human-induced  disturbances,  due  to  a 
lack  of  information  of  the  key  processes  in  many  of  Belize's  main  ecosystems.  So,  for 
example,  the  effect  of  habitat  fragmentation  caused  by  deforestation  will  depend  on  the Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  155 
pollination  mechanisms  employed  by  the  different  tree  species,  which  at  present  are  largely  a 
matter  of  conjecture  (Bird,  1997).  The  extent  to  which  land  clearance  and  deforestation  will 
result  in  erosion,  siltation  and  sedimentation  is  also  unknown  due  to  "an  enormous  gap  in 
present  day  knowledge"  (DHV,  1994a:  p42).  Another  issue  is  the  extent  to  which  accelerated 
deforestation  will  lead  to  biodiversity  losses.  Other  uncertainties  relate  to  the  interaction  of  the 
different  ecosystems.  Thus,  the  effect  of  increased  sedimentation  and  nutrient  enrichment, 
which  could  be  caused  by  increased  agricultural  development  on  mangrove,  seagrass  and 
coral  systems  is  unknown.  What  threshold  of  increased  sedimentation  will  cause  seagrass 
communities  to  become  vulnerable  is  not  understood,  nor  is  the  long-term  impact  of 
increased  run-off  of  fertilisers  or  pesticides  on  such  ecosystems.  The  possible  impacts  of 
these  factors  on  the  coral  reef  is  also  surrounded  by  hard  uncertainty.  For  example, 
increased  nutrient  enrichment  can  cause  the  development  of  previously  unknown  harmful 
microbes  and  toxic  algaes,  which  can  have  a  devastating  affect  on  marine  life  (Warrick,  1997). 
A  further  dimension  to  the  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  environmental  effects  of  the  road 
relates  to  the  value  of  possible  changes  in  the  environment.  It  is  evident  from  the  dependence 
of  the  economy  on  the  natural  environment  in  Southern  Belize  that  the  key  functions  and 
services  that  the  forests,  swamps,  mangroves,  savannahs,  seagrass  and  coral  provide  are 
highly  valued  and  the  links  to  the  economic  system  are  very  strong.  However,  the  nature  of 
the  complex  linkages  between  the  economic  system  and  the  ecological  system  are  typified  by 
hard  uncertainty  caused  by  a  lack  of  information  on  the  functional  relationships  between  the 
existence  of  ecosystems  and  their  management.  As  such,  the  value  of  possible 
environmental  changes  associated  with  the  road  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain.  To  return  to  the 
value  of  both  Belize's  terrestrial  and  marine  ecosystems  buffers  against  the  effects  of  a 
hurricane,  it  is  possible  that  key  thresholds  may  be  passed.  In  particular  the  effect  of  marginal 
changes  in  the  ecosystem  structure  (both  qualitative  and  quantitative)  is  unlikely  to  be 
continuous  and  so  the  true  value  of  any  changes,  can  only  be  determined  ex  post  after  the 
event  has  occurred.  Thus,  while  it  is  evident  that  a  major  part  of  the  value  of  the  environment 
in  Belize  is  in  terms  of  damage  avoidance,  the  true  value  of  this  cannot  to  a  large  degree  be 
unanticipated. 
The  loss  of  biodiversity  associated  with  increased  deforestation  rates  as  a  result  of  the 
upgrading  of  the  road  may  result  in  the  loss  of  species,  which  have  an  unanticipated  value  in 
future  equilibrium  states.  For  example,  increases  in  rain  and  moist  forest  deforestation,  with 
accompanying  erosion  and  degradation  of  soils,  means  that  certain  species  may  have  a 
specific  value  in  preventing  further  erosion  and  allowing  over  long  time  periods  the Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  156 
accumulation  of  nutrients  (Kellman,  1979)  and  possible  reversion  to  the  previous  state.  Thus, 
the  endemic  species  currently  found  in  transitional  savannah  pine  systems  (which  exist  on 
poor  soils)  may  be  crucial  in  allowing  nutrient  enrichment  and  regeneration  of  degraded  areas. 
As  such,  it  is  evident  that  many  species  will  have  a  latent  or  unanticipated  value  at  the  time  of 
the  project  evaluation. 
Lack  of  knowledge  of  the  functioning  of  the  ecosystems  present  in  the  area  affected  by  the 
project  means  also  that,  to  a  large  degree,  the  result  of  factors  such  as  increased  fertiliser  run- 
off  on  seagrass  and  coral  systems  is  uncertain  and  therefore  the  value  of  such  a  change  is 
difficult  to  ascertain  ex  ante.  Moreover,  to  be  able  to  identify  the  link  between  increased 
fertiliser  run-off  and  the  economic  consequences  of  degraded  reef  systems  in  terms  of  tourism 
would  require  an  understanding  of  the  links  between  seagrass  systems  and  corals.  Even  if  it 
is  possible  to  estimate  this,  it  is  also  evident  that  the  different  species  possibly  affected  by  the 
road  will  have  a  primary  value  in  maintaining  healthy  functioning  ecosystems,  on  which  the 
directly  valued  services  described  in  section  6.2.3  are  based.  Thus,  although  individual 
species,  that  could  be  affected  by  the  road  will  have  a  conservation  and  biodiversity  value,  the 
largest  component  of  their  true  worth  will  be  in  relation  to  maintaining  the  provision  of  valued 
services  and  functions.  As  a  result,  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  will  surround  the  valuation  of 
changes  which  could  arise  as  a  consequence  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway. 
6.4  The  decision  context 
The  focus  of  this  research  is  on  the  way  that  environmental  uncertainty  is  dealt  with  in  the 
decision  making  process.  The  emphasis  is  therefore  not  on  the  decision  that  is  eventually 
made  nor  on  the  politics  surrounding  such  a  decision,  but  on  the  decision  process  and  in 
particular  the  way  that  a  course  of  action  or  policy  is  evaluated  in  the  presence  of  hard 
uncertainty.  Although  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  that  has  been  developed  is  in 
relation  to  individual  decision  making,  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  importance  that  the 
wider  context  plays  in  the  decision-making  process.  In  particular  it  is  important  to  have  a 
greater  understanding  of  the  main  actors  involved  in  the  decision-making  process,  as  well  as 
the  way  that  the  decision  process  itself  is  structured. 
In  relation  to  the  case  study  there  are  three  main  institutions  that  will  be  analysed  in  more 
detail.  The  first  is  the  Government  of  Belize,  which  plays  its  part  as  the  initiator  and  co- 
ordinator  of  the  project,  and  as  such  is  both  the  executing  agency  as  well  as  co-financler.  The 
GoBl's  interaction  with  the  other  financing  agencies  is  a  also  a  key  element  in  the  analysis  of 
the  decision  process  associated  with  the  road.  The  other  main  organisations  that  will  form  the Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  15  7 
focus  of  the  case  study  are  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  and  the  Department 
for  International  Development  (DFID).  The  IDB,  as  well  as  having  a  specific  part  in  the 
decision  process  associated  with  the  Southern  Highway,  provides  a  wider  context  for  the 
investigation,  in  that  it  is  involved  in  the  evaluation  of  many  similar  projects  in  Latin  America 
involving  environmental  uncertainty.  Due  to  the  fact  that  for  many  projects  the  overall  decision 
context  and  evaluation  framework  is  very  similar,  then  the  case  study  will  provide  an  insight 
into  wider  issues  associated  with  project  evaluation.  The  last  actor  investigated  was  DFID, 
although  this  was  limited  to  accessing  reports  rather  than  comprehensive  interviews  (which 
were  carried  out  with  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB).  It  is  these  three  organisations  that  were  involved 
in  producing  the  main  reports  between  1995  and  19981  which  were  the  focus  of  the  project 
evaluation. 
The  assessment  of  the  roles  of  the  other  co-financiers,  namely,  the  Kuwait  Fund  for  Arab 
Economic  Development,  the  OPEC  fund  for  International  Development,  the  International  Co- 
operation  Development  Fund  (Taiwan)  and  the  Caribbean  Development  Bank  does  not  form 
part  of  the  case  study.  This  was  due  to  practical  considerations  in  relation  to  interviewing  and 
gaining  access  to  reports,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  they  were  not  involved  directly  in  the 
production  of  the  key  reports. 
6.4.1  The  Belize  Government:  Institutional  context. 
Belize,  a  former  colony  of  Britain  (known  as  British  Honduras)  became  fully  independent  in 
1981,  although  it  got  a  new  constitution  for  self  government  in  1964.  It  is  a  parliamentary 
democracy  with  two  major  political  parties,  namely  the  Peoples  United  Party  (PUP)  and  the 
United  Democratic  Party  (UDP).  The  government  from  1993  until  1998  has  been  the  UDP 
which  was  headed  by  Manuel  Esquivel. 
The  principal  Governmental  actors  involved  in  the  Southern  Highway  Project  are  based  in  a 
number  of  key  ministries.  Foremost  is  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  which  has 
responsibility  for  development  planning  and  thus  the  Public  sector  investment  program.  The 
Ministry  of  Economic  Development  also  serves  a  key  role  in  that  it  is  the  government's  official 
link  with  international  agencies  such  as  the  IDB  and  DFID9.  The  Ministry  of  Economic 
Development  is  also  the  executing  agency  of  the  ESTAP  program,  and  as  such  has  been 
involved  in  the  evaluation  of  the  environmental-economic  issues  associated  with  the  road 
project.  On  the  other  hand,  the  executing  agency  for  the  physical  construction  of  the  road  is 
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the  Ministry  of  Works.  Other  ministries  which  have  also  been  involved  in  the  Project  are  the 
Ministry  of  Human  Resources,  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources,  The  Ministry  of  Tourism  and  the 
Environment  and  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries.. 
The  large  number  of  ministries  involved  in  the  Southern  Highway  Project,  especially  in  relation 
to  its  environmental  aspects,  reflect  the  fact  that  the  authority  for  environmental  planning  and 
management  is  shared  by  a  number  of  ministries  and  q  uasi-govern  mental  authorities  (World 
Bank,  1996).  Previous  to  the  setting  up  of  ESTAP,  which  is  specific  to  the  Southern  Highway 
Project,  inter-ministerial  and  departmental  co-ordination  on  environmental  issues  was  not 
institutional  ised,  but  instead  based  on  informal  structures  (GoBl,  1996).  However,  under  the 
Environmental  Assessment  Regulations  legislation  of  1995  there  is  provision  for  the 
establishment  of  the  National  Environmental  Assessment  Committee  (NEAC),  which  is 
responsible  for  reviewing  all  environmental  impact  assessments  (see  fig  6.8).  By  virtue  of  the 
environmental  agencies  sifting  on  the  Committee,  and  the  lack  of  other  formal  structures,  it 
plays  a  wider  role  as  the  central  body  for  co-ordinating  environmental  management  decision 
making  and  as  such  is  the  main  environmental-decision  making  body  (GoBl,  1996).  As  of 
1997  its  role  with  regard  to  the  environmental  evaluation  of  the  Southern  Highway  was  to  a 
large  degree  taken  over  by  ESTAP. 
ig  6.8  Members  of  the  National  Environmental  Appraisal  Commi  ee 
-  The  Chief  Environmental  Officer  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Commissioner  of  Lands  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Housing  and  Planning  Officer  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Chief  Forest  Officer  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Fisheries  Administrator  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Chief  Hydrologist  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Archaeological  Commissioner  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Director  of  Geology  and  Petroleum  or  his  nominee 
-  The  Chief  Agricultural  Officer  or  his  nominee 
-  Two  non-govern  mental  representatives  appointed  by  the  Minister  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Department  of  Environment.  (GoBl,  1995) 
Before  the  introduction  of  ESTAP  the  evaluation  and  co-ordination  of  the  road  project  was 
carried  out  by  the  different  ministries,  which  were  part  of  a  multi-ministry  committee.  It  was  at 
this  stage  that  wider  public  consultations  were  carried  out  by  the  Ministry  of  Human Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  159 
Resources'O.  This  committee  has  been  replaced  by  the  ESTAP  Project  Steering  Committee 
(PSC),  which  has  responsibility  for  co-ordinating  the  ESTAP  program  itself  and  is  made  up  of 
the  Permanent  Secretahes  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development,  the  Ministry  of  Natural 
Resources,  the  Ministry  of  Tourism  and  Environment,  the  Ministry  of  Human  Resources  and 
the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries.  The  ESTAP  Project  Manager,  as  well  as  three 
community  representatives  from  Stann  Creek  District  and  three  from  Toledo,  complete  the 
ESTAP  project  steering  committee.  The  involvement  of  the  population  of  Southern  Belize  as 
stakeholders  in  the  project  is  most  evident  in  the  structure  of  the  ESTAP  program  in  which 
public  participation  is  a  key  element. 
Overall  the  main  bodies  involved  in  the  decision  making  process  associated  with  the  Southern 
Highway  can  be  surnmarised  by  fig  6.9. 
Fig  6.9  The  Southern  Highway  decision  context 
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The  hierarchy  of  decision  making  in  respect  of  the  different  ministries  is  itself  dependent  on 
the  different  political  weight  that  they  are  given  within  the  cabinet.  This  itself  is  evident  in  the 
different  resource  allocations  given  to  the  different  ministries  and  departments,  as  well  as  the 
responsibilities  given  to  them  (World  Bank  1996).  As  such  it  is  difficult  to  identify  a  formalised 
hierarchy  for  the  decision  process  associated  with  the  road  project,  apart  from  the  existence  of 
the  committees  which  have  provided  the  basis  for  the  decision  process.  However,  the  role  of 
NEAC  is  to  a  large  extent,  however,  formalised  within  the  1995  legislation,  under  which  the 
ultimate  decision  rests  with  the  Minister  (GoBI,  1995).  In  addition  the  structure  of  the  decision 
process  associated  with  the  road  is  complicated  by  the  interaction  of  the  GoBI  with  the 
different  financing  institutions.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development 
has  played  a  key  role. 
In  terms  of  the  environmental  aspects  of  the  road  project  the  key  legislation  is  the 
comprehensive  Environmental  Protection  Act  (EPA),  which  went  into  effect  in  1993,  The  EPA 
provided  for  the  establishment  of  the  Department  of  the  Environment  which  was  invested  with 
a  number  of  regulatory  and  authoritative  powers,  including  the  power  to  require  the 
completion  of  a  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (EIA)  (World  Bank  1996).  The  1995 
legislation  on  environmental  protection  provides  further  detail  and  requires  the  completion  of  a 
EIA  for  all  national  highways  (GoBI,  1995). 
It  is  the  preparation  and  negotiation  stages  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project  with  the  external 
organisations  that  provide  the  focus  for  the  research.  A  number  of  key  reports  were  central  to 
the  Government  of  Belize's  preparation  of  the  project.  These  included  a  feasibility  study 
commissioned  by  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  in  1993,  and  an  EIA  commissioned 
in  1995,  together  with  the  project  proposals  written  by  two  consultants  employed  by  the  GoBI, 
and  which  form  the  basis  of  the  project  proposal  submitted  to  the  IDBI11.  These  reports  will  be 
referred  to  in  much  greater  detail,  in  the  following  chapters. 
6.4.2  The  IDB:  Institutional  context 
The  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  because  of  its  long  history  of  financing  similar 
projects  in  Latin  America  to  that  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  has  a  formalised  set  of 
decision-making  procedures.  What  is  interesting  about  the  Southern  Highway  Project, 
however,  is  that  there  was  a  shift  in  the  way  that  it  was  viewed.  Initially  it  was  considered  as 
merely  a  physical  infrastructure  program,  but  later  it  shifted  to  being  one  which  had  a  far 
greater  emphasis  on  the  environmental  and  social  implications  of  the  road.  Thus,  the  way  that Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  161 
the  project  was  evaluated  runs  parallel  to  the  evolution  of  the  Bank's  policy  towards  evaluation 
of  such  projects.  Increasingly  the  way  in  which  the  different  loan  proposals  are  evaluated  has 
been  given  greater  weight  within  the  Bank,  not  only  at  the  design  stage,  but  also  at  the 
implementation  stage  (IDB,  1997c).  As  such,  the  emphasis  by  the  Bank  on  a  formal 
framework  for  evaluating  projects  provides  a  useful  context  for  the  case  study. 
Essentially  the  IDB  now  requires  that  each  loan  proposal  goes  through  what  is  termed  as  the 
'Project  Cycle',  which  formalises  a  set  of  procedures  for  the  evaluation,  financing  and  carrying 
out  of  projects.  The  Project  Cycle  is  made  up  of  a  number  of  key  stages,  as  outlined  in  fig 
6.10. 
Fig 6.10  The  project  cycle 
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The  first  stage  of  the  Project  Cycle  is  based  on  the  Bank  and  the  country  reviewing  the 
country's  development  priorities  and  needs.  This  stage  directly  influences  the  Bank's  future 
lending  programme  in  the  country.  The  next  stage  involves  the  identification  of  specific 
projects  for  which  financing  is  requested.  At  this  point  both  the  Bank  and  the  borrower  identify 
the  main  issues  that  need  to  be  addressed,  as  well  as  establishing  the  strategy  and  terms  of 
reference  of  any  studies  that  will  be  necessary.  The  preparation  stage  is  then  carried  out  by 
the  borrowing  country,  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  define  the  scope  of  the  project,  establish  its 
components,  determine  costs  and  institutional  issues,  carry  out  an  environmental  assessment 
and  any  other  engineering  and  design  studies  (IDB,  1999).  The  next  stage  of  analysis  is 
carried  out  by  the  Bank  specifically  to  assess  the  financial  and  technical  feasibility  of  the 
project  from  the  Bank's  view.  After  this  the  Project  Cycle  moves  to  the  negotiation  and 
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approval  of  the  project.  It  is  at  this  stage  that  the  loan  must  be  approved  by  the  Bank's  Board 
of  Executive  Directors.  (IDB,  1999). 
It  is  the  identification,  preparation,  analysis,  negotiation  and  approval  stages  of  the  Project 
Cycle,  which  are  of  particular  interest  to  this  thesis,  as  they  embody  the  essential  decision 
process  that  all  projects  must  go  through  before  they  are  approved.  At  each  of  these  various 
stages  of  the  Project  Cycle  there  are  a  number  of  evaluation  functions.  In  the  identification 
and  project  preparation  stages  there  are  a  number  of  evaluation  tools  which  the  IDB  identify 
(IDB,  1997c).  These  include  a  logical  framework,  benchmarks  and  performance  indicators, 
baseline  data,  results-oriented  objectives  and  risk  assessment.  In  evaluating  an  application  for 
a  loan,  a  number  of  analyses  are  carried  out.  These  include  the  institutional  analysis  which 
determines  whether  the  borrower  has  the  capacity  to  carry  out  the  project,  the  technical 
evaluation,  the  socio-economic  evaluation,  the  potential  environmental  impact,  the  financial 
analysis  and  the  legal  evaluation  (IDB,  1996).  The  focus  in  the  case  study  will  be  on  those 
analyses  which  include  an  assessment  of  the  uncertainties  associated  with  the  project  and  in 
particular  hard  uncertainty  relating  to  the  environmental-economic  impacts  of  upgrading  the 
road  in  Southern  Belize. 
After  the  identification  of  the  project,  the  preparation  and  analysis  stages  are  carried  out  by  a 
project  team.  The  project  team,  therefore,  plays  a  crucial  role  in  collecting  the  necessary 
information,  commissioning  reports,  liaising  with  the  different  actors  and  eventually  preparing 
with  the  borrower  an  application  for  a  loan.  Thus,  although  the  loan  committee  makes  the 
final  decision  regarding  whether  or  not  to  approve  the  loan,  the  project  team  plays  a  crucial 
role  in  evaluating  the  project  and  making  its  recommendations  to  the  board  of  executive 
directors.  This  function  will  be  analysed  in  closer  detail  in  chapter  8.  At  present  it  is  sufficient 
to  summarise  the  overall  structure  and  hierarchy  of  the  IDB,  which  is  depicted  in  fig  6.11. 
Because  of  the  IDB's  commitment,  made  in  the  Report  on  the  Eighth  General  Increase  in  the 
Resources  of  the  Bank  (1994),  all  projects  approved  by  the  Bank  are  required  to  be 
environmentally  and  socially  sustainable  12.  The  responsibility  for  implementing  these 
objectives  in  the  IDB  falls  on  the  Committee  on  Environment  and  Social  Impact  (CESI), 
formerly  known  as  the  Environment  Committee.  The  Committee  is  made  up  of  the  following: 
the  Division  Chiefs  of  the  Environment  and  Natural  Resource  Divisions  of  regional  Operations 
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Departments  1,2  and  3;  designated  Division  Chiefs  from  the  Strategic  Planning  Department; 
the  External  Relations  Department  and  the  Legal  Department;  the  Chief  of  the  Environment 
Division  (SDS/IND);  and  finally  the  Chief  of  the  Women  in  Development  Unit  (SDS/WID).  It  is 
chaired  by  the  manager  of  Social  Programs  and  Sustainable  Development  Department  and 
also  receives  technical  support  from  the  staff  of  the  Environmental  Division  (SDS/  ENV)  13 
. 
It  is  CESI,  therefore,  and  its  members  that  also  play  an  important  role  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
environmental  affects  of  a  project  such  as  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  and  is  the  focal  point 
of  environmental  quality  and  social  impact  assessment  within  the  IDB.  As  such,  all  loans 
made  through  the  Bank  are  subject  to  the  procedures  of  CESPI.  These  procedures  are 
implemented  at  the  different  stages  of  the  project  cycle.  Therefore,  at  the  initial  programming 
stage  where  the  country  strategy  is  being  defined  there  would  be  an  assessment  of  the  main 
environmental  issues.  As  a  result,  such  a  procedure  will  be  crucial  in  determining  the  extent 
to  which  major  environmental  uncertainties  are  recognised  before  proposals  for  a  particular 
development  project  are  considered.  The  Committee  on  Environmental  and  Social  Impacts 
also  has  the  role  of  ensuring  that  its  procedures  for  producing  the  Environmental  and  Social 
Impact  Brief  are  followed  and/  or  deciding  whether  an  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  is 
required.  The  extent  to  which  this  and  other  procedures  ensure  that  environmental  uncertainty 
is  fully  accounted  for  in  the  IDB's  decision  process  will  be  addressed  in  chapter  8. 
In  the  process  of  the  Project  Cycle  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  a 
number  of  reports  and  documents  were  produced  that  are  crucial  to  the  case  study.  As  early 
as  1993  the  Environment  Committee  classified  the  project  as  a  Category  IV  operation  (the 
second  highest  category  in  terms  of  possible  environmental  impacts).  After  this  a  number  of 
reports  were  produced  which  included  an  environmental  brief,  an  environmental  summary 
(approved  in  1997),  as  well  as  the  final  loan  document.  Other  reports  that  were  financed  by 
the  IDB  included  a  further  Environmental  Impact  Assessment,  an  archaeological  assessment 
of  the  Southern  Highway,  a  National  Protected  Area  Systems  Plan  for  Belize  (IDB/  NARMAP) 
and  an  economic  feasibility  study  of  the  agricultural  development  related  to  the  Southern 
Highway  upgrading  project,  as  well  as  the  Indigenous  Peoples  Consultation  Process.  Those 
reports  used  in  the  analysis  presented  in  Chapter  8  will  be  reviewed  in  greater  detail  in  section 
6.4.4. 
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6.4.3  The  ODA/  DFID  (British  Development  Division  in  the  Caribbean):  Institutional 
context 
The  third  organisation  which  will  be  studied  to  a  much  lesser  extent  in  this  case  study  will  be 
the  former  ODA  (Overseas  Development  Agency)  now  called  the  Department  for  International 
Development  (DFID).  In  particular  the  focus  will  be  on  the  British  Development  Division  in  the 
Caribbean  (BDDC),  which  was  responsible  for  the  project.  The  information  about  the  role  of 
this  organisation  will  be  used  mainly  to  supplement  the  more  detailed  information  collected 
with  respect  to  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB.  The  main  reason  for  the  limited  study  of  the  DFID  role 
was  the  practical  difficulty  of  gaining  access  to  senior  decision  makers,  as  well as  key  reports. 
The  BDDC  was  involved  at  an  early  stage  in  the  Southern  Highway  Project.  As  mentioned 
previously  it  was  initially  involved  as  the  financier  of  section  2.  However,  due  to  a  number  of 
reports  that  questioned  the  economic  feasibility  of  this  section,  funding  was  switched  to 
section  3  in  the  form  of  a  loan.  The  UK  grant  for  section  3  was  approved  by  DFID's  Secretary 
of  State  in  February  1998.  The  BDDC  formed  the  project  team  which  had  responsibility  for 
evaluating  the  project.  For  the  Southern  Highway  this  consisted  of  a  team  of  five  members. 
As  well  as  carrying  out  their  own  project  evaluation  and  commissioning  reports,  such  as  the 
Belize  Southern  Highway  social  impact  study,  the  team  liased  extensively  with  the  GoBI  and 
the  IDB  15 
. 
The  preparation  and  evaluation  of  the  project  is  structured  in  terms  of  a  project  cycle  very 
similar  to  that  used  by  the  IDB.  At  the  different  stages  of  a  project,  certain  procedures  must 
be  carried  out  and  these  are  detailed  within  the  Office  Instructions  Manual.  These  include  the 
requirement  for  a  logical  framework  for  all  projects,  as  well  as  a  project  evaluation  which 
includes  an  assessment  of  the  'risks'  of  the  project  and  an  appraisal  of  the  environmental 
issues  raised  by  a  project.  For  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  as  well  as  the  main  body  of  the 
report,  separate  technical  annexe  were  produced  for  technical,  environmental,  economic, 
16  social  and  'risk'  analyses 
Once  completed  the  project  proposal  is  then  presented  to  the  Projects  and  Evaluation 
Committee  (PEC),  which  is  made  up  of  senior  London-based  civil  servants  (normally 
permanent  secretaries),  who  decide  whether  to  recommend  the  project  to  the  Minister  for 
International  Development.  As  is  the  case  with  the  IDB,  the  project  document,  prepared  by 
the  project  team,  therefore,  plays  a  key  role  in  this  decision  process.  The  extent  to  which  the 
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existing  evaluation  procedures,  adequately  deal  with  environmental  uncertainty  will  be  left 
until  chapter  8. 
6.4.4  Key  reports  and  information  available  to  the  decision  makers 
A  large  number  of  reports  and  studies  were  carried  out  during  the  decision  process.  The  aim 
of  this  section  is  to  summarise  briefly  the  information  that  was  available  to  decision  makers  as 
a  result  of  these  and  other  studies.  This  is  important  as  it  reflects  to  a  large  degree  what  was 
known  or,  more  importantly,  what  was  unknown.  It  was  from  the  different  reports  and  studies 
that  the  main  environmental  uncertainties  surrounding  the  project  could  be  identified.  A 
number  of  these  key  reports  also  formed  the  basis  of  the  research  carried  out  in  Belize, 
although  the  methodological  details  of  this  will  be  left  to  Chapter  7. 
The  key  studies  commissioned  for  the  project  are  given  in  fig  6.12,  while  other  studies  useful 
in  assessing  the  wider  environmental  impacts  of  the  project  are  given  in  fig  6.13.  Other  on- 
going  studies  at  the  time  that  the  Southern  Highway  Project  was  being  considered  included 
the  ODA/DFID  funded  Forest  Planning  and  Management  Plan.  This  provided  information 
aimed  at  improving  land  use  planning  and  forest  management  to  ensure  the  management  of 
the  national  forests  on  a  sustainable  basis. 
While  each  of  the  reports  commissioned  as  a  result  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project  highlight 
specific  considerations  in  terms  of  the  viability  and  possible  impacts  of  the  project,  the 
availability  of  other  reports  has  been  important  in  terms  of  information  on  certain  key  issues 
such  as  Coastal  Management.  In  relation  to  the  environmental  impacts,  although  the  EIA 
reports  focused  more  on  the  direct  physical  impacts  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern 
Highway  than  its  indirect  effects  (IDB,  1997b),  it  is  the  indirect  impacts  of  the  project  that  have 
increasingly  become  the  focus  of  concern  as  the  evaluation  of  the  project  has  progressed 
(IDB,  1997).  As  such,  in  evaluating  the  possible  indirect  environmental  impacts  of  upgrading 
the  road,  the  decision  makers  have  needed  to  draw  on  a  wide  range  of  the  reports. 
Drawing  on  these  reports  the  1997  IDB  Environmental  Summary  identified  a  number  of 
concerns  that  could  result  from  rapid  land  use  change  caused  by  the  road  as  a  result  of  agro- 
industrial  expansion,  tourism  development,  and  population  growth  from  migration,  all  of  which 
could  exert  pressure  on  the  region's  environment  and  traditional  way  of  life.  Specific 
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Fig  6.12  Studies  and  reports  carded  out  during  the  Southern  Highway  Project 
1)  Southern  Highway  Upgrading  and.  Rehabilitation  Project,  Feasibility  Study.  Kocks 
Consult  GMBH  (1993) 
2)  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  of  the  Southern  Highway  upgrading  project,  Belize, 
financed  by  the  IDB  (DHV,  1994a) 
3)  Southern  Highway  Archaeological  Assessment:  Field  Reconnaissance;  financed  by  the 
IDB  (Dunham  et  al,  1994) 
4)  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project,  financed  by 
the  Government  of  Belize  (BECA  International  Consultants,  1995) 
5)  Belize  Southern  Highway  Social  Impact  Study,  financed  by  the  ODA  (Harrison  et  al.,  1995) 
6)  A  National  Protected  Area  Systems  Plan  for  Belize:  Ecosystems  Evaluation  and  Protection 
Analysis,  financed  by  NARMAP/  IDB  Programme  for  Belize  (1995) 
7)  Economic  feasibility  study  of  the  agricultural  development  related  to  the  Southern  Highway 
Upgrading  project,  financed  by  the  IDB  (DHV,  1995) 
7)  Indigenous  Peoples  Consultation  Process  financed  by  the  IDB  (Blackstone  Corporation, 
1996) 
Fig  6.13  Additional  key  environmental  reports  and  studies  available  to  the 
decision  makers 
1)  Land  Resource  Survey  of  Toledo  District,  Belize  (Land  Resource  Development  Centre,  UK, 
King  et  al,  1996) 
2)  Land  Resource  Assessment  of  Stann  Creek  District,  Belize  (Overseas  Development 
Natural  Resources  Institute,  UK,  King  et  al,  1989) 
3)  Agricultural  Development  Prospects  in  Belize,  NRI,  ODA,  King  et  a[,  1993) 
ý4)  The  Land  Use  of  Belize  1989/92  (Land  Information  Centre,  Technical  Report  Ministry  of 
Natural  Resources,  1994) 
5)  State  of  the  Coastal  Zone  Report,  Belize,  1995.  Coastal  Zone  Management  Programme 
Government  of  Belize  (with  the  assistance  of  UNDP  and  GEF.  McField  et  al  Eds,  1996) 
6)  Belize  Environmental  Report  (World  Bank,  1996) 
7)  Belize  National  Environmental  Action  Plan  (The  Government  of  Belize,  1996) Chapter  6:  Case  study:  The  Belize  Southern  Highway  168 
problems  include:  a)  increased  social  problems;  b) 
biodiversity  due  to  increased  deforestation;  and  c) 
1997). 
erosion,  sedimentation  and  losses  in 
the  potential  loss  of  biodiversity  (IDB, 
Paradoxically  the  availability  and  information  provided  by  these  reports  also  highlights  the 
significant  gaps  present  and  reinforces  the  nature  of  the  uncertainties  faced  by  decision 
makers  in  evaluating  the  Southern  Highway  Project.  It  is  to  the  design  of  an  appropriate 
methodology  to  assess  the  way  in  which  these  uncertainties  are  evaluated  by  the  decision 
makers  that  this  thesis  now  turns. Chapter  7:  Methodology  169 
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CHAPTER  7.  -  METHODOLOGY 
7.1  Introduction 
A  recurrent  theme  in  this  thesis  has  been  the  linking  of  theory  with  practice.  This  chapter 
builds  on  this  by  focusing  on  the  methodology  used  in  this  research.  The  theoretical  approach 
underpinning  the  research  has  already  been  outlined  and  a  theoretical  framework  for 
analysing  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  environmental  decision-making  discussed. 
It  is  this  theoretical  framework  which  provides  the  impetus  for  the  investigation  and  the  basis 
of  the  case  study.  The  methods  used  in  the  fieldwork  are  the  means  by  which  the  theoretical 
aspects  of  this  thesis  are  applied.  The  design  of  the  methodology  is  therefore  of  crucial 
importance  because,  as  Murdoch  and  Pratt  highlight,  it  is: 
"the  means  by  which  social  scientists  gain  access  to  the  worid"  (Murdoch  &  Praft,  1994:  p  85) 
Specifically,  the  purpose  of  the  case  study  is  to  assess  whether  Shackle's  theory  can  be 
operationalised  in  the  context  of  environmental  uncertainty.  In  designing  a  methodology  to 
test  the  applicability  of  the  Shackle  model  a  deductive  approach  has  been  taken,  whereby  the 
focus  is  on  the  questions  of  whether  the  model  is  useful  in  explaining  the  way  that  hard 
uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  environmental  decisions  and  whether  at  an  individual  level  actual 
behaviour  is  consistent  with  the  key  elements  of  the  model  outlined  in  Chapter  5.  However, 
what  cannot  be  assessed  is  whether  an  individual,  when  faced  with  hard  uncertainty, 
approaches  the  decision  process  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  Shackle  model,  as  opposed 
to,  for  example,  the  expected  utility  (or  variant)  model'.  This  issue  has  been  dealt  with  at  a 
theoretical  level  earlier. 
Although  this  chapter  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  design  of  a  suitable  methodology  which 
will  enable  an  evaluation  of  the  behavioural  or  positive  assumptions  of  the  developed  model,  it 
is  not  advantageous  to  completely  separate  questions  of  what  should  happen  from  what  does 
An  excellent  range  of  experiments  which  have  been  carried  out  and  which  attempt  to  provide  evidence  on 
the  choice  by  individuals  in  respect  of  the  different  measures  of  uncertainty  put  forward  by  alternative 
models,  are  detailed  in  Ford  &  Ghose  (1994a:  1994b;  1995a;  1995b;  1995c)  A  possible  means  of 
distinguishing  between  the  use  of  the  Shackle  model  and  the  expected  utility  model  is  found  in  Ford 
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happen.  Normative  approaches,  if  they  are  to  have  any  relevance,  must  recognise  the  limits 
of  human  cognitive  ability,  as  well  as  the  limits  and  realities  inherent  in  decision-making 
structures  and  institutions.  They  must  also  be  tempered  by  what  is  the  best  that  the  decision- 
making  process  can  hope  to  achieve  in  given  circumstances.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in 
situations  of  hard  uncertainty  where,  as  was  argued  in  the  previous  chapters,  notions  of 
optimality  are  often  meaningless.  As  such  therefore,  one  eye  was  kept  on  assessing  whether 
particular  features  of  the  model  of  decision-making  under  hard  uncertainty  lend  themselves  to 
being  operationalised  in  a  normative  manner. 
As  the  main  theoretical  issues  have  already  been  dealt  with  before,  this  chapter  focuses  on 
the  design  of  the  questionnaire  used  in  the  fieldwork,  and  its  subsequent  analysis.  The  next 
section  specifically  raises  some  of  the  main  issues  of  concern  relating  to  the  design  of  the 
fieldwork  methodology,  justifying  in  particular  the  use  of  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
approaches.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  sources  and  methods  used  in  the 
collection  of  data  for  the  research.  Section  7.3  focuses  on  design  issues  relating  to  the 
interviews  carried  out,  with  particular  attention  focusing  on  the  design  of  the  questionnaire 
used  to  assess  the  applicability  of  the  variant  of  the  Shackle  model  used.  The  next  section 
concentrates  on  the  use  of  the  structured  interviews  to  gain  more  general  information  on 
environmental  decision-making  under  uncertainty.  Finally,  the  method  adopted  for  analysing 
the  data  is described,  before  an  assessment  of  the  validity  and  robustness  of  the  methodology 
and  analysis  is  made. 
1.1  Designing  a  research  framework  for  testing  the  Shackle  model 
Designing  a  framework  for  testing  the  Shackle  model  raises  a  number  of  issues  surrounding 
the  epistemological  position  associated  with  particular  research  methods.  In  particular  the 
use  of  quantitative  methods  has  to  a  large  extent  been  associated  with  a  positivist  approach, 
which  emphasises  the  identification  of  laws  and  genera  I  isatio  ns.  In  contrast  qualitative 
methods  have  been  most  closely  associated  with  post-modern  or  post  structuralist 
approaches  (Devine,  1995).  However,  it  should  be  recognised  that  there  are  no  necessarily 
fixed  linkages  between  epistemology  and  the  type  of  research  methodology  adopted 
(McKendrick,  1996).  Indeed,  when  carefully  designed,  the  two  can  be  applied  in  a 
complementary  manner.  Given  the  aim  of  testing  the  application  of  the  model  in  the  context  of 
a  real  world  decision,  a  flexible,  multi-method  approach  was  adopted.  This  reflected  the  need 
to  gain  the  information  from  a  wide  range  of  different  data  sources,  as  well  as  the  immediate 
requirement  of  an  interview  approach  to  test  both  the  more  general  and  the  specific 
assumptions  of  the  model.  It  is  through  the  use  of  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative Chapter  7:  Methodology  172 
techniques  that  different  research  questions  have  therefore  been  asked.  Furthermore,  where 
the  information  or  data  collected  is  designed  to  overlap  this  allows  a  check  to  be  made  on  the 
consistency  and  validity  of  the  research. 
The  separation  of  epistemology  from  the  methodological  approach  is  highlighted  in  relation  to 
operationalising  the  Shackle  model  in  a  behavioural  manner.  Although  the  model  provides  a 
general  framework  under  which  behaviour  can  be  explained,  room  is  allowed  to  accommodate 
the  uniqueness  of  the  individual's  decision-making  context.  This  reinforces  the  position  taken 
that,  while  it  will  be  possible  to  apply  methods  to  evaluate  objectively  a  particular  theory,  the 
data  and  results  collected  are  conditional  on  the  specific  decision  context  with  in  which  the 
individual  operates  at  a  particular  point  in  time  and  thus  can  not  be  replicated.  This 
recognises  that  such  evaluation  will  not  result  in  conclusive  proof  of  the  veracity  of  the  theory 
in  question  (Keat  &  Urry,  1975).  The  emphasis  is  therefore  not  on  a  designing  a  framework 
which  will  allow  predictions  to  be  made  about  the  resulting  decision  per  se,  but  on  explaining 
the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is  evaluated  by  the  individual  involved  in  the  decision-making 
process. 
The  choice  of  the  case  study  of  a  'real  world  decision'  rather  than  designing  an  experimental 
situation  was  another  important  factor  in  guiding  the  methodology  adopted  for  the  collection  of 
data.  This  choice  reflected  the  importance  of  observing  behaviour  in  relation  to  the  decision 
process  associated  with  an  actual  project  with  which  they  would  be  familiar,  rather  than  a 
hypothetically  observed  situation.  By  using  a  real  world  decision  context  it  is  contended  that  a 
better  insight  is  given  into  the  research,  than  could  be  gained  from  experimental  situations, 
due  to  the  familiarity  and  involvement  of  those  interviewed  in  the  decision-making  process. 
However,  the  application  of  the  model  to  the  evaluation  of  environmental  uncertainty  in  an 
actual  decision  does  result  in  a  number  of  practical  limitations,  which  imply  the  need  for  a 
greater  degree  of  flexibility  in  the  approach  taken.  This  reinforces  the  choice  of  a  multi- 
method  approach  as  the  most  appropriate  in  designing  a  suitable  framework  for  applying  the 
model  to  the  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway. 
7.2  The  collection  of  data 
Two  main  sources  of  data  were  used  in  the  research.  The  first  involved  the  collection  and 
analysis  of  relevant  documents  on  the  Southern  Highway  Project  while  the  second  involved 
the  interviewing  of  decision  makers  involved  directly  with  the  evaluation  of  the  Southern 
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and  capable  of  giving  insights  into  how  environmental  uncertainty  was  evaluated  in  the 
decision  making  process. 
7.2.1  Documentary  data 
Before  the  fieldwork  could  be  carded  out,  a  large  amount  of  reports  and  data  had  to  be 
collected,  both  as  background  material  and  to  allow  the  construction  of  the  questionnaires. 
Four  months  before  the  date  of  the  fieldwork,  correspondence  was  entered  with  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank  (IDB)  and  the  Government  of  Belize  (GoBI)  to  collect  as  many 
reports  on  the  project  as  possible.  In  particular  key  reports  at  this  stage  were  the  feasibility 
study  (Kocks,  1993),  the  environmental  assessments  (DHV,  1994a;  BECCA,  1995)  the 
Environmental  Summary  (IDB,  1997a)  and  the  Belize  Environmental  Report  (World  Bank, 
1996). 
These  reports  were  used  to  familiarise  the  researcher  with  all  the  different  aspects  of  the 
project.  This  analysis  was  crucial  to  the  construction  of  the  structured  interview  and 
questionnaire,  as  it  allowed  a  sufficiently  deep  understanding  of  the  project  for  the  key  issues 
to  be  identified.  In  particular  the  focus  at  this  stage  was  on  identifying  the  key  uncertainties  in 
the  project,  especially  in  relation  to  its  environmental  impacts.  At  this  initial  stage,  for 
example,  it  was  evident  that  with  regard  to  the  indirect  effects  of  the  upgrading  of  the  Southern 
Highway,  the  dominant  mode  of  uncertainty  would  be  that  of  hard  uncertainty.  As  such, 
attention  was  focused  on  gaining  as  much  background  information  on  the  possible  indirect 
consequences  of  the  road.  Furthermore,  analysis  of  the  key  reports  provided  information  on 
the  decision  context  of  the  project.  This  was  important  in  relation  to  identifying  the  key 
individuals  and  organisations  that  would  have  to  be  interviewed,  as  well  as  the  structure  of  the 
decision-making  process  associated  with  the  evaluation  of  the  project.  As  Wagstaffe  &  Moyer 
(1987)  stressed  this  preliminary  research  phase  cannot  be  overemphasised. 
The  second  objective  behind  analysing  the  different  reports  was  to  gain  evidence  from  the 
reports  themselves  on  the  way  that  uncertainty  was  evaluated.  For  example  was  it  handled  in 
a  qualitative  or  quantitative  manner  ?  This  was  important  in  relation  to  linking  theory  to 
practice,  in  that  while  the  expected  utility  model  is  without  doubt  the  dominant  model  used  in 
economic  theory,  it  was  believed  that  the  practice  would  be  very  different  from  that  implied  in 
the  use  of  such  a  model.  Consequently  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  different  ways  in 
which  uncertainty  was  identified  and  the  approaches  to  uncertainty  detailed  in  the  reports 
were  reviewed.  The  third  objective  in  analysing  the  different  documents  specific  to  the  Belize 
Southern  Highway  was  to  design  the  questions  that  would  be  used  to  test  the  assumptions  of Chapter  7:  Methodology  174 
the  developed  model.  In  particular  the  documentary  data  collected  were  crucial  to  the 
construction  of  the  scenarios  which  formed  a  key  element  of  the  interviews. 
The  second  phase  involving  collection  of  documentary  evidence  was  carried  out  during  the 
period  of  fieldwork  between  the  end  of  June  and  October  1997.  The  first  three  months  were 
spent  in  Belize  and  the  last  month  was  spent  in  Washington  D.  C.  At  the  initial  stage,  before 
the  interviews  were  carried  out  in  Belize  and  in  Washington,  a  range  of  documents  was 
collected  and  the  information  gathered  was  thoroughly  analysed,  so  as  to  refine  the  initial 
drafts  of  the  questions  to  be  used  in  the  interviews,  as  well  as  provide  further  data  necessary 
for  the  construction  of  the  scenarios. 
7.2.3  Access  to  documents,  before  field  visit  and  during 
A  key  reason  for  choosing  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  as  the  basis  of  the  case  study  was 
the  accessibility  of  the  necessary  information.  Nevertheless,  even  though  the  majority  of  the 
documents  utilised  were  in  the  public  domain,  in  some  cases  access  was  granted  to 
confidential  material.  At  the  preliminary  stage  of  collection,  the  majority  of  documents  were 
obtained  from  the  IDB  or  from  the  collection  held  by  the  Department  of  Geography,  University 
of  Edinburgh.  In  the  latter  case  key  reports  were  identified  and  researchers  in  the  department 
with  substantial  knowledge  of  Belize  consulted.  An  important  aspect  of  the  research  during 
this  period  was  the  identification  of  further  documents  which  would  need  to  be  collected  from 
external  agencies.  The  key  documents  collected  at  this  stage  are  shown  in  table  7.1.  Access 
and  collection  of  documents  during  the  period  of  the  field  work  was  largely  done  on  a  personal 
basis.  In  the  case  of  Belize,  before  the  interviews  were  carried  out,  a  number  of  visits  were 
made  to  different  ministries  and  departments,  such  as  the  Land  Information  Centre,  to  gain 
key  reports  and  maps,  which  although  previously  identified  as  important  sources  of 
information,  were  unobtainable  in  the  UK.  In  Washington  D.  C.,  a  similar  initial  period  was 
spent  researching  documents  and  reports,  in  the  research  centre  at  the  IDB  headquarters.  In 
the  course  of  the  interviews  a  number  of  further  documents  were  also  identified  and  in  many 
cases  made  available  by  the  particular  decision  maker,  at  the  time  of  the  interview.  Examples 
of  some  of  the  documents  collected  for  analysis  during  the  fieldwork  period  are  included  in 
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Table  7.1  Key  documents  obtained  at  the  preliminary  stage 
1)  Southern  Highway  Upgrading  and  Rehabilitation  Project,  Feasibility  Study.  Kocks 
Consult  GMBH  (1993) 
2)  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  of  the  Southern  Highway  upgrading  project,  Belize, 
financed  by  the  IDB  (DHV,  1994a) 
3)  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project,  financed 
by  the  Government  of  Belize  (BECCA  International  Consultants,  1995) 
4)  Belize  Southern  Highway  Social  Impact  Study,  financed  by  the  ODA  (Harrison  et  al., 
1995) 
5)  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project,  Environmental  Summary  (Working  Draft)  (IDB, 
1997a) 
6)  Belize  Environmental  Report  (World  Bank,  1996) 
7)  Land  Resource  Survey  of  Toledo  District,  Belize  (Land  Resource  Development  Centre, 
UK,  King  et  al,  1996) 
8)  Land  Resource  Assessment  of  Stann  Creek  District,  Belize  (Overseas  Development 
Natural  Resources  Institute,  UK,  King  et  al,  1989) 
9)  Agricultural  Development  Prospects  in  Belize,  NRI,  ODA,  King  et  al,  1993) 
10)  The  Land  Use  of  Belize  1989/92  (Land  Information  Centre,  Technical  Report  Ministry  of 
Natural  Resources,  1994) 
11)  State  of  the  Coastal  Zone  Report,  Belize,  1995.  Coastal  Zone  Management 
Programme  Government  of  Belize  (with  the  assistance  of  UNDP  and  GEF.  McField  et 
al  (eds)  1996) 
12)  Land  Use  in  Stann  Creek  District  (1989/1992)  1:  200,000,  Land  Information  Centre,  The 
land  Information  Centre  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
13)  Land  Use  in  Toledo  District  (1989/1992),  1:  200,000,  Land  Information  Centre,  The 
land  Information  Centre  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
14)  Stann  Creek  District,  Land  Systems  (1988)  1:  100,000,  Overseas  Development  Natural 
Resources  Institute 
15)  Toledo  District,  Land  Systems  (1988)  1:  100,000,  Overseas  Development  Natural 
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Table  7.2  Examples  of  documents  obtained  during  the  period  of  fieldwork 
1)  A  National  Protected  Area  Systems  Plan  for  Belize:  Ecosystems  Evaluation  and 
Protection  Analysis,  financed  by  NARMAP/  I  DB  Programme  for  Belize  (1995) 
2)  Belize  National  Environmental  Action  Plan  (The  Government  of  Belize,  1996) 
3)  Environmental  Protection  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Regulations,  1995, 
Statutory  Instrument  No.  107  of  1995.  Ministry  of  Tourism  and  the  Environment. 
Department  of  the  Environment.  The  Government  of  Belize. 
4)  Minutes  of  the  Project  Steering  Committee  Meeting,  Environmental  and  Social 
Technical  Assistance  Project  (ESTAP) 
5)  Bis  Weekly.  Government  of  Belize. 
6)  The  Columbia  Controlled  Felling  Program.  Forest  Planning  and  Management  Unit, 
Ministry  of  Natural  resources,  Belmopan 
, 
Belize 
7)  Strategy  for  evaluating  the  Benefits  Derived  from  the  Columbia  Forest  Management 
Unit.  Ministry  of  Natural  resources,  Belmopan 
, 
Belize 
8)  Port  Feasibility  Study,  Big  Creek.  Final  Report.  Government  of  Belize,  Ministry  of 
Agriculture.  April  1998 
9)  Proceedings  of  the  Second  National  Symposium  on  the  State  of  The  Belize 
Environment,  Department  of  the  Environment,  Ministry  of  Tourism  and  the 
Environment. 
10)  Economic  Feasibility  Study  of  the  Agricultural  Development  related  to  the  Southern 
Highway  Rehabilitation  Project  Belize.  Final  Report,  1994. 
11)  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project.  Environmental  Summary.  August  1997,  IDB- 
11)  The  Manual  of  Environmental  Appraisal,  Overseas  Development  Administration 
7.3.  Conducting  the  interviews 
Although  the  use  of  interviewing  as  a  research  method  is  common  in  geography,  it  is  more 
limited  in  the  case  of  economics,  where  there  is  a  preference  for  indirect  observations  of 
(market)  behaviour.  The  development  of  environmental/  ecological  economics  has  led  to  a 
wider  use  of  different  research  methods,  including  an  increasing  use  of  questionnaires,  best 
exemplified  in  the  proliferation  of  Contingent  Valuation  surveys.  Although  the  use  of  such 
questionnaires  has  raised  a  number  of  issues  surrounding  the  presence  of  biases  (Bateman  & 
Turner,  1993)  and  their  consequent  reliability,  it  is  evident  that  in  relation  to  observing  the 
behaviour  of  individuals  there  is  no  alternative  means  of  eliciting  the  information.  Moreover, 
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otherwise  be  unobtainable.  Furthermore,  in  order  to  assess  whether  an  individual  is  using  a 
normatively  operational  criterion  to  guide  behaviour,  there  is  no  alternative  to  simply  asking 
him  or  her  (Katzner,  1995). 
The  choice  of  interview  techniques  was  another  factor  for  consideration  in  the  design  of  the 
research  methodology.  The  use  of  interviews  in  environmental  economics  has  been  limited  to 
the  use  of  formal  questionnaires  designed  to  elicit  quantitative  information,  as  in  the  case  in 
Contingent  Valuation  surveys  or  market  research  surveys.  While  such  an  approach  is  useful 
in  obtaining  specific  data  which  are  suitable  for  quantitative  analysis,  it  does  limit  those  being 
interviewed  in  terms  of  the  response  and  interpretation  of  the  original  question  (Schoenberger, 
1991).  Equally,  it  was  foreseen  that,  in  terms  of  operationalising  the  Shackle  model  in  the 
context  of  the  case  study,  a  number  of  problems  would  arise  that  would  mean  that  a  purely 
quantitative  approach  would  be  inadequate.  As  a  consequence  of  these  concerns,  the 
interviews  utilised  a  mixture  of  questions  designed  to  elicit  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
data.  The  two  approaches  were  specifically  designed  therefore  with  different,  yet 
complementary  aims  in  mind. 
A  further  consideration  in  designing  the  approach  taken  in  the  interviews  was  in  relation  to  the 
decision  context  of  the  person  to  whom  the  questions  would  be  directed.  The  primary  focus, 
in  terms  of  testing  the  assumptions  of  the  model,  was  on  decision  makers  involved  in  the 
evaluation  stages  of  the  project  in  the  GoBI,  as  well  as  the  IDB  (see  appendix  1).  In  the  IDB 
and  BIDIDC  more  general  focused  interviews  were  also  designed  for  a  smaller  number  of 
decision  makers  who,  although  familiar  with  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  project,  were  not  in 
a  position  to  answer  the  detailed  quantitative  questions  (see  appendix  6).  Instead  these 
decision  makers  were  asked  questions  relating  to  the  way  that  environmental  uncertainty  was 
evaluated  at  a  more  general  level.  The  specific  design  of  the  questionnaire  relating  to  the 
Southern  Highway  Project  and  the  more  general  focused  interviews  will  be  outlined  in 
sections  7.3.2  and  7.3.3  respectively. 
7.3.1.7  Interviews  carried  out  in  Belize 
Three  months  were  spent  in  Belize  (End  of  June-September,  1997)  in  order  to  carry  out  the 
fieldwork.  The  selection  of  the  decision  makers  to  be  interviewed  in  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB 
was  based  on  a  sampling  strategy  which  involved  interviewing  as  many  of  the  decision 
makers  involved  in  the  evaluation  of  the  road  projects  as  possible.  As  such,  the  emphasis 
was  on  interviewing  the  civil  servants  involved  in  the  evaluation  stages  rather  than  those 
involved  in  the  political  decision-making  process.  This  reflected  the  focus  of  the  research  on Chapter  7:  Methodology  178 
the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  within  the  decision-making  process,  rather  than  on  the  resulting 
decision  per  se.  Initial  interviews  were  carried  out  with  the  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  lead 
Ministry  involved  in  the  project,  namely  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  and  a  list  of 
decision  makers  to  be  interviewed  was  drawn  up.  This  list  comprised  decision  makers  from 
the  six  Government  Ministries  involved  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway  and  their 
respective  departments,  as  well  as  those  involved  in  National  Environmental  Appraisal 
Committee  (NEAC),  which  had  originally  evaluated  the  project  and  the  newly  formed  ESTAP 
(see  fig  6.9).  With  regards  to  identifying  specific  individuals,  contact  was  limited  to  those  to 
those  who  had  had  access  to  the  technical  reports  which  formed  the  basis  of  the  interview.  A 
list  of  the  decision-makers  finally  interviewed,  as  well  as  their  position  and  institution/  agency, 
is  presented  in  table  7.3.  Overall  20  individuals  were  interviewed. 
Mr  Mathews  was  interviewed,  while  on  mission  in  Belize,  and  was  the  only  member  of  the 
BDDC  project  team  working  on  the  Southern  Highway  project  to  be  interviewed.  This  was 
mainly  due  to  cost  as  it  was  prohibitive  to  go  to  Barbados  to  interview  the  four  other  team 
members.  A  further  reason  for  not  pursuing  further  interviews  with  the  BDDC/  DFID  was  that 
a  large  amount  of  the  information,  that  the  project  team  were  using  to  evaluate  the  project, 
was  at  the  time  not  in  the  public  domain.  This  meant  that  the  interviews  would  have  been 
severely  restricted  in  terms  of  what  could  be  covered.  The  final  problem  was  the  difficulty  in 
accessing  the  top  tier  of  the  decision-making  process  in  the  civil  service,  namely  the  Project 
Evaluation  Committee  at  a  time  when  the  Government  in  the  UK  had  just  changed.  These 
difficulties  meant  that  the  information  gained  with  respect  to  DFID  was  largely  in  relation  to 
more  general  evaluation  procedures. 
7.3.1.2  Interviews  carried  out  in  Washington  D.  C. 
One  month  was  spent  in  Washington  D.  C  conducting  interviews  with  individuals  in  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank.  Identification  of  those  involved  in  the  Southern  Highway  project 
was  achieved  by  reference  to  documents  obtained  from  the  research  centre,  as  well  by 
meetings  with  the  project  leader,  who  helped  to  identify  the  individuals  involved  at  various 
stages  in  the  decision-making  process.  Further  individuals  were  then  identified  in  the  course 
of  the  interviews.  In  this  way  a  large  number  of  those  involved  in  the  decision-making  process 
associated  with  the  road  were  interviewed.  Table  7.4  lists  the  decision  makers  interviewed  in 
the  IDB.  Overall  15  individuals  were  interviewed.  While  in  Washington  D.  C,  two 
environmental  specialists  were  also  interviewed  in  the  World  Bank,  Olav  Kjorven  and  Peter  A. 
Dewees,  to  get  an  impression  of  the  way  that  environmental  uncertainty  surrounding 
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Table  7.3  List  of  interviewees  in  Belize 
Name  Position  Institution/  agency 
Yvonne  Hyde  Permanent  Secretary  Ministry  of  Economic  Development,  GoBI 
Lindsay  Beslile  Permanent  Secretary  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
Pedro  Carillo  Chief  Engineer  Ministry  of  Works 
Ismael  Fabro,  Chief  Environmental  Officer  Department  of  Environment,  Chairman  of 
NEAC 
Richard  Beslile  Chief  Forest  Officer  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
, 
NEAC 
Elfrain  Aldana,  Chief  Agricultural  Officer  &  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries,  NEAC 
Acting  Permanent  Secretary 
Evan  Dakers  Social  Planner  Ministry  of  Human  Resources,  ESTAP 
Rudolph  Williams  Senior  Hydrologist  National  Hydrological  Service.  NEAC 
Fay  Smith  Geologist  Geology  and  Petroleum  Unit,  NEAC 
Imaini  Fairweather  Planner  Housing  and  Planning  Department,  NEAC 
Evaristo  Avella  Environmental  Officer  Department  of  Environment,  NEAC 
James  Azueca  Marine  Protected  Areas  Ministry  of  Fisheries,  NEAC 
Co-ordinator 
Mrs  Cardonna  Physical  Planner  Physical  Planning  Section,  NEAC 
Janet  Gibson  National  Project  Advisor  UNDP  Coastal  Zone  Management  Project, 
NEAC 
Fred  Hunter  ESTAP  Project  Manager  ESTAP 
Gregory  Choc  Toledo  Community  ESTAP 
Representative 
Andrew  Mitchell  Forest  Economist  Forest  Planning  and  Management  Unit 
Neil  Bird  Forest  Management  Specialist  Forest  Planning  and  Management  Unit, 
RH  Mathews  Senior  Engineering  Advisor  British  Development  Division  in  the 
Caribbean,  ODA/  DFID 
Gareth  O'Brien  Third  Secretary  Aid  British  High  Commission  Belmopan 
7.3.7.3  Interviewing  practicalities 
Because  the  majority  of  those  involved  in  the  evaluation  stages  of  the  decision-making 
process  associated  with  the  project  were  interviewed,  the  sample  was  very  close  to  that  of  the 
total  population.  The  Interviews  were  arranged  by  first  writing  to  the  different  Ministries  in 
Belize  and  in  the  case  of  the  IDB,  to  the  project  leader.  At  this  and  later  stages,  the  context  of 
the  research  was  described  and  the  impartial  nature  of  the  work  stressed.  In  part,  cular  it  was 
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of  environmental  uncertainty,  rather  than  on  assessing  the  road  project  itself  or  the  resulting 
decision.  This  was  particularly  important  given  the  controversial  nature  of  some  aspects  of 
the  road  project. 
In  Belize  once  a  list  of  those  involved  with  the  decision-making  process  was  identified, 
contacts  were  made  by  phone  and  interviews  were  arranged.  The  majodty  of  the  interviews 
were  carried  out  in  Belmopan,  the  administrative  capital,  although  a  further  number  were  also 
carried  out  in  Belize  City,  and  Punta  Gorda.  In  the  case  of  the  IDB,  access  to  higher  level 
senior  decision  makers  was  facilitated  by  previous  interviewee's  introductions.  Overall,  in 
both  Belize  and  Washington,  only  two  individuals  refused  interviews. 
Table  7.4  Decision  makers  interviewed  in  the  IDB 
Name  Position  Department/  Off  ice 
Edward  T.  Costello  Officer  -  Country  Division  4 
Mich6le  H.  Lemay  Coastal  Resources  Specialist 
Luis  R.  Zavaleta  Remy  Agricultural  Economist 
Juan  Manuel  Fernandez  Operations  Officer  -  Country 
Division  4. 
Anne  Deruyttere  Chief 
Dana  V.  Martin  Attorney 
Luis  Hidalgo  Transport  Specialist 
Ricardo  E  Quiroga  Economist 
Walter  Gomez  D'Angelo  Economist 
Alberto  Uribe  Environment  and  Natural 
Resources  Management 
Division 
Margaret  Hagan  Wood  Country  Co-ordinator 
Antonio  Carlos  Rossin  Senior  Industrial  and  Urban 
Pollution  Control  Specialist 
William  J.  Vaughan  Senior  Economist 
Eleanor  H.  Howard  Deputy  Manager 
Regional  Operations  Department  2 
Environmental  Division 
Controllers  Office 
Regional  Operations 
Department  2 
Indigenous  Peoples  and 
Community  Development  Unit 
Regional  Operations 
Department  2 
Management  Division  2.  Regional 
Operations  Department  2 
Environment  and  Natural  Resources 
Management  Division  2 
Regional  Operations  Department  2 
Region  3,  Country  Division  6 
Environmental  Division 
Regional  Operations  Department  2 
Strategic  Planning  and  Operational 
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Because  of  the  relatively  small  number  of  people  involved  in  the  evaluation  stage  in  the 
decision-making  process  associated  with  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Southern  Highway,  a  pilot 
survey  could  not  be  conducted.  The  only  way  in  which  the  interview  itself  and  interviewing 
technique  could  be  piloted  was  by  conducting  a  number  of  informal  interviews  with  individuals 
not  directly  involved  in  the  project  evaluation,  who  were  nevertheless  familiar  with  the 
technical  details  surrounding  it.  After  these  and  a  number  of  initial  interviews  it  soon  became 
clear  what  would  work  and  as  a  result  the  questionnaire  and  techniques  was  adjusted  and 
better  defined  questions  were  constructed.  After  this  the  questionnaire  format  was  unchanged 
with  the  exception  of  references  to  the  specific  institution  to  which  the  decision  maker 
belonged  (see  appendix  1,  Q3  and  Q6).  In  respect  of  the  focused  interviews  designed  to  elicit 
information  on  decision  making  under  uncertainty  in  the  IDB  at  a  more  general  level,  a  more 
flexible  approach  was  taken,  with  the  list  and  order  of  questions  only  loosely  structured  (see 
appendix  6).  All  the  decision  makers  were  interviewed  on  an  individual  basis.  A  further 
concern  in  the  design  of  the  questions  asked  in  the  interviews  was  that  the  time  taken  would 
be  as  short  as  possible.  In  general  the  average  time  taken  for  the  interview  was  one  hour. 
At  all  the  interviews  the  respondent  was  asked  if  they  would  mind  if  the  interview  was  tape 
recorded,  the  advantage  of  taping  the  interviews  was  that  the  analysis  of  the  interviews  could 
be  as  accurate  as  possible.  Only  four  respondents  declined  to  be  recorded  and  in  these 
cases  hand  written  notes  were  taken.  In  all  cases  assurances  of  confidentiality  were  given. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  Ministry  of  Economic  Development  and 
the  Project  Leader  at  the  IDB,  who  were  interviewed  twice,  all  the  decision  makers  were 
interviewed  only  once.  The  decision  makers  were  asked  either  the  specific  questions  (see 
appendix  1)  relating  to  the  Southern  Highway  Project  (23  in  total,  from  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB) 
or  the  more  general  questions  (see  appendix  6,  restricted  to  6  individuals  in  the  IDB,  3  from 
the  GoBl,  1  from  the  BDDC  and  2  from  the  World  Bank).  All  the  interviews  were  carried  out  in 
person,  during  the  period  of  fieldwork,  which  was  thought  particularly  important  in  relation  to 
explaining  fully  to  the  respondents  what  was  being  asked.  Only  one  individual  refused  to  be 
interviewed. 
7.3.2  Design  of  the  questionnaire  specific  to  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  PrpjeCt2 
There  were  two  main  parts  to  the  questionnaire  which  was  directed  at  decision  makers 
involved  in  the  evaluation  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project.  The  first  part  (QS  1-6)  was 
structured,  so  as  to  allow  the  decision  maker  to  respond  as  freely  as  possible  to  the  particular 
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issue  raised  on  a  purely  qualitative  basis  (see  appendix  1).  As  well  as  gaining  specific 
information,  starting  with  the  less  formal  and  loosely  structured  questions  helped  to  build  a 
rapport  with  the  decision  maker,  before  the  more  formal  and  more  demanding  section  of  the 
questionnaire  was  started.  Another  more  general  aim  of  the  first  part  of  the  interview  was  to 
ensure  that  the  decision  maker's  attention  was  fixed  on  the  Southern  Highway  Project  and  in 
particular  the  evaluation  process. 
More  specifically,  Q1  and  Q2  were  designed  to  provided  details  of  the  decision  making 
context  and  the  role  of  the  individual  in  the  decision  making  process.  Questions  3  to  6  were 
designed  to  gain  qualitative  information  on  the  extent  to  which  uncertainties  surrounding  the 
project  had  been  identified,  how  they  had  been  evaluated,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  had 
affected  the  decision-making  process.  These  questions  not  only  reminded  the  decision-maker 
of  the  way  that  he/  she  had  evaluated  the  Southern  Highway  Project  (which  was  important  for 
the  second  part  of  the  questionnaire),  but  allowed  the  respondent  to  give  answers,  without 
assuming  the  existence  of  a  particular  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty. 
The  second  part  of  the  questionnaire  (Qs  7-  20,  appendix  1)  involved  the  use  of  a  more 
formal  questionnaire  based  on  a  number  of  scenarios  presented  to  the  decision  maker  (see 
appendix  2).  The  questions  were  specifically  designed  to  elicit  a  mix  of  qualitative  data  and 
quantitative  data  that  would  provide  information  on:  1)  the  way  that  the  individual  evaluated 
the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possible  gains  and  loss  associated  with  the  Southern  Highway 
Project  (Qs  7-13,  qualitative  only);  and  2)  to  provide  data  that  would  allow  a  number  of 
propositions  derived  from  the  key  elements  of  the  model  to  be  tested  (Qs  14-20,  qualitative 
and  quantitative).  On  the  basis  of  this,  the  usefulness  of  the  model  as  a  means  of  explaining 
the  way  in  which  uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  the  decision-making  process  could  be 
ascertained.  Before  more  detail  is  given  on  the  design  of  questions  7-20,  in  section  7.3.2.2, 
the  construction  of  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios  which  formed  the  basis  of  these  questions  will 
be  now  described. 
7.3.2.1  Preparation  of  the  hypothesised  outcomesl  scenarios 
The  design  of  the  formal  questionnaire  involved  a  considerable  amount  of  preparation.  This 
was  due  to  the  wide  range  of  information  that  had  to  be  collected  and  analysed,  before  any 
subsequent  analysis  could  be  carried  out.  After  the  key  elements  of  the  model  had  been 
theoretically  developed,  attention  turned  to  how  the  main  elements  of  the  model  could  be 
practically  operationallsed  in  relation  to  the  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway.  The Chapter  7:  Methodology  18.3  3 
methodology  focused,  therefore,  on  the  construction  of  the  potential  surprise  function  of  the 
individual  and  the  specification  of  his  or  her  ascendancy  function.  Both  of  these  elements 
required  that  a  set  of  possible  gain  and  loss  scenarios,  with  corresponding  valuations,  be 
identified.  This  had  not  been  done  in  a  formal  manner  in  any  of  the  project  documents  or 
reports.  It  was  the  construction  of  possible  gain  and  loss  outcomes  that  could  occur  as  a 
result  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  that  formed  the  basis  of  the  design 
of  the  formal  questionnaire. 
Although  it  would  have  been  interesting  to  allow  the  decision  makers  to  construct  their  own  list 
of  possible  gain  and  loss  outcomes  (as  was  done  in  Ford  &  Ghose,  1995c),  the  requirement 
that  a  gain  and  loss  value  be  specified  in  relation  to  each  possible  outcome  of  the  road  project 
precluded  this  for  practical  reasons  (notably  the  length  of  interview  required  to  enable  the 
decision  makers  to  construct  the  scenarios  and  place  valuations,  as  well  as  access  to 
information).  For  these  reasons  it  was  decided  that  a  range  of  gain  and  loss  outcomes,  which 
reflected  as  far  as  possible  the  information  available  to  the  decision  makers  at  the  time,  would 
be  prepared  in  advance  of  the  interviews  and  presented  within  the  formal  questionnaire.  The 
construction  of  the  different  outcomes  was  based  on  the  project  documents  that  had  been 
received  prior  to  the  commencement  of  fieldwork  in  Belize  and  were  modified  slightly  in 
Belize,  after  additional  information  had  been  collected,  and  prior  to  the  scheduling  of  the 
interviews  with  the  decision  makers.  The  key  design  concern  was  to  make  the  different 
scenarios  reflect  as  fully  as  possible  the  information  available  to  the  decision  makers  at  the 
time.  In  particular  the  reports  were  used  to  describe  possible  scenarios  which  could  occur  as 
the  result  of  the  road.  The  tendency  of  the  different  reports  to  separate  the  possible  positive 
and  negative  impacts  of  the  road  facilitated  this.  As  was  stated  earlier,  in  terms  of  the 
negative  impacts  of  the  road,  the  focus  was  on  the  indirect  consequences,  particularly  those 
related  to  environmental  affects.  At  this  stage  it  was  decided  that  a  total  of  10  scenarios,  five 
gain  and  five  loss,  would  be  sufficient  to  encapsulate  the  range  of  hypothesised  outcomes 
(see  appendix  2).  A  further  practical  consideration  was  that,  because  a  detailed  description 
was  to  be  provided  for  each  scenario,  any  more  scenarios  would  require  a  longer  period  of 
time  for  the  respondent  to  go  through.  The  next  stage  was  to  attach  estimates  of  the  possible 
gains  and  losses  associated  with  each  scenario  in  the  form  of  monetary  values.  This 
necessitated  the  detailed  information  in  the  project  reports  on  the  economic  feasibility  of  the 
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The  gain  scenarios 
Identifying  the  monetary  values  associated  with  the  road  was  relatively  simple  for  the  gains  as 
opposed  to  the  losses,  due  to  the  availability  of  the  analysis  carried  out  in  the  Kocks  (1993) 
feasibility  study.  However,  the  DHV  (1994b)  study  of  the  agricultural  benefits  of  the  road  was 
not  available  initially.  The  different  scenarios  gradually  increased  in  value  from  the  base  case, 
which  only  included  road  benefits  derived  from  savings  made  in  terms  of  vehicle  operating 
costs,  to  those  scenarios  where  significant  benefits  were  derived  from  increased  agricultural 
productivity  and  tourism.  All  the  figures,  in  keeping  with  the  feasibility  studies,  were 
discounted  at  12%  over  the  time  span  of  the  project,  which  was  1993  -  2015. 
Scenario  4  included  a  hypothesised  estimate  of  the  increases  in  tourism,  as  well  as  the  health 
and  education  benefits,  which  were  not  estimated  in  the  Kocks  (1993)  study.  The  last  gain 
scenario  (5)  was  estimated  from  the  previous  scenario,  with  the  addition  of  an  estimate  of 
unanticipated  social  and  economic  benefits.  This  incorporation  of  unanticipated  benefits  in 
the  last  gain  scenario  captured  Shackle's  notion  of  a  residual  hypothesis  (a  similar  approach 
is  taken  in  the  last  loss  scenario),  and  reinforced  the  idea  that  the  set  of  scenarios  was  not 
assumed  to  be  exhaustive.  The  calculations  used  to  construct  the  different  scenarios  are 
detailed  in  Appendix  3.  It  should  be  stressed  that,  in  estimating  valuations  for  the  different 
scenarios,  the  emphasis  was  purely  in  relation  to  the  possible  outcomes,  reflecting  the 
information  detailed  in  the  project  reports,  with  which  the  decision  makers  were  familiar.  The 
focus  was  then  on  the  use  of  the  scenarios  in  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  the  uncertainty  or 
( surprise'  that  the  decision  maker  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome,  rather  than  the 
outcome  value  per  se.  Consequently  the  aim  was  not  to  produce  the  most  accurate  figures 
possible;  indeed  an  element  of  the  exercise  was  to  incorporate  a  certain  degree  of  uncertainty 
into  the  different  possible  gain  scenarios. 
The  loss  scenarios 
The  construction  of  the  loss  scenarios,  because  of  their  focus  on  the  possible  environmental 
losses,  was  more  complicated.  Although  the  ElAs  carried  out  for  the  project  (DHV,  1994a  & 
BECCA,  1995)  together  with  the  environmental  summary  (IDB,  1997a),  provided  a  large 
amount  of  information  on  which  the  descriptions  of  the  loss  scenarios  could  be  based,  there 
was  no  attempt  in  any  of  the  reports  to  quantify  the  monetary  value  of  the  possible  losses 
associated  with  the  loss  of  key  ecosystem  functions  or  services.  As  a  result,  once  the  five 
loss  scenarios  were  described  qualitatively,  the  estimation  of  environmental  valuations  for  the 
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this  process  was  to  calculate  the  areas  of  the  different  key  ecosystems  in  the  area  affected  by 
the  road.  This  was  derived  from  information  contained  in  the  following  maps: 
1)  Land  Use  in  Stann  Creek  District  (1989/1992)  1:  200,000,  Land  Information  Centre,  The 
land  Information  Centre  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
2)  Land  Use  in  Toledo  District  (1989/1992),  1:  200,000,  Land  Information  Centre,  The 
land  Information  Centre  Ministry  of  Natural  Resources 
3)  Stann  Creek  District,  Land  Systems  (1988)  1:  100,000,  Overseas  Development  Natural 
Resources  Institute 
4)  Toledo  District,  Land  Systems  (1988)  1:  100,000,  Overseas  Development  Natural 
Resources  Institute. 
Additionally,  detailed  descriptions  on  the  different  land  systems  (including  area  and  vegetation 
type)  were  taken  from: 
5)  Land  Resource  Survey  of  Toledo  District,  Belize  (Land  Resource  Development  Centre, 
UK,  King  et  al,  1986) 
6)  Land  Resource  Assessment  of  Stann  Creek  District,  Belize  (Overseas  Development 
Natural  Resources  Institute,  UK,  King  et  al,  1989) 
From  these  maps,  which  encompassed  the  area  affected  by  the  road,  as  well  as  the 
accompanying  reports,  the  area  and  dominant  ecosystem  type  was  specified  for  different  land 
systems  and  sub-units  according  to  the  classification  used  by  King  et  al  (1986,1989).  In 
confirming  the  dominant  ecosystem  type,  this  information  was  visually  cross  checked  with  the 
1989/92  Land  use  maps  (1  &2  in  the  above  list)  and  the  data  were  then  entered  onto  a 
spread  sheet.  Although  a  more  recent  vegetation  classification  was  carried  out  by  NARMAP 
(1995),  at  the  time  of  the  fieldwork  area  estimates  for  the  different  ecosystem  types  were  not 
available.  Moreover,  there  were  only  very  minor  differences  between  the  1989/1992  maps 
and  the  1994  data  collected  for  the  NARMAP  report.  On  the  basis  of  this  data,  the  different 
areas  of  5  key  ecosystems/  biomes  were  identified,  namely  i)  tropical  broad-leaved  forest,  ii) 
pine  forest,  iii)  savannah  iv)  marsh/mangroves  and  v)  swamps/flood  plains.  In  identifying  the 
different  ecosystems,  only  the  areas  where  there  was  no  or  very  limited  agriculture  or 
development  were  included.  When  the  different  sub-units  were  grouped  together  the  total 
areas  of  the  different  systems  were  as  given  in  table  7.5. Chapter  7:  Methodology  186 
Table  7.5  Total  ecosystem  areas,  in  area  of  influence  of  the  Southern  Highway 
Area  (ha)  Tropical  Savannah  Pine  Swamp/  Mangroves 
Broad  leaf  Wetlands 
forest 
549,638  434.1  633.32  508  295 
The  next  stage  involved  the  estimation  of  the  area  losses  associated  with  the  different 
scenarios  to  be  presented  to  the  decision  maker.  This  was  done  by  firstly  hypothesising 
different  incremental  area  losses  for  the  individual  areas  of  the  various  ecosystem  types/ 
biomes  present,  based  on  the  extent  of  development  described  in  the  scenario.  The  type  of 
ecosystem  affected  was  dependent  on  the  type  of  development  induced  by  the  road.  So  for 
example,  agricultural  expansion  was  assumed  to  cause  deforestation.  In  terms  of  projecting 
the  different  areas,  another  assumption  made  was  that  areas  closest  to  the  road  would  be 
most  vulnerable  and  would  therefore  be  affected  first'.  Because  each  of  the  different 
ecosystem  types  was  split  up  into  a  large  number  of  sub-units,  for  which  the  area  was  known 
and  was  visually  represented  on  the  maps,  the  process  of  identifying  those  areas  closest  to 
the  road  was  greatly  facilitated.  The  hypothesised  areas  which  were  destroyed  as  a  result  of 
the  road,  are  detailed  in  appendix  5.  Once  the  total  area  destroyed  in  each  biome  were 
calculated,  these  were  converted  into  percentage  terms  for  ease  of  description  in  the  loss 
scenarios  presented  to  the  decision  maker  (see  appendix  2).  In  the  case  of  scenario  6,  the 
first  loss  outcome,  this  contained  only  the  direct  costs  of  building  the  road  and  thus 
encompassed  no  destruction  of  the  main  ecosystems.  As  in  the  case  of  gains  scenario  10, 
included  unanticipated  losses,  but  it  was  also  not  quantified  in  terms  of  percentage  losses  of 
ecosystem  type. 
The  next  step  was  to  attach  estimated  monetary  values  to  the  loss  scenarios  in  terms  of  the 
hypothesised  destruction  of  the  key  ecosystem  types  identified.  Again  the  estimation  of  the 
values  attached  to  the  different  scenarios  was  not  the  main  concern  of  this  thesis.  As  a  result, 
some  of  the  major  issues  raised  earlier  in  this  thesis  with  regards  to  valuation  are  side- 
stepped,  with  the  focus  remaining  on  the  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty,  which 
requires  the  gain  and  loss  values  to  facilitate  its  operationalisation  in  a  behavioural  sense. 
The  use  of  environmental  valuation  reflects  the  focus  on  environmental  uncertainty. 
I  ed  to  Belize,  NNhich  also  makes  -'See  Chomitz  &  Gray  (1996)  for  a  model  of  road  induced  development  app  I 
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Once  the  five  loss  scenarios  had  been  developed  from  information  derived  from  the  different 
reports  available,  valuation  estimates  were  attached  to  the  different  scenarios.  For  the  first 
loss  scenario,  scenario  6,  because  no  environmental  degradation  was  hypothesised,  this  cost 
figure  represented  the  total  cost  of  all  sections  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project4 
. 
The  loss 
scenarios  7,8  and  9  were  based  on  this  total  cost  figure  plus  the  valuations  attached  to  the 
hypothesised  loss  of  the  area  of  the  various  ecosystems  under  the  different  outcomes. 
The  environmental  valuation  data,  which  were  used  to  come  up  with  environmental  loss 
figures  for  scenarios  7-9,  were  derived  from  the  study  by  Costanza  et  al  (1997b).  This  large 
study  presented  estimates  of  the  average  global  value  of  annual  ecosystem  services  in  1994 
US$  per  hectare  for  the  different  ecosystem  systems  grouped  by  Biome.  However,  the  study 
recognised  that: 
"there  are  many  conceptual  and  empifical  problems  inherent  in  producing  such  an  estimate" 
(Costanza  et  al,  1997b:  p255). 
In  particular,  there  are  a  large  number  of  dangers  inherent  in  the  extrapolation  of  point 
estimates  to  global  totals,  as  well  as  the  uncertainties  inherent  in  the  estimates  produced. 
Even  so,  given  that  at  the  time  of  the  fieldwork  no  valuation  studies  had  been  carried  out 
specifically  in  relation  to  Belize,  the  Costanza  et  al  study  was  by  far  the  most  comprehensive 
and  best  source  of  estimates  of  the  possible  valuations  of  different  ecosystem  functions.  Full 
details  of  the  way  in  which  the  estimates  were  calculated,  the  valuation  techniques  used,  the 
sources  of  the  data  and  the  assumptions  made  could  be  downloaded  in  spreadsheet  from  the 
Nature  web  site5. 
The  study,  therefore,  presented  a  source  of  annual  ecological  valuations  of  different  biomes 
(see  table  7.6)  which  could  be  used,  in  conjunction  with  the  area  data  collected  on  the 
different  sub-units  present  in  Belize,  to  estimate  the  economic  value  of  hypothesised 
destruction  of  the  different  biomes  in  the  scenarios.  The  overall  value  given  to  the  different 
biomes  was  based  on  valuations  of  specific  ecosystem  functions,  such  as  climate  regulation, 
erosion  control,  nutrient  cycling  and  genetic  resources.  Further  details  of  the  different 
ecosystem  functions,  which  were  valued,  to  arrive  at  an  annual  value  of  the  biomes,  as  well 
as  the  specific  techniques  used,  are  given  in  Appendix  4.  The  methodology  involved 
extrapolating  the  global  data  in  relation  to  the  locationally  and  culturally  specific  value  of  the 
'This  total  cost  figure  was  derived  from  a  unpublished  document,  although  it  is  very  similar  to  that  contained 
in  the  Kocks  (199-33)  feasibifit,  y  study. 
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biomes  in  Belize.  This  process  further  increases  the  extent  to  which  the  valuation  attached  to 
the  biomes  in  the  projected  area  of  influence  of  the  road  are  conditioned  by  uncertainty.  This 
reinforces  the  presence  of  valuation  uncertainty,  identified  in  Chapter  3,  and  constitutes  an 
element  of  the  hard  uncertainty,  which  the  decision  makers  were  asked  to  evaluate  in  the 
formal  questionnaire. 
Table  7.6  Summary  of  global  value  of  annual  ecosystem  services 
Biome  low 
ha-1  yr  -1 
US$ 
ha-1  yr  -1 
BZ$ 
high 
ha-1  yr  -1 
US$ 
ha-1  yr  -1 
BZ$ 
average 
ha-1  yr  -1 
US$ 
ha-1  yr  -1 
BZ$ 
Estuaries  12,150  24,300  33,833  67666  22,832  45664 
Sea  Grass  10,002  20,004  28,002  56004  19,002  38004 
Coral  Reefs  613  1226  11537  23074  6,075  12150 
Tropical  Forest  1,175  2350  4,052  8104  2,007  4014 
Temperate/  Pine  261  522  344  688  302  604 
Forest 
Grasslands/savannah  232  464  232  464  232  464 
Marsh/  Mangroves  7,906  15,812  15,469  30938  9,990  19980 
Swamps/  Floodplains  9,865  19,730  30,331  60662  19,580  39160 
Source:  adapted  from  Costanza  et  al,  (199  7b)  and  accompanying  notes. 
The  next  step  was  calculate  the  total  gross  discounted  costs  for  scenarios  7,8,  and  9.  This 
was  based  on  firstly  adding  the  direct  costs  of  the  roads  (in  scenario  1)  to  the  total  lost  value 
of  the  flow  of  ecosystem  services  over  the  lifetime  of  the  project  for  all  the  biomes  which  were 
projected  to  be  affected  in  the  different  scenarios.  The  latter  figure  was  calculated  in  five 
steps: 
1)  Firstly,  the  time  scale  of  the  project  was  defined  as  1993-2015  to  ensure  consistency  with 
the  Kocks  (1993)  figures  used  in  the  benefit  scenarios. 
2)  None  of  the  losses  from  the  ecosystem  areas  were  assumed  to  take  place  until  1998.  Then 
in  the  following  five  years,  30%  of  the  total  area  loss  of  the  biome  lost  under  the  scenario 
(e.  g.  if  as  in  scenario  7,13%  of  the  region's  tropical  broad-leaved  forest  were  projected  to 
be  removed,  corresponding  to  an  area  of  71,871  ha)  was  assumed  to  occur  at  a  constant 
rate,  with  the  remaining  70%  being  destroyed  at  a  fixed  rate  from  2003-2015. 
3)  The  area  destroyed  for  the  different  biomes  was  then  multiplied  by  the  yearly  flow  value 
provided  by  the  ecosystem  services  of  that  biome.  Because  of  the  inherent  difficulties  in Chapter  7:  Methodology  189 
extrapolating  the  data  to  Belize,  the  low  per  hectare  values  were  used.  This  assumpbon 
again  highlights  the  problem  of  valuation  uncertainty,  as  far  larger  values  would  have  been 
obtained  if  the  high  values  in  Table  7.5  had  been  used.  A  further  assumption  made, 
emphasising  the  problem  of  valuation  uncertainty,  was  that  the  lost  services  were  not 
added  cumulatively.  However  an  alternative  approach  in  which  the  flow  of  services  lost 
was  added  cumulatively  over  the  life  span  of  the  project  would  appear  equally  valid.  This 
assumption  rests  on  the  question  of  whether  all  the  valued  ecosystem  services  of  a 
destroyed  biome  would  be  lost  for  all  time,  or  whether  they  would  be  replaced,  at  a  lower 
level  of  service  (value)  by  the  system  based  on  a  new  equilibrium  which  replaces  the 
original  ecosystem.  Because  this  question  is  very  difficult  to  answer,  and  the  fact  that  if  the 
flow  of  services  was  added  cumulatively,  it  would  have  resulted  in  very  large  valuation 
figures,  the  more  conservative  approach  was  taken. 
4)  The  total  value  of  the  ecosystem  services  lost  for  all  the  biomes  projected  to  be  affected  by 
the  road  for  each  year  of  the  project  was  then  calculated  by  adding  the  different  yearly 
values  lost  for  the  separate  biomes. 
5)  The  last  stage  was  to  discount  the  values  by  12%  (the  discount  rate  used  in  the  other 
studies)  to  give  the  total  gross  discounted  costs  of  a  particular  scenario. 
For  the  last  scenario  (10),  no  specific  areas  were  specified.  Instead  large  losses  for  all  the 
different  biomes  were  assumed  to  occur,  including  sea  grass  beds  and  corals.  The  latter  two 
could  not  be  given  valuation  estimates  because,  although  value  data  existed  in  the  Costanza 
et  al  (1  997b)  study,  no  area  figures  could  be  obtained  for  the  area  of  sea  grass,  and  coral  in 
the  area  affected  by  the  road.  Further  losses  were  hypothesised  to  occur  from  unanticipated 
losses  of  ecosystem  services.  A  very  conservative  estimate  was  made  for  this  scenario. 
Again  it  should  be  emphasised  that  these  valuations  relate  to  the  marginal  value  of  the 
different  biomes,  rather  than  the  total  value.  Further  caveats  of  using  the  valuation  data  are 
detailed  in  Costanza  et  al  (1997b).  Nevertheless,  despite  these  problems,  the  attachment  of 
environmental  values  to  the  different  scenarios  provided  a  good  basis  on  which  to  test  the 
operationalisation  of  the  Shackle  model  in  relation  to  environmental  uncertainty. 
7.3.2.2  Designing  the  questions  relating  to  the  gain  and  loss  scenariOS6 
It  is  convenient  to  separate  this  second  part  of  the  interview  based  on  the  scenarios  into  two 
sections.  The  first  section,  consisting  of  questions  7-13,  was  designed  to  allow  the 
respondent  to  be  as  unconstrained  as  possible  in  his  /  her  description  of  the  way  in  which  they 
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would  go  about  evaluating  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  scenarios,  before  any  restrictions 
were  placed  on  the  format  of  responses  necessary  to  assess  the  model  quantitatively.  The 
second  section  consisting  of  questions  14-20  was  designed  to  ascertain  whether  the  decision 
maker's  behaviour  was  consistent  with  the  key  propositions  of  the  model.  This  was  also 
important  in  indicating  whether  the  model  could  be  practically  operationalised  in  a  normative 
manner. 
On  the  basis  of  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios  generated,  the  formal  questionnaire  included  a 
number  of  qualitative  questions,  which  were  asked  once  the  decision  maker  was  read  a  note 
explaining  the  different  scenarios  (see  appendix  2),  and  given  time  to  read  over  the  gain  and 
loss  scenarios.  The  questions  7-13  (appendix  1)  were  asked  before  any  of  the  different 
elements  of  the  Shackle  model  were  applied.  These  questions  allowed  the  decision  maker  to 
draw  on  the  evaluation  of  the  project  in  the  decision  process  and  provided  information  on  the 
approach  which  he  /  she  would  have  taken.  The  information  gained  from  the  answers  could 
then  be  analysed  in  relation  to  its  general  consistency  with  the  Shackle  model  as  opposed  to, 
say,  an  expected  utility  approach.  At  a  more  basic  level  information  on  the  extent  to  which  the 
particular  institution  /  organisation  explicitly  recognised  the  existence  of  uncertainties 
surrounding  the  road  was  also  gained. 
Questions  14-20  presumed  the  existence  of  the  key  elements  of  the  model  of  decision  making 
under  uncertainty  developed  in  chapter  5,  namely  the  potential  surprise  function  and  the 
ascendancy/  weighting  function.  The  aim  of  the  questionnaire  was  then  to  provide  data  which 
could  be  then  analysed  in  order  to  assess  whether  the  individual's  behaviour  was  in  fact 
consistent  with  the  different  elements  of  the  model.  The  purpose  was  therefore  not  to  provide 
evidence  on  the  choice  of  uncertainty  variable  (as  in  Ford  &  Ghose,  1995c)  or  weighting 
procedure,  but  to  assess  whether,  if,  the  decision  makers  were  asked  to  assign  a  degree  of 
potential  surprise  and  weight  the  different  outcomes,  they  would  do  so  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  the  Shackle  model.  The  only  way  that  such  a  methodology  could  be  designed  was  by 
using  an  existing  model  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty.  Such  a  deductive  framework 
was  adopted,  because  the  only  alternative  methodological  approach  to  this  would  have 
involved  being  present  at  all  the  different  meetings  in  which  uncertainties  related  to  the  road 
were  discussed  and  evaluated.  Although  this  would  have  overcome  some  of  the  difficulties 
encountered  in  the  use  of  a  formal  questionnaire  to  elicit  direct  responses  to  a  series  of 
questions  it  was  not  practically  feasibly,  nor  would  provide  data  that  would  lend  itself  to 
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This  section  of  the  interview  based  on  the  different  scenarios  used  a  mixture  of  quantitative 
and  qualitative  questions.  The  quantitative  questions  were  designed  to  elicit  data  that  could 
be  used  to  model  the  ascendancy  function  (see  section  7.4.2  and  chapter  8).  The  qualitative 
questions  (Q15-18)  not  only  provided  a  valuable  source  of  stand  -  alone  information  on  the 
propositions  of  the  model,  but  also  served  as  a  check  on  the  consistency  and  validity  of  the 
quantitative  responses  to  questions  14,19,  and  20  (see  appendix  1).  Of  the  26  individuals 
interviewed  in  relation  to  the  Southern  Highway  project  only  3  did  not  fully  complete  the 
interview  and  were  thus  discarded  from  analysis.  One  of  the  individuals  only  did  the  first  part 
(Qs  1-7),  due  to  time  constraints,  and  although  a  second  interview  was  arranged  to  carry  out 
the  second  part  of  the  interview,  due  to  illness  of  the  individual  it  was  not  carried  out.  The 
other  two  respondents  did  not  want  to  carry  out  the  second  part  of  the  questionnaire  (Qs  8- 
20).  All  the  other  respondents  (23  in  total),  who  were  asked  the  questions  detailed  in 
appendix  1,  answered  both  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  questions. 
The  first  assumption  made  in  questions  14-20  was  that  gains  and  losses  could  be  separated, 
as  proposed  by  the  Shackle  model.  This  proposition  is  arguably  the  least  controversial  of  the 
main  elements  of  the  Shackle  model.  Moreover,  evidence  of  the  separation  of  the  gains  and 
losses  at  a  qualitative  level  was  found  in  the  report  documents'.  On  the  basis  of  the  gain  and 
loss  scenarios,  Q14  was  designed  to  derive  a  measure  of  the  potential  surprise  that  the 
decision  maker  attached  to  the  alternative  outcomes.  Building  on  the  experiments  by  Ford  & 
Ghose  (1994a;  1994b;  1995a;  1995b;  &  1995c),  the  potential  surprise  values  for  the  decision- 
makers  were  elicited  directly  from  the  respondents  by  asking  the  following  question": 
Q14:  /  would  like  you  to  now  consider  each  of  the  scenarios  described  above  and  then 
allocate  the  degree  of  potential  surprise,  ranging  from  0-10,  which  you  would  feel  at  the 
occurrence  of  the  different  scenarios.  A  zero  degree  of  potential  surprise  will  imply  that  you 
will  not  at  all  be  surprised  if  the  outcome  actually  occurred,  whereas  10  would  imply  that  you 
would  be  totally  surprised  if  the  outcome  to  which  it  is  assigned  were  to  occur. 
After  the  potential  surprise  allocated  to  each  of  the  five  gain  and  five  loss  outcomes  by  the 
respondent  was  recorded,  attention  turned  to  the  ascendancy  function.  First  of  all  a  series  of 
qualitative  questions  (Q15  &  Q16)  were  designed  to  gain  information  on  whether,  as 
consistent  with  the  Shackle  model,  the  respondent  would  sift  through  the  different  gain  and 
loss  scenarios  and  focus  on  one  loss  outcome  and  one  gain  outcome.  Similarly  Q17  and  Q18 
The  documentary  evidence  will  be  analysed  in  more  detail  in  the  following  chapter. 
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were  used  to  identify  on  a  qualitative  basis  the  outcome  which  would  be  weighted  highest  out 
of  the  gain  scenarios  and  the  outcome  which  would  be  weighted  highest  out  of  the  loss 
scenarios  (corresponding  to  the  focus  gain  and  focus  loss  in  Shackle's  model). 
The  method  used  to  elicit  the  ascendancy  function,  namely  the  means  by  which  the  decision 
maker  is  presumed  to  evaluate  the  outcome  and  the  corresponding  degree  of  surprise,  was 
more  complicated.  It  should  also  be  reiterated  that  the  emphasis  in  the  interpretation  of  the 
Shackle  model  given  in  Chapter  5  is  on  the  ascendancy  function  as  a  means  by  which  the 
decision  maker  weights  the  various  (x,  y)  elements  (see  section  5.5.3)  and  is  in  no  way  related 
to  the  concept  of  utility.  Theoretically,  in  the  Shackle  model,  the  ascendancy  function  is 
derived  from  a  series  of  indifference  curves.  One  approach  akin  to  that  taken  in  utility  analysis 
involves  attempting  to  elicit  a  series  of  ascendancy  indifference  curves  (as  opposed  to  utility 
indifference  curves)  and  then  indirectly  inferring  the  ascendancy  function  from  such  curves. 
Such  trade-off  methods  use  hypothetical  questions  to  elicit  trade-offs  between  different  pairs 
of  elements.  However,  the  problem  with  using  this  method  is  that  it  is  time  consuming  (an 
issue  of  particular  concern  in  relation  to  interviewing  senior  decision  makers)  and  also  can  be 
unreliable.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  decision  makers  find  making  specific  (hypothetical) 
trade-offs  over  a  large  number  of  element  pairs  very  difficult  (Edwards,  1977).  Because  of 
these  methodological  concerns,  as  well  the  argument  advanced  in  Chapter  5  that  the 
specification  of  ascendancy  indifference  curves  was  not  necessary  for  the  operational  isation 
of  the  Shackle  model,  attention  turned  to  directly  eliciting  the  ascendancy  function. 
The  advantage  of  eliciting  the  ascendancy  function  directly  was  that  the  decision  maker  would 
only  have  to  consider  the  5  gain  (gain,  surprise)  pairs  and  the  5  loss  pairs  rather  than  the  far 
larger  volume  of  information  required  in  order  to  generate  the  ascendancy  indifference  curves. 
In  order  to  specify  the  function,  and  in  light  of  the  theoretical  interpretation  given  to  the 
Shackle  model,  the  ascendancy  function  was  interpreted  as  a  weighting  function,  by  which  the 
decision  maker  would  then  allocate  a  subjective  weight  to  each  pair  which  reflected  the  weight 
that  he/she  would  give  the  outcome  and  its  associated  degree  of  surprise  in  the  decision- 
making  process.  Thus,  after  reading  a  short  paragraph  to  the  interviewee  explaining  the 
scaling  of  the  weights  to  be  allocated  (see  appendix  1),  the  following  questions  were  designed 
in  order  to  gain  the  weights  that  the  decision  makers  would  give  to  the  different  gain/  loss 
uncertainty  pairs: 
Q19.  Consider  scenario  1  -5  for  the  Southern  Highway.  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated 
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surprised  if  the  outcome  were  to  Occur,  could  you  assign  on  a  scale  0-10  the  weight  or  the 
amount  of  attention  that  you  would  give  that  outcome  in  evaluating  all  the  possible  outcomes 
for  the  Southern  Highway  Project?  A  score  of  10  would  mean  that  you  would  weight  that 
outcome  very  highly  in  the  eventual  decision-making  process,  whereas  a  score  of  0  would 
mean  that  you  would  give  no  weight  to  that  outcome. 
Q20.  Consider  scenarios  6-10  for  the  Southern  Highway.  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  costs 
that  would  result  if  this  outcome  were  to  occur  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be 
surprised  if  the  outcome  were  to  occur  could  you  now  assign  on  a  scale  0-  10  the  weight  that 
you  would  give  that  outcome  in  evaluating  all  the  possible  outcomes  for  the  Southern  Highway 
Project?  A  score  of  10  would  mean  that  you  would  weight  that  outcome  very  highly  in  the 
eventual  decision-making  process,  whereas  a  score  of  0  would  mean  that  you  would  give  no 
weight  to  that  outcome. 
7.3.3  Design  of  the  focused  interviews9 
Although  the  main  part  of  the  fieldwork  was  associated  with  the  interviews  relating  to  the 
Belize  Southern  Highway  project,  separate  interviews  were  carried  out  with  decision  makers 
who,  although  not  familiar  with  the  specifics  of  the  Southern  Highway,  had  been  involved  at  a 
higher  level,  as  well  as  decision  makers  who  were  involved  in  the  evaluation  of  other  projects 
with  environmental  consequences  at  a  more  general  level.  The  aim  of  the  focused  interviews 
was  to  gain  supplementary  information  on  the  way  that  uncertainty  was  evaluated  more 
generally  over  a  range  of  projects.  As  a  result,  the  focused  interviews  (see  appendix  6)  were 
limited  to  a  total  of  9  individuals  (6  in  the  IDB,  2  in  the  world  bank  and  1  in  the  BDDC). 
The  interviews  were  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  a  pre-defined  list  of  important  subject  areas  / 
questions  (see  appendix  6).  Once  the  general  question,  indicated  by  the  different  topic 
numbers  in  appendix  6,  was  raised,  a  flexible  approach  was  taken  allowing  if  necessary 
follow-up  questions  to  be  asked  to  gain  greater  detail  on  a  particular  issue  of  concern.  The 
questions  raised  were  similar  in  design  to  the  qualitative  questions  used  in  the  Interviews  with 
decision  makers  concerning  the  Southern  Highway  Project.  However,  no  scenarios  were 
introduced  and  the  interview  was  carried  out  at  a  more  general  level,  although  the  decision 
makers  were  encouraged  to  illustrate  their  answers  with  examples  from  development  projects. 
Questions  1  -2  were  introductory  questions  to  provide  detail  on  the  role  and  position  of  the 
individual  in  their  respective  organisation,  In  questions  3-7  the  questions  were  aimed  at 
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inferring  the  way  in  which  uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  a  general  manner  in  the  decision-making 
process.  Questions  9-13  were  concerned  with  assessing  in  a  more  general  fashion  whether 
the  way  that  uncertainty  was  evaluated  was  consistent  with  a  model  similar  to  that  of 
Shackle's. 
7.4  Data  analysis 
The  analysis  of  the  data  involved  three  elements.  Firstly  the  documentary  evidence  was  read 
over  a  number  of  times  to  assess  the  extent  and  way  that  the  decision  process  had  evaluated 
environmental  uncertainty.  The  second  element  involved  the  analysis  of  the  qualitative 
questions  asked  in  both  the  specific  and  general  interviews  and  the  third  aspect  involved  the 
econometric  analysis  of  the  quantitative  data.  The  analysis  of  the  latter  two  elements  form  the 
bulk  of  the  analysis  and  are  therefore  considered  separately  in  more  detail. 
7.4.1  Analysis  of  qualitative  structured  interviews 
For  all  the  interviews  that  were  recorded  the  answers  to  the  questions  were  transcribed.  In 
those  interviews  which  were  not  recorded  the  detailed  notes  were  written  up.  Going  though 
the  interviews  identified  key  answers  to  certain  questions,  as  well  as  recurrent  themes,  which 
was  particularly  important  in  relation  to  the  open-ended  questions  regarding  the  way  that 
decision  makers  evaluated  the  different  outcomes  and  uncertainty  associated  with  the 
outcome.  The  next  step  involved  analysing  the  statements  of  the  different  individuals  in 
relation  to  the  proposed  model  of  decision  making  under  hard  uncertainty  in  order  to  check 
whether  the  statements  were  consistent  with  its  main  propositions.  It  was  at  this  stage  that 
the  qualitative  results  were  cross-checked  with  the  quantitative  data.  Rather  than  coding  the 
text,  under  broad  subject  headings,  the  meaning  and  interpretation  of  the  text  was  analysed  in 
relation  to  the  whole  interview,  as  well  as  the  quantitative  analysis.  This  took  account  of  the 
variability  of  language  used,  as  well  as  the  wider  issue  of  the  statements  used  (Fairclough 
(1995). 
The  information  collected  is  presented  in  relation  to  either  the  general  decision  context,  or  in 
terms  of  providing  evidence  in  terms  of  the  key  elements  of  the  developed  model.  Interview 
quotations,  as  well  as  providing  stand  -  alone  information  in  terms  of  the  decision  making 
process,  have  helped  to  provide  greater  detail  on  the  behaviour  of  the  individual  than  could  be 
gained  from  analysing  the  quantitative  data  from  the  questionnaire  alone.  Thus,  once  key 
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surrounding  the  different  outcomes  are  identified,  they  are  presented  in  the  analysis  in  the 
Chapter  8  and  9  as  reflective  of  the  decision  makers  perceptions  and  behaviour 
7.4.2  Analysis  of  quantitative  data 
The  first  stage  in  the  quantitative  analysis  was  to  input  the  potential  surprise  and  the  weighting 
allocated  by  each  individual,  along  with  the  corresponding  absolute  gain  or  loss  value  of  the 
scenario,  into  a  spread  sheet.  For  each  individual  the  potential  surprise  function  was  then 
graphed  separately  over  gains  and  losses.  The  ascendancy  or  weighting  function  was  also 
graphed,  by  graphing  the  weight  given  against  the  outcome  value  as  described  theoretically  in 
Chapter  5.  Graphing  the  variables  allowed  a  good  initial  indication  on  whether  the  different 
functions  specified  were  consistent  with  the  propositions  of  the  model. 
The  next  stage  was  to  carry  out  the  initial  screening  of  the  data  to  check  that  the  assumptions 
required  to  carry  out  an  ordinary  least  squares  regression  were  met.  A  number  of  standard 
checks  were  carried  out  to  test  for  normality,  linearity,  heteros  keda  city,  auto-correlation  and 
multicollinearity,  and  the  relationship  between  the  dependent  weighting/  ascendancy  variable 
and  the  independent  variables,  namely  the  outcome  value  and  the  degree  of  potential 
surprise,  was  then  modelled.  This  process  is  detailed  in  Chapter  8. 
7.4.4  Validity  and  robustness  of  methodology  and  analysis. 
Although  the  methodology  adopted  for  the  research  is  necessarily  unique,  due  to  the  flexible 
approach  taken  with  regards  to  the  use  of  different  methods,  there  remains  the  need  to  ensure 
that  the  method  and  analysis  can  be  considered  robust.  This  is  important  in  relation  to 
presenting  the  evidence  as  reliable  and  worthy  of  attention.  Three  main  criteria  were  used  to 
assess  the  validity  of  the  methodology'O: 
Content  Validity:  A  subjective  judgement  about  the  soundness  of  the  procedures  and 
methods  adopted. 
2)  Theoretical  Validity:  A  comparison  of  observed  results  with  those  expected  from  theory. 
3)  Comparative  Validity:  A  comparison  of  the  different  data  provided  by  the  various 
methods. 
"  The  criteria  have  been  adapted  from  4  criteria  suggested  by  Bateman  et  al  (1993)  in  relation  to  the 
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Content  validity  was  judged  by  reference  to  the  methodology  adopted  in  designing  the 
focused  interviews,  as  well  as  the  formal  questionnaire.  In  particular,  the  design  of  the 
questionnaire  and  structured  interview,  the  creation  of  the  different  scenarios  and  the 
assumptions  made,  serve  to  provide  a  clear,  valid  context  for  the  research.  Theoretical 
validity  can  be  assessed  in  relation  to  the  general  assumptions  made  in  the  deductive 
approach  taken.  For  example  is  the  behaviour  of  the  individuals  consistent  with  the 
interpretation  of  the  Shackle  model  given  in  Chapter  5?  The  last  criterion  of  comparative 
validity  can  be  judged  from  the  triangulation  of  qualitative  textual  data,  the  quantitative  data 
and  the  documentary  evidence  contained  in  the  project  reports.  The  use  of  these  three 
elements,  and  in  particular  the  responses  to  the  open-ended  questions  relative  to  the  data 
derived  from  the  modelling  exercise,  provides  an  important  cross  check  when  analysed  in 
relation  to  the  way  that  the  decision  maker  evaluated  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  different 
outcomes. 
7.5  Summary 
This  chapter  has  dealt  with  the  design  of  an  appropriate  research  methodology,  and  in 
particular  the  linking  of  the  theory  developed  in  the  earlier  chapters,  with  its  application  in 
practice.  In  order  to  do  this  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  Shackle  model  has  been  adapted 
and  a  deductive  approach  taken,  by  which  the  model  can  be  operationalised  and  evidence 
provided  which  will  support  or  refute  the  key  elements  of  the  model.  A  multi-method  approach 
to  collecting  data  has  been  taken,  which  has  resulted  in  a  richer  collection  of  evidence  than 
would  have  been  possible  if  only  one  method  was  adopted.  Attention  has  also  been  paid  in 
the  design  to  ensure  that  the  methods  adopted  are  robust.  This  provides  the  foundation  on 
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CHAPTER  8:  RESULTS  OF  THE  APPLICATION  OF  THE  SHACKLE  MODEL 
8.1  IntroducHon 
Now  that  the  basis  for  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  to  the  case  study  of  the  Belize 
Southern  Highway  has  been  outlined,  the  results  of  the  application  of  the  model  can  be 
presented  and  analysed.  As  detailed  in  Chapter  7,  a  deductive  approach  has  been  taken 
whereby  the  Shackle  model  as  interpreted  in  Chapter  5  has  been  assumed  to  be  a  real 
description  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty.  A  review  and  analysis  of  the  actual 
approaches  used  to  handle  uncertainty  in  the  Southern  Highway  project  as  well  at  a  more 
general  level  is  left  to  the  following  chapter.  This  chapter  is  primarily  concerned  with 
questions  relating  to  the  specific  application  of  the  model  developed  in  Chapter  5  to  the 
Southern  Highway  project.  In  particular  the  focus  is  on  its  operational  isation  to  help  to  explain 
the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is  evaluated  by  individual  decision  makers  within  the  decision- 
making  process.  It  should  be  emphasised  however  that  the  analysis  of  the  individuals  is 
restricted  to  explaining  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  evaluated.  Attention  is  not  given  to 
interpreting  the  information  from  the  individual  decision  makers  in  terms  of  actual  decisions 
surrounding  the  Southern  Highway  per  se. 
As  such,  section  8.2  of  this  thesis  therefore  presents  evidence  of  whether  the  behaviour  of  the 
individuals  is  consistent  with  the  key  propositions  of  the  model.  These  propositions  centre  on 
the  evaluation  of  the  outcomes  in  terms  of  degree  of  potential  surprise  as  well  as  the 
existence  of  an  ascendancy  function.  In  terms  of  potential  surprise  the  specific  assumptions 
on  which  evidence  is  provided  include:  that  potential  surprise  reflects  the  belief  that  the 
individual  has  in  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome;  the  extent  to  which  any  of  the  axioms  for 
potential  surprise  (as  described  in  section  5.4.1.1)  are  supported;  and  whether  potential 
surprise  was  treated  as  a  continuous  or  binary  measure  of  uncertainty.  In  terms  of  the 
existence  of  the  ascendancy  function,  evidence  is  provided  on:  the  consistency  of  the 
coefficients  of  the  potential  surprise  and  outcome  variables  with  that  of  theory;  the  overall 
explanatory  power  of  the  ascendancy  function;  the  difference  between  the  ascendancy/ 
weighting  function  over  gains  and  losses;  the  difference  of  the  coefficients  between  the 
individuals;  the  significance  of  the  potential  surprise  and  outcome  vahable;  and  the  role  of  the 
ascendancy  function  as  a  means  of  sifting  device  by  which  the  individual  decision  maker 
focuses  on  one  gain  and  one  loss  outcome  respectively. Chapter  8:  Results  of  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  199 
In  section  8.3  the  Shackle  model  is  then  applied  at  a  more  general  level  in  an  attempt  to  help 
explain  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  institutions  such  as  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  and  the  World  Bank.  In  this  chapter  the  results  from  the  specific 
interviews  will  be  interpreted  in  a  broader  context  and  will  be  supplemented  by  the  more 
general  interviews  carried  out  with  decision  makers,  which  did  not  solely  focus  on  the 
Southern  Highway  (see  appendix  6).  By  drawing  together  the  wider  implications  of  the 
theoretical  arguments  that  have  been  developed  throughout  the  course  of  this  thesis,  as  well 
as  the  information  gained  from  the  interviews,  the  aim  is  to  help  explain  in  a  broader  context 
the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  within  the  decision-making  process.  Thus,  while  the  application 
of  the  Shackle  model  focused  on  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  at  an  individual  level,  the 
recognition  that  the  decision-making  process  involves  the  interaction  of  a  number  of  key 
actors  necessitates  a  broader  analysis  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  developed  in  this 
thesis.  As  such,  it  is  argued  that  within  the  decision-making  process  the  different  actors 
effectively  contest  different  competing  focus  outcomes.  It  is  at  this  stage  that,  if  no  explicit 
evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  has  been  made,  there  is  a  danger  that  it  has  not  been 
adequately  dealt  with. 
Considerations  of  the  existing  mechanisms  (rather  than  the  theoretical  approaches  outlined 
earlier)  by  which  uncertainty  is  currently  handled  in  the  institutions,  as  well  as  the  possible 
normative  application  of  the  model  as  a  framework  for  evaluating  hard  uncertainty,  is  left  to 
Chapter  9. 
8.2  Evidence  of  the  key  elements  of  the  Shackle  model  in  the  Southern  Highway 
Project 
This  section  focuses  more  specifically  on  the  key  elements  of  the  Shackle  model  as 
interpreted  in  Chapter  5.  The  separation  of  gains  and  losses  is  discussed,  before  evidence 
surrounding  the  evaluation  of  uncertainties  analysed.  The  bulk  of  this  section  however, 
focuses  on  the  testing  of  a  number  of  propositions  with  respect  to  the  use  of  potential  surprise 
and  the  role  of  the  ascendancy  or  weighting  function. 
Before  the  results  were  analysed  a  check  was  made  on  the  consistency  of  the  respondents. 
This  was  important  in  terms  of  checking  that  the  decision  makers  had  understood  the 
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made  of  the  mix  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  data  (derived  from  the  questionnaire  detailed  in 
Appendix  1)  to  ensure  that  what  the  respondents  articulated  was  consistent  with  the 
quantitative  questions  (see  Chapter  7).  If  both  the  answers  to  the  qualitative  and  quantitative 
questions  were  consistent,  this  was  taken  as  indicating  that  the  respondents  had  fully 
understood  the  questions.  Clearly,  however,  there  will  always  be  a  degree  of  subjectivity  in 
the  interpretation  of  the  responses  of  the  decision  makers. 
When  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  results  of  the  23  respondents  used  in  the  analysis  was 
collected  together  and  analysed,  2  were  discarded  (respondents  G&  H)  due  to  inconsistencies 
in  the  responses.  In  both  cases  the  qualitative  response  to  the  question  asking  them  which 
gain  and  which  loss  scenarios  they  would  weight  highest  (Q1  7  and  Q1  8,  appendix  1)  was  not 
consistent  with  the  scenarios  to  which  they  had  allocated  the  greatest  weight  quantitatively 
(Q19  and  Q20).  In  both  cases  at  the  time  of  the  interviews,  in  comparison  to  the  other 
interviewees,  much  less  time  was  taken  during  the  weighting  exercise,  suggesting  that  little 
attention  had  been  paid  to  the  questions.  A  further  reason  for  discarding  one  of  the 
respondents,  was  that  he  stated  that  he  would  only  focus  on  gains  and  would  not  be 
concerned  with  losses.  This,  however,  could  also  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  a  decision  maker 
who  would  only  focus  on  the  positive  outcomes  of  a  scenario,  or  who  were  fulfilling  a 
particular  role  within  the  decision-making  process.  The  remaining  21  respondents  were  then 
analysed  fully. 
8.2.1  Separation  of  gains  and  losses 
The  first  element  of  the  Shackle  model  on  which  some  evidence  from  the  reports  and 
interviews  was  gained  was  the  separation  of  gains  and  losses.  Although  this  was  not  formally 
tested,  as  were  the  other  elements  relating  to  potential  surprise  and  the  ascendancy  function, 
it  is  arguably  the  least  controversial  aspect  of  Shackle's  theory.  Evidence  of  the  separation  of 
costs  and  benefits  was  evident  in  the  project  reports,  which  formally  separated  the  two  (either 
costs  and  benefits  or  positive  and  negative  impacts  (Kocks,  1993;  DHV,  1994a;  BECA,  1995, 
IDB,  1997a).  The  respondents  were  also  comfortable  with  the  separation  of  gains  and  losses 
in  the  scenarios  presented  to  them  as  part  of  the  questionnaire  (see  appendix  1  and  2).  Thus, 
during  the  interviews  the  respondents  tended  to  focus  on  the  gains  and  losses  separately, 
sometimes  giving  more  attention  to  one  than  the  other.  For  example  one  decision  maker 
stated: 
"/  would  start  with  the  worst  case  scenario"' 
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8.2.2  The  quantification  of  uncertainty 
Before  the  decision  makers  were  asked  to  assign  the  degree  of  surprise  they  would  feel  at  the 
occurrence  of  the  individual  outcomes,  preliminary  evidence  was  gained  on  possible 
measures  of  uncertainty  used  by  decision  makers,  when  they  were  assessing  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  a  particular  outcome.  This  provided  an  interesting  insight  into  how  the  decision 
makers  evaluated  the  uncertainties  on  an  individual  basis.  Overall  only  2  of  the  total  of  23 
respondents  interviewed  with  respect  to  the  Southern  Highway  started  to  talk  about 
uncertainties  in  terms  of  probability.  One  of  these  individuals  when  asked  if  they  would 
attempt  to  quantify  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty  faced  in  the  project,  responded: 
"I'm  not  sure  that  there  were  any  attempts  to  quantify  the  uncertainties  ... 
having  said  that  I'd 
probably  build  a  probability  curve  starting  with  the  worst  case  scenario  and  moving  on  to  what 
/  would  call  a  more  likely  scenario.  I 
The  use  of  probability  was  framed  in  terms  of  the  likelihood  of  a  particular  effect  such  as 
sedimentation.  However,  when  the  same  decision  maker  was  asked  about  whether  she 
would  attempt  to  estimate  a  probability  curve  for  the  consequences  of  a  particular  effect  she 
replied: 
"/  am  willing  to  venture  that  we  have  never  done  that,  because  it  is  very  difficult,  you  have  to 
have  so  much  data,  you  could  do  it  in  a  very  conceptual  way.  " 
The  decision  makers'  interpretation  and  use  of  probability  is  rather  interesting,  however,  and 
will  be  returned  to  in  section  8.3.2.  Only  one  other  individual  mentioned  probability  in  relation 
to  one  of  the  scenarios  introduced,  in  relation  to  the  weighting  of  the  scenarios. 
The  rest  of  the  respondents  made  no  mention  of  probability  as  a  possible  measure  and 
indeed  other  notions  of  measures  were  used.  For  example  one  individual  stated: 
"The  Southern  Highway  is  one  of  those  projects  where  there  is  a  large  measure  of  uncertainty 
on  a  range  1-5,1  being  minimal  uncertainty  to  5  being  some  maximum4 
Another  stated: 
Interview  with  senior  decision-maker 
Interview  with  senior  decision-maker 
Interview  with  senior  decision-maker Chapter  8:  Results  of  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  202 
"using  as  scale  1-10,  /  would  definitely  be  about  70-80%  uncertain"-5 
Other  respondents  talked  about  the  surprise  they  would  feel  at  the  occurrence  of  a  particular 
outcome,  while  another  talked  in  terms  of  likelihood,  and  another  in  terms  of  the  realism  of 
particular  scenarios  and  whether  or  not  they  were  believable.  A  number  of  individuals 
referred  to  the  possibility  of  a  particular  event  occurring.  This  would  appear  to  indicate  that 
individuals  may  base  their  expectation  in  relation  to  an  uncertain  event  on  more  than  one 
criterion  such  as  belief  or  realism  (see  section  5.4.1.1).  Whether  the  use  of  different  criteria 
corresponds  to  different  types  of  uncertainty  is  difficult  to  conclude  from  the  evidence  obtained 
in  the  interviews,  although  one  decision  maker  stated  that: 
"high  levels  of  surprise  reflect  the  huge  uncertainties  that  /  fee/  are  running  through  the 
process" 
Overall,  however,  the  majority  of  decision  makers  stated  that  they  had  not  quantified  or 
attempted  to  assign  some  scale  to  the  level  of  uncertainty  that  they  faced.  Again  this 
indicates  that  no  normative  framework  had  been  adopted.  However,  the  use  of  certain  scales 
or  criteria  such  as  belief,  reality  and  surprise,  indicates  that  on  an  individual  basis  some 
informal  assessment  of  the  outcomes  of  the  project  was  made. 
8.2.2.1  Potential  surprise 
The  replacement  of  probability  by  an  alternative  measure  of  uncertainty  is  a  key  element  in 
the  Shackle  model.  While  the  analysis  did  not  test  the  use  of  potential  surprise  as  opposed  to 
other  measures  such  as  probability  (as  in  Ford  &  Ghose,  1994b),  the  results  do  provide 
evidence  of  whether,  if  adopted  as  a  measure  of  the  decision  makers'  degree  of  uncertainty 
as  to  the  outcomes  of  the  road  (in  terms  of  the  different  gain  and  loss  scenarios  presented  to 
them),  the  assignment  of  potential  surprise  by  the  decision  maker  is  broadly  consistent  with 
what  would  be  expected  in  theory.  In  addition,  some  indication  of  its  applicability  as  a 
measure  of  uncertainty  in  a  normative  manner  can  also  be  assessed.  At  a  theoretical  level  its 
superiority  as  a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty,  of  the  kind  faced  in  the  Southern  Highway 
project  has  already  been  demonstrated. 
The  focus  of  this  section  is  on  Q14  (appendix  1).  The  results  for  the  individual  respondents 
are  presented  in  appendix  7.  The  majority  of  respondents  when  asked  to  do  the  question 
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seemed  comfortable  with  the  concept  of  surprise  and  the  scale  of  0-10  used,  although  one 
respondent  initially  required  the  concept  to  be  explained  to  him  in  greater  detail.  The 
interpretation  of  potential  surprise  as  a  measure  of  uncertainty  was  perhaps  more  varied.  In 
Shackle's  theory,  potential  surprise  is  seen  as  reflecting  the  degree  of  possibility  that  the 
individual  thinks  resides  in  the  realisation  of  the  alternative  outcomes.  As  such,  it  is  a 
measure  of  the  belief  that  a  particular  outcome  is  possible.  This  is  captured  by  axiom  Al 
which  states  that  degree  of  potential  surprise  is  dependent  on  the  extent  that  an  individual 
believes  that  a  particular  outcome  is  possible.  Zero  degree  of  surprise  indicates  that  the 
individual  believes  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  that  the  outcome  will  occur,  while  the  absolute 
maximum  degree  of  surprise  y  indicates  that  the  individual  believes  the  occurrence  of  the 
outcome  to  be  impossible  (see  section  5.4.1.1). 
Evidence  of  the  interpretation  of  potential  surprise  was  articulated  in  a  number  of  cases.  For 
example,  one  decision  maker  stated  with  reference  to  the  different  scenarios: 
"Because  (scenario)  10,  would  be  a  total  surprise  as  would  (scenario)  6.  (Scenario)  6  would 
be  a  total  surprise.  Okay  in  fact  what  /  am  saying  is  that  for  me  (scenario)  6  and  (scenario)  10 
would  be  totally  unrealistic,  (scenario)  9  would  be  very  unrealistic.  Can  /  put  the  same 
surprise  to  more  than  one  of  them  ?  YY7 
This  statement  would  tend  to  support  the  interpretation  of  surprise  which  was  broadly 
consistent  with  the  model.  Namely,  that  the  decision  maker  asked  if  they  could  assign  the 
same  degree  of  surprise  to  two  outcomes  (which  she  had  started  to  do)  would  indicate  some 
consistency  with  for  example  axiom  A5  which  states  that  the  degree  of  surprise  assigned  to 
any  outcome  need  not  depend  on  the  degree  of  surprise  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  its 
rivals  (See  section  5.4.1.1).  However,  in  terms  of  allocating  numerically  a  degree  of  surprise, 
the  same  respondent  when  talking  about  scenario  6  stated: 
"/  don't  think  scenario  6  is  a  realistic  one  as  far  as  we  are  concerned" 
Yet,  she  went  on  to  allocate  a  zero  degree  of  surprise  to  the  same  outcome  (see  respondent  1, 
appendix  7),  which  could  be  interpreted  that,  although  the  decision  maker  did  not  believe  the 
outcome  to  be  realistic  (or  have  a  high  degree  of  possibility),  nevertheless  she  would  not  be 
surprised  as  to  its  occurrence.  At  a  more  general  level  this  would  appear  to  be  in  line  with 
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some  of  Carter's  (1953)  criticisms  that,  while  an  individual  may  believe  that  the  possibility  of 
an  outcome  is  low  (or  unrealistic),  they  would  still  not  be  surprised  were  it  to  occur 
The  two  respondents  who  mentioned  the  use  of  probability  are  interesting  in  that  although 
they  both  allocated  degrees  of  surprise,  in  the  course  of  the  interview  they  repeatedly  referred 
to  probability.  While  the  comments  of  one  of  the  respondents  will  be  left  to  the  following 
section,  the  behaviour  of  respondent  E  will  be  considered  here.  When  the  respondent  was 
allocating  the  degree  of  surprise  to  the  different  scenarios  she  also  talked  about  the 
probability  of  the  different  outcomes  occurring.  In  particular  with  respect  to  the  gain  scenarios 
(1-5),  she  allocated  a  probability  of  40%  to  scenarios  1,2  and  3,  which  corresponded  to  a 
degree  of  surprise  of  3,  a  probability  of  25%  to  scenario  4  which  was  equivalent  to  a  degree  of 
surprise  of  5,  and  a  probability  of  1  %,  to  scenario  5  equivalent  to  a  surprise  of  10.  The  use  of 
probabilities  and  their  conversion  to  potential  surprise  could  in  certain  respects  have  more  in 
common  with  the  approach  taken  by  Ford  (1983)  although  in  this  case  the  probability  is 
replaced  by  potential  surprise.  However,  in  specifying  the  probability  of  the  scenarios,  she  did 
so  in  a  manner  which  was  not  consistent  with  probability  theory  which  would  require  that  the 
probabilities  sum  to  100%.  This  would  appear  to  demonstrate  a  greater  consistency  with 
Shackle's  theory  and  in  particular  the  proposition  that  the  measure  should  be  non-additive. 
None  of  the  other  respondents  mentioned  the  use  of  probability  in  the  exercise,  which  is 
interesting  given  the  theoretical  hegemony  of  probability  in  academic  studies. 
Where  no  verbal  description  was  offered  of  how  decision  makers  interpreted  their  allocation  of 
degrees  of  surprise  to  the  different  scenarios,  their  behaviour  in  terms  of  the  allocation  of  the 
degree  of  surprise  could  be  interpreted  by  analysing  their  potential  surprise  values.  This  was 
done  by  graphing  all  the  potential  surprise  values  allocated  by  the  individual  decision  makers 
to  the  different  scenarios  (see  appendix  7).  The  most  revealing  aspect  of  the  graphs  is  the 
shape  of  the  potential  surprise  function.  Although  Shackle's  theory  indicates  that  there  are 
numerous  shapes  that  the  potential  surprise  function  could  take,  where  the  function  is 
generally  smooth,  as  opposed  to  having  a  number  of  peaks  and  troughs,  this  appears  to 
indicate  that  potential  surprise  has  been  interpreted  as  a  continuous  variable.  The  majority  of 
the  graphs  do  tend  to  a  smooth  continuous  shape,  indicating  that  potential  surprise  is  revised 
gradually  in  accordance  with  the  magnitude  of  the  gain  and  loss  values,  which  is  consistent 
with  theory. 
There  are  a  number  of  exceptions,  which  would  appear  to  indicate  an  interpretation  of 
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Respondents  D  and  K  are  the  most  obvious  example  of  this.  The  graphs  for  respondents  B, 
C,  0,  and  S  interestingly  appear  very  similar  to  the  shape  of  the  potential  surprise  function 
sketched  by  Shackle  (see  fig  5.1).  What  is  perhaps  unclear  is  the  relationship  between 
potential  surprise  and  the  extent  to  which  the  individual  believes  there  is  a  high  degree  of 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  outcome.  So,  for  example,  in  terms  of 
scenario  6  (the  first  cost  scenario)  which  reflects  the  direct  costs  of  the  project,  eight 
respondents  allocated  this  outcome  a  low  (relative  to  the  other  cost  scenarios)  or  zero 
surprise,  which  indicated  they  would  be  not  be  surprised  at  all,  if  the  scenario  was  to  occur 
because  at  a  minimum  these  costs  would  be  incurred.  However,  the  other  respondents  gave 
a  higher  degree  of  surprise  for  scenario  6,  indicating  that,  because  they  felt  that  there  would 
be  greater  costs  than  those  encapsulated  by  the  first  costs  scenario,  they  would  feel  a  greater 
degree  of  surprise  at  its  occurrence. 
In  terms  of  interpreting  the  data  It  should  be  emphasised  that  a  fair  amount  of  caution  must  be 
exercised.  The  results  cannot  explain  exactly  how  the  uncertainty  associated  with  a  particular 
scenario  is  evaluated  by  the  different  individuals.  Even  so,  in  terms  of  assessing  the 
consistency  of  the  behaviour  of  the  individuals  with  that  suggested  by  theory,  the  results 
suggest  that  the  allocation  of  degree  of  surprise  by  the  decision  makers,  is  broadly  in  line  with 
that  which  would  be  expected  in  the  model.  In  particular  the  evidence  would  suggest  that 
potential  surprise  was  defined  as  a  non-additive  variable,  by  the  majority  of  respondents.  In 
addition  most  of  the  decision  makers  did  assign  the  degree  of  surprise  in  a  continuous 
manner.  However,  a  significant  number  of  individuals  did  appear  in  contrast  to  interpret 
degree  of  surprise  in  a  binary  manner,  suggesting  that  some  individuals  did  not  interpret 
degree  of  surprise  in  a  fashion  consistent  with  the  Shackle  model.  As  well  as  providing 
evidence  in  relation  to  potential  surprise  as  an  element  in  the  Shackle  model  an  important 
aspect  of  eliciting  the  potential  surprise  variables  was  to  facilitate  the  modelling  of  the 
ascendancy  function  which  we  now  turn  to. 
8.2.3  The  ascendancy  or  weighting  function 
The  next  stage  of  the  analysis  involved  the  modelling  of  the  ascendancy  or  weighting  function. 
The  purpose  being  to  gain  evidence  of  whether  the  behaviour  exhibited  by  individuals,  when 
they  were  asked  to  weight  the  different  scenarios,  was  consistent  with  the  model  outlined  in 
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8.2.3.1  Preliminary  evidence  of  a  sifting  or  editing  process 
In  Shackle's  theory  the  ascendancy  function  encapsulates  the  editing  or  sifting  process  by 
which  the  decision  makers  arrive  at  one  focus  outcome  on  the  gain  side  and  one  focus 
outcome  on  the  loss  side.  Before  the  function  in  relation  to  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios 
presented  to  the  decision  maker  was  elicited  from  the  decision  makers,  the  individuals  were 
asked  to  assign  a  weight  to  the  different  scenarios  (see  appendix  1  and  2).  Specifically 
questions  15  and  16  were  asked  in  order  to  gain  some  evidence  of  the  respondents 
willingness  to  discard  any  of  the  scenarios  and  exclude  them  from  any  further  consideration  in 
the  evaluation  process.  Although  this  cannot  be  directly  equated  with  the  ascendancy  or 
weighting  function,  it  highlighted  whether  individuals  would  at  a  preliminary  stage  find  it  useful 
to  discard  some  of  the  scenarios.  This  would  suggest  the  basis  of  a  sifting  or  editing  process 
as  described  in  Chapter  5.  In  total  in  response  to  questions  15  and  16,  fourteen  or  62%  of  the 
21  decision  makers  included  in  the  analysis  stated  that  they  would  discard  one  or  more 
scenarios  at  the  initial  stage  of  the  evaluation  process.  The  details  of  the  number  of  scenarios 
excluded,  as  well  as  which  ones,  are  shown  in  Tables  8.1.  and  8.2. 
Table  8.1  Number  of  scenarios  discarded 
Number  of  scenarios  0123456  Total 
excluded 
Number  of  21 
Respondents 
Table  8.2  Frequency  of  scenarios  discarded8 
Scenario  Number  1  10 
Number  of  respondents 
that  discarded  the  scenario 
3  01  2450489 
Overall  it  is  the  highest  gain  and  highest  loss  scenarios  that  were  the  most  likely  to  be 
excluded  by  the  decision  makers.  Interestingly  enough  only  one  scenario  on  the  gain  side 
(scenario  2)and  one  on  the  loss  side  (scenario  7)  was  not  excluded  by  any  of  the  decision- 
makers.  This  is  consistent  with  the  next  section  in  which  in  no  cases  were  these  scenarios 
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allocated  a  weighting  of  zero,  which  would  appear  to  indicate  that  in  the  sifting  out  process, 
scenarios  2  and  7  survived  to  the  latter  stages. 
8.2.3.2  Modelling  the  ascendancyl  weighting  function 
In  order  to  model  the  ascendancy  or  weighting  function  for  the  individuals,  a  functional  form 
had  to  be  specified.  From  Chapter  5,  the  general  functional  form  of  the  ascendancy  function 
was  assumed  to  be: 
0=  (x,  y) 
Three  specific  functional  forms,  consistent  with  Shackle's  theory,  were  then  identified: 
0.5 
-b 
2 
=ax  ýy 
=ax-b 
Y2 
ax 
0.5 
_by 
(8.1) 
(8.2) 
(8.3) 
(8.4) 
With  0  indicating  the  level  of  ascendancy  (or  weight)  on  a  scale  0-10,  x  the  absolute  gain  or 
loss,  measured  in  US$,  y  is  potential  surprise  measured  on  a  scale  0-10,  and  a  and  bare 
coefficients  for  the  outcome  value  and  the  degree  of  surprise  respectively.  These  coefficients 
can  be  different  over  gains  and  losses.  Equation  8.3  has  been  used  theoretically  by  Ford 
(1994).  The  sign  of  the  coefficients  are  consistent  with  Shackle's  arguments  that  the  absolute 
value  of  the  outcome  will  increase  the  ascendancy  or  weight  of  that  outcome  in  the  mind  of 
the  decision  maker,  whereas  potential  surprise  will  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  weight  or 
ascendancy  given  to  the  outcome.  All  three  differ  with  respect  to  the  combinations  of  the 
power  attached  to  the  outcome  value  and  the  degree  of  potential  surprise.  So,  for  example,  a 
power  of  0.5  attached  to  the  size  of  the  outcome  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  assumption 
that  the  contribution  of  the  magnitude  of  the  gain  or  loss  outcome  makes  to  the  overall  weight 
given  will  decline  marginally.  A  power  of  2  attached  to  the  degree  of  potential  surprise 
assumes  that  the  (negative)  contribution  that  degree  of  surprise  makes  to  the  overall  weight  is 
marginally  increasing.  Although  the  model  was  intrinsically  linear  and  additive,  the  use  of  the 
power  terms  reflected  Shackle's  assumption  that  the  outcome  value  and  the  degree  of 
surprise  are  non-linearly  (negatively  in  the  case  of  potential  surprise)  related  to  the  weighting/ 
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Once  the  different  functional  forms  were  specified,  the  weight  given  (elicited  from  Q19  and 
Q20,  appendix  1),  0,  was  regressed  against  the  value  of  the  outcome  (derived  from  the 
scenarios)  and  the  degree  of  surprise  (elicited  from  Q14)  for  the  whole  sample  (21  x  10 
observations),  over  gains  and  losses  (21  X5  observations),  as  well  as  for  each  of  the 
individual  decision  makers.  On  the  basis  of  the  results  of  the  OLS  regressions,  equation  (8.2) 
was  chosen  as  the  most  appropriate.  This  decision  was  based  on  the  theoretical 
considerations  outlined  above  and  in  Chapter  5,  as  well  as  the  statistical  diagnostics  produced 
for  each  of  the  individual  regressions.  Because  the  potential  surprise  values  used  in  the 
regression  for  each  individual  represent  the  degree  of  surprise  associated  with  that  outcome 
value,  it  was  important  to  check  for  multicollinearity. 
The  theoretical  model  assumes  no  intercept.  A  first  step  therefore  was  to  run  regressions  for 
the  individual  respondents  which  included  an  intercept  term.  In  14  out  of  the  21  individuals  in 
the  sample  (  66%  of  the  respondents  )  the  intercept  term  was  not  significant.  This  confirmed 
at  a  general  level  that  the  theoretical  assumption  of  no  intercept  term  could  be  accepted,  and 
indicates  that  the  ascendancy  functions  of  the  individual  decision  makers  were  broadly 
consistent  with  that  of  the  theoretical  model  represented  by  equation  8.2. 
On  the  basis  of  the  OLS  regressions  carried  out  for  the  functional  form  specified  in  equation 
8.2,  the  data  obtained  from  the  modelling  of  each  individual  in  respect  of  gains  and  losses 
jointly,  as  well  as  gains  and  losses  separately,  were  analysed.  The  results  of  the  regression 
and  the  diagnostics  tests  are  summarised  in  Appendix  8.  Although  the  individual  regressions 
passed  the  majority  of  the  diagnostic  tests,  for  some  there  were  a  number  of  possible 
problems  identified  with  the  individual  models.  However,  because  the  aim  was  to  compare 
the  propositions  of  a  theoretical  model  with  actual  behaviour,  rather  than  attempt  to  define 
closely  the  specification  of  the  weighting/  ascendancy  function,  no  attempt  was  made  to 
define  the  best  fitted  function  for  each  individual.  Instead  the  diagnostics  were  used  as  a 
further  check  on  the  consistency  of  individual  behaviour  with  the  theory. 
Another  concern  was  that,  although  the  modelling  of  the  individuals'  weighting  function 
allowed  the  analysis  to  take  place  at  the  individual  level  and  provided  comparative  data  for  the 
qualitative  information  collected,  for  the  gain  and  loss  regressions  there  was  an  issue  of 
statistical  reliability  due  to  the  small  sample  sizes  (5).  This  re-emphasised  the  importance  of 
making  sure  that  the  general  characteristics  of  the  overall  data  set  were  consistent  with  the 
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Overall  the  weighting  /  ascendancy  functions  for  each  decision  maker  over  gains  and  losses 
jointly  and  gains  and  losses  separately  pass  most  of  the  diagnostic  tests.  The  most  common 
problem  indicated  by  the  diagnostics  was  the  possibility  of  multicollinearity  or  possible  mis- 
specification  indicated  by  an  inconclusive  Durbin-Watson  statistic.  As  such  the  regression 
models  for  the  majority  of  the  individuals  would  appear  to  be  fairly  reliable.  The  explanatory 
power  of  the  individual  models  in  terms  of  the  R-squared  values  is  also  relatively  high  (see 
appendix  8).  However,  where  the  diagnostic  statistics  have  indicated  a  number  of  problems 
such  as  is  the  case  for  respondent  M,  less  weight  should  be  given  to  the  R-squared  value  for 
the  individual.  Overall,  the  theoretical  model  of  the  ascendancy  function  seems  to  have 
captured  fairly  well  the  behaviour  of  the  individual  respondents.  If  the  ascendancy  functions 
for  gains  and  losses  are  taken,  for  example,  the  majority  of  the  adjusted  R-squared  values  are 
higher  than  60%,  with  a  large  number  in  the  80%  and  90%  regions.  These  figures  allow  us  to 
proceed  in  relative  confidence  to  the  more  detailed  analysis  of  a  number  of  further 
propositions  relating  to  the  Shackle  model. 
8.2.3.3  Testing  the  propositions  of  the  ascendancyl  weighting  function 
Modelling  the  weighting/  ascendancy  function  permitted  a  number  of  further  propositions 
relating  to  the  model  to  be  tested.  A  summary  of  the  key  results  is  presented  in  Table  8.3. 
Table  8.3  Summary  of  key  results  from  the  modelling  of  the  ascendancy  function 
Percentage  with  Percentage  of  Percentage  of  Percentage  of 
negative  coefficient  significant  equations  significant  xo'5  significant  Y2 
sign  for  b  (IF  test  sig.  =  0.05)  (T-test  sig.  (T-test  sig. 
0.05)  0.05) 
All  77%  100%  90%  43 
Gain  57%  76%  52%  24 
Loss  80%  52%  43%  38 
No.  of  No.  of  respondents  No.  of  No.  of  respondents 
respondents  where  weighting  respondents  where  Y2  is 
with  negative  function  is  significant  where  XO, 
5  is 
significant 
coefficient  sign  (F  test  sig.  =  0.05)  significant  (T-test  sig.  =  0.05) 
for  b  (T-test  sig.  =  0.05) 
All  16  21  19  9 
Gain  12  16  11  5 
Loss  17  11  9  8 
The  first  proposition  that  can  be  tested  is  whether  or  not  the  sign  of  the  coefficients  of  the 
individuals  weighting  function  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  requirements.  In  Shackle's 
model  the  absolute  value  of  the  outcome,  x,  is  expected  to  contribute  positively  to  the Chapter  8:  Results  of  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  210 
weighting  assigned,  while  the  degree  of  surprise,  y,  is  expected  to  affect  negatively  the 
weight  assigned  to  a  outcome.  For  all  of  the  respondents,  in  respect  of  the  ascendancy 
function  over  gains  and  losses  jointly  and  gains  and  losses  separately,  the  coefficient  of  x, 
namely  a,  was  positive,  showing  perfect  consistency  with  the  Shackle  model  (see  appendix 
8).  The  fact  that  the  coefficient  for  the  absolute  value  of  the  loss  outcomes  was  positive  also 
confirms  that  none  of  the  respondents  interpreted  the  weighting  function  in  terms  of  utility, 
because  if  this  were  the  case,  then  it  would  be  expected  that  as  the  loss  got  larger  its  utility 
would  decrease. 
The  analysis  of  the  signs  of  the  coefficient  of  potential  surprise,  b,  for  the  individual 
respondents  would  also  appear  to  be  consistent  with  theory.  For  the  ascendancy  function 
grouped  together  for  all  respondents  for  gains  and  losses  jointly,  as  well  as  for  gains  and 
losses  separately,  the  coefficients  had  a  negative  sign  in  the  main  (see  appendix  8).  In  terms 
of  the  gains  and  losses  jointly  for  77%  of  the  respondents  a  negative  sign  was  exhibited.  For 
the  gain  function  this  figure  was  less,  with  approximately  12  or  57%  of  the  decision  makers 
having  the  expected  sign.  For  losses  considered  separately  the  figure  was  higher  with  80%  or 
17  of  the  respondents  having  negative  coefficients  for  potential  surprise.  This  would  appear 
to  suggest  some  difference  in  respect  of  gains  and  losses.  However  on  further  inspection  of 
the  function  for  gains  and  losses  jointly,  in  all  but  one  of  the  respondents  ascendancy 
function's  for  whom  b  was  positive,  the  y  term  was  not  a  significant  (see  table  8.4). 
Table  8.4  Individual  ascendancy  function  for  gains  and  losses  jointly 
Total  no.  No.  where  Y2  not  %  where  y2  not 
significant  (0.05)  significant  (0.05) 
Sign  of  b  positive  54  80% 
Sign  of  b  negative  16  7  44% 
In  respect  of  gains  all  the  coefficients  that  were  positive  (9)  were  not  significant  (see  table 
8.5).  For  losses,  for  all  but  one  of  the  respondents,  for  whom  the  coefficient  of  potential 
surprise  was  positive,  y  was  not  significant  (see  table  8.6).  When  tested  statistically,  it  was 
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Table  8.5  Individual  ascendancy  function  for  gains 
2  Total  no.  No.  where  Y2  not  %  where  not 
significant  (0.05)  significant  (0.05) 
Sign  of  b  positive  99  100% 
Sign  of  b  negative  12  7  58% 
Table  8.6  Individual  ascendancy  function  for  losses 
Total  no.  No.  where  Y2  not  %  where  Y2  not 
significant  (0.05)  significant  (0.05) 
Sign  of  b  positive  43  75% 
Sign  of  b  negative  17  11  65% 
the  separate  gains  and  losses  weighting  functions  This  would  suggest  that  there  was  no 
significant  difference  between  the  ascendancy  function  over  gains  and  losses  and  would 
suggest  that  the  estimated  individual  ascendancy  functions  for  gains  and  losses  jointly  could 
be  considered  reliable.  Thus,  although  Shackle's  theory  allows  room  for  the  gain  and  loss 
ascendancy  function  to  differ  in  terms  of  the  effect  of  the  degree  of  surprise  on  the  weight 
attached  to  a  particular  outcome,  in  the  case  of  the  decision  makers  sampled  for  the  Southern 
Highway  there  was  no  difference  in  the  effect  of  potential  surprise  over  gains  and  losses  on 
the  weighting  function. 
The  lack  of  difference  between  the  size  of  the  coefficients  a  and  b  in  respect  of  the  separate 
gain  and  loss  functions  can  be  shown  by  comparing  the  rolling  regression  plots  of  the 
coefficients  for  the  gains  and  losses  jointly  (see  fig  8.1  a  and  8.1  b),  gains  separately  (see  fig 
8.2a  and  8.2b)  and  losses  (see  fig  8.3a  and  fig  8.3b).  If  figs  8.1  a,  8.2a  and  8.3a  are  analysed, 
it  is  apparent  that  there  is  very  little  difference  in  the  range  of  values  of  the  coefficients  for  the 
individuals.  Likewise,  if  figs  8.1  b,  8.2b  and  8.3b  are  compared,  the  gain  and  loss  coefficients 
for  y-  squared  are  broadly  within  the  same  range,  although  it  is  evident  that  in  comparison  to 
gains  for  losses  a  higher  number  are  negative.  Two  respondents  D  and  W  were  excluded 
from  the  rolling  regression  due  to  the  coefficients  for  their  equations  being  out-with  the  range 
shown  in  figs  8.1-8.3  (see  appendix  8  for  the  size  of  the  coefficients  of  respondents  D  and  W). 
With  the  exception  of  decision  makers  D  and  W,  generally  the  size  of  the  coefficients  is  within 
a  relatively  narrow  range,  showing  a  degree  of  similarity  amongst  the  individual  decision 
makers  in  the  way  that  the  outcome  value  and  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  affect  the 
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Fig  8.1  a  Rolling  regression  plot  of  a  for  the  ascendancy  function  for  gains  and 
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Fig  8.2a  Rolling  regression  plot  of  a  for  the  ascendancy  function  for  gains 
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Ig  .2b  Rolling  regression  plot  of  b  for  the  ascendancy  function  for  gains 
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Although  overall  it  would  appear  that  gains  and  losses  were  not  treated  differently  in  relation 
to  the  effect  of  outcome  and  degree  of  surprise  on  the  overall  weighting  given  to  the  outcome 
in  the  course  of  the  interviews,  some  of  the  respondent  suggested  that  they  would  treat  gains 
and  losses  differently.  Although  this  behaviour  is  sfill  consistent  with  the  Shackle  model,  it  is 
worth  highlighting  as  an  insight  into  the  evaluation  process  of  one  of  the  individuals  who  was 
one  of  the  two  decision  makers  who  had  at  the  earlier  stages  talked  about  the  concept  of 
probability.  The  following  excerpt  is  interesting  not  only  as  an  insight  into  the  weighting 
process  but  also  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  given  to  probability  which  was  very  different 
to  that  given  in  a  conventional  expected  utility  approach.  Thus,  the  respondent  stated: 
"The  approach  towards  benefits  is  very  different  to  the  approach  towards  costs.  Uncertainty  in 
terms  of  costs,  I  guess  from  an  environmental  side  has  an  element  of  irreversibility.  So  even 
though  this  is  improbable,  it  has  a  low  probability,  the  9  here  (gains)  is  not  equivalent  to  the  9 
here  (losses).  Although  this  would  surprise  me,  I  have  more  uncertainty  towards  this,  and 
there  is  an  element  of  irreversibility,  which  magnifies,  it  sort  of  exacerbates  the  uncertainty, 
.... 
/  was  saying  that  the  probability  here  is  different  to  the  probability  here.  Here  its  like  what  I 
call  dream  land.  Here  it  has  maybe  a  1%  probability  because  it  assumes  all  these  things 
about  the  govemment  wanting  to  manage  the  whole  process.  Whereas  here  even  although  it 
is  a  worst  case  scenario,  you  may  in  fact  be  as  high  as  15%.  I'm  trying  to  make  a  sort  of 
relationship,  it  is  not  a  quantitative  thing,  but  the  9  does  not  reflect  well,  the  degree  of  surprise 
on  the  loss  side.  That  would  affect  my  weighting.  That's  what  I'm  trying  to  say,  in  terms  of 
weighting,  In  terms  of  how  much  attention  you  would  give  to  a  worst  case  scenario  is  maybe 
even  a  7"  9 
The  weighting  function  for  this  individual  clearly  therefore  fulfils  an  important  role  in  allowing 
the  decision  maker  to  weight  higher  a  loss  outcome  with  the  same  degree  of  surprise  as  a 
gain  outcome. 
The  significance  of  the  variable  in  the  modelled  ascendancy  functions  for  the  decision  makers 
has  already  been  touched  on  in  relation  to  testing  whether  there  are  any  differences  between 
the  way  that  weights  were  assigned  to  the  different  gain  and  loss  scenarios.  The  significance 
of  the  outcome  variable  and  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  is  also  important  in  that  it  partly 
indicates  the  importance  of  that  variable  in  the  weighting  process,  and  as  such  gives  an 
insight  into  the  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  environmental  consequences  of 
the  road.  In  terms  of  the  ascendancy  functions  for  the  individual  decision  makers  for  gains 
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and  losses  considered  jointly,  for  all  but  2  of  the  individuals  the  outcome  variable,  xO-5,  was 
significant.  For  gains,  only  for  10  out  of  the  21,  was  the  outcome  variable  significant.  For 
losses,  in  20  out  of  the  21  respondents  the  outcome  variable  was  significant  (see  table  8.3). 
The  significance  of  potential  surprise  in  the  individual  ascendancy  function  is  less  for  gains 
and  losses  considered  jointly,  Y2  is  significant  in  9  out  of  21  cases,  while  for  gains  in  only  5 
cases  is  Y2  significant,  and  for  losses  the  equivalent  number  of  cases  is  8  (see  table  8.3). 
The  difference  between  the  significance  of  the  outcome  and  potential  surprise  variables  does 
suggest  some  inconsistency  with  the  theoretical  model.  Part  of  the  difference  can  be  partly 
explained  by  the  instances  where  the  coefficient  of  the  potential  surprise  variable  is  positive 
and  non-significant  (see  table  8.5),  as  well  as  their  being  problems  in  the  small  sample  size. 
In  contrast  for  the  model  for  all  the  respondents  grouped  together,  both  the  outcome  and 
potential  surprise  variables  are  highly  significant.  At  the  same  time  the  relatively  low  number 
of  cases  in  which  potential  surprise  is  significant  could  also  suggest  that  potential  surprise,  as 
a  measure  of  hard  uncertainty,  was  not  a  significant  factor  in  the  weighting  of  the  outcome. 
Instead  the  decision  makers  focused  purely  on  the  outcome  value  alone.  This  position  would 
appear  to  be  consistent  with  the  views  of  a  significant  minority  of  decision  makers,  who  in  the 
course  of  their  interview,  gave  the  impression  that  they  did  not  consider  hard  uncertainty  to  be 
a  major  concern  in  the  evaluation  process.  In  other  words  where  the  potential  surprise 
variable  is  insignificant,  this  may  be  either  seen  in  terms  of  the  quality  and  sample  size  of  the 
data,  or  in  the  interpretation  that  the  surprise  that  the  decision  maker  felt  at  the  occurrence  of 
the  outcome  was  to  a  large  degree  ignored. 
A  further  proposition  of  the  Shackle  model  that  could  be  assessed  by  the  modelling  of  the 
ascendancy  function  related  to  its  role  in  editing  or  sifting  the  different  outcomes  to  arrive  at  a 
focus  gain,  representing  the  best  outcome  to  be  hoped  for,  and  a  focus  loss  value, 
representing  the  worst  outcome  to  be  feared.  A  simple  way  of  testing  this  proposition  was  to 
look  at  the  weighting  of  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios  and  identify  whether  only  one  gain  value 
and  one  loss  value  was  identified.  In  19  out  of  the  21  cases  only  one  gain  outcome  was  given 
the  highest  weighting.  For  losses,  15  of  the  respondents  gave  their  highest  weighting  to  one 
outcome.  Overall,  14  out  of  the  21  decision-makers  identified  only  one  outcome  value  and 
one  loss  value,  suggesting  that  generally  the  behaviour  of  the  decision  makers  in  terms  of  the 
ascendancy  as  a  focusing  device  was  in  a  manner  consistent  with  that  expected  in  theory. 
Where  only  one  outcome  on  the  gain  side  and  one  loss  outcome  is  identified  when  the 
ascendancy  function  is  graphed  with  respect  to  the  absolute  value  of  the  outcome,  then  the 
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drawn  by  Shackle  (see  fig  5.3).  In  terms  of  the  identification  of  the  focus  gain  value,  scenario 
5,  was  by  far  the  modal  choice  (see  table  8-7).  In  terms  of  losses  the  spread  was  more  even 
with  scenarios  7  and  8  being  the  most  common  choice  of  focus  loss  (see  table  8.8). 
Table  8.7  Identification  of  focus  gain 
Scenario  145  Total 
Frequency  213  10  19 
Table  8.8  Identffication  of  focus  loss 
Scenario  6789  10  Total 
Frequency  34431  15 
8.2.4  Summary  of  results 
The  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  provides  an  interesting  insight  into  the  way 
that  uncertainty  is  evaluated  in  the  decision-making  process.  The  application  of  the  Shackle 
model  to  the  case  study  also  demonstrates  that  the  model  is  indeed  operational,  and  that  a 
number  of  its  key  propositions  could  be  tested.  From  the  application  of  the  model,  it  would 
appear  that  the  decision  makers  felt  comfortable  with  the  separation  of  gains  and  losses,  a 
position  which  is  also  reflected  in  the  project  documents.  The  use  of  potential  surprise  as  a 
measure  of  uncertainty  seems  to  be  broadly  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model,  although  in 
a  number  of  cases,  it  was  interpreted  as  a  binary  measure.  In  terms  of  the  modelling  of  the 
individual  ascendancy/  weighting  functions,  the  functional  form  chosen  would  appear  to 
capture  the  behaviour  of  the  decision  makers  relatively  well,  as  indicated  by  the  high  R- 
squared  values,  the  overall  significance  of  the  equations  and  the  fact  that  the  individual 
regression  models  passed  the  majority  of  the  diagnostic  tests:  The  signs  of  the  coefficients 
are  also  broadly  consistent  with  the  Shackle  model,  although  interestingly  there  was  no 
difference  in  the  way  that  gains  and  losses  were  evaluated,  indicating  that  a  separate 
ascendancy  function  over  gains  and  losses  was  not  necessary.  Indeed  the  individual  decision 
makers  showed  a  large  degree  of  similarity  in  the  way  that  they  weighted  the  different 
outcomes  based  on  the  outcome  and  potential  surprise  values. 
In  terms  of  the  significance  of  the  variables,  the  outcome  variable  is  significant  in  a  large 
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inconsistency  with  the  Shackle  model.  Although  some  of  these  cases  can  be  explained 
statistically,  an  alternative  interpretation  is  that  some  of  the  decision  makers,  effectively 
ignored  any  uncertainties  that  they  felt  at  the  occurrence  of  the  different  outcomes,  as 
indicated  by  their  degree  of  surprise.  The  last  proposition  tested  was  that  of  the  behaviour  of 
the  individuals  in  terms  of  the  ascendancy/  weighting  function  acting  as  an  editing  or  sifting 
device.  The  results  obtained  would  suggest  that  the  behaviour  of  the  individuals  was 
consistent  with  the  model,  with  the  majority  of  respondents  focusing  on  one  gain  outcome  (the 
focus  gain)  and  one  loss  value  (the  focus  loss). 
Overall  the  results  would  therefore  appear  to  offer  some  support  for  the  Shackle  model, 
although  clearly  some  reservations  apply,  as  would  be  expected  from  the  necessity  of  using 
small  data  sets  for  the  individuals.  The  more  general  explanations  which  the  model  can  offer 
in  terms  of  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  dealt  within  the  decision-making  process  is  now  looked 
at  in  the  following  section. 
8.3  An  interpretation  of  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  in  the  decision  making 
process. 
While  the  evidence  presented  in  the  previous  section  does  suggest  a  certain  degree  of 
consistency  in  the  behaviour  of  individuals  as  regards  the  Shackle  model,  a  further  step  can 
be  taken  in  applying  the  Shackle  model  as  a  framework  for  explaining  the  decision-making 
process  at  a  more  general  level.  This  is  useful  in  that  it  provides  an  understanding  of  the  way 
that  within  institutions  uncertainty  is  dealt  with  in  the  decision-making  process.  Moreover,  in 
terms  of  using  elements  of  the  model  to  help  develop  a  normative  framework,  for  improving 
the  way  that  environmental  uncertainty  is  dealt  with  in  the  decision-making  process,  its 
behavioural  application  at  a  more  general  level  helps  gives  further  evidence  on  the 
applicability  of  a  number  of  its  key  propositions. 
8.3.1  The  role  of  individual  decision  makers 
The  Shackle  model  as  a  model  of  individual  decision  making  under  uncertainty  was  applied 
on  an  individual  basis  to  decision  makers  involved  on  the  evaluation  of  the  Belize  Southern 
Highway  Project.  However,  in  relation  to  the  overall  decision-making  process  it  is  apparent 
that  individuals  will  play  different  roles  within  this  process.  Consequently  it  will  be  important  to 
consider  the  interaction  of  individuals  in  terms  of  the  decision's  made  and  the  evaluation  of 
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"with  an  institution  as  complex  as  this,  with  certain  different  departments  and  divisions,  that 
are  in  charge  of  certain  things  ....  within  that  you  have  very  random  results  when  you  mix  all 
the  private  interests  and  sub  interests  in  a  decision 
... 
theoretically  you  see  many  tools  that 
decision  makers  put  out  on  paper,  you  see  analytical  and  logical  frameworks  to  attain  certain 
aims.  But  along  the  way  they  are  kind  of  damaged  in  a  way,  hidden  within  a  not  very  clear  set 
of  r-oles"  '0 
Within  the  institutions,  therefore,  different  individuals  may  focus  on  different  issues  within  the 
decision-making  process.  Often,  for  example,  this  involved  limiting  their  role  to  that  defined  by 
their  position.  Thus,  one  environmental  specialist  pointed  out  that  she  felt  part  of  this  job 
entailed  assessing  the  worst  case  scenario  of  any  project.  "  In  another  case,  an  individual 
involved  in  the  assessment  of  the  environmental  aspects  of  the  project  pointed  out  that  he/she 
had  been  involved  in  several  instances  where  they  were  asked  not  to  comment  on  non- 
environmental  issues.  12.  In  addition,  decision  makers  at  different  levels  in  the  decision-making 
structure  played  different  roles.  As  one  senior  decision  maker  commented: 
"at  a  decision  making  level,  most  of  these  people  perhaps  at  one  point  in  their  career  are 
technical  people  but  they  aren't  really  technical  people  any  more,  you  apply  your  common 
sense,....  there  is  a  certain  point  where  you  have  to  trust  your  technical  people  and  you  go  a 
lot  frankly  by  the  reputation  of  the  people  that  are  doing  the  work.  PY13 
8.3.2  Contesting  focus  outcomes 
Recognising  the  different  roles  that  the  individuals  play  in  the  decision-making  process 
provides  a  platform  on  which  it  is  possible  to  assess  at  a  more  general  level  another  key 
proposition  of  Shackle's  theory,  namely  that  the  possible  outcomes  of  any  action,  such  as  a 
development  project  or  policy  are  sifted  out,  on  the  basis  of  the  consequences  of  the  outcome 
(which  can  be  expressed  in  monetary  terms)  and  the  extent  to  which  the  outcome  is  expected 
to  occur,  until  one  outcome  on  the  gain  side  and  one  outcome  on  the  loss  side  are  focused 
on.  While,  on  an  individual  basis,  this  sifting  out  process  is  represented  by  the  ascendancy 
function,  at  a  more  general  level  a  similar  process  within  the  IDB,  GoBl,  DFID  and  World  Bank 
can  be  described.  Accordingly  in  such  an  interpretation,  while  at  the  evaluation  stage  a 
number  of  possible  outcomes,  are  assessed,  by  the  time  the  project  reaches  the  final  stages 
Personal  Communication  with  senior  decision  maker 
Personal  Communication  with  decision  maker 
12  Personal  Communication  with  decision  maker 
13  Personal  communication  with  senior  decision  maker Chapter  8:  Results  of  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  219 
of  the  decision  making  process,  only  one  scenario  or  focus  outcome  is  presented.  As  one 
decision  maker  in  the  World  Bank  outlined: 
"By  the  end,  by  the  time  you  are  appraising  a  project,  before  you  even  think  about  sending  it 
to  the  Board,  you  have  one  scenario.  A  sifting  down  of  the  scenarios  takes  place  between  the 
concept  stage  and  the  decision  stage. 
1114 
One  senior  decision  maker  confirmed  this  process,  in  that  he  argued  that  the  top  managers 
did  not  want  to  consider  three  possibilities,  but  that  the  decision-making  process  pressurised 
the  evaluation  team  to  come  up  with  one  scenario.  15 
At  the  earlier  stages,  before  the  agreed  project  scenario  was  approved,  a  process  could  be 
seen  whereby  a  number  of  focus  outcomes  were  contested,  within  the  institution,  and  in  the 
case  of  a  project  like  the  Belize  Southern  Highway  Project,  between  the  different  institutions, 
such  as  between  the  IDB  and  the  GoBl.  Within  the  different  institutions  the  role  of  the 
individual  decision  makers  was  clearly  important  with  individual  decision  makers  pushing  a 
particular  outcome  depending  on  their  position,  for  example  as  an  environmental  specialist  or 
economist.  The  contesting  of  different  focus  outcomes  between  the  different  institutions 
involved  in  a  project  would  also  appear  to  be  an  important  aspect  of  the  negotiation  of  the 
project,  so  for  example  it  was  apparent  that  at  initial  stages  in  the  Southern  Highway  project 
there  was  a  contrast  in  the  focus  outcome  advanced  by  the  IDB  and  the  GoBI.  The 
differences  in  the  scenario  focused  on  was  highlighted  by  one  decision  maker  in  the  GoBI  who 
argued  that; 
"the  extemal  agencies  go  with  a  much  exaggerated  impact  in  terms  of  the  impacts  and  the 
scenarios.  When  you  could  easily  make  a  more  reliable  projection.  2116 
However,  while  it  was  clear  that  at  the  evaluation  stage  a  number  of  possible  outcomes  were 
considered,  the  project  was  then  designed  in  a  manner  which  aimed  to  reduce  the  possible 
negative  outcomes  of  the  project,  with  again  the  emphasis  being  on  a  solution  based 
approach: 
"when  somebody  works  as  a  specialist  in  a  project  they  look  for  certain  parameters  and  after 
you  have  looked  at  these  you  kind  of  narrow  down,  to  one  or  two  choices.  We  get  a  feeling 
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that  this  will  work,  or  this  will  not  After  that  you  basically  keep  on  nan-owing  down  to  the  end, 
where  you  come  with  one  choice  and  you  then  develop  it  in  the  feasibility  Study,  1-117 
Another  decision  maker  involved  in  the  evaluation  of  projects,  outlined  a  similar  process: 
"my  objective  is  to  relatively  quickly  in  the  project  ascertain  what  is  a  probable  scenario. 
... 
Given  that  what  is  accepted  as  what  is  going  to  be  the  project,  /  would  try  to  figure  out  what 
is  going  to  be  a  probable  scenario,  starting  with  the  worst  case  scenario  and  gradually  moving 
towards,  as  you  get  more  information,  what  is  a  probable  scenario.  "" 
However,  as  has  been  indicated  this  sifting  basis  was  done  on  the  basis  of  professional 
judgement  rather  than  with  the  use  of  any  formal  framework.  As  one  senior  decision  maker 
confirmed: 
"There  is  no  formal  methodology  that  we  use  to  sift  through  them,  we  tend  to  sift  through  the 
possible  alternative  outcomes,  based  on  the  project  officers,  and  the  team's  assessment  of 
the  risks  involved,  some  fisks  seemed  higher  than  others.  How  do  we  determine  these?  How 
do  we  determine  this,  mostly  /  would  say  this  is  based  on  experience  on  what  is  most  likely, 
the  most  likely  scenario.  "19 
By  the  end  of  the  process  a  single  focus  outcome  had  been  developed,  and  the  project  based 
on  this  outcome  is  presented  to  the  higher  tier  of  decision  makers,  at  which  stage  the 
emphasis  is  on  questioning  the  assumptions  made  in  that  scenario.  As  one  senior  decision 
maker  pointed  out  attention  was  placed  on  questioning  the  likelihood  of  the  outcome 
presented: 
"how  much  do  /  believe  in  those  assumptions?  What  do  I  think,  do  I  think  that  those 
assumptions  are  corTect  or  not,  or  do  /  think  that  they  exaggerate?  /  would  question  each  one 
of  the  assumptions. 
The  evidence  would  suggest,  therefore,  that  rather  than  taking  an  averaging  approach  as 
would  be  suggested  by  expected  value  and  utility  theory,  the  decision-making  process  is 
designed  at  an  early  stage  to  sift  through  the  range  of  possible  outcomes  and  focus  on  one 
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outcome.  However,  while  the  decision-making  process  results  in  the  focus  on  one  outcome, 
the  evidence  suggests  that  to  a  large  extent  the  weighting  of  the  different  outcomes  takes 
place  predominantly  on  the  extent  to  which  the  individual  decision  makers,  and  the  institution 
as  a  whole,  expects  an  outcome  to  occur. 
Although  the  focusing  approach  would  seem  consistent  at  a  general  level  with  Shackle's 
theory,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the  sifting  process  is  done  in  the  manner  theorised  in  the  form  of 
the  ascendancy  function.  In  particular  the  question  arises,  of  whether  this  sifting  process 
evaluates  both  the  uncertainty  associated  with  a  particular  outcome,  as  well  the 
consequences  of  the  outcome,  in  the  manner  theorised  by  Shackle  or  whether  in  essence  the 
uncertainty  is  filtered  out  with  the  focus  on  one  particular  outcome.  The  lack  of  formal 
mechanisms  to  evaluate  explicitly  the  uncertainty  (which  will  be  highlighted  in  the  following 
chapter),  as  well  as  evidence  presented  in  the  previous  chapter,  in  which  for  a  number  of  the 
individual  regressions  the  potential  surprise  was  not  significant,  would  to  a  large  degree  point 
to  the  latter  explanation. 
While  caution  must  be  exercised  in  any  interpretation,  an  explanation  of  the  decision-making 
process  can  be  advanced  in  which,  rather  than  uncertainty  being  explicitly  accounted  for,  it  is 
filtered  out  and  only  dealt  with  in  terms  of  designing  solutions  to  reduce  the  effects  of  any 
negative  consequence  of  the  resulting  outcome  which  is  focused  on.  This  could  even  be 
explained  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  suggested  by  Ford  &  Ghose  (11  994b),  namely,  that  while 
the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome  is  assessed  in  terms  of  the  expectations  of  the 
individual  or  institution,  this  in  itself  results  in  an  early  sifting  process,  before  any  consideration 
is  made  of  the  extent  to  which  the  decision  maker  would  be  surprised  or  confident  that  the 
outcome  would  occur.  In  a  normative  sense  there  is  a  danger,  therefore,  that  such  an 
approach  does  not  explicitly  consider  the  full  range  of  possible  uncertain  consequences  of  a 
particular  project,  and  indeed  there  could  be  a  tendency  for  a  confusion  between  the  most 
likely  and  the  most  desired  outcome.  Furthermore  the  emphasis  on  a  solutions  based 
approach  may  result  in  only  the  outcomes  for  which  possible  'solutions'  or  mitigative 
measures  can  be  designed  being  advanced  as  focus  outcomes.  Possible  hard  uncertainties 
surrounding  outcomes  for  which  the  uncertain  consequences  would  not  be  so  easily  solvable 
(such  as  the  passing  of  a  threshold  in  a  ecosystem)  are  in  effect  excluded  from  the  final 
decision  stages.  Thus,  hard  uncertainties  which  if  explicitly  considered  could  affect  a  decision 
to  proceed  with  a  particular  project  or  policy,  may  not  actually  reach  the  final  stage  of  the 
decision-making  process.  Consequently  In  such  an  interpretation  it  can  be  argued  that  only 
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likely  to  be  soft  rather  than  hard  uncertainties)  are  focused  on  and  presented  at  the  final 
decision-making  level.  Such  a  process,  by  designing  measures  which  attempt  to  ensure  that 
the  identified  outcome  is  the  one  that  occurs,  would  only  deal  indirectly  with  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  the  other  possible  outcomes.  As  one  senior  decision  maker  pointed  out: 
"The  starting  point  of  a  decision-making  process  that  is  self  seeking  and  is  seeking  the 
objective  ...  should  mean  that  you  are  able  to  redesign,  re-adapt,  re-shuffle  project  design'r2l 
He  went  out  to  provide  an  interesting  analogy  in  terms  of  how  the  I  uncertainties'  were  dealt 
with: 
"Think  of  it  in  a  general  way  like-you  are  throwing  a  dice,  and  before  you  are  going  to  throw 
the  dice,  you  call  all  the  clairvoyants  in  the  world  and  pay  them  tons  of  money,  i.  e.  consultants 
and  tell  them,  this  is  the  way  it  should  go,  /  want  a  six  on  the  table,  two  sixes.  And  the  guys 
come  in  and  they  put  Vaseline  on  your  hands  and  they  grease  the  cup,  and  say  don't  do  it  like 
this,  do  it  like  that.  And  then  sometimes  you  get  a  couple  of  five's,  sometimes  you  get  a  six,  a 
six and  a  five.  Depending  on  the  way  that  you  do  it.  " 
This  explanation  would  appear  to  be  further  supported  by  the  recognition  in  the  different 
institutions  that  there  has  been  a  tendency  for  projects  to  be  excessively  optimistic  in  their 
projections  (Phol  &  Mihaljek,  1992;  Mathur,  1994;  DFID,  1998).  Part  of  this  problem  could  be 
accounted  for  by  the  lack  of  explicit  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  within  the  decision-making 
process. 
This  process  would  also  appear  to  be  reinforced  by  the  higher  stages  of  the  decision-making 
process,  whereby  the  final  scenario  or  outcome  developed  in  the  feasibility  study  is 
questioned  in  terms  of  its  assumptions.  The  scenario  with  the  least  uncertain  assumptions  is 
therefore  pushed  forward.  This  process  may  exclude  from  explicit  consideration  the 
uncertainties  involved.  In  terms  of  environmental  decision-making,  there  is  therefore  a  danger 
that  particularly  the  negative  environmental  consequences  of  a  project  are  not  given  sufficient 
weight  in  the  decision-making  process  precisely  because  they  are  conditioned  by  hard 
uncertainty.  In  recognition  of  this  issue,  attention  is  turned  in  the  following  chapter  to 
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assessing  why  existing  practical  mechanisms  do  not  ensure  the  explicit  consideration  of  hard 
uncertainty  as  well  as  the  design  of  a  normative  framework  which  gives  adequate  attention  to 
these  concerns. 
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CHAPTER  9:  DISCUSSION:  A  FRAMEWORK  FOR  THE  EVALUATION  OF  HARD 
UNCERTAINTY  IN  ENVIRONMENTAL  DECISION  MAKING 
9.1  IntroducHon 
In  the  previous  chapter  the  Shackle  model  was  applied  as  a  tool  to  help  explain  the  way  that 
uncertainty  was  dealt  with  at  an  individual  as  well  as  institutional  level  within  the  decision- 
making  process.  An  explanation  was  forwarded,  in  which  although  the  decision-making 
process  did  result  in  the  sifting  out  of  the  possible  outcomes  of  a  project  or  policy,  the 
presence  of  hard  uncertainty  did  not  appear  to  have  been  dealt  with  in  a  manner  consistent 
with  that  outlined  in  the  Shackle  model.  This  chapter  therefore,  in  analysing  why  this  may  be 
the  case,  assesses  the  existing  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  at  an  institutional  level  as  well 
as  the  practical  (rather  than  theoretical)  mechanisms  currently  used  to  deal  with  uncertainty. 
It  is  argued  that  to  a  large  extent  only  a  limited  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  is  given  which 
results  in  none  of  the  existing  mechanisms  applied  within  the  decision-making  process  giving 
adequate  attention  to  hard  uncertainty.  Building  on  the  theoretical  development  of  the 
Shackle  model  in  this  thesis,  and  its  application  in  a  behavioural  sense  to  the  case  study  of 
the  Southern  Highway,  a  normative  framework  for  dealing  with  hard  uncertainty  is  advanced. 
Correspondingly  this  chapter  is  organised  into  two  main  sections.  In  the  first  section  the 
different  conceptual  isations  of  uncertainty  within  the  different  institutions  is  analysed  both  in 
relation  to  the  case  study  as  well  as  at  a  more  general  level.  Then  the  mechanisms  which  are 
designed  to  deal  with  uncertainty  in  the  decision  making  process  are  assessed  in  a  normative 
manner.  In  the  second  section  the  application  of  a  normative  framework  to  ensure  the  explicit 
evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision-making  will  be  forwarded. 
9.2  The  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making 
A  key  contribution  of  this  thesis  has  been  the  assertion  that  there  are  a  number  of  different 
modes  of  uncertainty,  and  that  this  recognition  has  a  number  of  implications  for  the  decision- 
making  process.  An  important  issue,  therefore,  is  the  extent  to  which  the  evidence  gained 
from  the  interviews  supports  or  refutes  the  proposition  that  adequate  attention  is  given  to  this 
in  the  decision-making  process.  In  terms  of  the  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  it 
would  appear  that  in  both  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB  no  formal  explicit  recognition  was  given  to 
distinguishing  between  the  types  of  uncertainty  faced.  In  particular,  the  presence  of  what  has Chapter  9:  Discussion  226 
been  termed  hard  uncertainty  or  any  similar  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty,  rather  than  soft 
uncertainty,  in  environmental  projects  was  not  explicitly  recognised. 
The  lack  of  recognition  in  the  case  study  of  the  Southern  Highway  of  the  presence  of  hard 
uncertainty  with  respect  to  the  environment,  was  evident  for  a  number  of  decision  makers. 
For  example  one  decision  maker  in  the  IDB  stated  that: 
"you  are  perturbing  some  sort  of  equilibrium  in  an  ecosystem  and  once  you  bring  in  a  road,  it 
doesn't  take  too  many  hours  of  experts  of  knowledge  to  arrive  at  a  list  of  possibilities.  No,  it 
doesn't  take  much  time  to  assume  which  of  the  impacts  are  going  to  have  the  highest 
likelihood  of  occurring"' 
Another  decision  maker  in  the  GoBI  highlighted  a  high  level  of  confidence  in  what  the 
implications  of  the  road  would  be  in  terms  of  its  environmental  impacts: 
"I  think  that  the  degree  of  uncertainty  is  mostly  in  the  area  of  the  extent  rather  than  the  nature 
of  the  impacts.  We  know  what  will  happen"2 
While  a  number  of  decision  makers  had  characterised  the  Southern  Highway  project  in  a 
manner  similar  to  what  has  been  defined  as  soft  uncertainty,  the  over-riding  impression  at  an 
individual  level,  and  perhaps  more  importantly  institutional  level  was  that  no  distinction  was 
made  between  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced.  For  example,  a  decision-maker  in  the  GoBl 
argued: 
"We  definitely  evaluate  risks,  but  uncertainties,  /  think  that  we  generalise  them  a//  as  risks. 
But  the  risks  we  do  address.  "3 
Another  decision  maker  in  the  IDB  confirmed  this  position: 
"I  don't  know  of  any  systematic  effort  to  distinguish  between  the  two  in  the  Bank.  In  fact  the 
word  uncertainty  is  not  used  much  in  the  Bank.  The  word  risk  is  used,  there  is  an  actual 
category  on  risks.  " 
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In  a  number  of  cases  however  in  the  project  reports  reference  is  made  to  uncertainty: 
uThere  is  considerabie  uncertainty  with  regards  the  magnitude  of  the  negative  indirect 
impacts"  (IDB  1997a,  p34) 
When  questioned  on  this,  the  same  decision  maker,  who  had  made  the  previous  statement, 
responded: 
"I  was  using  it  in  that  sense,  it  is  uncertainty  ... 
in  other  words  /  really  mean  uncertainty,  when  it 
is  a  risk  you  can  really  assess  it....  to  me  risk  is  very  different  from  uncertainty.  In  the  land 
use  context,  like  I  explained  to  you  in  the  beginning,  we  were  dealing  with  uncertainty. 
This  conceptual  isation  would  appear  to  be  similar  to  that  of  what  has  been  termed  hard 
uncertainty.  Thus,  although  no  formal  framework  was  present  in  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB  which 
distinguished  between  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  and  thus  the  approach  to  decision 
making,  some  individuals  did  make  an  distinction  similar  to  that  highlighted  in  Chapter  3. 
While  in  a  number  of  cases  a  distinction  was  made  between  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced,  in  a 
large  number  of  cases  the  term  'risk'  was  used  by  decision  makers  to  describe  the  negative 
impact  of  a  particular  outcome.  The  lack  of  clear  formal  conceptualisation  and  definition  of 
uncertainty  at  an  institutional  level,  has  led  to  a  potentially  misleading  situation  whereby  many 
decision-makers  in  the  institutions  assessed  in  the  case  study  appeared  to  implicitly  assume 
that  by  identifying  the  potential  negative  outcomes  of  a  project  or  'risks',  they  were  in  effect 
dealing  with  uncertainty  within  the  decision-making  process.  This  lack  of  formal  recognition  at 
a  institutional  level  resulted  in  a  lack  of  attention  being  paid  to  uncertainty  per  se.  As  one 
senior  decision  maker,  who  was  aware  of  this  problem  stated: 
"Many  people  don't  tend  to  see  uncertainty  and  make  it  explicit  as  something  that  is 
legitimate" 
The  lack  of  legitimacy  and  formal  recognition  of  uncertainty  in  practise  was  highlighted  by  one 
decision  maker  in  the  IDB  who  pointed  out: 
"Everyone  of  our  profiles  has  a  section  called  risk,  and  what  we  try  to  do  is  to  list  those  risks, 
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and  for  each  risk  we  have  to  show  how  we  are  going  to  manage  that  fisk,  and  if  we  can't 
manage  it  say  why.  But  as  far  as  uncertainty  goes  /  don't  believe  there  has  ever  been  a  big 
discussion  about  that" 
One  senior  decision  maker,  who  had  declined  to  be  recorded,  went  as  far  as  to  say  that 
the  reality  of  uncertainty  in  the  IDB,  was  that,  in  the  projects  looked  at  by  management, 
uncertainty  was  given  little  weight.  Another  consultant,  who  was  a  the  time  working  for  the 
Government  of  Belize  (GoBl)  and  who  had  had  experience  of  working  on  a  number  of 
development  projects,  confirmed  this  view  that  no  distinction  was  made  in  the  type  of 
uncertainty  faced. 
In  terms  of  the  British  Development  Division  in  the  Caribbean  (BDDC)  /  DFID,  from  the  more 
limited  evidence  gained,  the  focus  again  appeared  to  be  in  terms  of  soft  uncertainty  (or  risk), 
as  opposed  to  hard  uncertainty.  However,  there  did  appear  to  be  some  confusion  in  the  use 
of  the  term  'risk'  which  in  some  cases  was  used  to  refer  to  what  has  been  termed  soft 
uncertainty,  and  in  other  cases  to  the  negative  impacts  of  a  particular  outcome.  So,  for 
example,  in  the  Office  Instructions  which  give  guidance  on  the  completion  of  DFID  project 
reports,  (the  actual  DFID  Southern  Highway  project  report  was  not  available  at  the  time  of  the 
fieldwork)  within  the  section  which  must  be  completed  on  risks,  the  interpretation  seemed  to 
cover  both  definitions  of  'risk'.  However,  it  was  indicated  by  a  senior  decision  maker  that  an 
assessment  had  been  made  of  the  'risk'  or  soft  uncertainties  and  it  did  appear  that  a 
distinction  had  been  made  between  'risk'  and  'uncertainty',  or  what  has  been  defined  as  soft 
uncertainty  and  hard  uncertainty  in  this  thesis.  Indeed,  it  was  indicated  that  in  the  project 
report,  an  assessment  of  the  'risks'  or  soft  uncertainties  associated  with  the  road  project  was 
made.  Although  this  assessment  was  not  publicly  available  for  analysis,  the  assessment 
followed  the  procedures  set  out  in  a  technical  note  on  risk  (DFID,  1998).  This  document  is 
interesting  in  that  it  seems  to  address  in  part  the  need  to  distinguish  between  the 
interpretation  of  risk  as  the  negative  consequences  of  a  possible  outcome,  which  appeared  to 
be  prevalent  in  previous  reports,  and  an  interpretation  of'risk'  which  recognised  uncertainty. 
project  submission  have  hitherto  carTied  descnptions  of  the  main  risk  factors  identified  in 
project  frameworks.  But  little  attempt  is  generally  made  to  assess  how  seriously  these  factors 
are  likely  to  affect  project  outcomes.  "  (DFID,  1998;  p4  of  28) 
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Clearly,  therefore,  a  recognition  has  been  made  of  the  need  to  deal  more  explicitly  with  the 
uncertainty  per  se.  Again  interestingly,  a  distinction  is  made  between  the  type  of  uncertainty 
faced,  in  terms  of  quantifiable  and  unquantifiable  uncertainties,  but  the  term  'risk'  is  used  to 
cover  both  these  categories.  The  procedures  do,  however,  seem  to  recognise  that  in  many 
cases  a  mode  of  uncertainty  similar  to  that  defined  as  hard  uncertainty  is  present: 
"the  word  'risk'  is  used  to  broadly  encompass  both  quantifiable  and  unquantifiable 
uncertainties  about  outcomes.  In  only  a  very  few,  specialised,  cases  can  the  characteristics  of 
outcome  variability  be  accurately  quantified.  In  general  the  main  threats  to  outcomes  can  be 
identified  and  qualitatively  characterised,  but  with  only  intuitive  indications  of  probabilities.  In 
some  cases  our  state  of  knowledge  is  so  preliminary  that  we  cannot  initially  tell  what  the 
range  of  possible  outcomes  will  be  nor  what  the  principal  risk  factors  are.  " 
(DFID,  1998:  p7  of  28) 
Within  this  definition  of  risks,  further  characteristics  are  recognised  in  terms  of  the  nature  of 
the  uncertain  outcome.  For  example  key  considerations  include  whether  it  is  catastrophic  or 
non-catastrophic,  the  extent  to  which  the  outcome  is  reversible  or  non-reversible,  the  degree 
of  controllability,  the  extent  to  which  the  'risk'  can  be  insured  or  mitigated  and  whether  or  not  it 
is  quantifiable.  While  the  last  characteristic,  namely  whether  or  not  it  is  possible  to  quantify 
the  mode  of  uncertainty  is  similar  to  one  of  the  characteristics  used  in  Chapter  3,  the  other 
characteristics  would  appear  to  influence  the  weighting  given  to  that  uncertain  outcome. 
Although  the  DFID  procedures  do  incorporate  an  explicit  evaluation  of  the  uncertainty 
involved,  which  will  be  assessed  in  greater  detail  shortly,  the  extent  to  which  these  procedures 
were  applied  consistently  at  a  decision-making  level  could  not  be  determined,  due  to  the 
limited  contact  with  DFID.  The  methods  adopted  to  evaluate  'risks'  or  soft  uncertainties  will  be 
looked  at  in  the  next  section. 
In  terms  of  the  World  Bank,  the  evidence  gained  from  interviews  and  reports  confirmed  a 
similar  position  to  that  of  the  IDB,  in  that  there  was  no  real  formal  distinction  made  in  the  type 
of  uncertainty  faced,  with  in  many  cases  the  terms  'risks'  being  used  to  describe  the  negative 
consequences  of  a  possible  outcome.  So,  for  example,  even  although  in  the  World  Bank 
Environmental  Assessment  Source  Book  (1991)  a  formal  distinction  was  made: 
"Risks  are  involved  when  probabilities  can  be  assigned  to  the  likelihood  of  an  event 
occuf7ing  ... 
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where  no  probabilities  can  be  assigned  to  certain  outcomes,  or  where  even  the  outcomes  are 
so  novel  they  cannot  be  anticipated.  "  (World,  Bank,  1991:  p  149-150) 
the  same  manual  goes  on  to  state  that  in  practice  the  assessment  of  risk  and  uncertainty  is 
grouped  together  through  the  use  of  sensitivity  analysis  (World  Bank,  1991).  This  lack  of 
distinction  in  practice  was  confirmed  by  a  decision  maker  in  the  Bank  who  stated: 
"in  terms  of  distinguishing  between  risk  and  uncertainty,  /  think  that's  not  something  we  have 
gotten  into  on  a  systematic  policy  basis"B 
Instead  a  more  case-by-case  approach  was  outlined: 
uMost  types  of  considerations  are  brought  in  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Lets  say  there  is  a 
feeling  that  an  environmental  assessment  has  identifiled  serious  risks,  but  there  is  great 
uncertainty  as  to  whether  or  not,  you  know  situations  will  be  actually  in  place  that  will  trigger 
that  tisk  to  actually  materialise  then  you  have  to  deal  with  that,  but  that  is  only  at  a  case-by- 
case  basis,  it  is  not  systematically  factored  in...  we  don't  take  that  step  of  trying  to  distinguish 
between  tisk  and  uncertainty.  "9 
Overall,  although  a  number  of  individuals  did  appear  to  distinguish  between  the  mode  of 
uncertainty  faced,  with  the  exception  of  the  DFID,  a  general  lack  of  attention  appears  to  have 
been  paid  to  conceptualising  uncertainty  at  the  preliminary  stage  in  the  decision-making 
process.  This  lack  of  recognition  of  the  need  to  make  explicit  and  define  the  uncertainty  faced 
has  clearly  influenced  the  way  that  uncertainty  has  been  dealt  with  at  a  project  level  in  the 
GoBl,  the  IDB  and  the  World  Bank,  in  that  attention  was  placed  on  identifying  solutions  or 
ways  of  managing  the  'risks'  within  the  decision-making  process,  rather  than  explicitly  dealing 
with  the  uncertainty  per  se  when  evaluating  the  merits  of  a  particular  project.  One  decision 
maker  neatly  characterised  this  process  by  stating: 
"risk  is  manageable  uncertainty.  You  take  certain  risks  as  long  you  know  that  they  are 
manageable.  /  think  it  is  implicit,  no  distinction  is  made  explicitly  in  the  decision  making 
process. 
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Indeed  arguably  this  has  resulted  in  no  clear  recognition  of  hard  uncertainty  at  a  institutional 
level.  Overall,  this  has  had  a  major  impact  on  the  way  that  environmental  uncertainty  has 
been  evaluated  within  the  decision-making  process. 
9.2.1  The  evaluation  of  uncertainty  in  the  Southern  Highway  Project 
The  way  that  uncertainty  is  conceptualised  at  an  institutional  level  is  important  in  that  it 
influences  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  evaluated  within  the  decision  making  process.  This 
section  highlights  this  by  drawing  on  evidence  gained  from  the  interviews  conducted  as  part  of 
the  case  study.  In  particular,  the  focus  was  on  whether  any  formal  or  informal  approaches 
were  used  to  evaluate  the  uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process.  In  terms  of  the 
evaluation  of  uncertainty  in  the  Southern  Highway  Project,  it  was  generally  raised  in  the 
reports  in  an  impressionistic  manner  with  no  attempt  made  to  use  some  measure  of 
uncertainty,  instead  qualitative  statements  were  used.  So,  for  example,  in  relation  to 
uncertainty  surrounding  a  number  of  key  factors,  typical  statements  in  the  Environmental 
Summary  for  the  project  were: 
"The  indirect  effects  of  highway  rehabilitation  on  logging  activities  are  also  unclear" 
"it  is  difficult  to  foresee  the  most  likely  scenario". 
(IDB,  1997a:  p35) 
(IDB,  1997a:  p35) 
Although  no  attempt  was  made  in  the  decision  -making  process  to  quantify  or  measure  in  any 
formal  sense  the  uncertainty  faced,  evidence  of  a  distinction  in  the  level  of  uncertainty  faced 
was  made  at  an  individual  level  by  a  number  of  decision  makers.  Accordingly  one  decision 
maker  responded: 
"I'm  not  so  sure  that  there  were  attempts  to  quantify  the  uncertainties,  but  when  the  focus 
shifted  onto  indirect  effects,  because  when  we  started  talking  to  people  we  realised  that  the 
magnitude  of  indirect  effects  was  likely  to  be  considerably  larger  than  direct  effects  both  in 
time  and  true  magnitude  "I  I 
Another  decision  maker  in  the  IDB  stated  in  relation  to  uncertainties  regarding  the 
consequences  of  the  project, 
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"/  don't  think  we  tried  to  quantify  them,  /  think  them  we  ranked  them,  we  tended  to  rank 
them 
... 
To  quantify  that  uncertainty,  that  would  be  difficult.  What  we  would  do,  the  country 
team  would  look  at  these  issues  and  ask  whether  or  not  it  was  convincing,  was  it  believable, 
was  it  realistic  based  on  the  expertise  of  the  team  members,  again  impressionistic.  )Y1  2 
Further  recognition  of  the  uncertainty  (rather  than  risk)  faced  in  the  project  is  highlighted  in 
one  of  the  project  documents: 
it  substantial  indirect  effects  are  expected  given  the  growth  projected  in  sectors  such  as 
tourism,  agficulture  and  coastal  aquaculture.  The  proposed  improvements  to  the  Southern 
Highway  will  contribute  to  accelerated  expansion  of  these  operations  along  with  a  variety  of 
other  land  use  changes  which  will  bring  on  indirect  environmental  costs  associated  with 
increased  rates  of  deforestation,  increased  sedimentation  in  coastal  area  and  other  types  of 
biophysical  changes.  In  the  absence  of  reliable  projections  on  potential  land  use  changes  in 
the  southern  region,  uncertainty  is  leading  to  highly  differing  opinions  with  respect  to  the 
geographic  scope  and  magnitude  of  such  potential  negative  impacts.  " 
(IDB,  1997a:  p34) 
However  although  a  recognition  was  made  in  the  project  reports  of  the  presence  of 
uncertainty,  this  was  not  reflected  in  the  approaches  used  to  evaluate  the  uncertainties 
involved.  Indeed  it  became  clear  in  the  conversations  with  the  decision  makers  within  the 
GoBI  and  the  IDB  that  there  were  no  formal  approaches  used  to  evaluate  the  uncertainty. 
Instead  it  was  by  means  of  the  mechanisms  and  procedures  which  formed  the  basis  of  the 
decision-making  process  that  uncertainties  were  identified.  Therefore,  the  evaluation  of 
uncertainty  in  the  case  of  the  GoBI  was  carried  out  within  the  overall  evaluation  of  the  project 
by  means  of  the  project  reports,  the  assessment  of  the  project  by  NEAC  and  ESTAP  as  well 
as  by  consultation  with  the  stakeholders  of  the  project.  13 
Within  the  IDB,  again  no  formal  framework  was  evident  for  evaluating  environmental 
uncertainty  per  se.  However,  other  mechanisms  and  procedures  formIng  part  of  the  overall  ex 
ante  evaluation  of  the  project  raised  issues  of  uncertainty.  In  particular,  the  use  of  a  logical 
framework,  which  makes  clear  all  the  assumptions  of  the  project  as  well  as  allowing  a 
separate  section  on  'risks',  was  the  closest  to  a  formal  framework  that  existed  in  the  Bank. 
The  use  of  a  logical  framework  was  also  prominent  in  the  BDDC  evaluation  of  the  projeCt14. 
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The  use  of  logical  frameworks  will  be  looked  at  in  closer  detail  in  the  following  section. 
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Another  important  mechanism  in  which  uncertainties  were  raised  in  the  IDB  was  the  project 
evaluation  by  the  CESI  committee  and  the  approval  by  the  loan  committee.  Once,  any 
uncertainties  were  raised,  both  the  GoBI  and  the  IDB  tended  to  rely  on  the  studies  conducted 
in  order  to  identify  the  uncertainties,  as  one  senior  decision  maker  pointed  out: 
"the  mechanism  that  we  used  to  handle  uncertainty  in  those  environmental  areas  were 
basically  studies.  *Y1  5 
Although  therefore  a  number  of  mechanisms  were  in  place,  which  did  raise  (often  indirectly) 
issues  of  uncertainty  relating  to  the  Southern  Highway,  there  was  no  overall  formal  framework 
which  was  used  for  evaluating  the  uncertainty  either  in  the  IDB  or  the  GoBl  16 
,  and  certainly  no 
evidence  of  the  use  of  expected  value  or  expected  utility  approaches. 
In  the  case  of  the  GoBI  the  absence  of  a  formal  framework  for  evaluating  the  uncertainties 
surrounding  the  Southern  Highway  led  one  decision-maker  to  admit  that  the  formal  evaluation 
of  uncertainties: 
"is  something  certainly  that  /  think  we  need  to  look  at  because  there  are  certain  of  us  within 
this  government  that  feel  there  is  no  risk,  none  so  ever  But  then  you  begin  to  point  out 
certain  things  and  when  you  do  they'll  say  well  perhaps  /  do  need  to  think  about  that,  but  prior 
to  that  they  had  never  thought  about  that  They  have  seen  a  project  like  this  one,  in  only  one 
light  and  they  have  never  thought  that  there  could  be  risks  or  uncertainties,  more  the  risks"" 
In  summary,  it  is  evident  that  no  formal  mechanism  or  framework  was  employed  to  evaluate 
uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process.  Thus,  although  an  economic  feasibility  study  / 
Cost-Benefit  Analysis  was  an  integral  part  of  the  evaluation  process,  there  was  no  evidence  of 
the  formal  application  of  a  probability  approach  such  as  that  of  Expected  Value.  It  was  also 
clear  that  within  the  evaluation  process  no  formal  distinction  was  made  between  the  different 
types  of  uncertainty  faced.  The  lack  of  formal  approaches  used  to  evaluate  the  uncertainties 
is  partly  due  to  the  limited  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  made.  This  in  turn  appears  to  have 
affected  the  design  and  thus  ability  of  the  existing  mechanisms  actually  employed  in  the 
Personal  communication  with  senior  decision-maker. 
Because  of  the  lack  of  material  collected  from  the  BDDC/  DFID  relating  to  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  in 
the  case  of  the  Southern  Highway,  the  procedures  used  to  evaluate  uncertainvy  will  be  discussed  in  a  more 
aeneral  fashion  in  the  following  section. 
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evaluation  of  projects  to  deal  explicitly  with  hard  uncertainty.  It  is  to  a  brief  discussion  of  these 
existing  mechanisms  that  this  thesis  now  turns. 
9.2.2  Existing  mechanisms  which  attempt  to  deal  with  uncertainty 
An  argument  made  in  this  thesis  is  that  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  in  the  decision  process 
has  significant  implications  on  the  mechanism  or  framework  used  to  evaluate  environmental 
uncertainty  within  the  decision-making  process.  The  evidence  collected,  although  not 
comprehensive,  suggests  that  generally  limited  attention  has  been  given  to  the  presence  of 
hard  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making.  This  in  turn  has  influenced  the  way  that 
development  projects  have  been  evaluated  and  is  manifested  in  the  existing  methods  used  to 
evaluate  uncertainty.  This  section,  therefore,  reviews  the  main  mechanisms  utilised  in 
practice  especially  by  the  IDB,  the  World  Bank  and  DFID  to  evaluate  uncertainty  in  the 
decision-making  process  and  to  assess  at  a  normative  level  whether  they  adequately  deal 
with  hard  uncertainty  in  projects  with  environmental  consequences.  Less  attention  is  given  to 
the  GoBl,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  IDB,  World  Bank  and  DFID  over  a  long  period,  have  a  more 
established  set  of  procedures,  due  to  their  role  in  assessing  a  large  number  of  projects.  This 
section,  therefore,  complements  the  theoretical  review  of  approaches  to  dealing  with 
uncertainty,  in  assessing  the  way  that  uncertainty  has  been  evaluated  in  the  decision-making 
process  in  practice. 
Within  the  different  institutions  what  was  immediately  apparent  was  the  lack  of  evidence  of  the 
application  of  the  theoretical  approaches  reviewed  in  Chapter  4.  As  the  author  of  a  World 
Bank  paper  pointed  out: 
"While  there  is  an  extensive  literature  on  risk  and  uncertainty,  even  well  known  theoretical 
concepts  have  not  been  extensively  incorporated  into  project  appraisals.  At  the  same  time,  it 
is  also  clear  that  many  of  the  theoretical  results  available  in  the  literature  are  not  sufficiently 
practical  to  be  readily  applied  in  the  appraisal  of  projects  in  developing  countries" 
(Mathur,  1994) 
Instead,  in  practice,  it  was  assumed  that  a  number  of  alternative  mechanisms  used  to 
evaluate  the  project  as  a  whole,  would  effectively  deal  with  environmental  uncertainty.  In  only 
a  small  number  of  projects  did  a  formal  evaluation  of  the  uncertainty  take  place.  The  most 
apparent  mechanism,  common  to  all  the  institutions  surveyed  in  the  study,  was  the  reliance  on 
project  reports  to  pick  up  uncertainties,  which  were  dealt  with  on  an  impressionistic  basis. 
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and  with  no  formal  mechanisms  to  evaluate  the  uncertainty,  the  extent  to  which  hard 
uncertainty  was  addressed  was  limited  to  cases,  where  the  individual  writing  the  relevant 
section  of  the  report  was  aware  of  the  uncertainties  involved.  Nevertheless  even  where  the 
uncertainties  were  spelled  out  in  an  impressionistic  basis,  as  was  the  case  in  the  Southern 
Highway  Environmental  Summary,  there  was  no  mechanism  to  ensure  that  the  uncertainties 
were  explicitly  accounted  for  in  the  decision-making  process. 
Another  mechanism  was  the  use  of  review  committees,  which  reviewed  the  project,  and  which 
gave  an  opportunity  for  any  concerns  surrounding  the  uncertainties  to  be  raised.  In  a  large 
part,  the  committees  present,  for  example  NEAC  in  the  GoBI  and  CESI  in  the  IDB,  were  used 
to  review  the  environmental  aspects  of  the  project  before  the  project  passed  higher  up  in  the 
decision-making  process.  In  this  sense  they  did  provide  a  vital  role.  However,  the  extent  to 
which  they  effectively  dealt  with  hard  uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process  was  arguably 
undermined  by  the  lack  of  legitimacy  given  to  uncertainty  at  an  institutional  level,  and  as  an 
indirect  result  of  this,  a  lack  of  methodologies  available  to  deal  with  hard  uncertainty.  This 
situation  was  illustrated  by  a  senior  decision  maker  in  the  IDB: 
"What  we  do  a  lot  of  times  at  the  environmental  and  social  impact  committee  is  to  require, 
make  requests  that  projects  that  have  a  degree  of  risk,  for  instance  gas  service  plants  or 
something  like  that,  to  run  a  formal  risk  analysis,  and  that  they  incorporate  some  type  of 
contingency  analysis.  Yes,  in  many  cases  it  is  done  based  on  a  formal  methodology.  But 
what  /  am  saying,  is  basically  that  those  that  are  covered  by  that  kind  of  methodology  are  less 
uncertain,  than  the  uncertainties  we  have  been  talking  about  1118 
When  the  same  decision  maker  was  asked  whether  although  all  the  risks  are  tackled  by  the 
risk  analysis,  this  may  detract  from  giving  adequate  attention  to  the  other  uncertainties,  he 
responded: 
"Oh  yes,  for  sure,  exactly,  the  uncertainties  are  externalised,  they  are  spelt  out  as  some  other 
issue.  "'-' 
The  higher  committees  such  as  the  loan  committees  in  the  IDB  and  World  Bank,  as  well  as 
the  Projects  and  Evaluation  Committee  in  the  case  of  DFID,  also  clearly  play  an  important  role 
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in  the  decision-making  process.  However,  as  will  be  argued  in  the  next  section  to  a 
considerable  extent,  a  large  part  of  any  assessment  of  the  uncertainties  made  will  have  been 
done  before  the  project  reaches  the  loan  committee.  Again  the  extent  to  which  any  hard 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  environmental  impacts  of  the  project  is  dealt  with  at  this  level  will 
depend  on  whether  the  uncertainties  have  been  raised  explicitly  at  the  evaluation  stages  of 
the  decision-making  process.  In  certain  projects  the  committees  may  indirectly  deal  with 
some  of  the  uncertainties  present.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project, 
the  first  time  that  the  project  went  to  the  loan  committee,  it  was  rejected,  due  to  the  lack  of 
attention  given  to  the  indirect  environmental  effeCtS20  . 
The  committees,  while  not  explicitly 
dealing  with  the  uncertainty  per  se,  did  in  this  case  act  in  a  precautionary  manner.  This  action 
only  delays  however,  the  evaluation  of  the  remaining  uncertainties  and  the  weighting  of  them 
in  the  decision  process. 
The  economic  analysis  /  CBA 
A  key  element  of  the  decision  process  is  the  use  of  economic  feasibility  studies  or  cost-benefit 
analysis.  In  Chapter  2,  a  decision-making  framework  was  outlined,  and  in  particularly  the  role 
of  CBA  in  the  decision-making  context  critically  discussed  at  a  theoretical  level.  In  practice 
from  the  evidence  gained  from  the  case  study,  as  well  at  a  more  general  level  from  the 
interviews  carried  out  at  the  IDB,  the  World  Bank  and  DFID,  it  was  apparent  that  cost  -benefit 
analyses  that  were  carried  out,  were  often  done  on  a  limited  basis.  Moreover,  although  the 
NPV/  IRR  criteria  were  of  crucial  importance,  this  was  only  one  of  the  stages  that  the  project 
had  to  pass  in  the  decision-making  process  (see  fig  2.4).  In  the  case  of  Belize,  no  extended 
CBA  was  carried  out,  so  no  attempt  was  made  to  incorporate  the  possible  environmental 
costs  of  the  projects  in  monetary  terms.  From  the  general  interviews  with  decision  makers,  it 
was  apparent  that  the  use  of  environmental  valuation  was  very  limited,  with  often  the 
techniques  only  being  applied  when  the  project  had  significant  environmental  benefits.  One 
senior  decision  maker  in  the  IDB  argued  that,  there  was  a  reluctance  to  go  to  such  a  second 
stage  of  economic  analysis,  even  where  there  are  information  gaps  in  the  environmental 
damages  of  the  project,  with  the  focus  instead  on  gaining  a  positive  NPV  value  or  a  rate  of 
return  of  12%21 
. 
As  one  senior  decision  maker  stated: 
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U  we  could  not  go  to  the  Board  with  a  rate  of  return  less  than  12%.  Well  the  cynic  would  say 
you  just  bumped  the  figures  you  just  kept  bumping  then  up,  well  maybe  we  did,  but  we  tried  to 
do  that  it  in  a  way,  we  kept  digging  for  more  benefits.  1122 
This  focus  on  the  positive  benefits  of  a  project  is  backed  up  by  a  study  based  on  1,015  World 
Bank  projects,  which  found  that  there  was  an  upward  bias  in  the  appraisal  stage  in  rates  of 
return  (Pohl  &  Mihaljek,  1992).  This  was  backed  up  by  a  senior  decision  maker  who 
highlighted  the  difference  in  the  ex  ante  projections  and  the  ex  post  analysis  of  the  project 
benefits.  This  focus  on  the  project  benefits  is  particularly  of  concern  in  that,  as  was  argued  in 
Chapter  3,  it  is  in  the  realm  of  the  environmental  costs  associated  with  a  project  that  hard 
uncertainties  are  often  of  the  greatest  magnitude. 
Perhaps  partly  because  of  the  emphasis  on  the  positive  benefits  of  a  project,  in  terms  of  the 
Southern  Highway,  as  was  pointed  out  in  Chapter  6,  the  economic  feasibility  study  (limited 
CBA)  was  limited  in  its  reference  to  uncertainty.  In  general,  this  would  also  appear  to  be  the 
case  in  other  projects  for  which  cost-benefit-analyses  are  carried  out.  Thus  any  attempt  to 
deal  with  uncertainty  focused  on  'soft  uncertainty'  with  the  most  common  approach  involving 
sensitivity  analysis.  As  was  argued  in  section  2.2.3  however,  sensitivity  analysis  does  not 
evaluate  the  uncertainty  per  se  in  terms  of  evaluating  the  weight  that  should  be  given  to  the 
occurrence  of  a  particular  outcome.  Although  it  was  pointed  out  that  expected  value 
approaches,  and  even  expected  utility  approaches  had  been  attempted  in  the  1980's,  more 
recently  these  approaches  had  not  been  applied.  Generally,  as  is  supported  by  Mathur 
(1994),  the  perception  was  gained  that  the  elicitation  of  objective  and  subjective  probability 
distributions,  as  well  as  utility  functions,  was  a  too  difficult  a  task  for  practical  applications. 
Thus,  even  excluding  the  theoretical  concerns  outlined  previously,  the  application  of  such 
approaches,  or  even  behaviour  consistent  with  such  approaches  appeared  limited. 
Consequently,  because  a  practical  framework  for  evaluating  the  range  of  uncertainties 
present  in  a  project  was  absent,  even  the  assessment  of  the  different  possible  alternative 
scenarios,  which  could  arise  as  a  result  of  the  occurrence  of  a  range  of  uncertain  factors,  was 
rarely  considered  in  the  decision-making  stage.  23  Instead  this  stage  focused  on  one  scenario, 
and  the  possible  consequences  of  that  scenario.  As  one  senior  decision  maker  in  the  IDB 
summed  up  the  situation: 
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"what  analysts  do  is  they  come  out  and  use  their  bestjudgement  /  think  that  this  is  the  most 
likely  scenario,  so  he  uses  that  as  his  middle  of  the  road,  computational  value,  and  then  he 
varies  this  value  up  and  down,  to  try  and  see  how  sensitive  the  method  is,  and  this  is  as  much 
as  we  do.  We  don't  do,  for  all  the  projects  this  kind  of  study,  it  takes  a  long  time.  " 
Environmental  assessment  of  projects 
It  we  turn  to  the  role  of  environmental  assessment24  in  the  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainties,  as 
was  argued  in  Chapter  6,  it  is  evident  in  the  case  of  the  Environmental  Assessments  carried 
out  for  the  Southern  Highway  Project  (DHV,  1994a  &  Becca,  1995),  that  there  was  limited 
reference  to  hard  uncertainty,  with  the  dominant  interpretation  of  'risks'  in  terms  of  the 
negative  consequences  of  an  outcome.  As  such,  the  focus  in  the  environmental  assessments 
was  on  the  identification  of  'risks'  (in  the  above  sense),  particularly  of  the  direct  impacts  of  the 
highway  which  could  be  mitigated.  Thus,  in  the  environmental  summaries  of  projects,  less 
attention  was  placed  on  considering  the  possible  occurrence  of  a  range  of  possible  outcomes 
than  on  the  negative  outcomes  presented  by  the  scenario  pushed  forward  in  the  project 
evaluation.  As  one  senior  decision  maker  in  the  IDB  stated: 
"/  wouldn't  say  that  there  was  any  quantification  of  uncertainties,  because  personally  /  don't 
know  how  you  would  do  that  I  think  that  what  we  tried  to  do,  was  that,  recognising  that  we 
couldn't  control  uncertainty,  we  tried  to  see  how  we  could  deal  with  it  as  time  went  on  IT5 
Another  decision  maker  in  the  World  Bank  confirmed  this  emphasis  on  policies  to  achieve 
certain  goals  in  minimising  the  impacts  of  uncertain  outcomes  rather  than  accounting  for  the 
uncertainty  per  se,  in  the  overall  evaluation  of  the  project: 
U  we  have  a  natural  habitats  policy,  that  is  very  specific  about  what  the  Bank  can  and  can't  be 
involved  in.  We  can't  be  involved  in  species  extinction,  we  can't  be  involved  in  the  destruction 
of  critical  natural  habitat..  for  that  reason  we  try  to  come  up  with  mechanisms  to  avoid  that 
from  happening,  and  that's  what  we  are  concemed  with  more  than  deciding  what  form  of 
analysis  is  appropriate.  That  is  the  type  of  thing  that  we  can  bring  to  the  table  in  terms  of 
handbooks  and  training,  or  information  about  good  practice  ... 
but  in  the  end  of  the  day  its  the 
24  1  An  extensive  review  of  a  EIA  methodology  is  outwith  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  and  is left  to  the  extensive 
I  literature  on  the  topic.  See  World  Bank  (1991)  for  a  review  of  environmental  assessment  techniques  and 
procedures. 
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policies  that  are  binding,  and  what  we  have  to  live  up  to,  and  they  are  vefy  much  goal  ofiented 
rather  than  process  ofiented. 
-26 
The  danger  of  such  a  goal  -led  approach  as  argued  in  the  previous  chapter  however  is  that 
the  full  range  of  possible  uncertain  negative  outcomes  may  not  be  considered  adequately  in 
weighing  up  of  the  project  and  as  such  the  hard  uncertainty  may  not  be  explicitly  accounted 
for. 
At  a  more  general  level  where  certain  projects  were  faced  with  soft  uncertainties,  for  example 
in  the  case  of  the  possibility  of  flood  damage,  in  dam  construction  projects,  where  the  focus 
was  on  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  rather  than  the  consequences  of  the  outcome, 
formal  probability  analysis  has  been  used.  However,  in  terms  of  harder  uncertainties  there 
again  appeared  to  be  a  lack  of  applicable  methods  with  the  focus  on  soft  uncertainties  or 
risks.  This  was  highlighted  by  an  environmental  specialist  in  the  World  Bank  who  stated  that: 
"Lets  say  there  is  a  feeling  that  an  environmental  assessment  has  identified  serious  risks,  but 
there  is  great  uncertainty  as  to  whether  or  not,  you  know  situations  will  be  actually  in  place 
that  will  trigger  that  risk  to  actually  materialise,  then  you  have  to  deal  with  that,  but  that  is  only 
at  a  case-by-case  basis,  it  is  not  systematically  factored  in.  YY2  7 
One  more  generic  approach  that  has  been  introduced  in  the  World  Bank  more  recently  in  the 
section  on  risks  in  project  documents  is  the  use  of  a  simple  rating  system,  on  a  scale  of  1-4  by 
which: 
"The  only  purpose  of  that  is  for  people  to  be  conscious  of  risk,  and  to  alert  managers  that  this 
project  or  that  project  has  a  high  environmental  lisk  rating  and  needs  special  attention.  "21 
However  again  the  focus  would  appear  to  be  on  the  possible  negative  outcomes  of  the  project 
rather  than  on  taking  into  account  the  uncertainty  surrounding  those  outcomes  and  the 
possible  negative  consequences: 
"We  deal  systematically  with  risk  through  the  environmental  assessment  process,  plus  the 
generic  risk  management  system  that  I  mentioned  before  (using  the  scale  1-4).  But  we  don' 
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take  that  step  of  trying  to  distinguish  between  risk  and  uncertainty.  "2-9 
Logical  frameworks 
Another  tool  used  in  the  evaluation  of  projects,  which  is  being  increasingly  used  in  institutions 
which  evaluate  projects  such  as  the  IDB,  World  Bank  and  DFID,  is  the  'logical  framework'. 
The  logical  framework  is  used  to  evaluate  the  overall  objectives  of  the  project,  with  the 
emphasis  being  on  assessing  in  a  reasoned  fashion  the  goal,  purpose,  outputs  and  activities 
of  a  project.  These  four  factors  are  assessed  by  using  a  series  of  criteria:  objective, 
indicators,  means  of  verification  and  assumptions.  This  results  in  a  four-by  four-matrix  or 
table.  While  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  use  and  application  of  logical  frameworks  in  project 
evaluation  is  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis  (see  IDB,  1997c,  for  a  more  detailed  review  in 
the  context  of  project  appraisal),  what  is  interesting  is  that  the  framework  by  focusing  on  the 
assumptions  of  the  project  raises  albeit  indirectly,  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
assumptions  behind  the  project.  As  such  it  does  represent  a  step  forward  in  terms  of  the 
overall  evaluation  of  the  project.  However,  in  its  current  form  the  tendency  again  is  to  focus 
on  an  interpretation  of  'risks'  as  possible  negative  consequences: 
"The  objective  is  not  to  list  every  conceivable  contingency,  but  to  identify  reasonable  likely 
possibilities"  (IDB,  1997c;  p7  of  12) 
Thus,  it  is  identifying  the  possible  positive  and  negative  consequences  of  what  is  seen  as  the 
most  likely  scenario,  which  is  the  main  concern,  rather  than  the  evaluation  of  the  uncertainties 
surrounding  the  consequences.  Therefore,  again  it  does  not  explicitly  provide  a  framework  or 
mechanism  to  allow  the  decision  maker  to  consider  both  the  uncertainty,  and  range  of 
possible  consequences  of  a  particular  project. 
Specific  methods  for  dealing  directly  with  uncertainty 
It  is  apparent  that,  although  the  above  decision-making  tools,  are  often  assumed  to 
adequately  account  for  uncertainty,  uncertainty  is  only  dealt  with  indirectly  on  the  basis  of  a 
limited  conceptualisation.  As  a  result,  although  an  implicit  assumption  is  made  in  the 
decision-making  process  that  uncertainties  are  dealt  with,  in  practice  it  is  evident  that  hard 
uncertainties  in  environmental  decision  making  are  not  adequately  considered.  The  lack  of 
distinction  between  the  types  of  uncertainty  faced  and  lack  of  legitimacy  given  to  hard 
uncertainty  has  resulted  in  a  lack  of  formal  approaches  to  the  problem.  One  possible 
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exception  is  in  the  case  of  DFID  were  a  set  of  procedures  which  identify  two  methods  for 
evaluating  uncertainty  have  been  drawn  up  (DFID,  1998).  The  methods  are  interesting  in  that 
they  appear  to  distinguish  between  different  types  of  uncertainty  and,  when  combined  with 
other  rules  of  thumb,  provide  a  mechanism  for  evaluating  both  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
possible  occurrence  of  an  outcome,  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  that  outcome.  The  two 
methods  proposed  are  distinguished  in  terms  of  the  uncertainty  faced,  in  a  way  similar  to  the 
distinction  made  between  soft  uncertainty  and  hard  uncertainty,  although  no  explicit  distinction 
between  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  is  made.  The  technical  note  (DFID,  1998)  highlights  the 
basis  of  the  distinction  between  the  two  methods: 
"The  first  (Method  A)  is  a  general  descriptive  one,  which  should  be  applied,  both  to  projects 
where  there  are  major  uncertainties  about  the  relationship  between  project  inputs  and 
outcomes  or  about  the  impacts  and  probabilities  of  risk  factors 
... 
The  second  (method)  in  which 
impacts  and  probabilities  of  risk  factors  are  quantified  ..  should  be  attempted  where 
quantification  of  impacts  and  probabilities  is  thought  to  be  meaningful" 
(DFID,  1998:  p25  of  28) 
The  second  method,  if  applied  exclusively  to  cases  of  soft  uncertainty,  is  not  contended 
(although  clearly  if  no  correct  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  takes  place  it  could  be  applied 
incorrectly  to  cases  of  hard  uncertainty),  so  attention  will  focus  on  the  first  method,  and  in 
particular  in  its  applicability  to  cases  of  hard  uncertainty.  The  following  procedures  for  Method 
A  are  stated  in  the  technical  note  (DFID,  1998:  p  25): 
A.  identify  a  quantifiable  or  otherwise  verifiable  success  criterion  (e.  g.  a  net  present  value 
figure,  a  physical  quantity,  a  percentage,  a  development  achieved  by  a  specific  time,  or  a 
"yes/  no"  answer  to  a  question); 
B.  set  a  minimum  standard  of  acceptable  project  performance; 
C.  identify  and  describe  the  key  risk  factors.  (This  should  normally  be  done  in  compiling  the 
project  framework); 
D.  using  an  impact  probability  matrix,  discuss  the  potential  impact  of  each  factor  on  project 
success  and  the  probability  of  its  occurrence; 
E.  Review  mitigatory  measures  already  taken,  and  those  contingent  measures  which  could  be 
taken  if  required; 
F.  (where  method  B  assessment  is  not  attempted  )  classify  the  project  on  the  basis  of 
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In  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  the  uncertainty,  therefore,  the  reliance  in  this  method  is  sfill  on 
probability,  albeit  in  a  subjective  manner.  Indeed  this  approach  does  not  even  require  an 
actual  quantification  of  a  subjective  probability,  just  a  categorisation  in  terms  of  low,  medium 
or  high,  which  is  made  on  the  basis  of: 
upurely  infonnal,  judgmental  methods,  i.  e.  by  infonned  guess  worW'  (DFID,  1998:  p16) 
In  relation  to  the  weighting  of  the  outcome,  as  well  as  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
outcome,  a  number  of  rules  of  thumb  are  used.  The  identification  of  a  minimum  standard  in 
essence  sets  a  threshold,  beyond  which  the  decision  maker  is  not  willing  to  consider  the 
project.  In  relation  to  Shackle's  theory  this,  for  example,  might  encompass  a  minimum  series 
of  gain  values,  below  which  no  weight  would  be  given.  After  this  a  impact  /probability  matrix  is 
drawn  up,  based  on  the  categorisation  of  the  probability  and  the  impact  on  the  success  of  the 
project.  An  example  is  shown  in  fig  9.1,  where  the  crosses  represent  a  particular  impact. 
Fig  9.1:  An  example  of  a  impactl  probability  matrix 
Impact 
Probability 
Low  Medium  High 
Low  x  x 
Medium  xxx 
High  xx 
After  the  probability  matrix  is  drawn  up,  the  potential  impacts  are  reviewed  in  terms  of  the 
extent  to  which  they  can  be  minimised  and  then  an  overall  judgement,  called  the  assessment 
of  the  overall  risk  of  project  failure  is  made  on  basis  of  stages  D,  E  and  F,  with  the  resulting 
project  classified  as  low,  medium  or  high  risk  (DFID,  1998).  The  technical  note  then  goes  on 
to  advise  that  projects  with  at  least  one  high  impact  factor  with  a  high  probability  should  be 
classified  overall  as  a  "high  risk"  project.  Those  with  more  than  one  high  impact  factor  with  a 
medium  probability  should  also  be  classified  as  "high  risk"  projects.  If  there  is  only  one 
medium  impact  factors  with  high  probability  of  occurrence,  the  project  should  be  considered  to 
be  a  "medium  risk"  project.  Projects  where  there  are  only  medium  or  low  impact  factors  with 
low  probabilities,  would  be  given  a  "low  risk"  rating  (DFID,  1998:  p255). 
Such  a  method  is  clearly  an  improvement,  in  that  it  does  suggest  a  practically  applicable 
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evaluating  a  project  or  policy,  to  take  into  account  both  the  uncertainty  associated  with  a 
particular  outcome,  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  the  outcome.  However,  it  could  be 
improved  by  better  conceptualisation  and  distinction  between  the  mode  of  uncertainty  faced  at 
a  preliminary  stage.  Furthermore,  although  the  assessment  of  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome 
is  done  on  subjective  categorisation  of  probabilities,  by  remaining  within  a  probability 
framework,  the  theoretical  problems,  outlined  in  this  thesis  in  using  probability  in  cases  of  hard 
uncertainty,  remain. 
9.3  A  normative  framework  for  the  evaluation  of  environmental  uncertainty  in  the 
decision  making  process 
It  is  evident  from  the  information  gathered  in  relation  the  Southern  Highway  Project  as  well  as 
at  a  more  general  level,  that  existing  mechanisms  do  not  adequately  deal  with  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making.  Consequently  as  well  as  applying  and 
developing  the  Shackle  model  in  a  behavioural  sense  in  order  to  explain  the  way  that 
decisions  have  been  made,  an  additional  aim  of  this  thesis,  has  been  to  develop  a  normative 
framework  which  will  address  these  concerns.  In  achieving  this  aim  it  has  been  recognised 
from  an  early  stage  that  while  theories  may  be  developed  in  a  purely  behavioural  sense,  they 
are  often  looked  at  as  a  starting  point  in  terms  of  providing  prescriptions  to  decision  making 
and  that  the  normative  assumptions  in  a  theoretical  model  are  often  looked  at  as  a  first  stage 
to  guiding  'rational'  behaviour  in  decision  makers. 
From  the  evidence  of  the  case  study  as  well  as  the  more  general  investigation  of  the  Shackle 
model  in  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  development  projects,  it  is  apparent  that  there  are  a 
number  of  elements  of  the  theory  which  are  useful  in  explaining  the  way  that  decision  are  to 
made  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty.  This  would  suggest  that  some  of  its  behavioural 
assumptions  could  be  extended  to  the  model's  application  in  a  normative  manner. 
Consequently,  in  this  final  section  of  this  chapter  a  normative  framework  for  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making  will  be  outlined.  Again  it  should  be  reiterated 
that  the  focus  is  on  improving  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision  making  process. 
Another  caveat  is  that,  while  the  aim  of  the  framework  is  to  improve  the  decision-making 
process,  it  should  be  recognised  that  there  are  other  agendas  and  issues  (which  can  be 
rational  or  non-rational)  which  will  influence  the  decision-making  process,  and  that,  while  not 
the  focus  of  this  thesis,  should  be  given  explicit  attention  in  the  decision-making  process  (see 
Richardson,  1996  for  example). Chapter  9:  Discussion  244 
The  general  framework  developed  in  this  section  concerns  itself,  however,  with  the  evaluation 
and  weighting  of  hard  uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making.  The  specifics  of  such  a 
framework  however,  would  depend  on  the  institutional  and  decision-making  context.  A 
number  of  stages  in  such  a  framework  can  be  outlined,  and  are  presented  in  fig  9.2. 
1)  The  first  step  requires  that  the  nature  of  the  uncertainty  faced  in  the  particular  decision  is 
adequately  conceptualised.  In  particular,  based  on  the  different  characteristics  presented 
in  Chapter  3,  fig  3.2,  an  important  step  is  to  distinguish  explicitly  between  hard  and  soft 
uncertainty.  Where  the  dominant  mode  of  uncertainty  is  that  of  soft  uncertainty,  the  use  of 
probability  based  approaches  may  be  applicable  30 
. 
If  however  the  dominant  mode  of 
uncertainty  is  characterised  as  hard  uncertainty,  as  has  been  argued  is  the  case  in  many 
environmental  decisions  an  alternative  approach  will  have  to  be  taken. 
2)  In  cases  of  hard  uncertainty,  the  next  stage  will  be  to  consider  as  a  full  a  range  (although 
necessarily  non-exhaustive)  of  the  possible  benefit  and  cost  outcomes  which  could  occur 
as  a  result  of  the  project  or  policy  under  consideration.  This  stage  will  involve  at  least 
some  quantification  of  the  costs  and  benefits.  However  while  the  use  of  specific 
quantitative  values  (and  thus  environmental  valuation)  was  necessary  in  order  to  model  the 
ascendancy/  weighting  function  for  the  case  study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  in  order 
to  operationalise  the  model  in  a  normative  sense,  specific  values  would  not  be  necessary. 
This  is  because  in  practice  the  weighting  of  the  outcome  and  the  uncertainty  associated 
with  an  outcome  is  done  on  a  subjective  basis.  Thus,  while  valuations  attached  to  the 
occurrence  of  an  outcome  will  aid  the  decision  maker,  they  are  not  a  prerequisite  in  such  a 
framework.  Thus  an  alternative  would  be  to  describe  as  fully  as  possible  with  the  use  of 
qualitative  indicators  the  possible  consequences  of  an  uncertain  outcome.  However,  given 
the  important  role  that  CBA  plays  within  the  decision-making  process,  where  theoretically 
and  practically  possible  environmental  valuation  could  play  an  important  role  at  this  stage. 
What  should  be  accepted  is  that  any  valuation  estimates  will  necessarily  involve  a  large 
degree  of  uncertainty,  as  was  highlighted  in  chapter  3,  which  will  have  to  be  explicitly 
considered  in  the  next  stage  rather  than  within  the  decision  making  process  (see  section 
4.4.1). 
On  a  more  qualitative,  descriptive  level  it  is  also  important  to  consider  the  nature  of  the 
consequences  of  the  possible  outcomes  of  a  project  or  policy.  In  the  case  of  decisions  with 
30  Due  to  the  focus  on  hard  uncertainty  in  this  thesis,  the  applicabilitý'  of  the  various  probability  approaches 
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Fig  9.2:  A  Framework  for  the  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  in  environmental 
decision  making 
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significant  negative  environmental  consequences,  in  relation  to  ensuring  the  sustainability 
of  a  project  or  policy,  whether  the  consequences  of  a  particular  action  are  irreversible,  and 
the  extent  to  which  the  ecological  services  which  could  be  potentially  lost  are  substitutable 
are  important  criteria.  Similarly  an  additional  consideration  would  be  whether  an  action 
could  lead  to  the  possibility  of  a  potentially  catastrophic  outcome,  such  as  the  collapse  of 
ecosystem  resilience.  Another  aspect  is  the  extent  to  which  the  negative  consequences 
can  be  mitigated.  This  stage  will  of  course  rely  on  all  the  uncertain  outcomes  being  made 
explicit,  as  well  as  a  recognition  that  the  mitigative  measures  may  themselves  be 
associated  with  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty,  which  needs  to  be  evaluated.  An  important 
consideration  will  therefore,  be  the  extent  to  which  the  consequences  of  an  uncertain 
outcome  is  within  the  control  of  the  decision  makers  (DFID,  1998). 
3)  The  third  stage  involves  the  evaluation  of  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of  the 
possible  gain  and  loss  outcomes  associated  with  any  project  or  policy.  What  is  evident 
from  this  thesis  is  that,  at  both  a  theoretical  and  practical  level,  probability  is  not  an 
appropriate  measure  of  uncertainty.  The  case  study,  in  its  operationalisation  of  potential 
surprise,  demonstrated  the  possible  applicability  of  the  use  of  degree  of  potential  surprise, 
in  which  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  associated  with  each  gain  and  loss  outcome, 
could  be  allocated  a  value  on  a  scale  of  0-10  by  the  decision  maker.  Potential  surprise  is a 
suitable  measure  in  that  it  exhibits  the  crucial  properties  in  relation  to  the  evaluation  of  hard 
uncertainty  in  being  a  non-additive,  non-distributional  variable.  Even  so,  some  problems 
were  encountered  in  the  case  study,  where  potential  surprise  was  constructed  by  some 
individuals  as  an  binary  variable,  by  which  the  decision  maker  would  be  either  surprised  or 
not  at  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  outcome. 
As  a  result  of  this  concern  an  alternative  two-stage  approach",  which  could  be  used,  would 
be  to  assess  firstly  the  possibil  ity,  32  of  the  different  outcomes  occurring  (where  degree  of 
possibility  would  be  constructed  as  a  non-additive,  non-distributional  variable)  and  then 
secondly  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  decision  makers  would  be  surprised  at  the 
occurrence  of  the  outcome.  The  most  important  point  being  in  the  use  of  any  measure  by 
which  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  non-exhaustive  set  of  possible  outcomes  is  explicitly 
evaluated.  Another  issue  in  the  choice  of  variable  would  be  the  extent  to  which  the 
decision  makers  are  comfortable  with  a  measure.  In  a  normative  sense,  as  long  as  the 
31  Such  an  approach  is  similar  to  Keynes'  weight  of  evidence  theory  (192  1),  as  well  as  similar  two  stage 
approach  suggested  by  Ford  &  Ghose  (1994b). 
32  See  Ford  &  Ghose,  1994b  which  analyses  the  results  from  an  experiment  on  alternative  measure  of 
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measure  of  uncertainty  possesses  the  crucial  features  of  being  a  non-additive,  non 
distributional  variable,  then  its  nomenclature  would  be  irrelevant. 
4)  The  next  stage  is  the  weighting  mechanism.  The  importance  of  this  stage  is  that  both  the 
uncertainty  surrounding  an  outcome,  as  well  as  the  consequences  of  the  outcome,  are 
weighted  together  on  a  judgmental  basis  in  terms  of  the  attention  the  decision  makers 
would  give  to  a  particular  outcome  in  the  decision-making  process.  Again  this  weighting 
could  be  on  a  simple  0-10  scale,  as  was  done  in  the  application  of  the  case  study,  or  on 
another  more  simple  categorisation.  The  advantage  of  such  a  process  being  that  the 
decision  makers  are  forced  to  evaluate  and  sift  all  the  possible  outcomes  before  arriving  at 
a  focus  gain  and  loss.  In  terms  of  the  weighting  procedure,  some  of  assumptions  of  the 
Shackle  model  could  be  interpreted  in  a  normative  fashion  and  stated  explicitly  at  an 
institutional  level.  So,  for  example,  as  surprise  values  get  increasingly  larger  they  would  be 
expected  to  reduce  the  weight  given  to  that  outcome.  Similarly  increasing  benefits  or  costs 
(quantitatively  or  qualitatively  expressed)  would  increase  the  weight  given  to  that  outcome. 
Where  a  two-stage  approach  was  taken  to  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty,  it  would  be 
expected,  that  while  the  degree  to  which  an  outcome  was  thought  possible  would  increase 
the  weight  given,  the  degree  of  surprise  would  again  negatively  affect  the  weighting.  A 
statement  of  the  position  of  the  institution  towards  hard  uncertainty  on  an  explicit  basis,  as 
is  suggested  by  DFID  (1998),  would  also  appear  important  in  clarifying  the  role  of  decision 
makers  within  the  overall  decision-  making  process. 
In  some  cases  this  process  would  result  in  the  clear  identification  of  one  focus  gain  and 
one  focus  loss,  as  is  consistent  with  the  Shackle  model.  However,  the  evidence  from  the 
case  study  suggested,  that  while  a  sifting  or  editing  process  is  a  key  element  in  the 
decision-making  process,  it  may  not  always  result  in  the  identification  of  one  focus  gain 
and  one  focus  loss  value.  Recognising  this,  where  more  than  one  outcome  is  weighted 
highest,  then  all  the  outcomes  which  are  weighted  highest  should  be  carried  forward  to  the 
next  stage. 
5)  The  last  stage  involves  the  evaluation  or  overall  judgement  of  the  project  on  the  basis  of 
the  focus  gain  outcome(s)  and  focus  loss  outcome  (s).  In  essence  these  focus  values 
represent  the  best  to  be  hoped  for  and  the  worst  to  be  feared  in  any  project.  At  this  stage  it 
is  evident  from  the  preceding  chapters  that  any  form  of  optimising  decision  rule  will  not  be 
appropriate  in  cases  of  hard  uncertainty.  As  a  result  the  decision  on  the  overall  merits  of 
the  project  will  have  to  be  done  on  a  more  judgmental  basis,  with  other  (for  example Chapter  9:  Discussion  248 
political)  considerations  being  considered.  At  this  stage  particular  aftention  would  be 
focused  on  the  weighting  given  to  costs  and  benefits.  For  example,  the  institution  may  be 
particularly  adverse  to  irreversible  environmental  costs.  Again  the  explicit  use  of  positional 
policies  will  help  guide  the  resulting  decision. 
The  application  of  such  a  framework  cannot  guarantee  that  the  hard  uncertainty  present  in 
many  environmental  decisions  will  be  comprehensively  dealt  with.  However,  by  providing  a 
systematic  set  of  rules  of  thumb,  by  which  both  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possible 
outcomes  of  a  project  or  policy,  and  the  consequences  of  those  outcomes  can  be  evaluated. 
Such  a  framework,  if  applied,  could  result  in  more  explicit  attention  being  given  to  uncertainty 
and  provide  a  better  basis  for  making  environmental  decisions. Chapter  10:  Conclusions  249 
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CHAPTER  10:  CONCLUSION 
10.1  Summary  of  research  &  key  contribuffons 
This  thesis  has  focused  on  the  need  to  deal  adequately  with  uncertainty  and  particularly  what 
has  been  termed  'hard  uncertainty'  in  environmental  decision-making.  The  premise  for  this 
research  is  based  on  the  assertion  made  that,  if  projects  or  policies  are  to  be  consistent  with 
sustainable  development  objectives,  then  uncertainty  is  a  key  concern  that  must  be 
addressed.  The  importance  of  the  need  to  deal  adequately  with  uncertainty  is  emphasised  by 
a  number  of  key  issues,  such  as  the  complexity  and  interconnectedness  of  the  ecological 
economic  system,  the  public  good  nature  of  many  environmental  services,  the  substitutability 
of  ecological  functions,  the  issue  of  irreversibility,  and  the  dynamic  rather  than  static  nature  of 
the  ecological-economic  system. 
On  the  basis  of  this  premise  a  flexible  research  strategy,  which  draws  on  a  number  of 
disciplines  and  employs  both  a  theoretical  and  a  practical  approach,  was  adopted  and  four 
main  aims  and  hypotheses  were  outlined  in  section  1.4.1.  Before  these  hypotheses  could  be 
tackled,  the  decision-making  context,  in  which  the  issues  of  environmental  uncertainty  would 
be  considered,  was  reviewed.  In  particular,  attention  was  focused  on  the  use  of  a  cost-benefit 
framework,  and  a  number  of  theoretical  concerns  were  raised.  A  brief  review  of 
environmental  valuation  within  the  cost-benefit  analysis  framework  was  also  given,  and  the 
application  of  cost-benefit  analysis  in  terms  of  a  more  general  decision-making  framework 
was  forwarded.  In  particular,  it  was  stressed  that  cost-benefit  analysis  is  only  one  stage  in  a 
series  of  stages  in  the  decision-making  process  that  a  project  or  policy  will  pass  through. 
Chapter  3  formed  a  crucial  element  of  this  thesis,  in  that  it  took  a  step  not  often  taken  in  the 
literature,  by  arguing  that  before  the  issue  of  environmental  uncertainty  in  decision  making 
can  be  tackled,  a  more  comprehensive  conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  would  be  required. 
Following  from  this  a  key  contribution  to  research  was  made  in  section  3.2.2  in  that  a  number 
of  different  modes  of  uncertainty  were  defined  on  the  basis  of  characteristics  which  would 
affect  its  evaluation.  In  particular  a  distinction  was  made  between  hard  uncertainty  and  soft 
uncertainty.  Building  on  this,  the  chapter  went  on  to  explore  the  issue  of  environmental 
uncertainty  in  greater  depth  and  to  highlight  that,  in  terms  of  both  ecological  and  valuation 
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The  recognition  that  there  are  a  number  of  different  modes  of  uncertainty  and  that  many 
environmental  decisions  are  to  a  large  degree  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  poses  a 
number  of  problems  for  traditional  decision-making  frameworks.  Chapter  4  therefore 
addressed  this  concern,  and  argued  that  the  presence  of  hard  uncertainty  raised  questions 
surrounding  the  way  in  which  the  rationality  of  decision  making  is  judged.  In  particular,  in 
decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty  notions  of  substantive  rationality  are  no  longer 
valid  and  the  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-making 
process.  The  interconnection  between  the  behavioural  and  normative  decision-making 
models  was  also  stressed.  The  rest  of  the  chapter  then  critically  reviewed  the  dominant 
decision-making  paradigm,  based  on  the  use  of  probability,  and  argued  that  neither  objective 
nor  subjective  probabilities  are  appropriate  measures  of  hard  uncertainty.  This  critique  was 
then  applied  to  theoretical  approaches  which  rely  on  probability  in  attempting  to  deal  with 
uncertainty  within  the  valuation  stage  of  the  decision-making  process.  It  was  also  argued  that 
the  dominant  approaches  to  modelling  uncertainty  in  decision  making  based  on  expected 
utility  approaches,  are  also  flawed  in  a  behavioural  as  well  as  normative  sense. 
The  next  stage  of  the  thesis  focused  on  an  alternative  model  of  decision  making  under 
uncertainty  based  on  the  work  of  George  Shackle.  After  reviewing  the  Shackle  model, 
Chapter  5  made  a  contribution  to  research  in  relation  to  stressing  the  operationability  of  the 
Shackle  model.  On  the  basis  of  this,  an  interpretation  of  the  Shackle  model,  in  the  context  of 
environmental  decision  making,  and  in  particular  the  evaluation  of  hard  uncertainty  was  put 
forward.  An  important  aspect  in  the  interpretation  of  the  model  was  that,  in  contrast  to 
previous  authors,  it  was  argued  that  it  is  possible  to  operationalise  the  model  not  only  in  a 
behavioural  sense,  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is  dealt  with,  but 
also  in  a  normative  sense  in  order  to  derive  rules  of  thumb  to  guide  the  way  that  hard 
uncertainty  is  evaluated  within  the  decision-making  process. 
With  the  demonstration  that  it  is  indeed  possible  to  operationalise  the  Shackle  model 
advanced,  the  following  three  chapters  were  devoted  to  the  application  of  the  model  to  the 
case  study  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project  in  Belize.  This  application  itself  was  important  in 
that  to  the  authors'  knowledge,  it  is  the  first  empirical  application  of  the  Shackle  model  to  a 
A  real-world'  decision.  What  is  important  about  the  case  study  is  that  by  focusing  on  the 
decision-making  process  within  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  (IDB),  the  Department 
of  Foreign  and  International  Development  (DFID)  and  the  Government  of  Belize,  more  widely 
applicable  research  questions  could  be  asked,  which  were  backed  up  from  the  information 
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study,  by  focusing  on  the  steps  required  to  operationalise  the  model  also  makes  a  contdbution 
to  the  field  of  knowledge  by  designing  an  approach  which  allows  the  testing  of  a  number  of 
the  model's  behavioural  propositions. 
Chapters  8  and  9  present  the  results  of  the  application  of  the  model  to  the  case  study,  in 
conjunction  with  the  information  gained  from  the  interviews  and  the  analysis  of  other  reports 
and  documents  collected.  The  results  presented  provide  valuable  data  in  an  area  where  there 
has  been  a  lack  of  applied  work.  Chapter  8  focuses  on  the  application  of  the  model 
specifically  to  the  case  study  of  the  Southern  Highway  Project  in  terms  of  assessing  its  key 
behavioural  assumptions  in  relation  to  the  individual  decision  makers.  The  model  is  then 
interpreted  in  a  more  general  fashion  in  relation  to  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  in  the 
decision-making  process  associated  with  development  projects  at  an  institutional  level  in  the 
IDB,  DFID  and  the  World  Bank.  In  Chapter  9  evidence  was  provided  on  the  way  that 
uncertainty  was  conceptualised  within  the  different  institutions  and  the  effect  that  this  has  had 
on  the  approaches  used  to  evaluate  uncertainty  within  the  decision  making  process.  Building 
on  the  behavioural  operationalisation  of  the  Shackle  model,  as  well  as  the  evidence  relating  to 
the  way  that  uncertainty  is  currently  dealt  with  in  the  different  institutions,  a  normative 
framework  has  been  developed.  This  makes  a  contributition  to  research  both  in  terms  of  its 
demonstration  of  the  normative  operational  isation  of  a  number  of  key  elements  of  the  model, 
as  well  as  providing  a  practical  approach  which  could  be  applied  to  the  evaluation  of  projects 
or  policies  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty. 
10.2  Conclusions  from  the  research 
The  research  carried  out  has  yielded  a  number  of  theoretical  and  empirical  findings  which 
enable  several  key  conclusions  to  be  made.  Before  these  key  conclusions  are  made  it  will  be 
useful  to  recap  the  four  main  research  hypothesis  set  out  in  Chapter  1: 
1)  Existing  conceptualisations  of  uncertainty  and  in  particular  environmental  uncertainty  do 
not  reflect  the  full  range  of  uncertainty  faced  in  decision  making. 
2)  By  recognising  that  there  are  in  fact  a  number  of  different  modalities  of  uncertainty,  it  is 
argued  that  the  use  of  utility  maximising  models,  based  on  the  notion  of  probability,  do  not 
adequately  deal  with  the  range  of  environmental  uncertainty  faced  by  decision  makers. 
3)  The  Shackle  model  better  explains  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  in  face  of  uncertainty 
and  in  the  context  of  improving  the  procedural  rationality  of  the  decision-  making  process  can 
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4)  Building  on  this,  it  is  hypothesised  that  the  Shackle  model  can  be  operationalised  in  a 
real  world  decision  context,  as  is  done  in  case  study  which  focuses  on  the  Belize  Southern 
Highway  Project. 
Given  the  need  to  address  the  issue  of  uncertainty,  the  research  answers  the  first  hypothesis 
by  demonstrating  that  an  alternative  conceptualisation  to  the  dominant  conceptual  isatio  n  of 
uncertainty  in  the  literature  will  need  to  be  taken.  In  particular,  it  has  been  demonstrated  that 
in  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  a  number  of  different  modes  can  be  characterised, 
with  the  distinction  between  'hard'  and  'soft'  uncertainty  of  crucial  importance.  On  the  basis  of 
this  conceptualisation  it  can  be  concluded  that,  due  to  the  presence  of  what  has  been  termed 
ecological  uncertainty  and  valuation  uncertainty,  determining  both  the  ecological 
consequences  as  well  the  value  of  those  changes  to  society  of  a  particular  action  or  policy,  is 
largely  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty. 
The  existence  of  different  modalities  of  uncertainty,  means  that  notions  of  optimising  decision 
rules  become  meaningless  in  decisions  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty,  with  attention 
instead  focusing  on  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  or  the  procedural  rationalisation  of  the 
decision-making  process.  Ex  ante  it  is  not  possible  in  conditions  of  hard  uncertainty  to  know 
what  the  optimum  decision  is.  An  acceptance  of  this  point  is  crucial,  as  it  results  in  a  re- 
assessment  of  the  way  that  decision-making  models  are  evaluated.  With  regard  to  the 
assessment  of  decision-making  models  in  relation  to  uncertainty,  another  step  that  has  been 
taken,  is  to  accept  that  it  is  not  advantageous  to  separate  completely  behavioural  and 
normative  interpretations  of  the  models.  The  assumption  that  individual  decision  makers 
behave  in  a  'rational'  manner  is  inevitably  tied  up  in  normative  assumptions  of  how  the 
decision  maker  should  behave  in  the  face  of  uncertainty,  and  indeed  what  'rational'  behaviour 
should  be.  Accepting  this  position  is  also  important  in  facilitating  better  links  between  the 
theoretical  and  practical  applications  of  decision-making  models. 
The  recognition  of  hard  uncertainty  not  only  changes  the  way  that  decision-making  models  of 
uncertainty  are  assessed,  but  poses  a  number  of  problems  for  the  application  of  traditional 
models  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty  in  respect  of  environmental  decisions,  which  are 
typically  characterised  by  hard  uncertainty.  Thus,  in  relation  to  the  second  hypothesis, 
attempts  to  deal  with  uncertainty  within  the  valuation  stages  by  means  of  option  value  or  quasi 
option  values  are  not  applicable  on  a  theoretical  or  practical  basis.  Moreover,  it  has  been 
forcefully  argued  that  expected  value  and  expected  utility  models  are  not  appropriate  in  cases 
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measure  of  the  uncertainty  and  secondly  due  to  their  reliance  on  a  weighting  mechanism 
which  does  not  weight  or  attach  utility  to  both  the  uncertainty  as  well  as  the  value  of  the 
outcome.  From  a  normative  perspective  the  weighting  the  outcome  alone  in  expected  utility 
models,  would  appear  not  to  adequately  account  for  the  presence  of  uncertainty  surrounding 
the  outcome.  Consequently,  where  expected  utility  models  or  their  variants  are  applied  to 
environmental  decisions,  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty,  they  may  lead  to  unacceptable 
outcomes. 
The  failure  of  the  dominant  paradigm  based  on  expected  utility  approaches  to  adequately 
explain,  as  well  as  provide  the  basis  for  practical  normative  frameworks  to  be  developed  in 
environmental  decisions,  points  to  the  need  for  an  alternative  framework.  The  third  and  fourth 
hypothesis  contend  that  an  alternative  model  based  on  the  work  of  George  Shackle  not  only 
explains  better  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  in  the  face  of  hard  uncertainty,  but  also  can 
be  practically  operationalised  in  both  a  behavioural  and  normative  manner.  Firstly,  the 
relevance  of  the  Shackle  model  at  a  theoretical  level  in  relation  to  environmental  decisions  is 
demonstrated  by  developing  an  interpretation  of  the  Shackle  model  that  retains  a  number  of 
its  strongest  elements,  such  as  the  replacement  of  probability  with  an  alternative  measure  of 
uncertainty  based  on  potential  surprise,  as  well  as  the  existence  of  an  ascendancy  or 
weighting  function.  In  contrast,  the  interpretation  advanced  dispenses  with  other  elements  of 
the  original  model,  such  as  the  standardisation  of  the  focus  outcomes  and  the  existence  of 
and  application  of  a  gambler's  preference  map.  By  interpreting  the  Shackle  model  in  a  slightly 
different  fashion,  and  solely  in  the  context  of  hard  uncertainty  (rather  than  all  types  of 
uncertainty),  a  large  number  of  the  most  prevalent  criticisms  of  the  model  have  been 
addressed  and  a  better  platform,  upon  which  the  model  can  be  operationalised,  arrived  at. 
Building  on  this,  the  thesis  demonstrates  that  the  Shackle  model  can  be  operationalised 
successfully.  In  Chapter  5,  the  most  attractive  normative  features  of  the  model,  namely  the 
explicit  attention  given  to  uncertainty,  and  the  weighting  of  the  value  of  an  outcomes  as  well 
as  the  uncertainty  surrounding  it  are  highlighted.  In  the  application  of  the  model  to  the  case 
study  of  the  Belize  Southern  Highway,  the  model's  practical  operationalisation  to  a  real  world 
decision  has  also  been  demonstrated.  Moreover,  the  evidence  presented  would  appear  to 
show  that  the  majority  of  decision  makers,  when  asked  to  go  through  the  various  stages  of  the 
model,  did  so  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  model's  main  propositions.  Even  so,  as  is  often 
the  case  in  real  world  experiments,  a  fair  amount  of  caution  has  to  be  taken  in  the  statistical 
interpretation  of  the  results.  The  use  of  the  more  qualitative  evidence  gained  does,  however, 
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surprise  in  evaluating  the  uncertainty  associated  with  a  particular  outcome  was  largely  done  in 
a  manner  which  can  be  explained  by  the  Shackle  model.  However,  in  a  number  of  cases  it 
would  appear  that  for  some  individuals  potential  surprise  was  defined  as  a  binary  measure.  In 
terms  of  the  presence  of  the  ascendancy  or  weighting  function,  the  majority  of  individuals  did 
behave  in  a  manner  broadly  consistent  with  the  theory,  with  the  sign  of  the  coefficients  of 
potential  surprise  being  negative  and  the  absolute  gain  or  loss  value  positive  in  the  majority  of 
cases.  Generally,  there  was  little  difference  in  the  size  of  the  coefficients,  which  could 
suggest  the  importance  of  interpreting  the  behaviour  of  the  individual  decision  makers  at  a 
wider  institutional  level. 
Overall,  the  ascendancy  function  did  provide  evidence  that  the  majority  of  decision  makers 
utilise  it  as  a  means  of  sifting  out  the  different  outcomes,  providing  backing  to  Shackle's 
arguments  that,  rather  than  taking  a  weighted  averaging  approach,  the  decision  makers  are 
inclined  to  sift  through  the  outcomes  and  arrive  at  one  focus  gain  outcome  and  one  focus  loss. 
However,  at  a  qualitative  level  the  importance  of  retaining  as  wide  a  range  of  outcomes  as 
possible  in  the  early  stages  of  evaluation  was  emphasised.  One  aspect  of  the  results,  which 
was  inconsistent  with  the  theory,  was  evidence  that  in  a  relatively  large  number  of  cases 
potential  surprise  was  not  significant.  Although  a  number  of  statistical  reasons  could  partly 
account  for  this,  another  interpretation  could  be  that  some  decision  makers,  effectively  ignored 
the  surprise  that  they  felt  at  a  particular  outcome  occurring.  Clearly,  if  this  is  the  case,  this 
could  have  important  consequences  in  environmental  decision  making. 
Drawing  together  the  evidence  from  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  to  the  Southern 
Highway  Project,  and  the  information  on  the  way  that  uncertainty  was  evaluated  in  practice  in 
the  different  institutions,  a  more  general  interpretation  of  the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is  or  is 
not  dealt  with  in  the  decision-making  process  was  outlined.  Firstly,  it  is  argued  that,  while  the 
Shackle  model  is  applied  on  an  individual  level,  individual  decision  makers  will  play  different 
roles  and  represent  different  agendas  within  the  decision  making  process.  The  evidence  from 
the  interviews  carried  out  would  appear  to  support  this  claim.  Secondly,  a  sifting  process 
could  be  outlined  in  which  different  outcomes  are  contested  within  the  decision-making 
process  until  eventually  discussion  is  narrowed  down  to  one  scenario  representing  the  focus 
gain  and  focus  loss.  Evidence  from  the  interviews  carried  out  gives  weight  to  the  idea  that 
such  a  process,  similar  to  that  articulated  by  Shackle  actually,  occurs. 
However,  while  this  process  may  arrive  at  a  focus  outcome,  in  sifting  the  original  set  of 
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be  possible  results  in  a  preliminary  sifting  out  of  the  outcomes.  Accordingly,  the  resulting 
outcomes  left  by  this  process  are  then  judged  on  the  basis  of  the  outcome  itself,  and  an 
overall  weighting  obtained.  If  a  two-stage  process  in  the  evaluation  of  uncertainty  is 
envisaged,  it  could  be  that  while  the  decision  makers  initially  evaluate  the  possibility  of  the 
outcome  occurring,  they  do  not  consider  the  extent  to  which  they  would  be  surprised  by  any  of 
the  other  possible  outcomes.  In  other  words  they  may  not  consider  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  the  outcome.  Such  an  interpretation  would 
appear  to  be  consistent  with  the  evidence  from  the  case  study.  This  tendency  by  decision 
makers  to  focus  on  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  outcome  or  scenario,  rather 
than  explicit  considerations  of  any  hard  uncertainties  which  may  affect  the  possibility  of  the 
outcome  occuring,  could  have  worrying  consequences  in  environmental  decision  making. 
Thus,  the  evidence  from  the  interviews  would  appear  to  point  to  a  perception  at  an  institutional 
level  that  the  possibility  of  the  outcome  occurring  could  to  a  large  degree  be  controlled  within 
the  design  of  a  particular  project  or  policy.  This  may  result  in  only  scenarios  for  which  any 
negative  uncertain  outcomes  can  be  'solved'  or  mitigated  being  advanced  to  the  latter  stages 
of  the  decision-making  process.  In  essence  therefore,  the  hard  uncertainty  is  extracted  or 
removed  from  the  process,  which  rather  than  considering  the  full  range  of  possible  uncertain 
consequences  of  an  action,  instead  focuses  on  increasing  the  possibility  of  the  most  desirable 
outcome  occurring.  It  is  evident  that  such  a  goal  rather  than  process  led  approach  to  decision 
making  does  not  deal  sufficiently  with  the  hard  uncertainty  present  in  many  environmental 
decisions. 
The  research  also  provides  evidence  of  the  way  at  a  more  general  level  in  which  institutions 
such  as  the  IDB,  the  World  Bank  and  DFID  evaluate  uncertainty  within  the  decision-making 
process.  When  used  in  conjunction  with  the  evidence  from  the  case  study  this  can  help  to 
explain  the  way  that  uncertainty  is  actually  evaluated  in  practice  within  the  decision  making  - 
process.  An  important  conclusion  was  that  there  was  insufficient  attention  given  to  the 
conceptualisation  of  uncertainty  at  an  institutional  level.  In  particular,  no  explicit  attention  was 
given  to  distinguishing  between  hard  uncertainty  and  soft  uncertainty,  or  any  other  similar 
definitions.  Moreover  the  tendency  was  to  group  all  uncertainties  as  risks,  with  often  'risks' 
being  interpreted  solely  in  relation  to  the  negative  consequences  of  an  outcome.  This 
confusion  over  the  definition  of  uncertainty,  may  have  resulted  in  a  lack  of  legitimacy  given  to 
hard  uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process.  The  consequences  of  this  were  manifested 
in  the  approaches  taken  by  the  different  institutions.  Overall  there  was  a  clear  lack  of  formal 
frameworks  for  evaluating  hard  uncertainty  and  largely  the  tools  and  mechanisms  used 
appeared  to  fail  in  dealing  explicitly  with  the  hard  uncertainty  present  in  a  decision.  The  one Chapter  10:  Conclusions  257 
possible  exception  was  the  approach  detailed  by  the  DFID,  which  even  although  a  significant 
improvement  on  other  methods,  remained  within  a  subjective  probability  framework.  Given 
the  huge  number  of  projects  in  developing  countries  that  these  institutions  evaluate  on  an 
annual  basis,  the  environmental  consequences  of  not  adequately  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  could  be  significant. 
Given  the  theoretical  and  practical  evidence,  which  would  suggest  that  uncertainty  and 
especially  hard  uncertainty  is  not  adequately  dealt  with  within  the  decision-making  process, 
the  final  contribution  of  the  thesis  was  to  advance  a  normative  framework  for  dealing  with  hard 
uncertainty  in  environmental  decision  making.  The  normative  framework  in  building  on  the 
behavioural  evidence  presented  in  this  thesis,  as  well  as  the  normative  interpretation  of  the 
Shackle  model,  also  answers  the  claim  made  in  Chapter  1  that  it  was  possible  to  normatively 
operationalise  the  Shackle  model  to  help  arrive  at  such  a  framework.  The  framework  itself, 
which  addresses  both  the  theoretical  and  practical  concerns  raised  by  this  thesis,  identifies  six 
important  stages  required  to  improve  the  way  that  hard  uncertainty  is  dealt  with.  Firstly,  the 
importance  of  conceptualising  and  defining  the  type  of  uncertainty  faced  is  stressed. 
Secondly,  a  list  (which  is  recognised  as  non-exhaustive)  of  possible  outcomes  must  be 
identified,  and  where  possible  the  consequences  quantified  (for  example  in  monetary  values) 
or  given  qualitative  descriptions.  Thirdly,  the  hard  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of 
the  seperate  outcomes  should  be  explicitly  evaluated.  Fourthly,  it  is  necessary  to  weight  the 
different  outcomes,  taking  into  account  both  the  consequences  of  a  particular  outcome  as  well 
as  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  of  the  outcomes.  Fifthly,  on  the  basis  of  this 
weighting,  the  outcomes  should  be  evaluated  and  a  sifting  process  carried  out  in  order  to 
arrive  at  a  focus  gain  and  focus  loss.  In  the  last  stage  the  final  evaluation  and  decision 
regarding  a  project  can  be  made  on  the  basis  of  the  focus  outcomes. 
In  summary,  this  thesis  demonstrates  that  the  application  of  the  Shackle  model  is  a  useful  tool 
in  terms  of  explaining  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  in  the  face  of  uncertainty  and  could  be 
fruitfully  applied  to  other  case  studies  involving  environmental  decisions,  as  well  as  other  non- 
environmental  decisions  conditioned  by  hard  uncertainty.  By  developing  a  normative 
framework  it  is  also  hoped  that  fresh  impetus  has  been  given  to  developing  practical 
approaches,  which  will  improve  the  way  that  decisions  are  made  in  the  face  of  hard 
uncertainty  and  which  will  adequately  address  the  concerns  that  the  presence  of 
environmental  uncertainty  poses  to  society. Appendix  1  258 
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APPENDIX  1:  QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction  to  the  work:  Thank  you  for  your  time  today.  The  research  I  am  conducting  aims 
to  investigate  the  way  that  uncertainty  about  the  environmental  consequences  of  development 
projects  is  dealt  with  in  the  decision-making  process.  I  am  also  assessing  the  use  of  a 
alternative  decision  making  framework  for  evaluating  uncertainty.  I  would  like  to  emphasise 
that  the  research  does  not  seek  to  evaluate  the  Southern  Highway  but  is  restricted  to  a 
analysis  of  the  decision  making  process.  The  research  is  independently  funded. 
/  would  like  to  record  this  interview,  if  you  don't  object  ff  you  want  me  to  stop  recording  at  any 
point  please  say. 
Q1:  Can  I  ask  you  first  of  all  to  briefly  outline  your  position,  and  your  responsibilities  ? 
Q2:  Can  you  describe  briefly  your  role  in  the  evaluation  of  the  Southern  Highway 
rehabilitation  project  and  the  stages  in  the  project  that  you  have  been  involved  in  ? 
Q3:  Can  you  indicate  if  there  are  any  direct  or  indirect  effects  of  the  project  on  the 
environment  to  which  you  or  the  GoBl  /  IDB  in  general  felt  there  is  a  degree  of  uncertainty 
surrounding  the  occurrence  and  the  possible  implications  of  those  effects  ? 
If  so  what  are  these  effects  and  can  you  indicate  what  you  think  are  the  main  sources  of  the 
uncertainty  surrounding  them  ? 
Q4.  Could  you  tell  me  if  any  informal  or  formal  approaches  were  used  to  assess  any 
uncertainties  that  were  identified  and  if  there  were  any  attempts  made  to  quantify  the 
uncertainties  involved  or  evaluate  their  relative  importance  ? 
Q5:  In  both  the  EIA  and  the  feasibility  study  conducted  for  the  Southern  Highway  a  number  of 
possible  different  outcomes,  which  could  result  as  a  consequence  of  the  southern  highway 
were  presented.  Were  any  of  these  outcomes  excluded  from  the  decision-making  process 
because  it  was  felt  that  it  was  very  unlikely  that  they  would  occur  and  was  particular  attention 
focused  on  one  or  more  outcome  of  which  there  was  particular  concern  ? Appendix  1  260 
Q6:  On  a  more  general  basis  would  you  be  able  to  outline  at  all  the  way  that  you  individually 
or  the  GoBI  /  IDB  would  go  about  evaluating  possible  costs  or  benefits  of  a  project  when  there 
is  any  uncertainty  surrounding  the  occurrence  and  the  scale  of  these  costs  or  benefits  ? 
The  respondent  is  given  the  separate  sheets  containing  the  gain  and  loss  scenarios  and  read 
the  accompanying  explanatory  notes  (see  appendix  2) 
Q7.  As  a  decision  maker  if  you  had  to  evaluate  the  Southern  Highway  based  on  the 
above  scenarios  would  you  be  able  to  outline  the  steps  you  would  go  through  in  assessing  the 
individual  scenarios  and  the  most  important  factors  which  you  use  in  evaluating  the  scenarios. 
Specifically  I  am  interested  in  how  you  would  evaluate  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
occurrence  of  the  different  outcomes. 
Q8.  Could  you  tell  me  what  you  perceive  to  be  the  major  uncertainties  which  would  influence 
whether  or  not  the  above  scenarios  would  occur  or  not. 
Q9.  Would  you  attempt  to  quantify  the  degree  of  uncertainty  you  feel  about  the  different 
outcomes  occurring. 
Q10  If  so  can  you  outline  the  steps  you  would  go  through  to  do  this. 
Q1  1.  What  would  be  the  most  important  factors  you  would  use  in  order  to  distinguish  between 
the  different  scenarios  in  terms  of  the  uncertainty  surrounding  their  occurrence. 
Q12.  For  the  Southern  Highway  project  do  you  think  it  is  possible  to  predict  all  the  possible 
effects  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  highway  or  do  you  think  that  for  some  of  the  possible 
outcomes,  at  present  this  is  not  possible. 
Q13.  In  terms  of  the  analysis  and  evaluation  of  development  projects  do  you  or  your 
organisation  in  general  distinguish  between  risk  and  uncertainty,  in  terms  of  the  possible 
effects  of  development  projects  especially  in  terms  of  the  environment  ? 
Q14:  I  would  like  you  to  now  consider  each  of  the  scenarios  described  above  and  then 
allocate  the  degree  of  potential  surprise,  which  can  range  from  0-10  that  you  would  feel  at  the 
occurrence  of  the  different  scenarios.  A  zero  degree  of  potential  surprise  will  imply  that  you Appendix  1  261 
will  not  at  all  be  surprised  if  the  outcome  actually  occurred,  whereas  10  would  imply  that  you 
would  be  totally  surprised  if  the  outcome  to  which  it  is  assigned  were  to  occur. 
Q15:  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  benefits  associated  with  the  occurrence  of  the  various 
gain  scenarios  and  the  degree  of  surprise  you  have  attached  to  the  outcomes  occurrence,  can 
you  successively  discard  those  outcomes  to  which  you  give  less  weight  and  feel  it  would  be 
useful  to  exclude  from  the  decision  making  process  ? 
Can  you  tell  me  for  each  scenario  the  reasons  why  you  excluded  a  particular  outcome  ?  (ask 
question  on  the  different  outcomes  that  were  excluded) 
Why  did  you  exclude  outcome  no.  Y  before  outcome  no.  'y'  ? 
Repeat  for  the  different  outcomes  excluded. 
If  /eft  with  more  than  one  outcome,  ask  them  why  they  found  it  difficult  to  exclude  any  more  of 
the  outcomes. 
Q16:  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  costs  associated  with  the  occurrence  of  the  various  gain 
scenarios  and  the  degree  of  potential  surprise  that  you  have  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  the 
outcomes,  can  you  successively  discard  those  outcomes  to  which  you  give  less  weight  and 
feel  that  can  be  excluded  from  consideration  in  the  decision  making  process  ? 
Can  you  tell  me  for  each  scenario  the  reasons  why  you  excluded  a  particular  outcome  ?  (ask 
question  on  the  different  outcomes  that  were  excluded) 
Why  did  you  exclude  outcome  no.  Y  before  outcome  no.  'y'  ? 
Repeat  for  the  different  outcomes  excluded. 
If  /eft  with  more  than  one  outcome,  ask  them  why  they  found  it  difficult  to  exclude  any  more  of 
the  outcomes. 
Q17:  From  the  set  of  gain  scenarios,  1-5,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  benefits 
associated  with  the  scenarios  of  the  various  outcomes  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be 
surprised  at  the  occurrence  of  the  outcomes,  can  you  state  the  outcome  to  which  you  would 
give  most  weight,  or  pay  most  attention,  in  assessing  the  benefits  of  the  road. Appendix  1  262 
Q1  8:  From  the  set  of  loss  scenarios,  6-10,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  costs  associated 
with  the  scenarios  of  the  various  outcomes  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be  surprised  at 
the  occurrence  of  the  outcomes,  can  you  state  the  outcome  to  which  you  would  give  most 
weight,  or pay  most  attention,  in  assessing  the  benefits  of  the  road. 
In  this  section  you  will  be  asked  about  how  much  weight  you  would  give  the  following  possible 
outcomes  in  evaluating  the  Southem  Highway  Rehabilitation  Project,  bearing  in  mind  the 
hypothesised  benefit  or  costs  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be  surprised  if  that  outcome 
was  to  occur  For  example  a  score  of  0  would  signify  that  you  would  give  that  outcome  no 
weight  in  evaluating  the  merits  and  the  drawbacks  of  the  rehabilitation  project  and  a  score  of  5 
would  signify  that  you  would  give  that  outcome  moderate  weighting  and  10  would  signify  that 
you  would  give  that  outcome  the  highest  weight  The  different  outcomes  can  have  equal  or 
different  weights. 
Q19.  Consider  scenario  1  -5  for  the  Southern  Highway.  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated 
benefits  that  would  result  if  this  outcome  were  to  occur  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be 
surprised  if  the  outcome  were  to  occur,  could  you  assign  on  a  scale  of  0-10  the  weight  or  the 
amount  of  attention  that  you  would  give  that  outcome  in  evaluating  all  the  possible  outcomes 
for  the  Southern  Highway  Project?  A  score  of  10  would  mean  that  you  would  weight  that 
outcome  very  highly  in  the  eventual  decision  making  process,  whereas  a  score  of  0  would 
mean  that  you  would  give  no  weight  to  that  outcome. 
Q20.  Consider  scenarios  6-10  for  the  Southern  Highway.  Bearing  in  mind  the  estimated  costs 
that  would  result  if  this  outcome  were  to  occur  and  the  degree  to  which  you  would  be 
surprised  if  the  outcome  were  to  occur,  could  you  assign  on  a  scale  of  0-  10  the  weight  that 
you  would  give  that  outcome  in  evaluating  all  the  possible  outcomes  for  the  Southern  Highway 
Project.  A  score  of  10  would  mean  that  you  would  weight  that  outcome  very  highly  in  the 
eventual  decision  making  process,  whereas  a  score  of  0  would  mean  that  you  would  give  no 
weight  to  that  outcome. Appendix  2  263 
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APPENDIX  2:  GAIN  AND  LOSS  SCENARIOS 
Benerit  scenarios  1  -5 
Scenario  I:  Increased  road  user  benefits  including  savings  in  vehicle  operating  costs  and 
time  and  accidental  costs. 
Total  gross  benefits  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  110.5  million 
Scenario  2:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  as  well  as  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added 
to  agricultural  production  as  a  result  of  agricultural  development  associated  with  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  road. 
Total  gross  benerits  (discounted  at  12  57p)  estimated  at  US  $  119million 
Scenario  3:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  as  well  as  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus 
production  which  stimulates  additional  production  with  higher  benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses 
paid  to  producers  for  non  damaged  fruit. 
Total  gross  benefits  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  135.5  million 
Scenario  4:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus  production  with 
benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses  paid  to  producers  for  non  damaged  fruit.  In  addition  the  road 
results  in  increased  tourism  in  Toledo  and  Stann  Creek  as  well  as  health  and  education 
benefits. 
Total  gross  benerits  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  165.5  million 
Scenario  5:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus  production  with 
benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses  paid  to  producers  for  non  damaged  fruit,  increased  benefits 
due  to  tourism,  health  and  education  benefits  as  well  as  other  unanticipated  social  and 
economic  development  benefits. 
Total  gross  benefits  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  200.  Million Appendix  2  265 
Cost  scenarios'6-  10 
Scenario  6:  Direct  costs  of  constructing  the  road  with  no  limited  direct  impact  and  no  major 
indirect  negative  impacts  on  the  environment,  complete  success  of  mitigation  measures  and 
planning  controls  results  in  carefully  controlled  agricultural  development,  with  minimal 
agricultural  pollution 
Total  gross  costs  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  73.  Million 
Scenario  7:  Direct  costs  of  constructing  the  road  with  some  ecosystem  losses  to  natural 
grasslands,  with  a  13%  loss  mainly  from  designated  agricultural  and  aquaculture 
developments.  Some  deforestation  occurs  of  approximately  13  %  of  the  area  of  influences 
tropical  forest  and  6%  of  pine,  but  most  serious  effects  reduced  by  successful  adoption  of 
better  agricultural  practices  as  opposed  to  milpa  agriculture,  and  protection  of  ecologically 
most  important  areas.  Mitigation  steps  generally  successful. 
Total  gross  costs  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  95.5  million 
Scenario  8.  Direct  costs  of  constructing  the  road  with  increased  habitat  and  biodiversity 
losses  due  to  increased  agricultural  development  and  squatting.  In  addition  there  is  serious 
deforestation  of  approximately  23  %  of  the  areas  tropical  forest,  mainly  due  to  widespread 
milpa  clearing  and  logging  activities,  with  associated  biodiversity  losses  and  increased  habitat 
fragmentation.  Losses  of  approximately  12%  of  pine  areas  and  13  %  of  grasslands  also 
occur  mainly  from  aquaculture  developments.  Pollution  from  pesticides  and  increased 
sedimentation  as  well  as  agricultural  and  tourism  development  result  in  a  15%  loss  of  swamp 
areas  as  well  as  8%  of  mangrove  areas. 
Total  gross  costs  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  134  million 
Scenario  9.  Direct  costs  of  constructing  the  road  with  unsuccessful  mitigation  of  negative 
effects,  large  habitat  and  biodiversity  losses  due  to  uncontrolled  agricultural  developments. 
Concession  of  forests  for  logging,  illegal  logging  activities  as  well  as  large  scale  milpa  clearing 
results  in  the  clearance  of  approximately  31  %  of  the  areas  tropical  forest  and  28%  of  the 
areas  natural  pine.  Aquaculture  and  agriculture  result  in  the  loss  of  22%  of  savannah  areas 
Very  serious  erosion  and  sedimentation  effects  and  reduced  flood  and  storm  control  due  to 
uncontrolled  destruction  of  23  %  of  mangrove  areas  and  33  %  swamp  areas  from  shrimp 
farms  and  tourism  development.  These  losses  result  in  reduction  in  fish  catches. 
Total  gross  costs  (discounted  at  72  57p)  estimated  at  US  $  176.5  million 
Scenario  10.  Direct  costs  of  constructing  the  road  with  unsuccessful  mitigation  of  negative 
effects.  Very  large  habitat  and  biodiversity  losses  associated  with  agriculture,  logging,  shrimp 
farming  and  tourism  development.  Degradation  of  Coral  reef  and  seagrass  beds  due  to 
increased  sedimentation  and  agricultural  pollution.  Other  unanticipated  losses  of  ecosystem 
services  and  functions  with  serious  effects  on  the  economy. 
Total  gross  costs  (discounted  at  12  7p)  estimated  at  US  $  230  million Appendix  2  266 
Notes  accompanying  scenarios 
These  scenarios  are  based  on  the  1993  Kocks  consult  feasibility  study,  the  DHV  (1994)  EIA, 
the  BECA  (1995)  EIA,  the  Southem  Highway  Social  Impact  Study  and  the  1997 
Environmental  Summary.  Use  was  not  made  of  the  1995  DHV  feasibility  study 
In  addition  the  costs  have  not  taken  into  account  the  revised  costs  as  presented  in  the 
EnvironmentalSsummary,  August  1997.  They  are  based  therefore  on  the  original  projections 
in  the  Kocks  Consult  Feasibility  Study  as  well  as  the  Draft  Environmental  Summary  of 
February  1997. 
The  following  possible  scenarios  of  the  project  have  been  hypothesised  from  information  from 
the  feasibility  study  and  the  EIA.  The  valuations  attached  to  the  occurrence  of  the  scenarios 
are  based  on  estimates  from  the  feasibility  study  for  the  benefits  and  from  various 
environmental  valuation  studies  of  the  value  of  similar  environmental  functions  associated 
with  a  particular  ecosystem  affected  by  the  road.  The  valuation  estimates  per  hectare  of  rain 
forest  include  estimates  of  the  value  that  this  ecosystem  provides  in  terms  services  such  as 
erosion  control,  nutrient  recycling,  and  raw  material  provision.  These  estimates  themselves 
will  vary  in  the  uncertainty  attached  to  the  calculations  on  which  they  were  based,  as  well  as 
the  extent  to  which  they  capture  the  full  value  of  the  particular  ecosystem  There  are  five 
possible  hypothesised  scenarios  in  terms  of  possible  benefits  of  the  rehabilitation  of  the  road 
and  possible  environmental  costs  associated  with  the  road.  Either  scenario  I  will  occur  or 
scenario  2  or  scenario  3  or  scenario  4  or  scenario  5.  In  the  case  of  the  costs  either  scenario  6 
will  occur  or  scenario  7  or  scenario  8  or  scenario  9  or  scenario  10.  One  benefit  scenario  AND 
one  cost  scenafid  will  occur 
All  the  values  are  discounted  at  12%  from  1993  and  are  projected  until  2015.  In  the 
environmental  cost  scenarios  30%  of  the  ecosystem  that  is  removed  in  the  scenario  is 
assumed  to  happen  between  1998  and  2002  at  a  constant  annual  rate.  After  2003  seventy 
per  cent  of  the  percentage  of  ecosystem  is  removed  until  2015  at  a  constant  annual  rate 
(Total  23  years). Appendix  3  267 
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APPENDIX  3:  CONSTRUCTION  OF  BENEFIT  SCENARIOS 
Note:  The  discount  rate  is  set  at  12%  and  the  project  span  from  1993,2015 
Scenario  1:  Increased  Road  user  Benefits,  derived  from  savings  in  vehicle  operating  costs, 
time  as  well  as  accidents. 
Gross  discounted  benefits  =  BZ$  221  millio 
-n 
or 
- 
US$  110.5  million  (Kocks,  1993:  p6-17) 
(1  US$  =2  BZ$) 
Scenario  2:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  as  well  as  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production  as  a  result  of  agricultural  development  associated  with  the 
rehabilitation  of  the  road. 
Gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  221  million 
+BZ$  16.6  million  estimate  of  value  added  to  agriculture 
(Kocks,  1993:  p  6-21) 
Total  gross  discounted  benefits  =  BZ$  238  million  (rounded)  or  US$  119  Million 
Note:  The  DHV  (1  994b)  Report  which  was  not  available  initially  estimated  total  benefits  to  all 
agricultural  sectors  (as  a  result  of  increased  production  stimulated  by  the  upgrading  of  the 
road)  as  BZ  $  19.47  million  (DHV,  1994:  p  26) 
Scenario  3:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  as  well  as  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus 
production  which  stimulates  additional  production  with  higher  benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses 
paid  to  producers  for  non-damaged  fruit. 
Gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  238  million 
+BZ$  0.22  million  citrus  (gross  discounted  benefits  calculated 
from  forecast  annual  additional  gross  margin  attributable  to 
upgrading  the  Southern  Highway  1993-2015  (no  increase  till 
1996)  derived  from  Kocks  (1993:  p6-8)) 
+  BZ$  33.45  million  (gross  discounted  benefits  calculated 
from  higher  quality  bonus  due  to  upgrading  the  Southern Appendix  3  269 
Highway  1993-2015  (no  increase  till  1995)  dedved  from  Kocks 
(1993:  p6-9)) 
Total  gross  discounted  benefits  =  BZ$  271  million  (rounded)  or  US$  135.5  million 
Scenario  4:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus  production  with 
benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses  paid  to  producers  for  non  damaged  fruit.  In  addition  the  road 
results  in  increased  tourism  in  Toledo  and  Stann  Creek  as  well  as  health  and  education 
benefits. 
Gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  271  million 
+BZ$  60  million  (hypothesised  figure  which  incorporates 
increase  in  Tourism  to  Belize,  and  in  particular  to 
Southern  Belize  in  addition  to  significant  educational 
and  health  benefits 
Total  gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  331  million  (rounded)  or  US$  135.5  million 
Scenario  5:  Increased  road  user  benefits,  increased  benefits  due  to  value  added  to 
agricultural  production,  favourable  economic  climate  for  Banana  and  citrus  production  with 
benefits  due  to  higher  bonuses  paid  to  producers  for  non-damaged  fruit,  increased  benefits 
due  to  tourism,  health  and  education  benefits,  as  well  as  other  unanticipated  social  and 
economic  development  benefits. 
Gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  331  million 
+.  BZ$  69  million  (hypothesised  figure  which  includes 
additional  benefits  due  to  a  favourable  economic 
climate,  as  well  as  other  additional  unanticipated 
development  benefits 
Total  gross  discounted  benefits  =BZ$  400  million  (rounded)  or  US$  200  million Appendix  4  270 
APPENDIX  4:  PRIMARY  DATA  SOURCES  AND  CALCULATIONS  FOR  THE 
VALUATION  ESTIMATES,  BY  BIOME  AND  SERVICE  TYPE u; 
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APPENDIX  5:  HYPOTHESISED  DESTRUCTION  OF  ECOSYSTEM  SUBUNITS  IN  THE 
LOSS  SCENARIOS 
Scenario  7 
Tropical  Forest 
Area  destroyed 
hectares  km  sq 
sub  unit  area 
km  sq 
%  of  sub  unit 
destroyed 
560  5.6  28  20 
30420  304.2  1521  20 
4600  46  230  20 
612  6.12  30.6  20 
340  3.4  17  20 
280  2.8  14  20 
1400  14  70  20 
1540  15.4  77  20 
220  2.2  11  20 
13210  132.1  1321  10 
1040  10.4  52  20 
1224  12.24  61.2  20 
4340  43.4  217  20 
11060  110.6  553  20 
1025.2  10.252  51.26  20 
Totals  (ha)  71871.2 
%  of  Total  area  13% 
of  ecosystem  type 
Savanah 
Area  destroyed 
hectares  km  sq 
sub  unit  area 
km  sq 
%  of  sub  unit 
destroyed 
745.6  7.456  37.28  20 
1118.4  11.184  55.92  20 
2003.8  20.038  200.38  10 
1025.2  10.252  102.52  10 
760  7.6  38  20 
Totals  (ha)  5653 
%  of  Total  area  13% 
of  ecosystem  type Appendix  5  288 
Pine 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  krn  sq  destroyed 
2886.4  28.864  144.32  20 
1090  10.9  54.5  20 
Totals  (ha)  3976.4 
%  of  Total  area  6% 
of  ecosystem  type Appendix  5  289 
Scenario  8 
Tropical  Forest 
Area  destroyed 
hectares  km  sq 
sub  unit  area 
km  sq 
%  of  sub  unit 
destroyed 
% 
1050  10.5  35  30 
6280  62.8  314  20 
1200  12  40  30 
6459.6  64.596  215.32  30 
10120  101.2  506  20 
3960  39.6  132  30 
26420  264.2  1321  20 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8 
%  of  Total  area  of 
ecosystem  type 
55489.6 
127360.8 
23% 
Savanah 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
0000 
Total  0 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8  5653 
%  of  Total  area  of  13% 
ecosystem  type 
Pine 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
3800  38  380  10 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8 
%  of  Total  area  of 
ecosystem  type 
3800 
7776.4 
12% Appendix  5  290 
Swamp 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
5160  51.6  129  40 
2790  27.9  93  30 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8 
%  of  Total  area  of 
ecosystem  type 
Mangrove 
7950 
7950 
15% 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
2400  24  80  30 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8 
%  of  Total  area  of 
ecosystem  type 
2400 
2400 
8% Appendix  5  291 
Scenario  9 
Tropical  Forest 
Area  destroyed 
hectares  km  sq 
sub  unit  area 
km  sq 
%  of  sub  unit 
destroyed 
1050  10.5  35  30 
9420  94.2  314  30 
15210  152.1  1521  10 
11060  110.6  553  20 
5060  50.6  506  10 
1224  12.24  61.2  20 
1320  13.2  132  10 
Total  44344 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8  &9  171704.8 
(ha) 
%  of  Total  area  of  ecosystem  31% 
type 
Savanah 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
4007.6 
Total  4007.6 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8  &9  9660.6 
%  of  Total  area  of  ecosystem  22% 
tvpe 
40.076  200.38  20 
Pine 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
7600  76  380  20 
2886.4  28.864  144.32  20 
Total  10486 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8  &9  18263 
%  of  Total  area  of  ecosystem  28% 
type Appendix  5  292 
Swamp 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
1290  12.9  129  10 
1860  18.6  93  20 
5720  57.2  286  20 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  M8  &9 
%  of  Total  area  of  ecosystem 
type 
Mangrove 
8870 
16820 
33% 
Area  destroyed  sub  unit  area  %  of  sub  unit 
hectares  km  sq  km  sq  destroyed 
4300  43  215  20 
Total 
Totals  from  scenario  7&  8  &9 
(ha) 
%  of  Total  area  of  ecosystem 
type 
4300 
6700 
22% Appendix  6  293 
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APPENDIX  6:  FOCUSED  INTERVIEWS 
This  appendix  describes  the  main  topics  that  were  covered  in  more  general  structured 
interviews  with  individual  decision  makers. 
1)  Outline  of  their  role  and  responsibilities  in  the  organisation 
2)  Their  specific  role  in  the  evaluation  of  development  projects  and  at  what  stage  they  are 
involved  in  the  project  cycle. 
Explain  that  for  next  set  of  questions  it  will  be  useful  if  the  respondent  can  illustrate  any  of 
their  comments  with  particular  examples  such  as  development  projects. 
3)  Are  there  any  development  projects  that  you  have  been  working  on  where  you  have 
felt  that  there  is  a  large  degree  of  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possible  direct  or  indirect  effects 
particularly  on  the  environment  ? 
4)  Were  any  formal  or  informal  approaches  of  methodologies  used  in  order  to 
evaluate  these  uncertainties 
5)  Were  any  attempts  made  to  quantify  the  uncertainties  involved  or  to  evaluate  the  relative 
importance  in  terms  of  evaluation  of  the  whole  project  ? 
6)  How  do  uncertainties  about  the  possible  effects  of  development  projects  on  the 
environment  affect  the  decision  making  process  ? 
7)  How  does  uncertainty  about  the  possible  environmental  costs  and  benefits  of  a 
project  influence  your  overall  assessment  of  the  viability  of  a  project  ? 
8)  When  in  a  project  cycle  are  you  presented  with  a  number  of  scenarios  from,  say,  a  EIA  or 
a  CBA  ?  When  you  are  evaluating  the  different  outcomes  do  you  find  it  useful  to  exclude  or 
discard  any  outcomes  that  you  find  very  unlikely  ? 
9)  When  you  are  evaluating  these  outcomes  do  you  focus  on  a  small  number  of,  say,  two  of 
the  outcomes Appendix  6  295 
10)  Do  you  find  it  useful  to  separate  costs  and  benefits  in  a  project  ? 
11)  Do  you  think  it  is  possible  to  attach  a  probability  to  the  occurrence  of  a  particular  outcome 
associated  with  a  development  project,  especially  in  terms  of  environmental  effects  ? 
12)  How  often  is  this  carried  out  in  terms  of  the  environmental  effects  of  a  project  and  do  you 
think  that  there  are  situations  where  it  is  not  possible  to  attach  probabilities  to  the  occurrence 
of  possible  effects  of  a  project  on  the  environment  ? 
13)  Do  you  distinguish  between  different  types  of  uncertainty  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
environmental  effects  of  a  project  ? Appendix  7  296 
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ASCENDANCY  FUNCTION Cj 
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